Proceeding now to the 1^{st} point on which he had contrasted the two plans, he observed that anxious as he was for some augmentation of the federal powers, it would be with extreme reluctance indeed that he could ever consent to give powers to Cong^s he had two reasons either of w^{ch} was sufficient, 1. Cong^s as a Legislative body does not stand on the people. 2. it is a _single_ body. 1. He would not repeat the remarks he had formerly made on the principles of Representation, he would only say that an inequality in it, has ever been a poison contaminating every branch of Gov^t. In G. Britain where this poison has had a full operation, the security of private rights is owing entirely to the purity of her tribunals of Justice, the Judges of which are neither appointed nor paid, by a venal Parliament. The political liberty of that Nation, owing to the inequality of representation is at the mercy of its rulers. He means not to insinuate that there is any parallel between the situation of that Country & ours at present. But it is a lesson we ought not to disregard, that the smallest bodies in G. B. are notoriously the most corrupt. Every other source of influence must also be stronger in small than large bodies of men. When Lord Chesterfield had told us that one of the Dutch provinces had been seduced into the views of France, he need not have added, that it was not Holland, but one of the _smallest_ of them. There are facts among ourselves which are known to all. Pa.s.sing over others, he will only remark that the _Impost_, so anxiously wished for by the public was defeated not by any of the _larger_ States in the Union. 2. _Congress is a single Legislature._ Despotism comes on Mankind in different Shapes, sometimes in an Executive, sometimes in a Military, one. Is there no danger of a Legislative despotism? Theory & practice both proclaim it. If the Legislative authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it within itself, into distinct and independent branches. In a single House there is no check, but the inadequate one, of the virtue & good sense of those who compose it.
On another great point, the contrast was equally favorable to the plan reported by the Committee of the whole. It vested the Executive powers in a single Magistrate. The plan of N. Jersey, vested them in a plurality. In order to controul the Legislative authority, you must divide it. In order to controul the Executive you must unite it. One man will be more responsible than three. Three will contend among themselves till one becomes the master of his colleagues. In the triumvirates of Rome first Caesar, then Augustus, are witnesses of this truth. The Kings of Sparta, & the Consuls of Rome prove also the factious consequences of dividing the Executive Magistracy. Having already taken up so much time he w^d not he s^d, proceed to any of the other points. Those on which he had dwelt, are sufficient of themselves; and on the decision of them, the fate of the others will depend.
M^r Pinkney,[87] the whole comes to this, as he conceived. Give N.
Jersey an equal vote, and she will dismiss her scruples, and concur in the Nat^l system. He thought the Convention authorized to go any length in recommending; which they found necessary to remedy the evils which produced this Convention.
[87] Yates states it was C. C. Pinckney who said this.--_Secret Proceedings_, etc., 123.
M^r Elseworth proposed as a more distinctive form of collecting the mind of the Committee on the subject, "that the Legislative power of the U.S. should remain in Cong^s" This was not seconded, though it seemed better calculated for the purpose than the 1^{st} proposition of M^r Patterson in place of which Mr. E. wished to subst.i.tute it.
M^r Randolph, was not scrupulous on the point of power. When the Salvation of the Republic was at stake, it would be treason to our trust, not to propose what we found necessary. He painted in strong colours, the imbecility of the existing Confederacy, & the danger of delaying a substantial reform. In answer to the objection drawn from the sense of our Const.i.tuents as denoted by their acts relating to the Convention and the objects of their deliberation, he observed that as each State acted separately in the case, it would have been indecent for it to have charged the existing Const.i.tution with all the vices which it might have perceived in it. The first State that set on foot this experiment would not have been justified in going so far, ignorant as it was of the opinion of others, and sensible as it must have been of the uncertainty of a successful issue to the experiment. There are certainly reasons of a peculiar nature where the ordinary cautions must be dispensed with; and this is certainly one of them. He w^d not as far as depended on him leave any thing that seemed necessary, undone. The present moment is favorable, and is probably the last that will offer.
The true question is whether we shall adhere to the federal plan, or introduce the national plan. The insufficiency of the former has been fully displayed by the trial already made. There are but two modes, by which the end of a Gen^l Gov^t can be attained: the 1^{st} is by coercion as proposed by M^r P"s plan 2. by real legislation as prop^d by the other plan. Coercion he p.r.o.nounced to be _impracticable_, _expensive_, _cruel to individuals_. It tended also to habituate the instruments of it to shed the blood & riot in the Spoils of their fellow Citizens, and consequently trained them up for the service of Ambition.
We must resort therefore to a National _Legislation over individuals_, for which Cong^s are unfit. To vest such power in them, would be blending the Legislative with the Executive, contrary to the rec^d maxim on this subject: If the Union of these powers heretofore in Cong^s has been safe, it has been owing to the general impotency of that body.
Cong^s are moreover not elected by the people, but by the Legislatures who retain even a power of recall. They have therefore no will of their own, they are a mere diplomatic body, and are always obsequious to the views of the States, who are always encroaching on the authority of the U. States. A provision for harmony among the States, as in trade, naturalization &.--for crushing rebellion whenever it may rear its crest--and for certain other general benefits, must be made. The powers for these purposes can never be given to a body, inadequate as Congress are in point of representation, elected in the mode in which they are, and possessing no more confidence than they do: for notwithstanding what has been said to the contrary, his own experience satisfied him that a rooted distrust of Congress pretty generally prevailed. A Nat^l Gov^t alone, properly const.i.tuted, will answer the purpose; and he begged it to be considered that the present is the last moment for establing one.
After this select experiment, the people will yield to despair.
The Committee rose & the House adjourned.
MONDAY JUNE 18. IN COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE on the propositions of M^r Patterson & M^r Randolph.
On motion of M^r d.i.c.kinson to postpone the 1^{st} Resolution in M^r Patterson"s plan, in order to take up the following viz--"that the Articles of Confederation ought to be revised and amended, so as to render the Government of the U. S. adequate to the exigencies, the preservation and the prosperity of the Union" the postponement was agreed to by 10 States, Pen: divided.
Mr. Hamilton,[88] had been hitherto silent on the business before the Convention, partly from respect to others whose superior abilities age & experience rendered him unwilling to bring forward ideas dissimilar to theirs, and partly from his delicate situation with respect to his own State, to whose sentiments as expressed by his Colleages, he could by no means accede. This crisis however which now marked our affairs, was too serious to permit any scruples whatever to prevail over the duty imposed on every man to contribute his efforts for the public safety & happiness. He was obliged therefore to declare himself unfriendly to both plans. He was particularly opposed to that from N. Jersey, being fully convinced, that no amendment of the Confederation, leaving the States in possession of their Sovereignty could possibly answer the purpose. On the other hand he confessed he was much discouraged by the amazing extent of Country in expecting the desired blessings from any general sovereignty that could be subst.i.tuted.--As to the powers of the Convention, he thought the doubts started on that subject had arisen from distinctions & reasonings too subtle. A _federal_ Gov^t he conceived to mean an a.s.sociation of independent Communities into one.
Different Confederacies have different powers, and exercise them in different ways. In some instances the powers are exercised over collective bodies; in others over individuals, as in the German Diet--& among ourselves in cases of piracy. Great lat.i.tude therefore must be given to the signification of the term. The plan last proposed departs itself from the _federal_ idea, as understood by some, since it is to operate eventually on individuals. He agreed moreover with the Honble gentleman from V^a (M^r R.) that we owed it to our Country, to do on this emergency whatever we should deem essential to its happiness. The States sent us here to provide for the exigencies of the Union. To rely on & propose any plan not adequate to these exigencies, merely because it was not clearly within our powers, would be to sacrifice the means to the end. It may be said that the _States_ cannot _ratify_ a plan not within the purview of the article of the Confederation providing for alterations & amendments. But may not the States themselves in which no const.i.tutional authority equal to this purpose exists in the Legislatures, have had in view a reference to the people at large. In the Senate of N. York, a proviso was moved, that no act of the Convention should be binding untill it should be referred to the people & ratified; and the motion was lost by a single voice only, the reason a.s.signed ag^{st} it being, that it might possibly be found an inconvenient shackle.
[88] Hamilton happened to call upon Madison while the latter was putting the last touches to this speech and "acknowledged its fidelity, without suggesting more than a few verbal alterations which were made."--(Cf. _Madison"s Writings_, vol. ii.). A brief of the speech from the Hamilton Papers is given in Lodge"s _Works of Hamilton_, i., 353, where (i., 375) Yates"s report also is quoted.
[Ill.u.s.tration: HAMILTON"S PRINc.i.p.aL SPEECH.
(Reduced.)]
The great question is what provision shall we make for the happiness of our Country? He would first make a comparative examination of the two plans--prove that there were essential defects in both--and point out such changes as might render a _national one_, efficacious.--The great & essential principles necessary for the support of Government are 1. an active & constant interest in supporting it. This principle does not exist in the States in favor of the federal Gov^t. They have evidently in a high degree, the esprit de corps. They constantly pursue internal interests adverse to those of the whole. They have their particular debts--their particular plans of finance &c. All these when opposed to, invariably prevail over the requisitions & plans of Congress. 2. The love of power. Men love power. The same remarks are applicable to this principle. The States have constantly shewn a disposition rather to regain the powers delegated by them than to part with more, or to give effect to what they had parted with. The ambition of their demagogues is known to hate the controul of the Gen^l Government. It may be remarked too that the Citizens have not that anxiety to prevent a dissolution of the Gen^l Gov^t as of the particular Gov^{ts}. A dissolution of the latter would be fatal; of the former would still leave the purposes of Gov^t attainable to a considerable degree. Consider what such a State as Virg^a will be in a few years, a few compared with the life of nations.
How strongly will it feel its importance and self-sufficiency? 3. An habitual attachment of the people. The whole force of this tie is on the side of the State Gov^t. Its sovereignty is immediately before the eyes of the people: its protection is immediately enjoyed by them. From its hand distributive justice, and all those acts which familiarize & endear a Gov^t to a people, are dispensed to them. 4.
_Force_ by which may be understood a _coercion of laws_ or _coercion of arms_. Cong^s have not the former except in few cases. In particular States, this Coercion is nearly sufficient; tho" he held it in most cases, not entirely so. A certain portion of military force is absolutely necessary in large communities. Ma.s.s^{ts} is now feeling this necessity & making provision for it. But how can this force be exerted on the States collectively. It is impossible. It amounts to a war between the parties. Foreign powers also will not be idle spectators.
They will interpose, the confusion will increase, and a dissolution of the Union will ensue. 5. _Influence._ he did not mean corruption, but a dispensation of those regular honors & emoluments, which produce an attachment to the Gov^t. Almost all the weight of these is on the side of the States; and must continue so as long as the States continue to exist. All the pa.s.sions then we see, of avarice, ambition, interest, which govern most individuals, and all public bodies, fall into the current of the States, and do not flow into the stream of the Gen^l Gov^t. The former therefore will generally be an overmatch for the Gen^l Gov^t and render any confederacy, in its very nature precarious. Theory is in this case fully confirmed by experience. The Amphyctionic Council had it would seem ample powers for general purposes. It had in particular the power of fining and using force ag^{st} delinquent members. What was the consequence. Their decrees were mere signals of war. The Phocian war is a striking example of it. Philip at length taking advantage of their disunion, and insinuating himself into their councils, made himself master of their fortunes. The German Confederacy affords another lesson. The Authority of Charlemagne seemed to be as great as could be necessary. The great feudal chiefs however, exercising their local sovereignties, soon felt the spirit & found the means of, encroachments, which reduced the imperial authority to a nominal sovereignty. The Diet has succeeded, which tho" aided by a Prince at its head, of great authority independently of his imperial attributes, is a striking ill.u.s.tration of the weakness of Confederated Governments. Other examples instruct us in the same truth. The Swiss cantons have scarce any union at all, and have been more than once at war with one another.--How then are all these evils to be avoided? only by such a compleat sovereignty in the General Goverm^t as will turn all the strong principles & pa.s.sions abovementioned on its side. Does the scheme of N.
Jersey produce this effect? does it afford any substantial remedy whatever? On the contrary it labors under great defects, and the defect of some of its provisions will destroy the efficacy of others. It gives a direct revenue to Cong^s but this will not be sufficient. The balance can only be supplied by requisitions: which experience proves cannot be relied on. If States are to deliberate on the mode, they will also deliberate on the object of the supplies, and will grant or not grant as they approve or disapprove of it. The delinquency of one will invite and countenance it in others. Quotas too must in the nature of things be so unequal as to produce the same evil. To what standard will you resort?
Land is a fallacious one. Compare Holland with Russia; France or Eng^d with other countries of Europe, Pen^a with N. Carol^a will the relative pecuniary abilities in those instances, correspond with the relative value of land. Take numbers of inhabitants for the rule and make like comparison of different countries, and you will find it to be equally unjust. The different degrees of industry and improvement in different Countries render the first object a precarious measure of wealth. Much depends too on _situation_. Con^t N. Jersey & N. Carolina, not being commercial States & contributing to the wealth of the Commercial ones, can never bear quotas a.s.sessed by the ordinary rules of proportion. They will & must fail in their duty, their example will be followed, and the union itself be dissolved. Whence then is the national revenue to be drawn? from Commerce; even from exports which notwithstanding the co[~m]on opinion are fit objects of moderate taxation, from excise, &c &c. These tho" not equal, are less unequal than quotas. Another destructive ingredient in the plan, is that equality of suffrage which is so much desired by the small States. It is not in human nature that V^a & the large States should consent to it, or if they did that they sh^d long abide by it. It shocks too much all ideas of Justice, and every human feeling. Bad principles in a Gov^t tho slow are sure in their operation, and will gradually destroy it. A doubt has been raised whether Cong^s at present have a right to keep Ships or troops in time of peace. He leans to the negative. Mr. P"^s plan provides no remedy.--If the powers proposed were adequate, the organization of Cong^s is such that they could never be properly & effectually exercised. The members of Cong^s being chosen by the States & subject to recall, represent all the local prejudices. Should the powers be found effectual, they will from time to time be heaped on them, till a tyrannic sway shall be established. The general power whatever be its form if it preserves itself, must swallow up the State powers. Otherwise it will be swallowed up by them. It is ag^{st} all the principles of a good Government to vest the requisite powers in such a body as Cong^s.
Two Sovereignties can not co-exist within the same limits. Giving powers to Cong^s must eventuate in a bad Gov^t or in no Gov^t. The plan of N.
Jersey therefore will not do. What then is to be done? Here he was embarra.s.sed. The extent of the Country to be governed, discouraged him.
The expence of a general Gov^t was also formidable; unless there were such a diminution of expence on the side of the State Gov^{ts} as the case would admit. If they were extinguished, he was persuaded that great oeconomy might be obtained by subst.i.tuting a general Gov^t. He did not mean however to shock the public opinion by proposing such a measure. On the other hand he saw no _other_ necessity for declining it. They are not necessary for any of the great purposes of commerce, revenue, or agriculture. Subordinate authorities he was aware would be necessary.
There must be district tribunals; corporations for local purposes. But cui bono, the vast & expensive apparatus now appertaining to the States.
The only difficulty of a serious nature which occurred to him, was that of drawing representatives from the extremes to the centre of the Community. What inducements can be offered that will suffice? The moderate wages for the 1^{st} branch would only be a bait to little demagogues. Three dollars or thereabouts he supposed would be the utmost. The Senate he feared from a similar cause, would be filled by certain undertakers who wish for particular offices under the Gov^t.
This view of the subject almost led him to despair that a Republican Gov^t could be established over so great an extent. He was sensible at the same time that it would be unwise to propose one of any other form.
In his private opinion he had no scruple in declaring, supported as he was by the opinion of so many of the wise & good, that the British Gov^t was the best in the world: and that he doubted much whether any thing short of it would do in America. He hoped Gentlemen of different opinions would bear with him in this, and begged them to recollect the change of opinion on this subject which had taken place and was still going on. It was once thought that the power of Cong^s was amply sufficient to secure the end of their inst.i.tution. The error was now seen by every one. The members most tenacious of republicanism, he observed, were as loud as any in declaiming ag^{st} the vices of democracy. This progress of the public mind led him to antic.i.p.ate the time, when others as well as himself would join in the praise bestowed by M^r Neckar on the British Const.i.tution, namely, that it is the only Gov^t in the world "which unites public strength with individual security."--In every Co[~m]unity where industry is encouraged, there will be a division of it into the few & the many. Hence separate interests will arise. There will be debtors & Creditors &c. Give all power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few, they will oppress the many. Both therefore ought to have the power, that each may defend itself ag^{st} the other. To the want of this check we owe our paper money, instalment laws &c. To the proper adjustment of it the British owe the excellence of their Const.i.tution. Their house of Lords is a most n.o.ble inst.i.tution. Having nothing to hope for by a change, and a sufficient interest by means of their property, in being faithful to the national interest, they form a permanent barrier ag^{st} every pernicious innovation, whether attempted on the part of the Crown or of the Commons. No temporary Senate will have firmness eno" to answer the purpose. The Senate (of Maryland) which seems to be so much appealed to, has not yet been sufficiently tried. Had the people been unanimous & eager in the late appeal to them on the subject of a paper emission they would have yielded to the torrent. Their acquiescing in such an appeal is a proof of it.--Gentlemen differ in their opinions concerning the necessary checks, from the different estimates they form of the human pa.s.sions. They suppose seven years a sufficient period to give the senate an adequate firmness, from not duly considering the amazing violence & turbulence of the democratic spirit. When a great object of Gov^t is pursued, which seizes the popular pa.s.sions, they spread like wild fire, and become irresistable. He appealed to the gentlemen from the N. England States whether experience had not there verified the remark.--As to the Executive, it seemed to be admitted that no good one could be established on Republican Principles. Was not this giving up the merits of the question; for can there be a good Gov^t without a good Executive. The English Model was the only good one on this subject. The Hereditary interest of the King was so interwoven with that of the Nation, and his personal emoluments so great, that he was placed above the danger of being corrupted from abroad--and at the same time was both sufficiently independent and sufficiently controuled, to answer the purpose of the inst.i.tution at home, one of the weak sides of Republics was their being liable to foreign influence & corruption. Men of little character, acquiring great power become easily the tools of intermeddling Neibours. Sweden was a striking instance. The French & English had each their parties during the late Revolution which was effected by the predominant influence of the former.--What is the inference from all these observations? That we ought to go as far in order to attain stability and permanency, as republican principles will admit. Let one branch of the Legislature hold their places for life or at least during good behaviour. Let the Executive also be for life. He appealed to the feelings of the members present whether a term of seven years, would induce the sacrifices of private affairs which an acceptance of public trust would require, so as to ensure the services of the best Citizens. On this plan we should have in the Senate a permanent will, a weighty interest, which would answer essential purposes. But is this a Republican Gov^t, it will be asked? Yes if all the Magistrates are appointed, and vacancies are filled, by the people, or a process of election originating with the people. He was sensible that an Executive const.i.tuted as he proposed would have in fact but little of the power and independence that might be necessary. On the other plan of appointing him for 7 years, he thought the Executive ought to have but little power. He would be ambitious, with the means of making creatures, and as the object of his ambition w^d be to _prolong_ his power, it is probable that in case of a war, he would avail himself of the emergence, to evade or refuse a degradation from his place. An Executive for life has not this motive for forgetting his fidelity, and will therefore be a safer depository of power. It will be objected probably, that such an Executive will be an _elective Monarch_, and will give birth to the tumults which characterize that form of Gov^t. He w^d reply that _Monarch_ is an indefinite term. It marks not either the degree or duration of power. If this Executive Magistrate w^d be a monarch for life--the other prop^d by the Report from the Co[~m]ittee of the whole, w^d be a monarch for seven years. The circ.u.mstance of being elective was also applicable to both. It had been observed by judicious writers that elective monarchies w^d be the best if they could be guarded ag^{st} the _tumults_ excited by the ambition and intrigues of compet.i.tors. He was not sure that tumults were an inseparable evil. He rather thought this character of Elective Monarchies had been taken rather from particular cases than from general principles. The election of Roman Emperors was made by the _Army_. In _Poland_ the election is made by great rival _princes_ with independent power, and ample means, of raising commotions. In the German Empire, The appointment is made by the Electors & Princes, who have equal motives & means, for exciting cabals & parties. Might not such a mode of election be devised among ourselves as will defend the community ag^{st} these effects in any dangerous degree? Having made these observations he would read to the Committee a sketch of a plan which he sh^d prefer to either of those under consideration. He was aware that it went beyond the ideas of most members. But will such a plan be adopted out of doors? In return he would ask will the people adopt the other plan? At present they will adopt neither. But he sees the Union dissolving or already dissolved--he sees evils operating in the States which must soon cure the people of their fondness for democracies--he sees that a great progress has been already made & is still going on in the public mind. He thinks therefore that the people will in time be unshackled from their prejudices; and whenever that happens, they will themselves not be satisfied at stopping where the plan of M^r R. w^d place them, but be ready to go as far at least as he proposes. He did not mean to offer the paper he had sketched as a proposition to the Committee. It was meant only to give a more correct view of his ideas, and to suggest the amendments which he should probably propose to the plan of M^r R. in the proper stages of its future discussion. He read his sketch in the words following; to wit
I. The supreme Legislative power of the United States of America to be vested in two different bodies of men; the one to be called the a.s.sembly, the other the Senate who together shall form the Legislature of the United States with power to pa.s.s all laws whatsoever subject to the Negative hereafter mentioned.
II. The a.s.sembly to consist of persons elected by the people to serve for three years.
III. The Senate to consist of persons elected to serve during good behaviour; their election to be made by electors chosen for that purpose by the people: in order to this the States to be divided into election districts. On the death, removal or resignation of any Senator his place to be filled out of the district from which he came.
IV. The supreme Executive authority of the United States to be vested in a Governour to be elected to serve during good behaviour--the election to be made by Electors chosen by the people in the Election Districts aforesaid--The authorities & functions of the Executive to be as follows: to have a negative on all laws about to be pa.s.sed, and the execution of all laws pa.s.sed; to have the direction of war when authorized or begun; to have with the advice and approbation of the Senate the power of making all treaties; to have the sole appointment of the heads or chief officers of the departments of Finance, War and Foreign Affairs; to have the nomination of all other officers (Amba.s.sadors to foreign Nations included) subject to the approbation or rejection of the Senate; to have the power of pardoning all offences except Treason; which he shall not pardon without the approbation of the Senate.
V. On the death resignation or removal of the Governour his authorities to be exercised by the President of the Senate till a Successor be appointed.
VI. The Senate to have the sole power of declaring war, the power of advising and approving all Treaties, the power of approving or rejecting all appointments of officers except the heads or chiefs of the departments of Finance War and foreign affairs.
VII. The supreme Judicial authority to be vested in ---- Judges to hold their offices during good behaviour with adequate and permanent salaries. This Court to have original jurisdiction in all causes of capture, and an appellative jurisdiction in all causes in which the revenues of the General Government or the Citizens of foreign Nations are concerned.
VIII. The Legislature of the United States to have power to inst.i.tute Courts in each State for the determination of all matters of general concern.
IX. The Governour Senators and all officers of the United States to be liable to impeachment for mal- and corrupt conduct; and upon conviction to be removed from office, & disqualified for holding any place of trust or profit--All impeachments to be tried by a Court to consist of the Chief ---- or Judge of the Superior Court of Law of each State, provided such Judge shall hold his place during good behavior, and have a permanent salary.
X. All laws of the particular States contrary to the Const.i.tution or laws of the United States to be utterly void; and the better to prevent such laws being pa.s.sed, the Governour or president of each State shall be appointed by the General Government and shall have a Negative upon the laws about to be pa.s.sed in the State of which he is the Governour or President.
XI. No State to have any forces land or Naval; and the militia of all the States to be under the sole and exclusive direction of the United States, the officers of which to be appointed and commissioned by them.
On these several articles he entered into explanatory observations corresponding with the principles of his introductory reasoning.[89]
[89] COPY OF A PAPER COMMUNICATED TO J. M. BY COL. HAMILTON, ABOUT THE CLOSE OF THE CONVENTION IN PHILAD^A, 1787, WHICH HE SAID DELINEATED THE CONSt.i.tUTION WHICH HE WOULD HAVE WISHED TO BE PROPOSED BY THE CONVENTION. HE HAD STATED THE PRINCIPLES OF IT IN THE COURSE OF THE DELIBERATIONS.
The people of the United States of America do ordain & establish this Const.i.tution for the government of themselves and their posterity.
ARTICLE I
-- 1. The Legislative power shall be vested in two distinct bodies of men, one to be called the a.s.sembly, the other the Senate, subject to the negative hereinafter mentioned.
-- 2. The Executive power, with the qualifications hereinafter specified, shall be vested in a President of the United States.
-- 3. The Supreme Judicial authority, except in the cases otherwise provided for in this Const.i.tution, shall be vested in a Court to be called the SUPREME COURT, to consist of not less than six nor more than twelve Judges.
ARTICLE II
-- 1. The a.s.sembly shall consist of persons to be called representatives, who shall be chosen, except in the first instance, by the free male citizens & inhabitants of the several States comprehended in the Union, all of whom of the age of twenty one years & upwards shall be ent.i.tled to an equal vote.
-- 2. But the first a.s.sembly shall be chosen in the manner prescribed in the last article and shall consist of one hundred members of whom N. Hampshire shall have five, Ma.s.sachusetts thirteen, Rhode Island two, Connecticut seven, N. York nine, N. Jersey six, Pennsylvania twelve, Delaware two, Maryland eight, Virginia sixteen, N. Carolina eight, S.
Carolina eight, Georgia four.
-- 3. The Legislature shall provide for the future elections of Representatives, apportioning them in each State, from time to time, as nearly as may be to the number of persons described in the 4-- of the VII article, so as that the whole number of Representatives shall never be less than one hundred, nor more than ---- hundred. There shall be a Census taken for this purpose within three years after the first meeting of the Legislature, and within every successive period of ten years. The term for which Representatives shall be elected shall be determined by the Legislature but shall not exceed three years. There shall be a general election at least once in three years; and the time of service of all the members in each a.s.sembly shall begin, (except in filling vacancies) on the same day, and shall always end on the same day.
-- 4. Forty members shall make a House sufficient to proceed to business; but their number may be increased by the Legislature, yet so as never to exceed a majority of the whole number of Representatives.
-- 5. The a.s.sembly shall choose its President and other officers, shall judge of the qualifications & elections of its own members, punish them for improper conduct in their capacity of Representatives not extending to life or limb; and shall exclusively possess the power of impeachment except in the case of the President of the United States; but no impeachment of a member of the Senate shall be by less than two thirds of the Representatives present.
-- 6. Representatives may vote by proxy; but no Representative present shall be proxy for more than one who is absent.[A]