M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out Dec^r & insert May. It might frequently happen that our measures ought to be influenced by those in Europe, which were generally planned during the Winter and of which intelligence would arrive in the Spring.
M^r Madison 2^{ded} the motion, he preferred May to Dec^r because the latter would require the travelling to & from the seat of Gov^t in the most inconvenient seasons of the year.
M^r Wilson. The Winter is the most convenient season for business.
M^r Elseworth. The summer will interfere too much with private business, that of almost all the probable members of the Legislature being more or less connected with agriculture.
M^r Randolph. The time is of no great moment now, as the Legislature can vary it. On looking into the Const.i.tutions of the States, he found that the times of their elections with which the election of the Nat^l Representatives would no doubt be made to coincide, would suit better with Dec^r than May. And it was advisable to render our innovations as little incommodious as possible.
On the question for "May" instead of "Dec^r"
N. H. no. Ma.s.s. no. C^t no. P^a no. Del. no. M^d no. V^a no.
N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
M^r Read moved to insert after the word "Senate," the words, "subject to the Negative to be hereafter provided." His object was to give an absolute Negative to the Executive--He considered this as so essential to the Const.i.tution, to the preservation of liberty, & to the public welfare, that his duty compelled him to make the Motion.
M^r Gov^r Morris 2^{ded} him. And on the question
N. H. no. Ma.s.s. no. C^t no. P^a no. Del. ay. M^d no. V^a no.
N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
M^r Rutlidge. Altho" it is agreed on all hands that an annual meeting of the Legislature should be made necessary, yet that point seems not to be free from doubt as the clause stands. On this suggestion, "Once at least in every year," were inserted, nem. con.
Art. III with the foregoing alterations was ag^d to nem. con., and is as follows: "The Legislative power shall be vested in a Congress to consist of 2 separate & distinct bodies of men; a House of Rep^s & a Senate. The Legislature shall meet at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the 1^{st} Monday in Dec^r unless a different day shall be appointed by law."
"Article IV. Sect. 1. taken up."
M^r Gov^r Morris moved to strike out the last member of the section beginning with the words "qualifications of Electors," in order that some other provision might be subst.i.tuted which w^d restrain the right of suffrage to freeholders.
M^r Fitzsimons 2^{ded} the motion.
M^r Williamson was opposed to it.
M^r Wilson. This part of the Report was well considered by the Committee, and he did not think it could be changed for the better. It was difficult to form any uniform rule of qualifications for all the States. Unnecessary innovations he thought too should be avoided. It would be very hard & disagreeable for the same persons at the same time, to vote for representatives in the State Legislature and to be excluded from a vote for those in the Nat^l Legislature.
M^r Gov^r Morris. Such a hardship would be neither great nor novel. The people are accustomed to it and not dissatisfied with it, in several of the States. In some the qualifications are different for the choice of the Gov^r & Representatives; In others for different Houses of the Legislature. Another objection ag^{st} the clause as it stands is that it makes the qualifications of the Nat^l Legislature depend on the will of the States, which he thought not proper.
M^r Elseworth. thought the qualifications of the electors stood on the most proper footing. The right of suffrage was a tender point, and strongly guarded by most of the State Const.i.tutions. The people will not readily subscribe to the Nat^l Const.i.tution if it should subject them to be disfranchised. The States are the best Judges of the circ.u.mstances & temper of their own people.
Col. Mason. The force of habit is certainly not attended to by those Gentlemen who wish for innovations on this point. Eight or nine States have extended the right of suffrage beyond the freeholders. What will the people there say, if they should be disfranchised. A power to alter the qualifications would be a dangerous power in the hands of the Legislature.
M^r Butler. There is no right of which the people are more jealous than that of suffrage. Abridgments of it tend to the same revolution as in Holland where they have at length thrown all power into the hands of the Senates, who fill up vacancies themselves, and form a rank aristocracy.
M^r d.i.c.kinson. had a very different idea of the tendency of vesting the right of suffrage in the freeholders of the Country. He considered them as the best guardians of liberty; And the restriction of the right to them as a necessary defence ag^{st} the dangerous influence of those mult.i.tudes without property & without principle with which our Country like all others, will in time abound. As to the unpopularity of the innovation it was in his opinion chimerical. The great ma.s.s of our Citizens is composed at this time of freeholders, and will be pleased with it.
M^r Elseworth. How shall the freehold be defined? Ought not every man who pays a tax, to vote for the representative who is to levy & dispose of his money? Shall the wealthy merchants & manufacturers, who will bear a full share of the public burthens be not allowed a voice in the imposition of them. Taxation & representation ought to go together.
M^r Gov^r Morris. He had long learned not to be the dupe of words. The sound of aristocracy therefore had no effect on him. It was the thing, not the name, to which he was opposed, and one of his princ.i.p.al objections to the Const.i.tution as it is now before us, is that it threatens this Country with an aristocracy. The aristocracy will grow out of the House of Representatives. Give the votes to people who have no property, and they will sell them to the rich who will be able to buy them. We should not confine our attention to the present moment. The time is not distant when this Country will abound with mechanics & manufacturers who will receive their bread from their employers. Will such men be the secure & faithful guardians of liberty? Will they be the impregnable barrier ag^{st} aristocracy?--He was as little duped by the a.s.sociation of the words, "taxation & Representation." The man who does not give his vote freely is not represented. It is the man who dictates the vote. Children do not vote. Why? because they want prudence, because they have no will of their own. The ignorant & the dependent can be as little trusted with the public interest. He did not conceive the difficulty of defining "freeholders" to be insuperable. Still less that the restriction could be unpopular. 9/10 of the people are at present freeholders and these will certainly be pleased with it. As to Merch^{ts}. &c. if they have wealth & value the right they can acquire it. If not they don"t deserve it.
Col. Mason. We all feel too strongly the remains of antient prejudices, and view things too much through a British medium. A Freehold is the qualification in England, & hence it is imagined to be the only proper one. The true idea in his opinion was that every man having evidence of attachment to & permanent common interest with the Society ought to share in all its rights & privileges. Was this qualification restrained to freeholders? Does no other kind of property but land evidence a common interest in the proprietor? does nothing besides property mark a permanent attachment. Ought the merchant, the monied man, the parent of a number of children whose fortunes are to be pursued in his own Country to be viewed as suspicious characters, and unworthy to be trusted with the common rights of their fellow Citizens.
M^r Madison. the right of suffrage is certainly one of the fundamental articles of republican Government, and ought not to be left to be regulated by the Legislature. A gradual abridgment of this right has been the mode in which aristocracies have been built on the ruins of popular forms. Whether the Const.i.tutional qualification ought to be a freehold, would with him depend much on the probable reception such a change would meet with in States where the right was now exercised by every description of people. In several of the States a freehold was now the qualification. Viewing the subject in its merits alone, the freeholders of the Country would be the safest depositories of Republican liberty. In future times a great majority of the people will not only be without landed, but any other sort of property. These will either combine, under the influence of their common situation: in which case, the rights of property & the public liberty, will not be secure in their hands: or which is more probable, they will become the tools of opulence & ambition, in which case there will be equal danger on another side. The example of England has been misconceived (by Col. Mason.) A very small proportion of the Representatives are there chosen by freeholders. The greatest part are chosen by the Cities & boroughs, in many of which the qualification of suffrage is as low as it is in any one of the U. S. and it was in the boroughs & Cities rather than the Counties, that bribery most prevailed, & the influence of the Crown on elections was most dangerously exerted.[18]
[18] "Note to speech of J. M. in Convention of 1787, August 7^{th}.:
"As appointments for the General Government here contemplated will, in part, be made by the State Gov^{ts}, all the Citizens in States where the right of suffrage is not limited to the holders of property, will have an indirect share of representation in the General Government.
But this does not satisfy the fundamental principle that men cannot be justly bound by laws in making which they have no part. Persons & property being both essential objects of Government, the most that either can claim, is such a structure of it as will leave a reasonable security for the other. And the most obvious provision, of this double character, seems to be that of confining to the holders of property the object deemed least secure in popular Gov^{ts} the right of suffrage for one of the two Legislative branches. This is not without example among us, as well as other const.i.tutional modifications, favouring the influence of property in the Government. But the U. S. have not reached the stage of Society in which conflicting feelings of the Cla.s.s with, and the Cla.s.s without property, have the operation natural to them in Countries fully peopled. The most difficult of all political arrangements is that of so adjusting the claims of the two Cla.s.ses as to give security to each and to promote the welfare of all. The federal principle,--which enlarges the sphere of power without departing from the elective basis of it and controuls in various ways the propensity in small republics to rash measures & the facility of forming & executing them, will be found the best expedient yet tried for solving the problem."--Madison"s Note.
"Note to the speech of J. M. on the [7^{th}.] day of [August].
"These observations (in the speech of J. M. see debates in the Convention of 1787, on the [7^{th}.] day of [August]) do not convey the speaker"s more full & matured view of the subject, which is subjoined. He felt too much at the time the example of Virginia.
"The right of suffrage is a fundamental Article in Republican Const.i.tutions. The regulation of it is, at the same time, a task of peculiar delicacy. Allow the right exclusively to property, and the rights of persons may be oppressed. The feudal polity, alone sufficiently proves it.
Extend it equally to all, and the rights of property, or the claims of justice, may be overruled by a majority without property or interested in measures of injustice. Of this abundant proof is afforded by other popular Gov^{ts} and is not without examples in our own, particularly in the laws impairing the obligation of contracts.
"In civilized communities, property as well as personal rights is an essential object of the laws, which encourage industry by securing the enjoyment of its fruits; that industry from which property results, & that enjoyment which consists not merely in its immediate use, but in its posthumous destination to objects of choice and of kindred affection.
"In a just & a free Government, therefore, the rights both of property & of persons ought to be effectually guarded.
Will the former be so in case of a universal & equal suffrage? Will the latter be so in case of a suffrage confined to the holders of property?
"As the holders of property have at stake all the other rights common to those without property, they may be the more restrained from infringing, as well as the less tempted to infringe the rights of the latter. It is nevertheless certain, that there are various ways in which the rich may oppress the poor; in which property may oppress liberty; and that the world is filled with examples. It is necessary that the poor should have a defence against the danger.
"On the other hand, the danger to the holders of property cannot be disguised, if they be undefended against a majority without property. Bodies of men are not less swayed by interest than individuals, and are less controlled by the dread of reproach and the other motives felt by individuals.
Hence the liability of the rights of property, and of the impartiality of laws affecting it, to be violated by Legislative majorities having an interest real or supposed in the injustice: Hence agrarian laws, and other leveling schemes: Hence the cancelling or evading of debts, and other violations of contracts. We must not shut our eyes to the nature of man, nor to the light of experience. Who would rely on a fair decision from three individuals if two had an interest in the case opposed to the rights of the third?
Make the number as great as you please, the impartiality will not be increased; nor any further security against injustice be obtained, than what may result from the greater difficulty of uniting the wills of a greater number.
"In all Gov^{ts} there is a power which is capable of oppressive exercise. In Monarchies and Aristocracies oppression proceeds from a want of sympathy & responsibility in the Gov^t towards the people. In popular Governments the danger lies in an undue sympathy among individuals composing a majority, and a want of responsibility in the majority to the minority. The characteristic excellence of the political System of the U. S. arises from a distribution and organization of its powers, which at the same time that they secure the dependence of the Gov^t on the will of the nation, provides better guards than are found in any other popular Gov^t against interested combinations of a Majority against the rights of a Minority.
"The U. States have a precious advantage also in the actual distribution of property particularly the landed property; and in the universal hope of acquiring property. This latter peculiarity is among the happiest contrasts in their situation to that of the old world, where no antic.i.p.ated change in this respect, can generally inspire a like sympathy with the rights of property. There may be at present, a Majority of the Nation, who are even freeholders, or the heirs or aspirants to Freeholds. And the day may not be very near when such will cease to make up a Majority of the community. But they cannot always so continue. With every admissible subdivision of the Arable lands, a populousness not greater than that of England or France will reduce the holders to a Minority. And whenever the majority shall be without landed or other equivalent property and without the means or hope of acquiring it, what is to secure the rights of property ag^{st} the danger from an equality & universality of suffrage, vesting compleat power over property in hands without a share in it: not to speak of a danger in the meantime from a dependence of an increasing number on the wealth of a few? In other Countries this dependence results in some from the relations between Landlords & Tenants in others both from that source & from the relations between wealthy capitalists and indigent labourers. In the U. S. the occurrence must happen from the last source; from the connection between the great Capitalists in Manufactures & Commerce and the numbers employed by them. Nor will acc.u.mulations of Capital for a certain time be precluded by our laws of descent & of distribution; Such being the enterprise inspired by free Inst.i.tutions, that great wealth in the hands of individuals and a.s.sociations may not be unfrequent. But it may be observed, that the opportunities may be diminished, and the permanency defeated by the equalizing tendency of our laws.
"No free Country has ever been without parties, which are a natural offspring of Freedom. An obvious and permanent division of every people is into the owners of the soil, and the other inhabitants. In a certain sense the country may be said to belong to the former. If each landholder has an exclusive property in his share, the Body of Landholders have an exclusive property in the whole. As the Soil becomes subdivided, and actually cultivated by the owners, this view of the subject derives force from the principle of natural law, which vests in individuals an exclusive right to the portions of ground with which he has incorporated his labour & improvements. Whatever may be the rights of others derived from their birth in the Country, from their interest in the highways & other parcels left open for common use, as well as in the national edifices and monuments; from their share in the public defence, and from their concurrent support of the Gov^t, it would seem unreasonable to extend the right so far as to give them when become the majority, a power of Legislation over the landed property without the consent of the proprietors. Some barrier ag^{st} the invasion of their rights would not be out of place in a just and provident System of Gov^t. The principle of such an arrangement has prevailed in all Gov^{ts} where peculiar privileges or interests held by a part were to be secured ag^{st} violation, and in the various a.s.sociations where pecuniary or other property forms the stake. In the former case a defensive right has been allowed; and if the arrangement be wrong, it is not in the defense but in the kind of privilege to be defended. In the latter case, the shares of suffrage, allotted to individuals have been with acknowledged justice apportioned more or less to their respective interests in the Common Stock.
"These reflections suggest the expediency of such a modification of Gov^t as would give security to the part of the Society having most at stake and being most exposed to danger. Three modifications present themselves.
"1. _Confining_ the right of suffrage to freeholders, & to such as hold an equivalent property, convertible of course into freeholds. The objection to this regulation is obvious.
It violates the vital principle of free Gov^t that those who are to be bound by laws, ought to have a voice in making them. And the violation w^d be more strikingly unjust as the law makers become the minority. The regulation would be as unpropitious, also, as it would be unjust. It would engage the numerical & physical force in a constant struggle ag^{st} the public authority; unless kept down by a standing army fatal to all parties.
"2. Confining the right of suffrage for one Branch to the holders of property, and for the other Branch to those without property. This arrangement which w^d give a mutual defence, where there might be mutual danger of encroachment, has an aspect of equality & fairness. But it w^d not be in fact either equal or fair, because the rights to be defended would be unequal, being on one side those of property as well as of persons, and on the other those of persons only.
The temptation also to encroach tho" in a certain degree mutual, w^d be felt more strongly on one side than on the other: It would be more likely to beget an abuse of the Legislative Negative in extorting concessions at the expence of property, than the reverse. The division of the State into two Cla.s.ses, with distinct & independ^t Organs of power, and without any intermingled agency whatever, might lead to contests & antipathies not dissimilar to those between the Patricians & Plebeians at Rome.
"3. Confining the right of electing one Branch of the Legislature to freeholders, and admitting all others to a common right with holders of property in electing the other Branch. This w^d give a defensive power to holders of property, and to the cla.s.s also without property when becoming a majority of electors, without depriving them in the meantime of a partic.i.p.ation in the Public Councils. If the holders of property would thus have a two-fold share of representation, they w^d have at the same time a two-fold stake in it, the rights of property as well as of persons, the two-fold object of political Inst.i.tutions. And if no exact & safe equilibrium can be introduced, it is more reasonable that a preponderating weight sh^d be allowed to the greater interest than to the lesser. Experience alone can decide how far the practice in this case would correspond with the Theory. Such a distribution of the right of suffrage was tried in N. York and has been abandoned whether from experienced evils, or party calculations, may possibly be a question. It is still on trial in N. Carolina, with what practical indications is not known. It is certain that the trial, to be satisfactory ought to be continued for no inconsiderable period; untill in fact the non-freeholders should be the majority.
"4. Should experience or public opinion require an equal & universal suffrage for each branch of the Gov^t such as prevails generally in the U. S., a resource favorable to the rights of the landed & other property, when its possessors become the minority, may be found in an enlargement of the Election Districts for one branch of the Legislature, and an extension of its period of service. Large districts are manifestly favorable to the election of persons of general respectability, and of probable attachment to the rights of property, over compet.i.tors depending on the personal solicitation practicable on a contracted theatre. And altho"
an ambitious candidate, of personal distinction, might occasionally recommend himself to popular choice by espousing a popular though unjust object, it might rarely happen to many districts at the same time. The tendency of a longer period of service would be, to render the Body more stable in its policy, and more capable of stemming popular currents taking a wrong direction, till reason & justice could regain their ascendancy.
"5. Should even such a modification as the last be deemed inadmissible, and universal suffrage and very short periods of elections within contracted spheres, be required for each branch of the Gov^t, the security for the holders of property when the minority, can only be derived from the ordinary influence possessed by property, & the superior information incident to its holders; from the popular sense of justice enlightened & enlarged by a diffusive education; and from the difficulty of combining & effectuating unjust purposes throughout an extensive country; a difficulty essentially distinguishing the U. S. & even most of the individual States, from the small communities where a mistaken interest or contagious pa.s.sion, could readily unite a majority of the whole under a factious leader, in trampling on the rights of the minor party.