The 5. Resol: "that each branch have the right of originating acts," was agreed to nem. con.
Adj^d.
WEDNESDAY JUNE 27. IN CONVENTION.
M^r Rutlidge moved to postpone the 6^{th} Resolution, defining the powers of Cong^s in order to take up the 7 & 8 which involved the most fundamental points; the rules of suffrage in the 2 branches which was agreed to nem. con.
A question being proposed on the Resol: 7; declaring that the suffrage in the first branch sh^d be according to an equitable ratio.
M^r L. Martin[115] contended at great length and with great eagerness that the General Gov^t was meant merely to preserve the State Govern^{ts} not to govern individuals: that its powers ought to be kept within narrow limits: that if too little power was given to it, more might be added; but that if too much, it could never be resumed: that individuals as such have little to do but with their own States; that the Gen^l Gov^t has no more to apprehend from the States composing the Union, while it pursues proper measures, that Gov^t over individuals has to apprehend from its subjects: that to resort to the Citizens at large for their sanction to a new Govern^t will be throwing them back into a state of Nature; that the dissolution of the State Gov^{ts} is involved in the nature of the process; that the people have no right to do this without the consent of those to whom they have delegated their power for State purposes: through their tongues only they can speak, through their ears, only can hear: that the States have shewn a good disposition to comply with the Acts of Cong^s, weak, contemptibly weak as that body has been; and have failed through inability alone to comply: that the heaviness of the private debts, and the waste of property during the war, were the chief causes of this inability; that he did not conceive the instances mentioned by M^r Madison of compacts between V^a & M^d between P^a & N. J. or of troops raised by Ma.s.s^{ts} for defence against the Rebels, to be violations of the articles of confederation--that an equal vote in each State was essential to the federal idea, and was founded in justice & freedom, not merely in policy: that tho" the States may give up this right of sovereignty, yet they had not, and ought not: that the States like individuals were in a State of nature equally sovereign & free. In order to prove that individuals in a State of Nature are equally free & independent he read pa.s.sages from Locke, Vattel, Lord Summers--Priestly. To prove that the case is the same with States till they surrender their equal sovereignty, he read other pa.s.sages in Locke & Vattel, and also Rutherford: that the States being equal cannot treat or confederate so as to give up an equality of votes without giving up their liberty: that the propositions on the table were a system of slavery for 10 States: that as V^a Ma.s.s^{ts} & P^a have 42/90 of the votes they can do as they please without a miraculous Union of the other ten: that they will have nothing to do, but to gain over one of the ten to make them compleat masters of the rest; that they can then appoint an Execut^e & Judiciary & legislate for them as they please: that there was & would continue a natural predilection & partiality in men for their own States; that the States, particularly the smaller, would never allow a negative to be exercised over their laws: that no State in Ratifying the Confederation had objected to the equality of votes; that the complaints at present run not ag^{st} this equality but the want of power: that 16 members from V^a would be more likely to act in concert than a like number formed of members from different States: that instead of a junction of the small States as a remedy, he thought a division of the large States would be more eligible.--This was the substance of a speech which was continued more than three hours. He was too much exhausted he said to finish his remarks, and reminded the House that he should tomorrow, resume them.
[115] "Mr. Martin, the Attorney-General from Maryland, spoke on this subject upwards of three hours. As his arguments were too diffuse, and in many instances desultory, it was not possible to trace him through the whole, or to methodize his ideas into a systematic or argumentative arrangement."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 174.
Adj^d.
THURSDAY JUNE 28TH. IN CONVENTION
M^r L. Martin resumed his discourse,[116] contending that the Gen^l Gov^t ought to be formed for the States, not for individuals: that if the States were to have votes in proportion to their numbers of people, it would be the same thing whether their representatives were chosen by the Legislatures or the people; the smaller States would be equally enslaved; that if the large States have the same interest with the smaller as was urged, there could be no danger in giving them an equal vote; they would not injure themselves, and they could not injure the large ones on that supposition without injuring themselves and if the interests, were not the same, the inequality of suffrage w^d be dangerous to the smaller States: that it will be in vain to propose any plan offensive to the rulers of the States, whose influence over the people will certainly prevent their adopting it: that the large States were weak at present in proportion to their extent; & could only be made formidable to the small ones, by the weight of their votes: that in case a dissolution of the Union should take place, the small States would have nothing to fear from their power; that if in such a case the three great States should league themselves together, the other ten could do so too; & that he had rather see partial Confederacies take place, than the plan on the table. This was the substance of the residue of his discourse which was delivered with much diffuseness & considerable vehemence.
[116] Yates gives Martin"s speech more fully:
"On federal grounds, it is said, that a minority will govern a majority--but on the Virginia plan a minority would tax a majority. In a federal government, a majority of states must and ought to tax. In the local government of states, counties may be unequal--still numbers, not property, govern. What is the government now forming, over states or persons? As to the latter, their rights cannot be the object of a general government. These are already secured by their guardians, the state governments. The general government is therefore intended only to protect and guard the rights of the states as states.
"This general government, I believe, is the first upon earth which gives checks against democracies or aristocracies. The only necessary check in a general government ought to be a restraint to prevent its absorbing the powers of the state governments. Representation on federal principles can only flow from state societies. Representation and taxation are ever inseparable--not according to the quantum of property, but the quantum of freedom.
"Will the representatives of a state forget state interests?
The mode of election cannot change it. These prejudices cannot be eradicated--Your general government cannot be just or equal upon the Virginia plan, unless you abolish state interests. If this cannot be done, you must go back to principles purely federal.
"On this latter ground, the state legislatures and their const.i.tuents will have no interests to pursue different from the general government, and both will be interested to support each other. Under these ideas can it be expected that the people can approve the Virginia plan? But it is said, the people, not the state legislatures, will be called upon for approbation--with an evident design to separate the interests of the governors from the governed. What must be the consequence? Anarchy and confusion. We lose the ideas of the powers with which we are intrusted. The legislatures must approve. By them it must, on your own plan, be laid before the people. How will such a government, over so many great states, operate. Wherever new settlements have been formed in large states, they immediately want to shake off their independency. Why? Because the government is too remote for their good. The people want it nearer home.
"The basis of all ancient and modern confederacies is the freedom and the independency of the states composing it. The states forming the amphictionic council were equal, though Lacedemon, one of the greatest states, attempted the exclusion of three of the lesser states from this right. The plan reported, it is true, only intends to diminish those rights, not to annihilate them--It was the ambition and power of the great Grecian states which at last ruined this respectable council. The states as societies are ever respectful. Has Holland or Switzerland ever complained of the equality of the states which compose their respective confederacies? Bern and Zurich are larger than the remaining eleven cantons--so of many of the states of Germany; and yet their governments are not complained of. Bern alone might usurp the whole power of the Helvetic confederacy, but she is contented still with being equal.
"The admission of the larger states into the confederation, on the principle of equality, is dangerous--But on the Virginia system it is ruinous and destructive. Still it is the true interest of all the states to confederate--It is their joint efforts which must protect and secure us from foreign danger, and give us peace and harmony at home.
"(Here Mr. Martin entered into a detail of the comparative powers of each state, and stated their probable weakness and strength.)
"At the beginning of our troubles with Great Britain, the smaller states were attempted to be cajoled to submit to the views of that nation, lest the larger states should usurp their rights. We then answered them--your present plan is slavery, which on the remote prospect of a distant evil, we will not submit to.
"I would rather confederate with any single state, than submit to the Virginia plan. But we are already confederated, and no power on earth can dissolve it but by the consent of _all_ the contracting powers--and four states, on this floor, have already declared their opposition to annihilate it. Is the old confederation dissolved, because some of the states wish a new confederation?"--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 177.
M^r Lansing & M^r Dayton moved to strike out "not," so that the 7 art.
might read that the rights of suffrage in the 1^{st} branch ought to be according to the rule established by the Confederation."
M^r Dayton expressed great anxiety that the question might not be put till tomorrow; Govern^r Livingston being kept away by indisposition, and the representation of N. Jersey thereby suspended.
M^r Williamson, thought that if any political truth could be grounded on mathematical demonstration, it was that if the States were equally sovereign now, and parted with equal proportions of sovereignty, that they would remain equally sovereign. He could not comprehend how the smaller States would be injured in the case, and wished some Gentleman would vouchsafe a solution of it. He observed that the small States, if they had a plurality of votes would have an interest in throwing the burdens off their own shoulders on those of the large ones. He begged that the expected addition of new States from the Westward might be kept in view. They would be small States, they would be poor States, they would be unable to pay in proportion to their numbers; their distance from market rendering the produce of their labour less valuable; they would consequently be tempted to combine for the purpose of laying burdens on com[~m]erce & consumption which would fall with greatest weight on the old States.
M^r Madison, s^d he was much disposed to concur in any expedient not inconsistent with fundamental principles, that could remove the difficulty concerning the rule of representation. But he could neither be convinced that the rule contended for was just, nor necessary for the safety of the small States ag^{st} the large States. That it was not just, had been conceded by M^r Breerly & M^r Paterson themselves. The expedient proposed by them was a new part.i.tion of the territory of the U. States. The fallacy of the reasoning drawn from the equality of Sovereign States in the formation of compacts, lay in confounding together mere Treaties, in which were specified certain duties to which the parties were to be bound, and certain rules by which their subjects were to be reciprocally governed in their intercourse, with a compact by which an authority was created paramount to the parties, & making laws for the government of them. If France, England & Spain were to enter into a Treaty for the regulation of commerce &c. with the Prince of Monacho & 4 or 5 other of the smallest sovereigns of Europe, they would not hesitate to treat as equals, and to make the regulations perfectly reciprocal. W^d the case be the same, if a Council were to be formed of deputies from each with authority and discretion, to raise money, levy troops, determine the value of coin &c.? Would 30 or 40, million of people submit their fortunes into the hands of a few thousands? If they did it would only prove that they expected more from the terror of their superior force, than they feared from the selfishness of their feeble a.s.sociates. Why are Counties of the Same States represented in proportion to their numbers? Is it because the representatives are chosen by the people themselves? So will be the representatives in the Nation^l Legislature. Is it because, the larger have more at stake than the smaller? The Case will be the same with the larger & smaller States.
Is it because the laws are to operate immediately on their persons & properties? The same is the case in some degree as the articles of confederation stand; the same will be the case in a far greater degree, under the plan proposed to be subst.i.tuted. In the cases of captures, of piracies, and of offences in a federal army, the property & persons of individuals depend on the laws of Cong^s. By the plan proposed a compleat power of taxation, the highest prerogative of supremacy is proposed to be vested in the National Gov^t. Many other powers are added which a.s.similate it to the Gov^t of individual States. The negative proposed on the State laws, will make it an essential branch of the State Legislatures & of course will require that it should be exercised by a body established on like principles with the other branches of those Legislatures.--That it is not necess[~a]y to secure the small States ag^{st} the large ones he conceived to be equally obvious: Was a combination of the large ones dreaded? This must arise either from some interest common to V^a Ma.s.s^{ts} & P^a & distinguishing them from the other States, or from the mere circ.u.mstance of similarity of size. Did any such common interest exist? In point of situation they could not have been more effectually separated from each other by the most jealous citizen of the most jealous State. In point of manners, Religion, and the other circ.u.mstances which sometimes beget affection between different communities, they were not more a.s.similated than the other States--In point of the staple productions they were as dissimilar as any three other States in the Union. The Staple of Ma.s.s^{ts} was _fish_, of P^a _flower_, of V^a _Tob^o_. Was a Combination to be apprehended from the mere circ.u.mstance of equality of size? Experience suggested no such danger. The journals of Cong^s did not present any peculiar a.s.sociation of these States in the votes recorded. It had never been seen that different Counties in the same State, conformable in extent, but disagreeing in other circ.u.mstances, betrayed a propensity to such combinations. Experience rather taught a contrary lesson. Among individuals of superior eminence & weight in Society, rivalships were much more frequent than coalitions. Among independent Nations, pre-eminent over their neighbours, the same remark was verified.
Carthage & Rome tore one another to pieces instead of uniting their forces to devour the weaker nations of the Earth. The Houses of Austria & France were hostile as long as they remained the greatest powers of Europe. England & France have succeeded to the pre-eminence & to the enmity. To this principle we owe perhaps our liberty. A coalition between those powers would have been fatal to us. Among the princ.i.p.al members of antient & Modern confederacies, we find the same effect from the same cause. The contentions, not the Coalitions of Sparta, Athens & Thebes, proved fatal to the smaller members of the Amphyctionic Confederacy. The contentions, not the combinations of Prussia & Austria, have distracted & oppressed the German empire. Were the large States formidable _singly_ to their smaller neighbours? On this supposition the latter ought to wish for such a General Gov^t as will operate with equal energy on the former as on themselves. The more lax the band, the more liberty the larger will have to avail themselves of their superior force. Here again Experience was an instructive monitor. What is y^e situation of the weak compared with the strong in those stages of civilization in which the violence of individuals is least controuled by an efficient Government? The Heroic period of Antient Greece, the feudal licentiousness of the middle ages of Europe, the existing condition of the American Savages, answer this question. What is the situation of the minor sovereigns in the great society of independent nations, in which the more powerful are under no controul but the nominal authority of the law of Nations? Is not the danger to the former exactly in proportion to their weakness. But there are cases still more in point. What was the condition of the weaker members of the Amphyctionic Confederacy.
Plutarch (life of Themistocles) will inform us that it happened but too often that the strongest cities corrupted & awed the weaker, and that Judgment went in favor of the more powerful party. What is the condition of the lesser states in the German Confederacy? We all know that they are exceedingly trampled upon: and that they owe their safety as far as they enjoy it, partly to their enlisting themselves, under the rival banners of the pre-eminent members, partly to alliances with neighbouring Princes which the Const.i.tution of the Empire does not prohibit. What is the state of things in the lax system of the Dutch Confederacy? Holland contains about 1/2 the People, supplies about 1/2 of the money, and by her influence, silently & indirectly governs the whole republic. In a word; the two extremes before us are a perfect separation & a perfect incorporation, of the 13 States. In the first case they would be independent nations subject to no law, but the law of nations. In the last, they would be mere counties of one entire republic, subject to one common law. In the first case the smaller States would have every thing to fear from the larger. In the last they would have nothing to fear. The true policy of the small States therefore lies in promoting those principles & that form of Gov^t which will most approximate the States to the condition of counties. Another consideration may be added. If the Gen^l Gov^t be feeble, the large States distrusting its continuance, and foreseeing that their importance & security may depend on their own size & strength, will never submit to a part.i.tion. Give to the Gen^l Gov^t sufficient energy & permanency, & you remove the objection. Gradual part.i.tions of the large, & junctions of the small States will be facilitated, and time may effect that equalization, which is wished for by the small States now, but can never be accomplished at once.
M^r Wilson. The leading argument of those who contend for equality of votes among the States is that the States as such being equal, and being represented not as districts of individuals, but in their political & corporate capacities, are ent.i.tled to an equality of suffrage. According to this mode of reasoning the representation of the boroughs in Engl[~d]
which has been allowed on all hands to be the rotten part of the Const.i.tution, is perfectly right & proper. They are like the States represented in their corporate capacity like the States therefore they are ent.i.tled to equal voices, old Sarum to as many as London. And instead of the injury supposed hitherto to be done to London, the true ground of Complaint lies with old Sarum: for London instead of two which is her proper share, sends four representatives to Parliament.[117]
[117] According to King"s Notes, Charles Pinckney spoke after Madison: "_Charles Pinckney._ The Honors & offices may become the objects of strong desire and of combination to acquire them. If Representatives be apportioned among the States in the Ratio of numbers, the Citizens will be free and equal but the States will be unequal, and their sovereignty will be degraded."--King"s _Life and Correspondence of Rufus King_, i., 610.
M^r Sherman. The question is not what rights naturally belong to man; but how they may be most equally & effectually guarded in Society. And if some give up more than others in order to obtain this end, there can be no room for complaint. To do otherwise, to require an equal concession from all, if it would create danger to the rights of some, would be sacrificing the end to the means. The rich man who enters into Society along with the poor man, gives up more than the poor man, yet with an equal vote he is equally safe. Were he to have more votes than the poor man in proportion to his superior stake the rights of the poor man would immediately cease to be secure. This consideration prevailed when the articles of Confederation were formed.[118]
[118] According to Yates, Madison followed Sherman: "Mr.
Madison. There is danger in the idea of the gentleman from Connecticut. Unjust representation will ever produce it. In the United Netherlands, Holland governs the whole, although she has only one vote. The counties in Virginia are exceedingly disproportionate, and yet the smaller has an equal vote with the greater, and no inconvenience arises."--Yates, _Secret Proceedings_, etc., 182.
The determination of the question from striking out the word "not" was put off till tomorrow at the request of the Deputies of N. York.
Doc^r Franklin. M^r President.
The small progress we have made after 4 or five weeks close attendance & continual reasonings with each other--our different sentiments on almost every question, several of the last producing as many noes as ays, is methinks a melancholy proof of the imperfection of the Human Understanding. We indeed seem to feel our own want of political wisdom, since we have been running about in search of it. We have gone back to ancient history for models of Government, and examined the different forms of those Republics which having been formed with the seeds of their own dissolution now no longer exist. And we have viewed Modern States all round Europe, but find none of their Const.i.tutions suitable to our circ.u.mstances.
In this situation of this a.s.sembly, groping as it were in the dark to find political truth, and scarce able to distinguish it when presented to us, how has it happened, Sir, that we have not hitherto once thought of humbly applying to the Father of lights to illuminate our understandings? In the beginning of the Contest with G. Britain, when we were sensible of danger we had daily prayer in this room for the divine protection.--Our prayers, Sir, were heard, & they were graciously answered. All of us who were engaged in the struggle must have observed frequent instances of a superintending providence in our favor. To that kind providence we owe this happy opportunity of consulting in peace on the means of establishing our future national felicity. And have we now forgotten that powerful friend? or do we imagine that we no longer need his a.s.sistance? I have lived, Sir, a long time, and the longer I live, the more convincing proofs I see of this truth--_that G.o.d Governs in the affairs of men_. And if a sparrow cannot fall to the ground without his notice, is it probable that an empire can rise without his aid? We have been a.s.sured, Sir, in the sacred writings that "except the Lord build the House they labour in vain that build it." I firmly believe this; and I also believe that without his concurring aid we shall succeed in this political building no better than the Builders of Babel: We shall be divided by our little partial local interests; our projects will be confounded, and we ourselves shall become a reproach and bye word down to future ages. And what is worse, mankind may hereafter from this unfortunate instance, despair of establishing Governments by Human wisdom and leave it to chance, war and conquest.
I therefore beg leave to move--that henceforth prayers imploring the a.s.sistance of Heaven, and its blessings on our deliberations, be held in this a.s.sembly every morning before we proceed to business, and that one or more of the Clergy of this City be requested to officiate in that Service--
M^r Sherman seconded the motion.
M^r Hamilton & several others expressed their apprehensions that however proper such a resolution might have been at the beginning of the convention, it might at this late day, 1. bring on it some disagreeable animadversions, & 2. lead the public to believe that the embarra.s.sments and dissensions within the Convention, had suggested this measure. It was answered by Doc^r F. M^r Sherman & others, that the past omission of a duty could not justify a further omission--that the rejection of such a proposition would expose the Convention to more unpleasant animadversions than the adoption of it: and that the alarm out of doors that might be excited for the state of things within, would at least be as likely to do good as ill.
M^r Williamson, observed that the true cause of the omission could not be mistaken. The Convention had no funds.
M^r Randolph proposed in order to give a favorable aspect to y^e measure, that a sermon be preached at the request of the convention on 4^{th} of July, the anniversary of Independence; & thenceforward prayers be used in y^e Convention every morning. D^r Frank^n 2^{ded} this motion. After several unsuccessful attempts for silently postponing this matter by adjourn^g the adjournment was at length carried, without any vote on the motion.
FRIDAY JUNE 29^{TH} IN CONVENTION.
Doc^r Johnson. The controversy must be endless whilst Gentlemen differ in the grounds of their arguments; Those on one side considering the States as districts of people composing one political Society; those on the other considering them as so many political societies. The fact is that the States do exist as political Societies, and a Gov^t is to be formed for them in their political capacity, as well as for the individuals composing them. Does it not seem to follow, that if the States as such are to exist they must be armed with some power of self-defence. This is the idea of (Col. Mason) who appears to have looked to the bottom of this matter. Besides the aristocratic and other interests, which ought to have the means of defending themselves, the States have their interests as such, and are equally ent.i.tled to like means. On the whole he thought that as in some respects the States are to be considered in their political capacity, and in others as districts of individual citizens the two ideas embraced on different sides, instead of being opposed to each other, ought to be combined; that in _one_ branch the _people_, ought to be represented, in the _other_ the _States_.
M^r Ghoram. The States as now confederated have no doubt a right to refuse to be consolidated, or to be formed into any new system. But he wished the small States which seemed most ready to object, to consider which are to give up most, they or the larger ones. He conceived that a rupture of the Union w^d be an event unhappy for all, but surely the large States would be least unable to take care of themselves, and to make connections with one another. The weak therefore were most interested in establishing some general system for maintaining order. If among individuals, composed partly of weak, and partly of strong, the former most need the protection of law & Government, the case is exactly the same with weak & powerful States. What would be the situation of Delaware (for these things he found must be spoken out, & it might as well be done at first as last) what w^d be the situation of Delaware in case of a separation of the States? Would she not be at the mercy of Pennsylvania? would not her true interest lie in being consolidated with her, and ought she not now to wish for such a union with P^a under one Gov^t as will put it out of the power of Pen^a to oppress her? Nothing can be more ideal than the danger apprehended by the States from their being formed into one nation. Ma.s.s^{ts} was originally three colonies, viz old Ma.s.s^{ts} Plymouth--& the province of Mayne. These apprehensions existed then. An incorporation took place; all parties were safe & satisfied; and every distinction is now forgotten. The case was similar with Connecticut & New haven. The dread of Union was reciprocal; the consequence of it equally salutary and satisfactory. In like manner N.
Jersey has been made one society out of two parts. Should a separation of the States take place, the fate of N. Jersey w^d be worst of all. She has no foreign commerce & can have but little. P^a & N. York will continue to levy taxes on her consumption. If she consults her interest she w^d beg of all things to be annihilated. The apprehensions of the small States ought to be appeased by another reflection Ma.s.s^{ts} will be divided. The province of Maine is already considered as approaching the term of its annexation to it; and P^a will probably not increase, considering the present state of her population, & other events that may happen. On the whole he considered a Union of the States as necessary to their happiness, & a firm Gen^l Gov^t as necessary to their Union. He sh^d consider it as his duty if his colleagues viewed the matter in the same light he did to stay here as long as any other State would remain with them, in order to agree on some plan that could with propriety be recommended to the people.
M^r Elseworth, did not despair. He still trusted that some good plan of Gov^t w^d be devised & adopted.