LONDON, _7th October 1853._
Lord Aberdeen presents his humble duty to your Majesty. As your Majesty will expect to hear from him to-day, he has the honour of addressing your Majesty, although he could wish that it had been in his power to give your Majesty a more full and satisfactory account of the decisions of the Cabinet. The meeting was very long, and considerable difference of opinion prevailed in the course of the discussion. At length, however, Lord Aberdeen is happy to say there was such an agreement as ensured a certain degree of unanimity. With this view, it was determined to adhere to a defensive principle of action in the East. The Fleets may perhaps be already at Constantinople; but, at all events, they are to be brought there forthwith, and to be stationed either there or in the Bosphorus, unless the Russians should cross the Danube, or make any attack upon the Turkish possessions on the coast of the Black Sea. In this case, the combined Fleets would enter the Black Sea, for the defence of the Turkish territory.
Considering the position we have already a.s.sumed in this unfortunate affair, perhaps it was impossible to do less than this; and as there is very little chance of Russia undertaking any active hostilities of the nature apprehended, it may reasonably be hoped that no actual collision will take place. At the same time it must be recollected that Russia will regard the entrance of line of battle-ships into the Black Sea as a virtual declaration of war against herself.
There is yet no confirmation of the actual declaration of war by the Porte, and although there is no reason to suspect any serious impediment to the decision of the Divan being fulfilled, it is rather strange that intelligence to this effect has not been received. If Lord Stratford should see great cause for apprehension at the prospect of the Turks in the prosecution of hostilities, it is just possible that by his influence he may have arrested the progress of their warlike measures; but probably this is too much to hope. At all events, Lord Aberdeen trusts that the path of negotiation is not finally closed, and that, notwithstanding the equivocal position of Great Britain in this contest, it may still be possible to employ words of conciliation and peace....
[Pageheading: WAR IMMINENT]
[Pageheading: LORD ABERDEEN OVERBORNE]
_Memorandum by the Prince Albert._
BALMORAL, _10th October 1853._
I had a long interview with Sir James Graham this morning, and told him that Lord Aberdeen"s last letter to the Queen and him[26] made us very uneasy. It was evident that Lord Aberdeen was, against his better judgment, consenting to a course of policy which he inwardly condemned, that his desire to maintain unanimity at the Cabinet led to concessions which by degrees altered the whole character of the policy, while he held out no hope of being able permanently to secure agreement. I described the Queen"s position as a very painful one.
Here were decisions taken by the Cabinet, perhaps even acted upon, involving the most momentous consequences, without her previous concurrence or even the means for her to judge of the propriety or impropriety of course to be adopted, with evidence that the Minister, in whose judgment the Queen placed her chief reliance, disapproved of it. The position was morally and const.i.tutionally a wrong one. The Queen ought to have the whole policy in spirit and ultimate tendency developed before her to give her deliberate sanction to it, knowing what it involved her in abroad and at home. She might now be involved in war, of which the consequences could not be calculated, chiefly by the desire of Lord Aberdeen to keep his Cabinet together; this might then break down, and the Queen would be left without an efficient Government, and a war on her hands. Lord Aberdeen renounced one of his chief sources of strength in the Cabinet, by not making it apparent that he requires the sanction of the Crown to the course proposed by the Cabinet, and has to justify his advice by argument before it can be adopted, and that it does not suffice to come to a decision at the table of the Cabinet. Sir James Graham perfectly coincided with this view and offered to go up to Town immediately. The Queen wrote the letter to Lord Aberdeen ... which Sir James takes up with him. He shall arrive at Windsor on Friday (14th), and Lord Aberdeen is to have an Audience on Sat.u.r.day. Sir James will tell him that the Queen wants his deliberate opinion on what course is best to be followed, and that the course once adopted should be steadily and uninterruptedly pursued.
ALBERT.
[Footnote 26:
_The Earl of Aberdeen to Sir James Graham._ [_Submitted to the Queen._]
ARGYLL HOUSE, _8th October 1853._
MY DEAR GRAHAM,--... When we met, Clarendon made a sort of _resume_ of what had taken place before we all separated, but ended with no specific proposal. After a few interlocutory remarks from different quarters, Palmerston proposed his plan.
Lord John faintly supported it in general terms, but did not seem much in earnest about it. I said that it appeared to involve the necessity of a declaration of war against Russia, and the calling together Parliament forthwith. Gladstone strongly argued against the proposal. Clarendon then read an outline of his proposed instructions, which were a great abatement from Palmerston"s plan. We came at last to a sort of compromise; our great difficulty being now to deal with the question of entering the Black Sea. I consented to this being done, provided it was strictly in defence of some point of attack on Turkish territory. I have no fear that this will take place; and as long as we abstain from entering the Black Sea, Peace may be possible between us and Russia. We have thus a.s.sumed a strictly defensive position, which for the moment may be sufficient, and will enable us to carry on negotiations; but this cannot last long. Under the character of defensive war, we should inevitably become extensively engaged. Should the Turks be at all worsted, which is probable, of course we must increase our a.s.sistance. We should have a French army, and perhaps English money--all for defence.
The aspect of the Cabinet was, on the whole, very good.
Gladstone, active and energetic for Peace; Argyll, Herbert, C. Wood, and Granville, all in the same sense. Newcastle, not quite so much so, but good; Lansdowne, not so warlike as formerly; Lord John warlike enough, but subdued in tone; Palmerston urged his views perseveringly, but not disagreeably. The Chancellor said little, but was cordially peaceful. Molesworth was not present, there having been some mistake in sending the notice.
On the whole, therefore, yesterday pa.s.sed off well enough; but we shall see what to-day will bring us. Not a syllable was said in the Cabinet on any other subject. Lord John seemed in good humour; he came to see me a few minutes before the Cabinet. I told you that I had spoken to Gladstone very fully; but I did not press any decision respecting _domestic_ matters, as it would at this moment be quite unseasonable.
Nevertheless, it must not be forgotten altogether. Yours, etc., etc.,
ABERDEEN.]
[Pageheading: LORD STRATFORD"S INSTRUCTIONS]
_Queen Victoria to the Earl of Clarendon._
BALMORAL, _11th October 1853._
The Queen has received Lord Clarendon"s letter. She had written to Lord Aberdeen that she felt it her duty to pause before giving her consent to the measures decided on in the Cabinet, until she should have received an explanation on the views which dictated that decision, and of the ulterior steps involved in it; and Sir James Graham is gone up to Town, verbally to explain more fully the Queen"s feelings. She has now received and read the Despatches, which have in the meantime been sent off to their points of destination without having received her sanction!
The draft to Vienna the Queen thinks very ably argued, and justly to define the present position of the question at issue.[27]
The instructions to Lord Stratford,[28] on the other hand, appear to her very vague, and entrusting him with enormous powers and a lat.i.tude of discretion which is hardly to be called safe. As matters have now been arranged, it appears to the Queen, moreover, that we have taken on ourselves in conjunction with France all the risks of a European war, without having bound Turkey to any conditions with respect to provoking it. The hundred and twenty fanatical Turks const.i.tuting the Divan at Constantinople are left sole judges of the line of policy to be pursued, and made cognisant at the same time of the fact that England and France have bound themselves to defend the Turkish Territory! This is entrusting them with a power which Parliament has been jealous to confide even to the hands of the British Crown. It may be a question whether England ought to go to war for the defence of so-called Turkish Independence; but there can be none that if she does so, she ought to be the sole judge of what const.i.tutes a breach of that independence, and have the fullest power to prevent by negotiation the breaking out of the war.
The Queen would wish copies of the enclosed papers to be sent for her use as soon as convenient.
[Footnote 27: In this despatch Lord Clarendon, after referring to the interpretation which Count Nesselrode had put upon the Vienna Note, and the Russian rejection of it as amended by the Porte, told Lord Westmorland that it would be useless and dishonourable to recommend it in its unaltered form, that the Czar was contending for privileges for Christian subjects of the Porte not hitherto enjoyed by them, and that a war embarked upon in such a cause would be without parallel in history.]
[Footnote 28: Authority had been given to Lord Stratford to employ the British Fleet in the manner he might deem most fit for defending Turkish territory from aggression, and he was instructed that if the Russian Fleet left Sebastopol, the British Fleet was to pa.s.s through the Bosphorus.]
[Pageheading: RESENTMENT OF THE CZAR]
[Pageheading: LORD JOHN AND THE PREMIERSHIP]
_Memorandum by the Prince Albert._
WINDSOR CASTLE, _16th October 1853._
We saw Lord Aberdeen yesterday. He went with us through the whole of the proceedings of the last six weeks with respect to the Eastern Question. Regretted Count Nesselrode"s Note,[29] which Baron Brunnow owned n.o.body would regret more than the Count himself, acknowledged the weakness of Austria, felt sure of Lord Stratford"s insincerity towards him and the Government,... as he had to Lord Aberdeen"s certain knowledge called "the conduct of the Government infamous" and declared "he would let the world know that his name was Canning." He acknowledged the disadvantage of the course adopted by the Cabinet, which left the Turks at liberty to do as they pleased; he had to concede this to the Cabinet, which would otherwise have been broken up by Lord John and Lord Palmerston. Had he known what the Queen"s opinion was, he might have been more firm, feeling himself supported by the Crown, but he had imagined from her letters that there was more animosity against Russia and leaning to war in her mind.
[Footnote 29: In this despatch to Baron Meyendorff, the Austrian Foreign Minister, the Count had disclosed the fact that the Russian interpretation of the Vienna Note differed from that of the other Powers.]
Yet, under all the adverse circ.u.mstances Lord Aberdeen saw still reason for hope that a peaceable settlement could be obtained. The French were ready to do anything we pleased, go to war, remain at peace, etc., etc.; in fact, Louis Napoleon had experienced the great advantage for his position of the Alliance with England.... Lord Stratford was thoroughly frightened, and had made a proposal himself, which accordingly he would support _con amore_. The Emperor of Russia had failed in his attempt to form a Northern League against the Western Powers.... The Emperor complained bitterly of the conduct of the Powers, who had disgraced him before the world by making him accept a Note, and sanctioning its alteration by Turkey; "now they should do what they pleased and settle matters with Turkey first, and bring him only what was settled and fixed, he was wearied of the whole business, and anxious to get rid of it for ever."
What Lord Aberdeen now proposed was to follow the Emperor"s advice and agree with Turkey upon a Note, leaving out all that she had objected to in the Vienna Note as Lord Stratford recommended, and taking as much as possible Redschid Pasha"s own words to found the proposal of it upon the declaration made by the Emperor at Olmutz to the Powers, that he sought for _no new_ right, privilege, or advantage, but solely for the confirmation of the legal _status quo_, but accompanying this with a declaration, that if Turkey created needless difficulties and tried to evade a peaceful settlement the Powers would withdraw their support and leave her to fight her own battle. We went over the Doc.u.ments which are not yet settled, even between Lord Aberdeen and Lord Clarendon, and will require the greatest caution in their wording. It is evident that the Turks have every inducement not to let this opportunity slip in going to war with Russia, as they will probably never find so advantageous a one again, as the whole of Christendom has declared them in the right, and they would fight with England and France actively on their side!
At home, Lord Aberdeen said matters do not stand much better. Lord John has convinced himself that, under present circ.u.mstances it would not do for him to ask Lord Aberdeen to retire from the Prime Ministership and let him step in in his place; perhaps he has found out also that the Peelites will not serve under him; his own Whig colleagues would very much regret if not object to such a change, and that Lord Palmerston could not well submit to the arrangement. So he told Lord Aberdeen that he had given up that idea; it was clear, however, that he was now looking for an opportunity to break up the Government on some popular ground, which it was impossible to hope that he should not find. He now had asked for the immediate summoning of Parliament, called for by the state of the Oriental Question. This would create the greatest alarm in the country, and embarra.s.sment to the Government, and was therefore resisted. Lord Aberdeen told Lord John quite plainly he knew what the proposal meant--he meant to break up the Government. "I hope not," was Lord John"s laughing reply.
The Queen taxed Lord Aberdeen with imprudence in talking to Lord John of his own readiness to leave office, which he acknowledged, but called _very natural_ in a man of seventy. Lord John was dissatisfied with his position;... upon Lord Aberdeen telling him that he had the most powerful and honourable position of any man in England as leader of the House of Commons, he answered, "Oh, _there_ I am quite happy!"
I asked how under such circ.u.mstances that all-important measure of Parliamentary Reform, upon which the future stability and well-being of the Country so much depended, was to be matured and brought forward? Lord Aberdeen replied that Lord John had it all ready and prepared in his pocket, and told Lord Aberdeen so, adding, however, that under present circ.u.mstances there was no use in bringing it forward, to which Lord Aberdeen added: "You mean unless you sit in the chair which I now occupy?" Lord John laughed.
We discussed the probable consequences of Lord John"s retirement. Lord Aberdeen thought that Lord Palmerston, Lord Lansdowne, and even Lord Clarendon would secede with him, but this by no means implied that the whole party would; Lord Palmerston would not coalesce with Lord John, but try for the lead himself; Lord Clarendon quite agreed with Lord Aberdeen, and had been very angry with Lord John, but was personally under great obligations to him, and Sir James Graham had (as he said) been very much struck with the change of tone in Lord Clarendon at the last meeting of the Cabinet. Most of the Liberals seemed very much pleased with their situation. Sir James Graham had, of his own accord, told Lord Aberdeen that, in the event of Lord John"s secession, he himself could not well sit in the House of Commons under so much younger a man as Mr Gladstone as Leader. He knew that there would be objections to his a.s.suming the lead himself, but he would be quite ready to go to the House of Lords to support Lord Aberdeen.
ALBERT.
[Pageheading: THE CZAR"S LETTER]