"There are other minor gentry who seek to curry favor & get into office by adding their mite of abuse, but I think for coa.r.s.eness & malignity of invention Algernon Sidney surpa.s.ses all party writers who have ever made pretensions to any decency of character. There is on this subject no such thing as a free press in Virginia, and of consequence the calumnies and misrepresentations of this gentleman will remain uncontradicted & will by many be believed to be true. He will be supposed to be the champion of state rights, instead of being what he really is, the champion of dismemberment."[1006]
When Roane"s articles were finished, Marshall wrote Story: "I send you the papers containing the essays of Algernon Sidney. Their coa.r.s.eness & malignity would designate the author if he was not avowed. The argument, if it may be called one, is, I think, as weak as its language is violent & prolix. Two other gentlemen[1007] have appeared in the papers on this subject, one of them is deeply concerned in pillaging the purchasers of the Fairfax estate in which goodly work he fears no other obstruction than what arises from the appellate power of the Supreme Court, & the other is a hunter after office who hopes by his violent hostility to the Union, which in Virginia a.s.sumes the name of regard for state rights, & by his devotion to Algernon Sidney, to obtain one. In support of the sound principles of the const.i.tution & of the Union of the States, not a pen is drawn. In Virginia the tendency of things verges rapidly to the destruction of the government & the re-establishment of a league of sovereign states. I look elsewhere for safety."[1008]
Another of the "minor gentry" of whom Marshall complained was William C.
Jarvis, who in 1820 had written a book ent.i.tled "The Republicans," in which he joined in the hue and cry against Marshall because of his opinion in M"Culloch _vs._ Maryland. Jarvis sent a copy of his book to Jefferson who, in acknowledging the receipt of it, once more spoke his mind upon the National Judiciary. To Jarvis"s statement that the courts are "the ultimate arbiters of all const.i.tutional questions," Jefferson objected.
It was "a very dangerous doctrine indeed, and one which would place us under the despotism of an oligarchy," wrote the "Sage of Monticello."
"The const.i.tution has erected no such single tribunal, knowing that to whatever hands confided, with the corruptions of time and party, its members would become despots.... If the legislature fails to pa.s.s"
necessary laws--such as those for taking of the census, or the payment of judges; or even if "they fail to meet in congress, the judges cannot issue their mandamus to them."
So, concludes Jefferson, if the President does not appoint officers to fill vacancies, "the judges cannot force him." In fact, the judges "can issue their mandamus ... to no executive or legislative officer to enforce the fulfilment of their official duties, any more than the president or legislature may issue orders to the judges.... When the legislature or executive functionaries act unconst.i.tutionally, they are responsible to the people in their elective capacity. The exemption of the judges from that is quite dangerous enough."[1009]
This letter by Jefferson had just been made public, and Story, who appears to have read everything from the Greek cla.s.sics to the current newspaper gossip, at once wrote Marshall. The Chief Justice replied that Jefferson"s view "rather grieves than surprizes" him. But he could not "describe the surprize & mortification" he felt when he learned that Madison agreed with Jefferson "with respect to the judicial department.
For M^r Jefferson"s opinion as respects this department it is not difficult to a.s.sign the cause. He is among the most ambitious, & I suspect among the most unforgiving of men. His great power is over the ma.s.s of the people, & this power is chiefly acquired by professions of democracy. Every check on the wild impulse of the moment is a check on his own power, & he is unfriendly to the source from which it flows. He looks of course with ill will at an independent judiciary.
"That in a free country with a written const.i.tution any intelligent man should wish a dependent judiciary, or should think that the const.i.tution is not a law for the court as well as for the legislature would astonish me, if I had not learnt from observation that with many men the judgement is completely controuled by the pa.s.sions."[1010]
To Jefferson, Marshall ascribes Roane"s attacks upon the Supreme Court: "There is some reason to believe that the essays written against the Supreme Court were, in a degree at least, stimulated by this gentleman, and that although the coa.r.s.eness of the language belongs exclusively to the author, its acerbity has been increased by his communications with the great Lama of the mountains. He may therefore feel himself ... required to obtain its republication in some place of distinction."[1011]
John E. Hall was at that time the publisher at Philadelphia of _The Journal of American Jurisprudence_. Jefferson had asked Hall to reprint Roane"s articles, and Hall had told Story, who faithfully reported to Marshall. "I am a little surprized at the request which you say has been made to M^r Hall, although there is no reason for my being so. The settled hostility of the gentleman who has made that request to the judicial department will show itself in that & in every other form which he believes will conduce to its object. For this he has several motives, & it is not among the weakest that the department would never lend itself as a tool to work for his political power....
"What does M^r Hall purpose to do?" asks Marshall. "I do not suppose you would willingly interfere so as to prevent his making the publication, although I really think it is in form & substance totally unfit to be placed in his law journal. I really think a proper reply to the request would be to say that no objection existed to the publication of any law argument against the opinion of the Supreme Court, but that the coa.r.s.eness of its language, its personal & official abuse & its tedious prolixity const.i.tuted objections to the insertion of Algernon Sidney which were insuperable. If, however, M^r Hall determines to comply with this request, I think he ought, unless he means to make himself a party militant, to say that he published that piece by particular request, & ought to subjoin the masterly answer of M^r Wheaton. I shall wish to know what course M^r Hall will pursue."[1012]
Roane"s attacks on Marshall did not appear in Hall"s law magazine!
Quitting such small, unworthy, and prideful considerations, Marshall rises for a moment to the great issue which he met so n.o.bly in his opinions in M"Culloch _vs._ Maryland and in Cohens _vs._ Virginia. "A deep design," he writes Story, "to convert our government into a mere league of states has taken strong hold of a powerful & violent party in Virginia. The attack upon the judiciary is in fact an attack upon the union. The judicial department is well understood to be that through which the government may be attacked most successfully, because it is without patronage, & of course without power. And it is equally well understood that every subtraction from its jurisdiction is a vital wound to the government itself. The attack upon it therefore is a masked battery aimed at the government itself.
"The whole attack, if not originating with M^r Jefferson, is obviously approved & guided by him. It is therefore formidable in other states as well as in this, & it behoves the friends of the union to be more on the alert than they have been. An effort will certainly be made to repeal the 25^{th} sec. of the judicial act."[1013] Marshall"s indignation at Roane exhausted his limited vocabulary of resentment. Had he possessed Jefferson"s resources of vituperation, the literature of animosity would have been enriched by the language Marshall would have indulged in when the next Republican battery poured its volleys upon him.
No sooner had Roane"s artillery ceased to play upon Marshall and the Supreme Court than the roar of Taylor"s heavy guns was again heard. In a powerful and brilliant book, called "Tyranny Unmasked," he directed his fire upon the newly proposed protective tariff, "this sport for capitalists and death for the rest of the nation."[1014] The theory of the Chief Justice that there is a "supreme federal power" over the States is proved false by the proceedings of the Const.i.tutional Convention at Philadelphia in 1787. Certain members then proposed to give the National Government a veto over the acts of State Governments.[1015] This proposal was immediately rejected. Yet to-day Marshall proclaims a National power, "infinitely more objectionable,"
which a.s.serts that the Supreme Court has "a negative or restraining power over the State governments."[1016]
A protective tariff is only another monstrous child of Marshall"s accursed Nationalism, that prolific mother of special favors for the few. By what reasoning is a protective tariff made Const.i.tutional? By the casuistry of John Marshall, that "present fashionable mode of construction, which considers the const.i.tution as a lump of fine gold, a small portion of which is so malleable as to cover the whole ma.s.s. By this golden rule for manufacturing the const.i.tution, a particular power given to the Federal Government may be made to cover all the rights reserved to the people and the States;[1017] a limited jurisdiction given to the Federal Courts is made to cover all the State Courts;[1018]
and a legislative power over ten miles square is malleated over the whole of the United States,[1019] as a single guinea may be beaten out so as to cover a whole house."[1020] Such is the method by which a protective tariff is made Const.i.tutional.
For one hundred and twenty-one scintillant and learned pages Taylor attacks this latest creation of National "tyranny." The whole Nationalist system is "tyranny," which it is his privilege to "unmask,"
and the duty of all true Americans to destroy.[1021] Marshall"s Const.i.tutional doctrine "amounts to the insertion of the following article in the const.i.tution: "Congress shall have power, with the a.s.sent of the Supreme Court, to exercise or usurp, and to prohibit the States from exercising, any or all of the powers reserved to the States, whenever they [Congress] shall deem it convenient, or for the general welfare.""[1022] Such doctrines invite "civil war."[1023]
By Marshall"s philosophy "the people are made the prey of exclusive privileges." In short, under him the Supreme Court has become the agent of special interests.[1024] "Cannot the Union subsist unless Congress and the Supreme Court shall make banks and lotteries?"[1025]
Jefferson eagerly read Roane"s essays and Taylor"s book and wrote concerning them: "The judiciary branch is the instrument which, working like gravity, without intermission, is to press us at last into one consolidated ma.s.s. Against this I know no one who, equally with Judge Roane himself, possesses the power and the courage to make resistance; and to him I look, and have long looked, as our strongest bulwark."
At this point Jefferson declares for armed resistance to the Nation in even stronger terms than those used by Roane or Taylor: "If Congress fails to shield the States from dangers so palpable and so imminent, the States must shield themselves, and meet the invader foot to foot....
This is already half done by Colonel Taylor"s book" which "is the most effectual retraction of our government to its original principles which has ever yet been sent by heaven to our aid. Every State in the Union should give a copy to every member they elect, as a standing instruction, and ours should set the example."[1026]
Until his death the aged politician raged continuously, except in one instance,[1027] at Marshall and the Supreme Court because of such opinions and decisions as those in the Bank and Lottery cases. He writes Justice Johnson that he "considered ... maturely" Roane"s attacks on the doctrines of Cohens _vs._ Virginia and they appeared to him "to pulverize every word which had been delivered by Judge Marshall, of the extra-judicial part of his opinion." If Roane "can be answered, I surrender human reason as a vain and useless faculty, given to bewilder, and not to guide us.... This practice of Judge Marshall, of travelling out of his case to prescribe what the law would be in a moot case not before the court, is very irregular and censurable."[1028]
Again Jefferson writes that, above all other officials, those who most need restraint from usurping legislative powers are "the judges of what is commonly called our General Government, but what I call our Foreign department.... A few such doctrinal decisions, as barefaced as that of the Cohens," may so arouse certain powerful States as to check the march of Nationalism. The Supreme Court "has proved that the power of declaring what the law is, _ad libitum_, by sapping and mining, slily and without alarm, the foundations of the Const.i.tution, can do what open force would not dare to attempt."[1029]
So it came to pa.s.s that John Marshall and the Supreme Court became a center about which swirled the forces of a fast-gathering storm that raged with increasing fury until its thunders were the roar of cannon, its lightning the flashes of battle. Broadly speaking, slavery and free trade, State banking and debtors" relief laws were arraigned on the side of Localism; while slavery restriction, national banking, a protective tariff, and security of contract were marshaled beneath the banner of Nationalism. It was an a.s.semblage of forces as incongruous as human nature itself.
The Republican protagonists of Localism did not content themselves with the writing of enraged letters or the publication of flaming articles and books. They were too angry thus to limit their attacks, and they were politicians of too much experience not to crystallize an aroused public sentiment. On December 12, 1821, Senator Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky, who later was honored by his party with the Vice-Presidency, offered an amendment to the Const.i.tution that the Senate be given appellate jurisdiction in all cases where the Const.i.tution or laws of a State were questioned and the State desired to defend them; and in all cases "where the judicial power of the United States shall be so construed as to extend to any case ... arising under" the National Const.i.tution, laws, or treaties.[1030]
Cooperating with Johnson in the National Senate, Roane in Virginia, when the Legislature of that State met, prepared amendments to the National Const.i.tution which, had they been adopted by the States, would have destroyed the Supreme Court. He declares that he takes this step "with a view to aid" the Congressional antagonists of Nationalism and the Supreme Court, "or rather to lead, on this important subject." The amendments "will be copied by another hand & circulated among the members. I would not wish to injure the great Cause, by being known as the author. My name would d.a.m.n them, as I believe, nay hope, with the _Tories_." Roane asks his correspondent to "jog your Chesterfield Delegates ... and other good republicans," and complains that "Jefferson & Madison hang back too much, in this great Crisis."[1031]
On Monday, January 14, 1822, Senator Johnson took the floor in support of his proposition to reduce the power of the Supreme Court. "The conflicts between the Federal judiciary and the sovereignty of the States," he said, "are become so frequent and alarming, that the public safety" demands a remedy. "The Federal judiciary has a.s.sumed a guardianship over the States, even to the controlling of their peculiar munic.i.p.al regulations."[1032] The "basis of encroachment" is Marshall"s "doctrine of Federal supremacy ... established by a judicial tribunal which knows no change. Its decisions are predicated upon the principle of perfection, and a.s.sume the character of immutability. Like the laws of the Medes and Persians, they live forever, and operate through all time." What shall be done? An appeal to the Senate "will be not only harmless, but beneficial." It will quiet "needless alarms ...
restore ... confidence ... preserve ... harmony." There is pressing need to tranquillize the public mind concerning the National Judiciary,[1033]
a department of the government which is a denial of our whole democratic theory. "Some tribunal should be established, responsible to the people, to correct their [the Judges"] aberrations."
Why should not the National Judiciary be made answerable to the people?
No fair-minded man can deny that the judges exercise legislative power.
"If a judge can repeal a law of Congress, by declaring it unconst.i.tutional, is not this the exercise of political power? If he can declare the laws of a State unconst.i.tutional and void, and, in one moment, subvert the deliberate policy of that State for twenty-four years, as in Kentucky, affecting its whole landed property, ... is not this the exercise of political power? All this they have done, and no earthly power can investigate or revoke their decisions."[1034] The Const.i.tution gives the National Judiciary no such power--that instrument "is as silent as death upon the subject."[1035]
How absurd is the entire theory of judicial independence! Why should not Congress as properly declare the decisions of the National courts unconst.i.tutional as that the courts should do the same thing to acts of Congress or laws of States? Think of it as a matter of plain common sense--"forty-eight Senators, one hundred and eighty-eight Representatives, and the President of the United States, all sworn to maintain the Const.i.tution, have concurred in the sentiment that the measure is strictly conformable to it. Seven judges, irresponsible to any earthly tribunal for their decisions, revise the measure, declare it unconst.i.tutional, and effectually destroy its operation. Whose opinion shall prevail? that of the legislators and President, or that of the Court?"[1036]
The Supreme Court, too, has gently exercised the principle of judicial supervision over acts of Congress; has adjudged that Congress has a free hand in choosing means to carry out powers expressly granted to that body. But consider the conduct of the Supreme Court toward the States: "An irresponsible judiciary" has ruthlessly struck down State law after State law; has repeatedly destroyed the decisions of State courts. Look at Marshall"s opinions in M"Culloch _vs._ Maryland, in the Dartmouth College case, in United States _vs._ Peters, in Sturges _vs._ Crowninshield, in Cohens _vs._ Virginia--smallest, but perhaps worst of all, in Wilson _vs._ New Jersey. The same principle runs through all these p.r.o.nouncements;--the States are nothing, the Nation everything.[1037]
Webster, in the House, heard of Johnson"s speech and promptly wrote Story: "Mr. Johnson of Kentucky ... has dealt, they say, pretty freely with the supreme court. Dartmouth College, Sturges and Crowninshield, _et cetera_, have all been demolished. To-morrow he is to pull to pieces the case of the Kentucky betterment law. Then Governor [Senator] Barber [Barbour] is to annihilate Cohens _v._ Virginia. So things go; but I see less reality in all this smoke than I thought I should, before I came here."[1038]
It would have been wiser for Webster to have listened carefully to Johnson"s powerful address than to have sneered at it on hearsay, for it was as able as it was brave; and, erroneous though it was, it stated most of the arguments advanced before or since against the supervisory power of the National Judiciary over the enactments of State Legislatures and the decisions of State courts.
When the Kentucky Senator resumed his speech the following day, he drove home his strongest weapon--an instance of judicial interference with State laws which, indeed, at first glance appeared to have been arbitrary, autocratic, and unjust. The agreement between Virginia and Kentucky by which the latter was separated from the parent Commonwealth provided that "all private rights and interests of lands" in Kentucky "derived from the laws of Virginia, shall remain valid ... and shall be determined by the laws now existing" in Virginia.[1039]
In 1797 the Kentucky Legislature enacted that persons occupying lands in that State who could show a clear and connected t.i.tle could not, without notice of any adverse t.i.tle, upon eviction by the possessor of a superior t.i.tle, be held liable for rents and profits during such occupancy.[1040] Moreover, all permanent improvements made on the land must, in case of eviction, be deducted from the value of the land and judgment therefor rendered in favor of the innocent occupant and against the successful claimant. On January 31, 1812, this "occupying claimant"
law, as it was called, was further strengthened by a statute providing that any person "seating and improving" lands in Kentucky, believing them "to be his own" because of a claim founded on public record, should be paid for such seating and improvements by any person who thereafter was adjudged to be the lawful owner of the lands.
Against one such occupant, Richard Biddle, the heirs of a certain John Green brought suit in the United States Court for the District of Kentucky, and the case was certified to the Supreme Court on a division of opinion of the judges. The case was argued and decided at the same term at which Marshall delivered his opinion in Cohens _vs._ Virginia.
Story delivered the unanimous opinion of the court: that the Kentucky "occupying claimant" laws violated the separation "compact" between Virginia and Kentucky, because, "by the _general principles of law_, and from the necessity of the case, t.i.tles to real estate can be determined only by the laws of the state under which they were acquired."[1041]
Unfortunately Story did not specifically base the court"s decision on the contract clause of the Const.i.tution, but left this vital point to inference.
Henry Clay, "as _amicus curiae_," moved for a rehearing because the rights of numerous occupants of Kentucky lands "would be irrevocably determined by this decision," and because Biddle had permitted the case "to be brought to a hearing without appearing by his counsel, and without any argument on that side of the question."[1042] In effect, Clay thus intimated that the case was feigned. The motion was granted and Green _vs._ Biddle was awaiting reargument when Senator Johnson made his attack on the National Judiciary.
Johnson minutely examined the historical reasons for including the contract clause in the National Const.i.tution, "in order to understand perfectly well the mystical influence" of that provision.[1043] It never was intended to affect such legislation as the Kentucky land system. The intent and meaning of the contract clause is, that "you shall not declare to-day that contract void, ... which was made yesterday under the sanction of law."[1044] Does this simple rule of morality justify the National courts in annulling measures of public policy "which the people have solemnly declared to be expedient"?[1045]
The decision of the Supreme Court in Green _vs._ Biddle, said Johnson, "prostrates the deliberate" course which Kentucky has pursued for almost a quarter of a century, "and affects its whole landed interest. The effect is to legislate for the people; to regulate the interior policy of that community, and to establish their munic.i.p.al code as to real estate."[1046]
If such judicial supremacy prevails, the courts can "establish systems of policy by judicial decision." What is this but despotism? "I see no difference, whether you take this power from the people and give it to your judges, who are in office for life, or grant it to a King for life."[1047]
The time is overripe, a.s.serts Johnson, to check judicial usurpation--already the National Judiciary has struck down laws of eight States.[1048] The career of this judicial oligarchy must be ended. "The security of our liberties demands it." Let the jurisdiction of National courts be specifically limited; or let National judges be subject to removal upon address of both Houses of Congress; or let their commissions be vacated "after a limited term of service"; or, finally, "vest a controlling power in the Senate ... or some other body who shall be responsible to the elective franchise."[1049]
The Kentucky Legislature backed its fearless Senator;[1050] but the Virginia a.s.sembly weakened at the end. Most of the Kentucky land t.i.tles, which the Supreme Court"s decision had protected as against the "occupying claimants," were, of course, held by Virginians or their a.s.signees. Virginia conservatives, too, were beginning to realize the wisdom of Marshall"s Nationalist policy as it affected all their interests, except slavery and tariff taxation; and these men were becoming hesitant about further attacks on the Supreme Court. Doubtless, also, Marshall"s friends were active among the members of the Legislature. Roane understood the situation when he begged friends to "jog up" the apathetic, and bemoaned the quiescence of Jefferson and Madison. His proposed amendments were lost, though by a very close vote.[1051]
Nevertheless, the Virginia Localists carried the fight to the floors of Congress. On April 26, 1822, Andrew Stevenson, one of Roane"s lieutenants and now a member of the National House, demanded the repeal of Section 25 of the Ellsworth Judiciary Act which gave the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over the State courts. But Stevenson was unwontedly mild. He offered his resolution "in a spirit of peace and forbearance.... It was ... due to those States, in which the subject has been lately so much agitated, as well as to the nation, to have it ...
decided."[1052]
As soon as Congress convened in the winter of 1823, Senator Johnson renewed the combat; but he had become feeble, even apologetic. He did not mean to reflect "upon the conduct of the judges, for he believed them to be highly enlightened and intelligent." Nevertheless, their life tenure and irresponsibility required that some limit should be fixed to their powers. So he proposed that the membership of the Supreme Court be increased to ten, and that at least seven Justices should concur in any opinion involving the validity of National or State laws.[1053]
Four months later, Senator Martin Van Buren reported from the Judiciary Committee, a bill "that no law of any of the States shall be rendered invalid, without the concurrence of at least five Judges of the Supreme Court; their opinions to be separately expressed."[1054] But the friends of the Judiciary easily overcame the innovators; the bill was laid on the table;[1055] and for that session the a.s.sault on the Supreme Court was checked. At the next session, however, Kentucky again brought the matter before Congress. Charles A. Wickliffe, a Representative from that State, proposed that writs of error from the Supreme Court be "awarded to either party," regardless of the decision of the Supreme Court of any State.[1056] Webster, on the Judiciary Committee, killed Wickliffe"s resolution with hardly a wave of his hand.[1057]
After a reargument of Green _vs._ Biddle, lasting an entire week,[1058]