RECOMMENDATION 67: The President should create a Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq. ATION 67: The President should create a Senior Advisor for Economic Reconstruction in Iraq.
Improving the Effectiveness of a.s.sistance Programs
Congress should work with the administration to improve its ability to implement a.s.sistance programs in Iraq quickly, flexibly, and effectively.
As opportunities arise, the Chief of Mission in Iraq should have the authority to fund quick-disbursing projects to promote national reconciliation, as well as to rescind funding from programs and projects in which the government of Iraq is not demonstrating effective partnership. These are important tools to improve performance and accountability--as is the work of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.
RECOMMENDATION 68: The Chief of Mission in Iraq should have the authority to spend significant funds through a program structured along the lines of the Commander"s Emergency Response Program, and should have the authority to rescind funding from programs and projects in which the government of Iraq is not demonstrating effective partnership.
RECOMMENDATION 69: The authority of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction should be renewed for the duration of a.s.sistance programs in Iraq.
U.S. security a.s.sistance programs in Iraq are slowed considerably by the differing requirements of State and Defense Department programs and of their respective congressional oversight committees. Since Iraqi forces must be trained and equipped, streamlining the provision of training and equipment to Iraq is critical. Security a.s.sistance should be delivered promptly, within weeks of a decision to provide it.
RECOMMENDATION 70: A more flexible security a.s.sistance program for Iraq, breaking down the barriers to effective interagency cooperation, should be authorized and implemented.
The United States also needs to break down barriers that discourage U.S. partnerships with international donors and Iraqi partic.i.p.ants to promote reconstruction. The ability of the United States to form such partnerships will encourage greater international partic.i.p.ation in Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 71: Authority to merge U.S. funds with those from international donors and Iraqi partic.i.p.ants on behalf of a.s.sistance projects should be provided.
7. Budget Preparation, Presentation, and Review
The public interest is not well served by the government"s preparation, presentation, and review of the budget for the war in Iraq.
First, most of the costs of the war show up not in the normal budget request but in requests for emergency supplemental appropriations.
This means that funding requests are drawn up outside the normal budget process, are not offset by budgetary reductions elsewhere, and move quickly to the White House with minimal scrutiny. Bypa.s.sing the normal review erodes budget discipline and accountability.
Second, the executive branch presents budget requests in a confusing manner, making it difficult for both the general public and members of Congress to understand the request or to differentiate it from counterterrorism operations around the world or operations in Afghanistan. Detailed a.n.a.lyses by budget experts are needed to answer what should be a simple question: "How much money is the President requesting for the war in Iraq?"
Finally, circ.u.mvention of the budget process by the executive branch erodes oversight and review by Congress. The authorizing committees (including the House and Senate Armed Services committees) spend the better part of a year reviewing the President"s annual budget request.
When the President submits an emergency supplemental request, the authorizing committees are bypa.s.sed. The request goes directly to the appropriations committees, and they are pressured by the need to act quickly so that troops in the field do not run out of funds. The result is a spending bill that pa.s.ses Congress with perfunctory review. Even worse, the must-pa.s.s appropriations bill becomes loaded with special spending projects that would not survive the normal review process.
RECOMMENDATION 72: Costs for the war in Iraq should be included in the President"s annual budget request, starting in FY 2008: the war is in its fourth year, and the normal budget process should not be circ.u.mvented. Funding requests for the war in Iraq should be presented clearly to Congress and the American people. Congress must carry out its const.i.tutional responsibility to review budget requests for the war in Iraq carefully and to conduct oversight.
8. U.S. Personnel
The United States can take several steps to ensure that it has personnel with the right skills serving in Iraq.
All of our efforts in Iraq, military and civilian, are handicapped by Americans" lack of language and cultural understanding. Our emba.s.sy of 1,000 has 33 Arabic speakers, just six of whom are at the level of fluency. In a conflict that demands effective and efficient communication with Iraqis, we are often at a disadvantage. There are still far too few Arab language--proficient military and civilian officers in Iraq, to the detriment of the U.S. mission.
Civilian agencies also have little experience with complex overseas interventions to restore and maintain order--stability operations--outside of the normal emba.s.sy setting. The nature of the mission in Iraq is unfamiliar and dangerous, and the United States has had great difficulty filling civilian a.s.signments in Iraq with sufficient numbers of properly trained personnel at the appropriate rank.
RECOMMENDATION 73: The Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of National Intelligence should accord the highest possible priority to professional language proficiency and cultural training, in general and specifically for U.S. officers and personnel about to be a.s.signed to Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 74: In the short term, if not enough civilians volunteer to fill key positions in Iraq, civilian agencies must fill those positions with directed a.s.signments. Steps should be taken to mitigate familial or financial hardships posed by directed a.s.signments, including tax exclusions similar to those authorized for U.S. military personnel serving in Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 75: For the longer term, the United States government needs to improve how its const.i.tuent agencies--Defense, State, Agency for International Development, Treasury, Justice, the intelligence community, and others--respond to a complex stability operation like that represented by this decade"s Iraq and Afghanistan wars and the previous decade"s operations in the Balkans. They need to train for, and conduct, joint operations across agency boundaries, following the Goldwater-Nichols model that has proved so successful in the U.S.
armed services.
RECOMMENDATION 76: The State Department should train personnel to carry out civilian tasks a.s.sociated with a complex stability operation outside of the traditional emba.s.sy setting. It should establish a Foreign Service Reserve Corps with personnel and expertise to provide surge capacity for such an operation. Other key civilian agencies, including Treasury, Justice, and Agriculture, need to create similar technical a.s.sistance capabilities.
9. Intelligence
While the United States has been able to acquire good and sometimes superb tactical intelligence on al Qaeda in Iraq, our government still does not understand very well either the insurgency in Iraq or the role of the militias.
A senior commander told us that human intelligence in Iraq has improved from 10 percent to 30 percent. Clearly, U.S. intelligence agencies can and must do better. As mentioned above, an essential part of better intelligence must be improved language and cultural skills.
As an intelligence a.n.a.lyst told us, "We rely too much on others to bring information to us, and too often don"t understand what is reported back because we do not understand the context of what we are told."
The Defense Department and the intelligence community have not invested sufficient people and resources to understand the political and military threat to American men and women in the armed forces.
Congress has appropriated almost $2 billion this year for countermeasures to protect our troops in Iraq against improvised explosive devices, but the administration has not put forward a request to invest comparable resources in trying to understand the people who fabricate, plant, and explode those devices.
We were told that there are fewer than 10 a.n.a.lysts on the job at the Defense Intelligence Agency who have more than two years" experience in a.n.a.lyzing the insurgency. Capable a.n.a.lysts are rotated to new a.s.signments, and on-the-job training begins anew. Agencies must have a better personnel system to keep a.n.a.lytic expertise focused on the insurgency. They are not doing enough to map the insurgency, dissect it, and understand it on a national and provincial level. The a.n.a.lytic community"s knowledge of the organization, leadership, financing, and operations of militias, as well as their relationship to government security forces, also falls far short of what policy makers need to know.
In addition, there is significant underreporting of the violence in Iraq. The standard for recording attacks acts as a filter to keep events out of reports and databases. A murder of an Iraqi is not necessarily counted as an attack. If we cannot determine the source of a sectarian attack, that a.s.sault does not make it into the database. A roadside bomb or a rocket or mortar attack that doesn"t hurt U.S.
personnel doesn"t count. For example, on one day in July 2006 there were 93 attacks or significant acts of violence reported. Yet a careful review of the reports for that single day brought to light 1,100 acts of violence. Good policy is difficult to make when information is systematically collected in a way that minimizes its discrepancy with policy goals.
RECOMMENDATION 77: The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense should devote significantly greater a.n.a.lytic resources to the task of understanding the threats and sources of violence in Iraq.
RECOMMENDATION 78: The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense should also inst.i.tute immediate changes in the collection of data about violence and the sources of violence in Iraq to provide a more accurate picture of events on the ground.
Recommended Iraqi Actions
The Iraqi government must improve its intelligence capability, initially to work with the United States, and ultimately to take full responsibility for this intelligence function.
To facilitate enhanced Iraqi intelligence capabilities, the CIA should increase its personnel in Iraq to train Iraqi intelligence personnel.
The CIA should also develop, with Iraqi officials, a counterterrorism intelligence center for the all-source fusion of information on the various sources of terrorism within Iraq. This center would a.n.a.lyze data concerning the individuals, organizations, networks, and support groups involved in terrorism within Iraq. It would also facilitate intelligence-led police and military actions against them.
RECOMMENDATION 79: The CIA should provide additional personnel in Iraq to develop and train an effective intelligence service and to build a counterterrorism intelligence center that will facilitate intelligence-led counterterrorism efforts.
Appendices