Ma.s.s^{ts} ay. C^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
M^r Spaight moved to fill the blank for the duration of the appointm^{ts} to the 2^d branch of the National Legislature with the words "7 years."
M^r Sherman, thought 7 years too long. He grounded his opposition he said on the principle that if they did their duty well, they would be reelected. And if they acted amiss, an earlier opportunity should be allowed for getting rid of them. He preferred 5 years which w^d be between the terms of the 1^{st} branch & of the executive.
M^r Pierce proposed 3 years. 7 years would raise an alarm. Great mischiefs had arisen in England from their septennial Act which was reprobated by most of their patriotic Statesmen.
M^r Randolph was for the term of 7 years. The democratic licentiousness of the State Legislatures proved the necessity of a firm Senate. The object of this 2^d branch is to controul the democratic branch of the Nat^l Legislature. If it be not a firm body, the other branch being more numerous, and coming immediately from the people, will overwhelm it. The Senate of Maryland const.i.tuted on like principles had been scarcely able to stem the popular torrent. No mischief can be apprehended, as the concurrence of the other branch, and in some measure, of the Executive, will in all cases be necessary. A firmness & independence may be the more necessary also in this branch, as it ought to guard the Const.i.tution ag^{st} encroachments of the Executive who will be apt to form combinations with the demagogues of the popular branch.
M^r Madison, considered 7 years as a term by no means too long. What we wished was to give to the Gov^t that stability which was every where called for, and which the Enemies of the Republican form alledged to be inconsistent with its nature. He was not afraid of giving too much stability by the term of Seven years. His fear was that the popular branch would still be too great an overmatch for it. It was to be much lamented that we had so little direct experience to guide us. The Const.i.tution of Maryland was the only one that bore any a.n.a.logy to this part of the plan. In no instance had the Senate of Mary^d created just suspicions of danger from it. In some instances perhaps it may have erred by yielding to the H. of Delegates. In every instance of their opposition to the measures of the H. of D. they had had with them the suffrages of the most enlightened and impartial people of the other States as well as of their own. In the States where the Senates, were chosen in the same manner as the other branches, of the Legislature, and held their seats for 4 years, the inst.i.tution was found to be no check whatever ag^{st} the instabilities of the other branches. He conceived it to be of great importance that a stable & firm Gov^t, organized in the republican form should be held out to the people. If this be not done, and the people be left to judge of this species of Gov^t by y^e operations of the defective systems under which they now live, it is much to be feared the time is not distant when, in universal disgust, they will renounce the blessing which they have purchased at so dear a rate, and be ready for any change that may be proposed to them.
On the question for "seven years" as the term for the 2^d branch
Ma.s.s^{ts} divided. (M^r King, M^r Ghorum ay, M^r Gerry, M^r Strong, no) Con^t no. N. Y. div^d N. J. ay. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
M^r Butler and M^r Rutlidge proposed that the members of the 2^d branch should be ent.i.tled to no salary or compensation for their services. On the question,[81]--
Ma.s.s^{ts} div^d. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P. no. Del. ay.
M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
[81] (It is probable y^e votes here turned chiefly on the idea that if the salaries were not here provided for, the members would be paid by their respective States) This note for the bottom margin.--Madison"s Note.
It was then moved & agreed that the clauses respecting the stipends & ineligibility of the 2^d branch be the same as, of the 1^{st} branch:--Con: disagreeing to the ineligibility.
It was moved & 2^{ded} to alter the Resol: 9. so as to read "that the jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall be to hear & determine in the dernier resort, all piracies, felonies, &c."
It was moved & 2^{ded} to strike out "all piracies & felonies on the high seas," which was agreed to.
It was moved & agreed to strike out "all captures from an enemy."
It was moved & agreed to strike out "other States" and insert "two distinct States of the Union."
It was moved & agreed to postpone the consideration of the Resolution 9, relating to the Judiciary:
The Com^e then rose & the House Adjourned.
WEDNESDAY JUNE 13.[82] IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE
[82] Edward Carrington wrote to Madison from New York, June 13, 1787:
"The public mind is now on the point of a favourable turn to the objects of your meeting, and, being fairly met with the result, will, I am persuaded, eventually embrace it--being calculated for the permanent fitness, and not the momentary habits of the country, it may at first be viewed with hesitation, but derived and patronized as it will be, its influence must extend into an adoption as the present fabric gives way--the work once well done will be done forever, but patched up in accommodation to the whim of the day, it will soon require the hand of the cobbler again, and in every unfortunate experiment the materials are rendered the less fit for that monument of civil liberty which we wish to erect.--Const.i.tute a federal Government, invigorate & check it well--give it then independent powers over the Trade the Revenues, and force of the Union, and all things that involve any relationship to foreign powers--give it also the revisal of all State acts--unless it possesses a compleat controul over the State Governments, the constant effort will be to resume the delegated powers,--nor do I see what inducement the federal sovereignty can have to negative an innocent act of a State--Const.i.tute it in such shape that, its first principles being preserved, it will be a good republic--I wish to see that system have a fair experiment--but let the liability to encroachment be rather from the federal, than the State, governments--in the first case we shall insensibly glide into a monarchy: in the latter nothing but anarchy can be the consequence.
"Some Gentlemen think of a total surrender of the State Sovereignty--I see not the necessity of that measure for giving us national stability in consequence--the negative of the federal sovereignty will effectually prevent the existence of any licentious or inconsiderate act--and I believe that even under a new monarchy it would be found necessary thus to continue the local administration--general Laws would operate many particular [undecipherable] and a general legislature would be found incompetent to the formation of local ones--the interest of the United States may be well combined for the common good--but the affairs of so extensive a country are not to be thrown into one ma.s.s--an attempt to confederate upon terms materially opposed to the particular Interests would in all probability occasion a dismemberment, and in that event, within a long time yet to come, the prospects of commerce will be at an end as to any degree of national importance, let her fate be what it may as to freedom or va.s.salage."--_Mad. MSS._
Resol: 9 being resumed
The latter parts of the clause relating to the jurisdiction of the Nat^l tribunals, was struck out nem. con in order to leave full room for their organization.
M^r Randolph & M^r Madison, then moved the following resolution respecting a National Judiciary,viz "that the jurisdiction of the National Judiciary shall extend to cases, which respect the collection of the national revenue, impeachments of any national officers, and questions which involve the national peace and harmony" which was agreed to.
M^r Pinkney & M^r Sherman moved to insert after the words "one supreme tribunal" the words "the Judges of which to be appointed by the National Legislature."
M^r Madison, objected to an app^t by the whole Legislature. Many of them were incompetent Judges of the requisite qualifications. They were too much influenced by their partialities. The candidate who was present, who had displayed a talent for business in the legislative field, who had perhaps a.s.sisted ignorant members in business of their own, or of their Const.i.tuents, or used other winning means, would without any of the essential qualifications for an expositor of the laws prevail over a compet.i.tor not having these recommendations, but possessed of every necessary accomplishment. He proposed that the appointment should be made by the Senate, which as a less numerous & more select body, would be more competent judges, and which was sufficiently numerous to justify such a confidence in them.
M^r Sherman & M^r Pinkney withdrew their motion, and the app^t by the Senate was ag^d to nem. con.
M^r Gerry moved to restrain the Senatorial branch from originating money bills. The other branch was more immediately the representatives of the people, and it was a maxim that the people ought to hold the Purse-strings. If the Senate should be allowed to originate such bills, they w^d repeat the experiment, till chance should furnish a sett of representatives in the other branch who will fall into their snares.
M^r Butler saw no reason for such a discrimination. We were always following the British Const.i.tution when the reason of it did not apply. There was no a.n.a.logy between the H. of Lords and the body proposed to be established. If the Senate should be degraded by any such discriminations, the best men would be apt to decline serving in it in favor of the other branch. And it will lead the latter into the practice of tacking other clauses to money bills.
M^r Madison observed that the Comentators on the Brit: Const: had not yet agreed on the reason of the restriction on the H. of L. in money bills. Certain it was there could be no similar reason in the case before us. The Senate would be the representatives of the people as well as the 1^{st} branch. If they s^d have any dangerous influence over it, they would easily prevail on some member of the latter to originate the bill they wished to be pa.s.sed. As the Senate would be generally a more capable sett of men, it w^d be wrong to disable them from any preparation of the business, especially of that which was most important, and in our republics, worse prepared than any other. The Gentleman in pursuance of his principle ought to carry the restraint to the _amendment_, as well as the originating of money bills, since, an addition of a given sum w^d be equivalent to a distinct proposition of it.
M^r King differed from M^r Gerry, and concurred in the objections to the proposition.
M^r Read favored the proposition, but would not extend the restraint to the case of amendments.
M^r Pinkney thinks the question premature. If the Senate sh^d be formed on the _same_ proportional representation as it stands at present, they s^d have equal power, otherwise if a different principle s^d be introduced.
M^r Sherman. As both branches must concur, there can be no danger whichever way the Senate be formed. We establish two branches in order to get more wisdom, which is particularly needed in the finance business--The Senate bear their share of the taxes, and are also the representatives of the people. What a man does by another, he does by himself is a maxim. In Con^t both branches can originate in all cases, and it has been found safe & convenient. Whatever might have been the reason of the rule as to The H. of Lords, it is clear that no good arises from it now even there.
Gen^l Pinkney. This distinction prevails in S. C. and has been a source of pernicious disputes between y^e 2 branches. The Const.i.tution is now evaded, by informal schedules of amendments handed from y^e Senate to the other House.
M^r Williamson wishes for a question chiefly to prevent re-discussion.
The restriction will have one advantage, it will oblige some member in the lower branch to move, & people can then mark him.
On the question for excepting money bills, as prop^d by M^r Gerry, Ma.s.s. no. Con^t no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Del. ay. M^d no.
V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.[83]
[83] According to the Journal (121) Pennsylvania was among the noes.
Committee rose & M^r Ghorum made report, which was postponed till tomorrow, to give an opportunity for other plans to be proposed. The report was in the words following:
Report of the Committee of Whole on M^r Randolph"s propositions.
1. Res^d that it is the opinion of this Committee that a National Governm^t ought to be established, consisting of a supreme Legislative, Executive & Judiciary.
2. Resol^d that the National Legislature ought to consist of two branches.
3. Res^d that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States for the term of three years, to receive fixed Stipends by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to public service, to be paid out of the National Treasury: to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the U. States, (except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the first branch), during the term of service, and under the national Government for the s.p.a.ce of one year after its expiration.
4. Res^d that the members of the second branch of the Nat^l Legislature ought to be chosen by the individual Legislatures, to be of the age of 30 years at least, to hold their offices for a term sufficient to ensure their independency, namely, seven years, to receive fixed stipends by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to public service to be paid out of the National Treasury; to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the U. States, (except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch) during the term of service, and under the Nat^l Gov^t for the s.p.a.ce of one year after its expiration.
5. Res^d that each branch ought to possess the right of originating Acts.