Gen^l Pinkney opposed six years in favor of four years. The States he said had different interests. Those of the Southern, and of S. Carolina in particular were different from the Northern. If the Senators should be appointed for a long term, they w^d settle in the State where they exercised their functions; and would in a little time be rather the representatives of that than of the State appoint^g them.
M^r Reed mov^d that the term be nine years. This w^d admit of a very convenient rotation, one third going out triennially. He w^d still prefer "during good behaviour," but being little supported in that idea, he was willing to take the longest term that could be obtained.
M^r Broome 2^{ded} the motion.
M^r Madison. In order to judge of the form to be given to this inst.i.tution, it will be proper to take a view of the ends to be served by it. These were first to protect the people ag^{st} their rulers; secondly to protect the people ag^{st} the transient impressions into which they themselves might be led. A people deliberating in a temperate moment, and with the experience of other nations before them, on the plan of Gov^t most likely to secure their happiness, would first be aware, that those charg^d with the public happiness might betray their trust. An obvious precaution ag^{st} this danger w^d be to divide the trust between different bodies of men, who might watch & check each other. In this they w^d be governed by the same prudence which has prevailed in organizing the subordinate departments of Gov^t, where all business liable to abuses is made to pa.s.s thro" separate hands, the one being a check on the other. It w^d next occur to such people, that they themselves were liable to temporary errors, thro" want of information as to their true interest, and that men chosen for a short term, & employed but a small portion of that in public affairs, might err from the same cause. This reflection w^d naturally suggest that the Gov^t be so const.i.tuted as that one of its branches might have an opp^y of acquiring a competent knowledge of the public interests. Another reflection equally becoming a people on such an occasion, w^d be that they themselves, as well as a numerous body of Representatives, were liable to err also, from fickleness and pa.s.sion. A necessary fence ag^{st} this danger would be to select a portion of enlightened citizens, whose limited number, and firmness might seasonably interpose ag^{st} impetuous councils. It ought finally to occur to a people deliberating on a Gov^t for themselves, that as different interests necessarily result from the liberty meant to be secured, the major interest might under sudden impulses be tempted to commit injustice on the minority. In all civilized Countries the people fall into different cla.s.ses hav^g a real or supposed difference of interests. There will be creditors & debtors; farmers, merch^{ts} & manufacturers. There will be particularly the distinction of rich & poor. It was true as had been observ^d (by M^r Pinkney) we had not among us those hereditary distinctions, of rank which were a great source of the contests in the ancient Gov^{ts} as well as the modern States of Europe, nor those extremes of wealth or poverty which characterize the latter. We cannot however be regarded even at this time, as one h.o.m.ogeneous ma.s.s, in which every thing that affects a part will affect in the same manner the whole. In framing a system which we wish to last for ages, we sh^d not lose sight of the changes which ages will produce. An increase of population will of necessity increase the proportion of those who will labour under all the hardships of life, & secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of its blessings. These may in time outnumber those who are placed above the feelings of indigence. According to the equal laws of suffrage, the power will slide into the hands of the former. No agrarian attempts have yet been made in this Country, but symptoms, of a levelling spirit, as we have understood, have sufficiently appeared in certain quarters, to give notice of the future danger. How is this danger to be guarded ag^{st} on the republican principles? How is the danger in all cases of interested coalitions to oppress the minority to be guarded ag^{st}?
Among other means by the establishment of a body in the Gov^t sufficiently respectable for its wisdom & virtue, to aid on such emergencies, the preponderance of justice by throwing its weight into that scale. Such being the objects of the second branch in the proposed Gov^t he thought a considerable duration ought to be given to it. He did not conceive that the term of nine years could threaten any real danger; but in pursuing his particular ideas on the subject, he should require that the long term allowed to the 2^d branch should not commence till such a period of life, as would render a perpetual disqualification to be re-elected little inconvenient either in a public or private view. He observed that as it was more than probable we were now digesting a plan which in its operation w^d decide for ever the fate of Republican Gov^t we ought not only to provide every guard to liberty that its preservation c^d require, but be equally careful to supply the defects which our own experience had particularly pointed out.
M^r Sherman. Gov^t is inst.i.tuted for those who live under it. It ought therefore to be so const.i.tuted as not to be dangerous to their liberties. The more permanency it has the worse if it be a bad Gov^t.
Frequent elections are necessary to preserve the good behavior of rulers. They also tend to give permanency to the Government, by preserving that good behavior, because it ensures their re-election. In Connecticut elections have been very frequent, yet great stability & uniformity both as to persons & measures have been experienced from its original establishm^t to the present time; a period of more than a 130 years. He wished to have provision made for steadiness & wisdom in the system to be adopted; but he thought six or four years would be sufficient. He sh^d be content with either.
M^r Read wished it to be considered by the small States that it was their interest that we should become one people as much as possible; that State attachments sh^d be extinguished as much as possible; that the Senate, sh^d be so const.i.tuted as to have the feelings of Citizens of the whole.
M^r Hamilton. He did not mean to enter particularly into the subject. He concurred with M^r Madison in thinking we were now to decide forever the fate of Republican Government; and that if we did not give to that form due stability and wisdom, it would be disgraced & lost among ourselves, disgraced & lost to mankind forever. He acknowledged himself not to think favorably of Republican Government; but addressed his remarks to those who did think favorably of it, in order to prevail on them to tone their Government as high as possible. He professed himself to be as zealous an advocate for liberty as any man whatever, and trusted he should be as willing a martyr to it though he differed as to the form in which it was most eligible.--He concurred also in the general observations of (M^r Madison) on the subject, which might be supported by others if it were necessary. It was certainly true that nothing like an equality of property existed; that an inequality would exist as long as liberty existed, and that it would unavoidably result from that very liberty itself. This inequality of property const.i.tuted the great & fundamental distinction in Society. When the Tribunitial power had levelled the boundary between the _patricians_ & _plebeians_, what followed? The distinction between rich & poor was subst.i.tuted. He meant not however to enlarge on the subject. He rose princ.i.p.ally to remark that (M^r Sherman) seemed not to recollect that one branch of the proposed Gov^t was so formed, as to render it particularly the guardians of the poorer orders of Citizens; nor to have adverted to the true causes of the stability which had been exemplified in Con^t. Under the British system as well as the federal, many of the great powers appertaining to Gov^t particularly all those relating to foreign Nations were not in the hands of the Gov^t there. Their internal affairs also were extremely simple, owing to sundry causes many of which were peculiar to that Country. Of late the Governm^t had entirely given way to the people, and had in fact suspended many of its ordinary functions in order to prevent those turbulent scenes which had appeared elsewhere.
He asks M^r S. whether the State at this time dare impose & collect a tax on y^e people? To these causes & not to the frequency of elections, the effect as far as it existed ought to be chiefly ascribed.
M^r Gerry, wished we could be united in our ideas concerning a permanent Gov^t. All aim at the same end, but there are great differences as to the means. One circ.u.mstance He thought should be carefully attended to.
There was not 1/1000 part of our fellow citizens who were not ag^{st} every approach towards Monarchy. Will they ever agree to a plan which seems to make such an approach. The Convention ought to be extremely cautious in what they hold out to the people. Whatever plan may be proposed will be espoused with warmth by many out of respect to the quarter it proceeds from as well as from an approbation of the plan itself. And if the plan should be of such a nature as to rouse a violent opposition, it is easy to foresee that discord & confusion will ensue, and it is even possible that we may become a prey to foreign powers. He did not deny the position of M^r Madison, that the majority will generally violate justice when they have an interest in so doing: But did not think there was any such temptation in this Country. Our situation was different from that of G. Britain; and the great body of lands yet to be parcelled out & settled would very much prolong the difference. Notwithstanding the symptoms of injustice which had marked many of our public Councils, they had not proceeded so far as not to leave hopes, that there would be a sufficient sense of justice & virtue for the purpose of Gov^t. He admitted the evils arising from a frequency of elections; and would agree to give the Senate a duration of four or five years. A longer term would defeat itself. It never would be adopted by the people.
M^r Wilson did not mean to repeat what had fallen from others, but w^d add an observation or two which he believed had not yet been suggested.
Every nation may be regarded in two relations 1 to its own citizens. 2 to foreign nations. It is therefore not only liable to anarchy & tyranny within, but has wars to avoid & treaties to obtain from abroad. The Senate will probably be the depository of the powers concerning the latter objects. It ought therefore to be made respectable in the eyes of foreign Nations. The true reason why G. Britain has not yet listened to a commercial treaty with us has been, because she had no confidence in the stability or efficacy of our Government. 9 years with a rotation, will provide these desirable qualities; and give our Gov^t an advantage in this respect over Monarchy itself. In a Monarchy much must always depend on the temper of the man. In such a body, the personal character will be lost in the political. He w^d add another observation. The popular objection ag^{st} appointing any public body for a long term was that it might by gradual encroachments prolong itself first into a body for life, and finally become a hereditary one. It would be a satisfactory answer to this objection that as 1/3 would go out triennially, there would be always three divisions holding their places for unequal times, and consequently acting under the influence of different views, and different impulses.--On the question for 9 years, 1/3 to go out triennially,
Ma.s.s^{ts} no. Con^t, no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d no. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
On the question for 6 years,[110] 1/3 to go out biennially
Ma.s.s^{ts} ay. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.
[110] Yates has the question on _five_ years, but this is obviously a mistake.--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 172.
"To receive fixt stipends by which they may be compensated for their services" considered.
General Pinkney proposed "that no Salary should be allowed." As this (the Senatorial) branch was meant to represent the wealth of the Country, it ought to be composed of persons of wealth; and if no allowance was to be made the wealthy alone would undertake the service.
He moved to strike out the clause.
Doct^r Franklin seconded the motion. He wished the Convention to stand fair with the people. There were in it a number of young men who would probably be of the Senate. If lucrative appointments should be recommended we might be chargeable with having carved out places for ourselves. On the question,--Mas^{ts} Connecticut[111] P^a M^d S.
Carolina ay. N. Y. N. J. Del. Virg^a N. C. Geo. no.
[111] Quer. whether Connecticut should not be, no. & Delaware, ay.--Madison"s Note.
M^r Williamson moved to change the expression into these words to wit "to receive a compensation for the devotion of their time to the public service." The motion was seconded by M^r Elseworth, and agreed to by all the States except S. Carol^a. It seemed to be meant only to get rid of the word "fixt" and leave greater room for modifying the provision on this point.
M^r Elseworth moved to strike out "to be paid out of the Nat^l Treasury"
and insert "to be paid by their respective States." If the Senate was meant to strengthen the Gov^t it ought to have the confidence of the States. The States will have an interest in keeping up a representation, and will make such provision for supporting the members as will ensure their attendance.
M^r Madison considered this as a departure from a fundamental principle, and subverting the end intended by allowing the Senate a duration of 6 years. They would if this motion should be agreed to, hold their places during pleasure; during the pleasure of the State Legislatures. One great end of the inst.i.tution was, that being a firm, wise and impartial body, it might not only give stability to the Gen^l Gov^t in its operations on individuals, but hold an even balance among different States. The motion would make the Senate like Congress, the mere Agents & Advocates of State interests & views, instead of being the impartial umpires & Guardians of justice and the general Good. Cong^s had lately by the establishment of a board with full powers to decide on the mutual claims between the U. States & the individual States, fairly acknowledged themselves to be unfit for discharging this part of the business referred to them by the Confederation.
M^r Dayton[112] considered the payment of the Senate by the States as fatal to their independence, he was decided for paying them out of the Nat^l Treasury.
[112] "Cap. Dayton is a young Gentleman of talents, with ambition to exert them. He possesses a good education and some reading; he speaks well, and seems desirous of improving himself in Oratory. There is an impetuosity in his temper that is injurious to him; but there is an honest rect.i.tude about him that makes him a valuable Member of Society, and secures to him the esteem of all good Men. He is about 30 years old, served with me a Brother Aid to General Sullivan in the Western Expedition of "79."--Pierce"s Notes, _Am. Hist. Rev._, iii., 328.
On the question for payment of the Senate to be left to the States as moved by M^r Elseworth.
Ma.s.s^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. P^a no. Del. no.
M^d no. V^a no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Col. Mason. He did not rise to make any motion, but to hint an idea which seemed to be proper for consideration. One important object in const.i.tuting the Senate was to secure the rights of property. To give them weight & firmness for this purpose, a considerable duration in office was thought necess[~a]y. But a longer term than 6 years, would be of no avail in this respect, if needy persons should be appointed. He suggested therefore the propriety of annexing to the office a qualification of property. He thought this would be very practicable; as the rules of taxation would supply a scale for measuring the degree of wealth possessed by every man.
A question was then taken whether the words "to be paid out of the public treasury," should stand.
Ma.s.s^{ts} ay. Con^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.
M^r Butler moved to strike out the ineligibility of Senators to _State offices_.
Mr. Williamson seconded the motion.[113]
[113] According to Yates, before Wilson spoke:
"Mr. Madison. Congress heretofore depended on state interests; we are now going to pursue the same plan."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 173.
M^r Wilson remarked the additional dependance this w^d create in the Senators on the States. The longer the time he observed allotted to the Officer, the more compleat will be the dependance if it exists at all.[114]
[114] After Wilson, according to Yates:
"Mr. Butler. This second branch I consider as the aristocratic part of our government; and they must be controlled by the states, or they will be too independent."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 173.
Gen^l Pinkney was for making the States as much as could be conveniently done, a part of the Gen^l Gov^t. If the Senate was to be appointed by the States, it ought in pursuance of the same idea to be paid by the States: and the States ought not to be barred from the opportunity of calling members of it into offices at home. Such a restriction would also discourage the ablest men from going into the Senate.
M^r Williamson moved a resolution so penned as to admit of the two following questions. 1. whether the members of the Senate should be ineligible to & incapable of holding offices _under the U. States_
2. Whether &c. under the _particular States_.
On the Question to postpone in order to consider Williamson"s Resol^n Mas^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay.
Del. ay. M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
M^r Gerry & M^r Madison move to add to M^r Williamson"s 1. Quest: "and for 1 year thereafter." On this amend^t
Mas^{ts} no. Con^t ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. P^a no. Del. ay.
M^d ay. V^a ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.
On M^r Will[iam]son"s 1 Question as amend^{ed} vz, inelig: & incapable &c. &c. for 1 year &c. ag^d to un[~a]mously.
On the 2. question as to ineligibility &c. to State offices,
Ma.s.s. ay. C^t no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P^a ay. Del. no. M^d no.
V^a ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.