MY DEAR RALPH:
Arthur has sent me Gardiner"s 37-page sketch of American-British Concords and Discords--a remarkable sketch; and he has reminded me that your summer plan is to elaborate (into a popular style) your sketch of the same subject. You and Gardiner went over the same ground, each in a very good fashion. That"s a fascinating task, and it opens up a wholly new vista of our History and of Anglo-Saxon, democratic history. Much lies ahead of that. And all this puts it in my mind to write you a little discourse on _style_. Gardiner has no style. He put his facts down much as he would have noted on a blue print the facts about an engineering project that he sketched.
The style of your article, which has much to be said for it as a magazine article, is not the best style for a book.
Now, this whole question of style--well, it"s the gist of good writing. There"s no really effective writing without it. Especially is this true of historical writing. Look at X Y Z"s writings. He knows his American history and has written much on it. He"s written it as an Ohio blacksmith shoes a horse--not a touch of literary value in it all; all dry as dust--as dry as old Bancroft.
Style is good breeding--and art--in writing. It consists of the arrangement of your matter, first; then, more, of the gait; the manner and the manners of your expressing it. Work every group of facts, naturally and logically grouped to begin with, into a climax. Work every group up as a sculptor works out his idea or a painter, each group complete in itself. Throw out any superfluous facts or any merely minor facts that prevent the orderly working up of the group--that prevent or mar the effect you wish to present.
Then, when you"ve got a group thus presented, go over what you"ve made of it, to make sure you"ve used your material and its arrangement to the best effect, taking away merely extraneous or superfluous or distracting facts, here and there adding concrete ill.u.s.trations--putting in a convincing detail here, and there a touch of colour.
Then go over it for your vocabulary. See that you use no word in a different meaning than it was used 100 years ago and will be used 100 years hence. You wish to use only the permanent words--words, too, that will be understood to carry the same meaning to English readers in every part of the world. Your vocabulary must be chosen from the permanent, solid, stable parts of the language.
Then see that no sentence contains a hint of obscurity.
Then go over the words you use to see if they be the best. Don"t fall into merely current phrases. If you have a long word, see if a native short one can be put in its place which will be more natural and stronger. Avoid a Latin vocabulary and use a plain English one--short words instead of long ones.
Most of all, use _idioms_--English idioms of force. Say an agreement was "come to." Don"t say it was "consummated." For the difference between idioms and a Latin style, compare Lincoln with George Washington. One"s always interesting and convincing. The other is dull in spite of all his good sense. How most folk do misuse and waste words!
Freeman went too far in his use of one-syllable words. It became an affectation. But he is the only man I can think of that ever did go too far in that direction. X--would have written a great history if he had had the natural use of idioms. As it is, he has good sense and no style; and his book isn"t half so interesting as it would have been if he had some style--some proper value of short, clear-cut words that mean only one thing and that leave no vagueness.
You"ll get a good style if you practice it. It is in your blood and temperament and way of saying things. But it"s a high art and must be laboriously cultivated.
Yours affectionately,
W.H.P.
This glimpse of a changing and chastened England appears in a letter of this period:
The disposition shown by an endless number of such incidents is something more than a disposition of grat.i.tude of a people helped when they are hard pressed. All these things show the changed and changing Englishman. It has already come to him that he may be weaker than he had thought himself and that he may need friends more than he had once imagined; and, if he must have helpers and friends, he"d rather have his own kinsmen. He"s a queer "cuss," this Englishman. But he isn"t a liar nor a coward nor any sort of "a yellow dog." He"s true, and he never runs--a possible hero any day, and, when heroic, modest and quiet and graceful. The trouble with him has been that he got great world power too easily. In the times when he exploited the world for his own enrichment, there were no other successful exploiters. It became an easy game to him. He organized sea traffic and sea power. Of course he became rich--far, far richer than anybody else, and, therefore, content with himself. He has, therefore, kept much of his mediaeval impedimenta, his dukes and marquesses and all that they imply--his outworn ceremonies and his mediaeval disregard of his social inferiors. Nothing is well done in this Kingdom for the big public, but only for the cla.s.ses. The railway stations have no warm waiting rooms. The people pace the platform till the train comes, and milord sits snugly wrapt up in his carriage till his footman announces the approach of the train. And occasional discontent is relieved by emigration to the Colonies. If any man becomes weary of his restrictions he may go to Australia and become a gentleman.
The remarkable loyalty of the Colonies has in it something of a servant"s devotion to his old master.
Now this trying time of war and the threat and danger of extinction are bringing--have in fact already brought--the conviction that many changes must come. The first sensible talk about popular education ever heard here is just now beginning. Many a gentleman has made up his mind to try to do with less than seventeen servants for the rest of his life since he now _has_ to do with less. Privilege, on which so large a part of life here rests, is already pretty well shot to pieces. A lot of old baggage will never be recovered after this war: that"s certain. During a little after-dinner speech in a club not long ago I indulged in a pleasantry about excessive impedimenta. Lord Derby, Minister of War and a bluff and honest aristocrat, sat near me and he whispered to me--"That"s me." "Yes," I said, "that"s you," and the group about us made merry at the jest. The meaning of this is, they now joke about what was the most solemn thing in life three years ago.
None of this conveys the idea I am trying to explain--the change in the English point of view and outlook--a half century"s change in less than three years, radical and fundamental change, too. The mother of the Duke of X came to see me this afternoon, hobbling on her sticks and feeble, to tell me of a radiant letter she had received from her granddaughter who has been in Washington visiting the Spring Rices. "It"s all very wonderful," said the venerable lady, "and my granddaughter actually heard the President make a speech!" Now, knowing this lady and knowing her son, the Duke, and knowing how this girl, his daughter, has been brought up, I dare swear that three years ago not one of them would have crossed the street to hear any President that ever lived. They"ve simply become different people. They were very genuine before. They are very genuine now.
It is this steadfastness in them that gives me sound hope for the future. They don"t forget sympathy or help or friendship. Our going into the war has eliminated the j.a.panese question. It has shifted the virtual control of the world to English-speaking peoples. It will bring into the best European minds the American ideal of service. It will, in fact, give us the lead and make the English in the long run our willing followers and allies. I don"t mean that we shall always have plain sailing. But I do mean that the direction of events for the next fifty or one hundred years has now been determined.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Lord Robert Cecil, Minister of Blockade, 1916-18, a.s.sistant Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 1918]
[Ill.u.s.tration: General John J. Pershing, Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Force in the Great War]
Yet Page found one stolid opposition to his attempts to establish the friendliest relations between the two peoples. That offish att.i.tude of the Washington Administration, to which reference has already been made, did not soften with the progress of events. Another experience now again brought out President Wilson"s coldness toward his allies. About this time many rather queer Americans--some of the "international"
breed--were coming to England on more or less official missions. Page was somewhat humiliated by these excursions; he knew that his country possessed an almost unlimited supply of vivid speakers, filled with zeal for the allied cause, whose influence, if they could be induced to cross the Atlantic, would put new spirit into the British. The idea of having a number of distinguished Americans come to England and tell the British public about the United States and especially about the American preparations for war, was one that now occupied his thoughts. In June, 1917, he wrote his old friend Dr. Wallace b.u.t.trick, extending an invitation to visit Great Britain as a guest of the British Government.
Dr. b.u.t.trick made a great success; his speeches drew large crowds and proved a source of inspiration to the British ma.s.ses. So successful were they, indeed, that the British Government desired that other Americans of similar type should come and spread the message. In November, therefore, Dr. b.u.t.trick returned to the United States for the purpose of organizing such a committee. Among the eminent Americans whom he persuaded to give several months of their time to this work of heartening our British allies were Mr. George E. Vincent, President of the Rockefeller Foundation, Mr. Harry Pratt Judson, President of Chicago University, Mr. Charles H. Van Hise, President of the University of Wisconsin, Mr. Edwin A. Alderman, President of the University of Virginia, Mr. Harry Emerson Fosd.i.c.k, and Bishop Lawrence of Ma.s.sachusetts. It was certainly a distinguished group, but it was the gentleman selected to be its head that gave it almost transcendent importance in the eyes of the British Government. This was ex-President William H. Taft. The British lay greater emphasis upon official rank than do Americans, and the fact that an ex-President of the United States was to head this delegation made it almost an historic event. Mr.
Taft was exceedingly busy, but he expressed his willingness to give up all his engagements for several months and to devote his energies to enlightening the British public about America and its purposes in the war. An official invitation was sent him from London and accepted.
Inasmuch as Mr. Taft was an ex-President and a representative of the political party opposed to the one in power, he thought it only courteous that he call upon Mr. Wilson, explain the purpose of his mission, and obtain his approval. He therefore had an interview with the President at the White House; the date was December 12, 1917. As soon as Mr. Wilson heard of the proposed visit to Great Britain he showed signs of irritation. He at once declared that it met with his strongest disapproval. When Mr. Taft remarked that the result of such an enterprise would be to draw Great Britain and the United States more closely together, Mr. Wilson replied that he seriously questioned the desirability of drawing the two countries any more closely together than they already were. He was opposed to putting the United States in a position of seeming in any way to be involved with British policy. There were divergencies of purpose, he said, and there were features of the British policy in this war of which he heartily disapproved. The motives of the United States in this war, the President continued, "were unselfish, but the motives of Great Britain seemed to him to be of a less unselfish character." Mr. Wilson cited the treaty between Great Britain and Italy as a sample of British statesmanship which he regarded as proving this contention. The President"s reference to this Italian treaty has considerable historic value; there has been much discussion as to when the President first learned of its existence, but it is apparent from this conversation with ex-President Taft that he must have known about it on December 12, 1917, for President Wilson based his criticism of British policy largely upon this Italian convention[67].
The President showed more and more feeling about the matter as the discussion continued. "There are too many Englishmen," he said, "in this country and in Washington now and I have asked the British Amba.s.sador to have some of them sent home."
Mr. Wilson referred to the jealousy of France at the close relations which were apparently developing between Great Britain and the United States. This was another reason, he thought, why it was unwise to make the bonds between them any tighter. He also called Mr. Taft"s attention to the fact that there were certain elements in the United States which were opposed to Great Britain--this evidently being a reference to the Germans and the Irish--and he therefore believed that any conspicuous attempts to increase the friendliness of the two countries for each other would arouse antagonism and resentment.
As Mr. Taft was leaving he informed Mr. Wilson that the plan for his visit and that of the other speakers had originated with the American Amba.s.sador to Great Britain. This, however, did not improve the President"s temper.
"Page," said the President, "is really an Englishman and I have to discount whatever he says about the situation in Great Britain."
And then he added, "I think you ought not to go, and the same applies to the other members of the party. I would like you to make my att.i.tude on this question known to those having the matter in charge."
Despite this rebuff Dr. b.u.t.trick and Mr. Taft were reluctant to give up the plan. An appeal was therefore made to Colonel House. Colonel House at once said that the proposed visit was an excellent thing and that he would make a personal appeal to Mr. Wilson in the hope of changing his mind. A few days afterward Colonel House called up Dr. b.u.t.trick and informed him that he had not succeeded. "I am sorry," wrote Colonel House to Page, "that the b.u.t.trick speaking programme has turned out as it has. The President was decidedly opposed to it and referred to it with some feeling."
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 64: August 1, 1917, Pope Benedict XV sent a letter to the Powers urging them to bring the war to an end and outlining possible terms of settlement. On August 29th President Wilson sent his historic reply. This declared, in memorable language, that the Hohenzollern dynasty was unworthy of confidence and that the United States would have no negotiations with its representatives. It inferentially took the stand that the Kaiser must abdicate, or be deposed, and the German autocracy destroyed, as part of the conditions of peace.]
[Footnote 65: On November 29, 1917, the London _Daily Telegraph_ published a letter from the Marquis of Lansdowne, which declared that the war had lasted too long and suggested that the British restate their war aims. This letter was severely condemned by the British press and by practically all representative British statesmen. It produced a most lamentable impression in the United States also.]
[Footnote 66: Eugene C. Shoecraft, the Amba.s.sador"s secretary.]
[Footnote 67: As related in Chapter XXII, page 267, President Wilson was informed of the so-called "secret treaties" by Mr. Balfour, in the course of his memorable visit to the White House.]
CHAPTER XXV
GETTING THE AMERICAN TROOPS TO FRANCE
A group of letters, written at this time, touch upon a variety of topics which were then engaging the interest of all countries:
_To Arthur W. Page_
London, January 19, 1918.
DEAR ARTHUR:
While your letter is still fresh in my mind I dictate the following in answer to your question about Palestine.
It has not been settled--and cannot be, I fancy, until the Peace Conference--precisely what the British will do with Palestine, but I have what I think is a correct idea of their general att.i.tude on the subject. First, of course, they do not propose to allow it to go back into Turkish hands; and the same can be said also of Armenia and possibly of Mesopotamia. Their idea of the future of Palestine is that whoever shall manage the country, or however it shall be managed, the Jews shall have the same chance as anybody else. Of course that"s quite an advance for the Jews there, but their idea is not that the Jews should have command of other populations there or control over them--not in the least. My guess at the English wish, which I have every reason to believe is the right guess, is that they would wish to have Palestine internationalized, whatever that means. That is to say, that it should have control of its own local affairs and be a free country but that some great Power, or number of Powers, should see to it that none of the races that live there should be allowed to impose upon the other races. I don"t know just how such a guarantee can be given by the great Powers or such a responsibility a.s.sumed except by an agreement among two or three of them, or barely possibly by the English keeping control themselves; but the control by the English after the war of the former German colonies will put such a large task on them that they will not be particularly eager to extend the area of their responsibility elsewhere. Of course a difficult problem will come up also about Constantinople and the Dardanelles. The Dardanelles must be internationalized.
I have never been able to consider the Zionist movement seriously.
It is a mere religious sentiment which will express itself in action by very few people. I have asked a number of Jews at various times who are in favour of the Zionist movement if they themselves are going there. They always say no. The movement, therefore, has fixed itself in my mind as a Jewish movement in which no Jew that you can lay your hands on will ever take part but who wants other Jews to take part in it. Of course there might be a flocking to Palestine of Jews from Russia and the adjoining countries where they are not happy, but I think the thing is chiefly a sentiment and nothing else. Morgenthau[68] is dead right. I agree with him _in toto_. I do not think anybody in the United States need be the least concerned about the Zionist movement because there isn"t a single Jew in our country such a fool as to go to Palestine when he can stay in the United States. The whole thing is a sentimental, religious, more or less unnatural and fantastic idea and I don"t think will ever trouble so practical a people as we and our Jews are.
The following memorandum is dated February 10, 1918: