The following Resolution, being the 2^d of those proposed by M^r Randolph was taken up, viz.--"that the rights of suffrage in the National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in different cases."
M^r Madison[39] observing that the words, "_or to the number of free inhabitants_," might occasion debates which would divert the Committee from the general question whether the principle of representation should be changed, moved that they might be struck out.
[39] "Mr. Madison is a character who has long been in public life; and what is very remarkable every Person seems to acknowledge his greatness. He blends together the profound politician, with the Scholar. In the management of every great question he evidently took the lead in the Convention, and tho" he cannot be called an Orator, he is a most agreeable, eloquent, and convincing Speaker. From a spirit of industry and application which he possesses in a most eminent degree, he always comes forward the best informed Man of any point in debate. The affairs of the United States, he perhaps, has the most correct knowledge of, of any Man in the Union. He has been twice a Member of Congress, and was always thought one of the ablest Members that ever sat in that Council. Mr. Maddison is about 37 years of age, a Gentleman of great modesty,--with a remarkable sweet temper. He is easy and unreserved among his acquaintance, and has a most agreeable style of conversation."--Pierce"s Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 331.
M^r King observed that the quotas of contribution which would alone remain as the measure of representation, would not answer, because waving every other view of the matter, the revenue might hereafter be so collected by the General Gov^t that the sums respectively drawn from the States would not appear, and would besides be continually varying.
M^r Madison admitted the propriety of the observation, and that some better rule ought to be found.
Col. Hamilton moved to alter the resolution so as to read "that the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought to be proportioned to the number of free inhabitiants." M^r Spaight 2^{ded} the motion.
It was then moved that the Resolution be postponed, which was agreed to.
M^r Randolph and M^r Madison then moved the following resolution--"that the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought to be proportioned."
It was moved and 2^{ded} to amend it by adding "and not according to the present system"--which was agreed to.
It was then moved & 2^{ded} to alter the resolution so as to read "that the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought not to be according to the present system."
It was then moved & 2^{ded} to postpone the Resolution moved by M^r Randolph & M^r Madison, which being agreed to:
M^r Madison, moved, in order to get over the difficulties, the following resolution--"that the equality of suffrage established by the articles of Confederation ought not to prevail in the national Legislature, and "that an equitable ratio of representation ought to be subst.i.tuted."
This was 2^{ded} by M^r Gov^r Morris, and being generally relished, would have been agreed to; when,
M^r Reed moved that the whole clause relating to the point of Representation be postponed; reminding the Com^e that the deputies from Delaware were restrained by their co[~m]ission from a.s.senting to any change of the rule of suffrage, and in case such a change should be fixed on, it might become their duty to retire from the Convention.
M^r Gov^r Morris observed that the valuable a.s.sistance of those members could not be lost without real concern, and that so early a proof of discord in the Convention as the secession of a State, would add much to the regret; that the change proposed was however so fundamental an article in a national Gov^t, that it could not be dispensed with.
M^r Madison observed that whatever reason might have existed for the equality of suffrage when the Union was a federal one among sovereign States, it must cease when a National Governm^t should be put into the place. In the former case, the acts of Cong^s depended so much for their efficacy on the cooperation of the States, that these had a weight both within & without Congress, nearly in proportion to their extent and importance. In the latter case, as the acts of the Gen^l Gov^t would take effect without the intervention of the State legislatures, a vote from a small State w^d have the same efficacy & importance as a vote from a large one, and there was the same reason for different numbers of representatives from different States, as from Counties of different extents within particular States. He suggested as an expedient for at once taking the sense of the members on this point and saving the Delaware deputies from embarra.s.sment, that the question should be taken in Committee, and the clause on report to the House, be postponed without a question there. This however did not appear to satisfy Mr.
Read.
By several it was observed that no just construction of the Act of Delaware, could require or justify a secession of her deputies, even if the resolution were to be carried thro" the House as well as the Committee. It was finally agreed however that the clause should be postponed: it being understood that in the event the proposed change of representation would certainly be agreed to, no objection or difficulty being started from any other quarter than from Delaware.
The motion of Mr. Read to postpone being agreed to,
The Committee then rose. The Chairman reported progress, and the House having resolved to resume the subject in Committee to-morrow,
Adjourned to 10 O Clock.
THURSDAY MAY 31[40]
[40] "This day the state of New Jersey was represented, so that there were now ten states in Convention."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 99. But in the _Journal of the Federal Convention (1819)_, as in Madison"s account, New Jersey is entered as present May 25th. On May 30 two votes are recorded by Madison and in the _Journal_ without New Jersey.
It is probable that an error was made in the _Journal_ and that Madison followed it.
William Pierce, from Georgia took his seat.[41]
[41] Rufus King kept a few notes of the proceedings of the convention from May 31st to August 8th. They are meagre, but corroborate Madison"s report. See King"s _Life and Correspondence of Rufus King_, i., 587.
Pierce also kept a few rough notes of the proceedings which were printed in the _Savannah Georgian_, April 19, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 28, 1828, and reprinted in _The American Historical Review_, iii., 317 _et seq._ They throw little additional light on the debates, but wherever they do are quoted here, as are King"s.
In Committee of the whole on Mr. Randolph"s propositions.
The 3^d Resolution "that the national Legislature ought to consist of two branches" was agreed to without debate or dissent, except that of Pennsylvania, given probably from complaisance to Doc^r Franklin who was understood to be partial to a single House of Legislation.
Resol: 4. first clause, "that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States," being taken up,
M^r Sherman opposed the election by the people, insisting that it ought to be by the State Legislatures. The people he said, immediately should have as little to do as may be about the Government. They want information and are constantly liable to be misled.
M^r Gerry. The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy.
The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots.
In Ma.s.s^{ts} it had been fully confirmed by experience that they are daily misled into the most baneful measures and opinions by the false reports circulated by designing men, and which no one on the spot can refute. One princ.i.p.al evil arises from the want of due provision for those employed in the administration of Governm^t. It would seem to be a maxim of democracy to starve the public servants. He mentioned the popular clamour in Ma.s.s^{ts} for the reduction of salaries and the attack made on that of the Gov^r though secured by the spirit of the Const.i.tution itself. He had he said been too republican heretofore: he was still however republican, but had been taught by experience the danger of the levelling spirit.
M^r Mason argued strongly for an election of the larger branch by the people. It was to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of the Gov^t. It was, so to speak, to be our House of Commons--It ought to know & sympathize with every part of the community; and ought therefore to be taken not only from different parts of the whole republic, but also from different districts of the larger members of it, which had in several instances particularly in Virg^a, different interests and views arising from difference of produce, of habits &c &c. He admitted that we had been too democratic but was afraid we s^d incautiously run into the opposite extreme. We ought to attend to the rights of every cla.s.s of the people. He had often wondered at the indifference of the superior cla.s.ses of society to this dictate of humanity & policy, considering that however affluent their circ.u.mstances, or elevated their situations, might be, the course of a few years, not only might but certainly would, distribute their posterity throughout the lowest cla.s.ses of Society.
Every selfish motive therefore, every family attachment, ought to recommend such a system of policy as would provide no less carefully for the rights and happiness of the lowest than of the highest orders of Citizens.
M^r Wilson contended strenuously for drawing the most numerous branch of the Legislature immediately from the people. He was for raising the federal pyramid to a considerable alt.i.tude, and for that reason wished to give it as broad a basis as possible. No government could long subsist without the confidence of the people. In a republican Government this confidence was peculiarly essential. He also thought it wrong to increase the weight of the State Legislatures by making them the electors of the national Legislature. All interference between the general and local Governm^{ts} should be obviated as much as possible.
On examination it would be found that the opposition of States to federal measures had proceeded much more from the officers of the States, than from the people at large.
M^r Madison considered the popular election of one branch of the national Legislature as essential to every plan of free Government. He observed that in some of the States one branch of the Legislature was composed of men already removed from the people by an intervening body of electors. That if the first branch of the general legislature should be elected by the State Legislatures, the second branch elected by the first--the Executive by the second together with the first; and other appointments again made for subordinate purposes by the Executive, the people would be lost sight of altogether; and the necessary sympathy between them and their rulers and officers, too little felt. He was an advocate for the policy of refining the popular appointments by successive filtrations, but thought it might be pushed too far. He wished the expedient to be resorted to only in the appointment of the second branch of the Legislature, and in the Executive & judiciary branches of the Government. He thought too that the great fabric to be raised would be more stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid foundation of the people themselves, than if it should stand merely on the pillars of the Legislatures.
M^r Gerry did not like the election by the people. The maxims taken from the British Const.i.tution were often fallacious when applied to our situation which was extremely different. Experience he said had shewn that the State legislatures drawn immediately from the people did not always possess their confidence. He had no objection however to an election by the people if it were so qualified that men of honor & character might not be unwilling to be joined in the appointments. He seemed to think the people might nominate a certain number out of which the State legislatures should be bound to choose.[42]
[42] "Mr. Strong would agree to the principle, provided it would undergo a certain modification, but pointed out nothing."--Pierce"s Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 318.
M^r Butler thought an election by the people an impracticable mode.
On the question for an election of the first branch of the national Legislature, by the people,
Ma.s.s^{ts} ay. Connec^t div^d. N. York ay. N. Jersey no. Pen^a ay.
Delaw^r div^d. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Georg^a ay.
The remaing Clauses of Resolution 4^{th} relating to the qualifications of members of the National Legislature, being posp^d nem. con., as entering too much into detail for general propositions.
The Committee proceeded to Resolution 5. "that the second, (or senatorial) branch of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the first branch out of persons nominated by the State Legislatures."
M^r Spaight contended that the 2^d branch ought to be chosen by the State Legislatures and moved an amendment to that effect.[43]
[43] "M^r King observed that the Question called for was premature, and out of order,--that unless we go on regularly from one principle to the other we shall draw out our proceedings to an endless length."--Pierce"s Notes, _Am.
Hist. Rev._, iii., 318.
M^r Butler apprehended that the taking so many powers out of the hands of the States as was proposed, tended to destroy all that balance and security of interests among the States which it was necessary to preserve; and called on M^r Randolph the mover of the propositions, to explain the extent of his ideas, and particularly the number of members he meant to a.s.sign to this second branch.
M^r Rand^f observed that he had at the time of offering his propositions stated his ideas as far as the nature of general propositions required; that details made no part of the plan, and could not perhaps with propriety have been introduced. If he was to give an opinion as to the number of the second branch, he should say that it ought to be much smaller than that of the first; so small as to be exempt from the pa.s.sionate proceedings to which numerous a.s.semblies are liable. He observed that the general object was to provide a cure for the evils under which the U. S. laboured; that in tracing these evils to their origin every man had found it in the turbulance and follies of democracy: that some check therefore was to be sought for ag^{st} this tendency of our Governments: and that a good Senate seemed most likely to answer the purpose.[44]
[44] "Butler said that until the number of the Senate could be known it would be impossible for him to give a vote on it."--Pierce"s Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 318.