"The existing political state of France is connected with certain internal & powerfully operating causes by which it has been & will continue to be greatly influenc"d. Not the least of these is the tenure by which property is held.
"In the course of the revolution it is believed that more than half the land of France has become national.[629] Of this a very considerable proportion has been sold at a low rate.
"It is true that much of it belonged to those who have fallen under the Guillotine or who have been termed emigrants. Among the emigrants are many whose attachment to their country has never been shaken; & what is remarkable, among them are many who were never out of France. The law upon this subject is worthy of attention.
"Any two persons, no matter what their reputation, may, to some authority, I believe the munic.i.p.ality of the district, write & subscribe against any person whatever a charge, that such person is an emigrant, on receipt of which the person so charg"d is without further investigation inscribed on the list of emigrants.
"If the person so inscribed be afterwards apprehended while his name remains on the list, the trial, as I understand, is, not of the fact of emigration, but of the ident.i.ty of the persons, & if this ident.i.ty be established, he is instantly fusiller"d [shot]. The law is either rightly executed or permitted to be relax"d, as the occasion or the temper of the times may direct.
"During intervals of humanity some disposition has been manifested to permit the return of those who have never offended, who have been banished by a terror which the government itself has reprobated, & to permit in case of arrestation, an investigation of the fact of emigration as well as of the ident.i.ty of the person accus"d.
"There is too a great deal of property which has been sold as national but which in truth was never so, & which may be reclaimed by the original proprietors.
"In this state the acquirers of national property are of course extremely suspicious. They form a vast proportion of the population of France. They are not only important in consequence of their numbers, but in consequence of their vigor, their activity & that unity of interest which produces a unity of effort among them.
"The armies too have been promised a milliard. This promise rests upon the national property for its performance. The effect of these circ.u.mstances cannot escape your observation. Cla.s.ses of citizens are to be disfranchised against the next election."
Marshall and Pinckney, at this early stage of Talleyrand"s financial-diplomatic intrigue, were so disgusted that they were on the point of "returning to America immediately." The continuance of French depredations on the high seas caused Marshall to write to Washington as follows:--
"The captures of our vessels seem to be only limited by the ability to capture. That ability is increasing, as the government has let out to hardy adventurers the national frigates. Among those who plunder us, who are most active in this infamous business, & most loud in vociferating criminations equally absurd and untrue, are some unprincipled apostates who were born in America.
"These sea rovers by a variety of means seem to have acquired great influence in the government.
"This influence will be exerted to prevent an accommodation between the United States & France and to prevent any regulations which may intercept the pa.s.sage of the spoils they have made on our commerce, to their pockets. The government I believe is too well disposed to promote their views. At present it seems to me to be radically hostile to our country.
"I cou"d wish to form a contrary opinion, but to do so I must shut my eyes on every object which presents itself to them & fabricate in my own mind non-existing things, to be subst.i.tuted for realities, & to form the basis of my creed.
"Might I be permitted to hazard an opinion it wou"d be the Atlantic only can save us, & that no consideration will be sufficiently powerful to check the extremities to which the temper of this government will carry it, but an apprehension that we may be thrown into the arms of Britain."
Although the Treaty of Campo Formio had been signed on the 17th of October, Paris had not yet heard of it. This treaty marked Bonaparte as the most constructive diplomat, as well as the foremost captain, of the age, for such he had already proved himself to be. A week later, when Marshall wrote the above letter to Washington (October 24, 1797), he reported that "The negotiations with the Emperor of Austria are said not to have been absolutely broken off. Yesterday it was said that peace with him was certain. Several couriers have arrived lately from Buonaparte & the national debt rose yesterday from seven to ten livres in the hundred. Whether this is founded on a real expectation of peace with Austria or is the mere work of stock jobbers is not for me to decide."
But three days afterward (October 27) the news reached Paris; and Marshall adds this postscript: "The definitive peace is made with the Emperor. You will have seen the conditions. Venice has experienced the fate of Poland. England is threatened with an invasion."[630]
The thunders of cannon announcing Bonaparte"s success were still rolling through Paris when Talleyrand"s plotters again descended upon the American envoys. Bellamy came and, Pinckney and Gerry being at the opera, saw Marshall alone. The triumph of Bonaparte was his theme. The victorious general was now ready to invade England, announced Bellamy; but "concerning America not a syllable was said."[631]
Already Talleyrand, sensitive as any hawk to coming changes in the political weather, had begun to insinuate himself into the confidence of the future conqueror of Europe, whose diplomatic right arm he so soon was to become. The next morning the thrifty Hottenguer again visits the envoys. Bonaparte"s success in the negotiations of Campo Formio, which sealed the victories of the French arms, has alarmed Hottenguer, he declares, for the success of the American mission.
Why, he asks, have the Americans made no proposition to the Directory?
That haughty body "were becoming impatient and would take a decided course in regard to America" if the envoys "could not soften them,"
exclaims Talleyrand"s solicitous messenger. Surely the envoys can see that Bonaparte"s treaty with Austria has changed everything, and that therefore the envoys themselves must change accordingly.
Exhibiting great emotion, Hottenguer a.s.serts that the Directory have determined "that all nations should aid them [the French], or be considered and treated as enemies." Think, he cries, of the "power and violence of France." Think of the present danger the envoys are in.
Think of the wisdom of "softening the Directory." But he hints that "the Directory might be made more friendly." Gain time! Gain time! Give the bribe, and gain time! the wily agent advises the Americans. Otherwise, France may declare war against America.
That would be most unfortunate, answer the envoys, but a.s.sert that the present American "situation was more ruinous than a declared war could be"; for now American "commerce was floundering unprotected." In case of war "America would protect herself."
"You do not speak to the point," Hottenguer pa.s.sionately cries out; "it is money; it is expected that you will offer money."
"We have given an answer to that demand," the envoys reply.
"No," exclaims Hottenguer, "you have not! What is your answer?"
"It is no," shouts Pinckney; "no; not a sixpence!"
The persistent Hottenguer does not desist. He tells the envoys that they do not know the kind of men they are dealing with. The Directory, he insists, disregard the justice of American claims; care nothing even for the French colonies; "consider themselves as perfectly invulnerable"
from the United States. Money is the only thing that will interest such terrible men. The Americans, parrying, ask whether, even if they give money, Talleyrand will furnish proofs that it will produce results.
Hottenguer evades the question. A long discussion ensues.
Pay the bribe, again and again urges the irritated but tenacious go-between. Does not your Government "know that nothing is to be obtained here without money?"
"Our Government had not even suspected such a state of things," declare the amazed Americans.
"Well," answers Hottenguer, "there is not an American in Paris who could not have given that information.... Hamburgh and other states of Europe were obliged to buy peace ... nothing could resist" the power of France; let the envoys think of "the danger of a breach with her."[632]
Thus far Pinckney mostly had spoken for the envoys. Marshall now took up the American case. Few utterances ever made by him more clearly reveal the mettle of the man; and none better show his conception of the American Nation"s rights, dignity, and station among the Governments of the world.
[Ill.u.s.tration: CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY]
"I told him [Hottenguer]," writes Marshall, "that ... no nation estimated her [France"s] power more highly than America or wished more to be on amicable terms with her, but that one object was still dearer to us than the friendship of France which was our national independence.
That America had taken a neutral station. She had a right to take it.
No nation had a right to force us out of it. That to lend ... money to a belligerent power abounding in every thing requisite for war but money was to relinquish our neutrality and take part in the war. To lend this money under the lash & coercion of France was to relinquish the government of ourselves & to submit to a foreign government imposed on us by force," Marshall declared. "That we would make at least one manly struggle before we thus surrendered our national independence.
"Our case was different from that of the minor nations of Europe," he explained. "They were unable to maintain their independence & did not expect to do so. America was a great, & so far as concerned her self-defense, a powerful nation. She was able to maintain her independence & must deserve to lose it if she permitted it to be wrested from her. France & Britain have been at war for near fifty years of the last hundred & might probably be at war for fifty years of the century to come."
Marshall a.s.serted that "America has no motives which could induce her to involve herself in those wars and that if she now preserved her neutrality & her independence it was most probable that she would not in future be afraid as she had been for four years past--but if she now surrendered her rights of self government to France or permitted them to be taken from her she could not expect to recover them or to remain neutral in any future war."[633]
For two hours Talleyrand"s emissary pleads, threatens, bullies, argues, expostulates. Finally, he departs to consult with his fellow conspirator, or to see Talleyrand, the master of both. Thus ran the opening dialogue between the French bribe procurers and the American envoys. Day after day, week after week, the plot ran on like a play upon the stage. "A Mr. Hauteval whose fortune lay in the island of St.
Domingo" called on Gerry and revealed how pained Talleyrand was that the envoys had not visited him. Again came Hauteval, whom Marshall judged to be the only one of the agents "solicitous of preserving peace."
Thus far the envoys had met with the same request, that they "call upon Talleyrand at private hours." Marshall and Pinckney said that, "having been treated in a manner extremely disrespectful" to their country, they could not visit the Minister of Foreign Affairs "in the existing state of things ... unless he should expressly signify his wish" to see them "& would appoint a time & place." But, says Marshall, "Mr. Gerry having known Mr. Talleyrand in Boston considered it a piece of personal respect to wait on him & said that he would do so."[634]
Hottenguer again calls to explain how anxious Talleyrand was to serve the envoys. Make "one more effort," he urges, "to enable him to do so."
Bonaparte"s daring plan for the invasion of England was under way and Hottenguer makes the most of this. "The power and haughtiness of France," the inevitable destruction of England, the terrible consequences to America, are revealed to the Americans. "Pay by way of fees" the two hundred and fifty thousand dollar bribe, and the Directory would allow the envoys to stay in Paris; Talleyrand would then even consent to receive them while one of them went to America for instructions.[635]
Why hesitate? It was the usual thing; the Portuguese Minister had been dealt with in similar fashion, argues Hottenguer. The envoys counter by asking whether American vessels will meanwhile be restored to their owners. They will not, was the answer. Will the Directory stop further outrages on American commerce, ask the envoys? Of course not, exclaims Hottenguer. We do "not so much regard a little money as [you] said,"
declare the envoys, "although we should hazard ourselves by giving it but we see only evidences of the most extreme hostility to us."
Thereupon they go into a long and useless explanation of the American case.
Gerry"s visit to his "old friend" Talleyrand was fruitless; the Foreign Minister would not receive him.[636] Gerry persisted, nevertheless, and finally found the French diplomat at home. Talleyrand demanded the loan, and held a new decree of the Directory before Gerry, but proposed to withhold it for a week so that the Americans could think it over. Gerry hastened to his colleagues with the news. Marshall and Pinckney told Hauteval to inform Talleyrand "that unless there is a hope that the Directory itself might be prevailed upon by reason to alter its arrete, we do not wish to suspend it for an instant."[637]
The next evening, when Marshall and Pinckney were away from their quarters, Bellamy and Hottenguer called on Gerry, who again invited them to breakfast. This time Bellamy disclosed the fact that Talleyrand was now intimately connected with Bonaparte and the army in Italy. Let Gerry ponder over that! "The fate of Venice was one which might befall the United States," exclaimed Talleyrand"s mouthpiece; and let Gerry not permit Marshall and Pinckney to deceive themselves by expecting help from England--France could and would attend to England, invade her, break her, force her to peace. Where then would America be? Thus for an hour Bellamy and Hottenguer worked on Gerry.[638]
Far as Talleyrand"s agents had gone in trying to force the envoys to offer a bribe of a quarter of a million dollars, to the Foreign Minister and Directory, they now went still further. The door of the chamber of horrors was now opened wide to the stubborn Americans. Personal violence was intimated; war was threatened. But Marshall and Pinckney refused to be frightened.
The Directory, Talleyrand, and their emissaries, however, had not employed their strongest resource. "Perhaps you believe," said Bellamy to the envoys, "that in returning and exposing to your countrymen the unreasonableness of the demands of this government, you will unite them in their resistance to those demands. You are mistaken; you ought to know that the diplomatic skill of France and the means she possesses in your country are sufficient to enable her, with the French party in America,[639] to throw the blame which will attend the rupture of the negotiations on the federalists, as you term yourselves, but on the British party as France terms you. And you may a.s.sure yourselves that this will be done."[640]
Thus it was out at last. This was the hidden card that Talleyrand had been keeping back. And it was a trump. Talleyrand managed to have it played again by a fairer hand before the game was over. Yes, surely; here was something to give the obstinate Marshall pause. For the envoys knew it to be true. There was a French party in America, and there could be little doubt that it was constantly growing stronger.[641] Genet"s reception had made that plain. The outbursts throughout America of enthusiasm for France had shown it. The popular pa.s.sion exhibited, when the Jay Treaty was made public, had proved it. Adams"s narrow escape from defeat had demonstrated the strength of French sympathy in America.
A far more dangerous circ.u.mstance, as well known to Talleyrand as it was to the envoys, made the matter still more serious--the democratic societies, which, as we have seen, had been organized in great numbers throughout the United States had pushed the French propaganda with zeal, system, and ability; and were, to America, what the Jacobin Clubs had been to France before their b.l.o.o.d.y excesses. They had already incited armed resistance to the Government of the United States.[642] Thorough information of the state of things in the young country across the ocean had emboldened Barras, upon taking leave of Monroe, to make a direct appeal to the American people in disregard of their own Government, and, indeed, almost openly against it. The threat, by Talleyrand"s agents, of the force which France could exert in America, was thoroughly understood by the envoys. For, as we have seen, there was a French party in America--"a party," as Washington declared, "determined to advocate French measures under _all_ circ.u.mstances."[643] It was common knowledge among all the representatives of the American Government in Europe that the French Directory depended upon the Republican Party in this country.