Yours as ever,
A. Lincoln.[37]
FOOTNOTES:
[34] Herndon-Weik. _Life of Lincoln_, 2d edition, vol. II, chap. IV.
[35] When Lincoln, at the Freeport debate, asked Douglas whether the people of a territory could in any lawful way exclude slavery from their limits prior to the formation of a state const.i.tution, Douglas replied that Lincoln had heard him answer that question "a hundred times from every stump in Illinois." He certainly had answered it more than once, and his answer had been published without attracting attention or comment either North or South. On the 16th of July, 1858, six weeks before the Freeport joint debate, he spoke at Bloomington, and there announced and affirmed the doctrine of "unfriendly legislation" as a means of excluding slavery from the territories. Lincoln was one of the persons present when this speech was delivered. On the next day, Douglas spoke at Springfield and repeated what he had said at Bloomington. Both of these speeches were published in the Illinois _State Register_ of July 19, yet the fact was not perceived, either by Lincoln himself, or by any of the lynx-eyed editors and astute political friends who labored to prevent him from asking Douglas the momentous question. Nor did the Southern leaders seem to be aware of Douglas"s views on this question until they learned it from the Freeport debate.
[36] _Cong. Globe_, 36th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2241.
[37] The ma.n.u.script of the foregoing letter is in the Lambert collection of Lincolniana. The two following which relate also to Delahay"s senatorial aspirations, are in the collection of Jesse W. Weik, of Greencastle, Ind.:
SPRINGFIELD, October 17, 1859.
DEAR DELAHAY: Your letter requesting me to drop a line in your favor to Gen. Lane was duly received. I have thought it over, and concluded it is not the best way. Any open attempt on my part would injure you; and if the object merely be to a.s.sure Gen. Lane of my friendship for you, show him the letter herewith enclosed. I never saw him, or corresponded with him; so that a letter directly from me to him, would run a great hazard of doing harm to both you and me.
As to the pecuniary matter, about which you formerly wrote me, I again appealed to our friend Turner by letter, but he never answered. I can but repeat to you that I am so pressed myself, as to be unable to a.s.sist you, unless I could get it from him.
Yours as ever,
(Enclosure) A. LINCOLN.
SPRINGFIELD, October 17, 1859.
M. W. DELAHAY, ESQ.,
My dear Sir: I hear your name mentioned for one of the seats in the U.S. Senate from your new state. I certainly would be gratified with your success; and if there was any proper way for me to give you a lift, I would certainly do it. But, as it is, I can only wish you well. It would be improper for me to interfere; and if I were to attempt it, it would do you harm.
Your friend, as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
P.S. Is not the election news glorious?
We shall hear of Delahay again.
CHAPTER VII
THE ELECTION OF LINCOLN--SECESSION
The nomination of Lincoln for President by the Republican National Convention in 1860 was a rather impromptu affair. In the years preceding 1858 he had not been accounted a party leader of importance in national politics. The Republican party was still inchoate. Seward and Chase were its foremost men. Next to them in rank were Sumner, Fessenden, Hale, Collamer, Wade, Banks, and Sherman. Lincoln was not counted even in the second rank until after the joint debates with Douglas. Attention was riveted upon him because his antagonist was the most noted man of the time. After the contest of 1858 was ended, although ended in defeat, Lincoln was certainly elevated in public estimation to a good place in the second rank of party leadership. It was not until the beginning of 1860, however, that certain persons in Illinois began to think of him as a possible nominee for the Presidency. Lincoln did not think of himself in that light until the month of March, about ten weeks before the convention met. His estimate of his own chances was sufficiently modest, and even that was shared by few. After the event his nomination was seen to have been a natural consequence of preexisting facts. Seward was the logical candidate of the party if, upon a comparison of views, it were believed that he could be elected. One third of the delegates of Illinois desired his nomination and intended to vote for him after a few complimentary votes for Lincoln.
There were some indispensable states, however, which, many people believed, Seward could not carry. In Pennsylvania, Indiana, New Jersey, Connecticut, and Rhode Island he was accounted too radical for the temper of the electors. Illinois was reckoned by Trumbull and other experienced politicians as doubtful if Seward should be the standard-bearer. A conservative candidate of good repute, and sufficiently well known to the public, seemed to be a desideratum.
n.o.body had as yet thought of seeking a _radical_ candidate, who was generally reputed to be a _conservative_. Bates, of Missouri, and McLean, of Ohio, were the men most talked about by those who hesitated to take Seward. McLean was a judge of the Supreme Court appointed by President Jackson. He had been Postmaster-General under Monroe and John Quincy Adams, and was now seventy-five years of age. Trumbull considered him the safest candidate, for vote-getting purposes, as regarded Illinois, if Lincoln were not nominated. In a letter dated April 7, Lincoln had said that "if McLean were ten years younger he would be our best candidate." Bates was regarded by both Lincoln and Trumbull as a fairly good candidate, but Trumbull had been advised by Koerner, the most influential German in Illinois, that Bates could not command the German vote. Koerner had said also (in a letter dated March 15) that he had made himself acquainted with the contents of more than fifty German Republican newspapers in the United States and had found that they were nearly unanimous for Seward, or Fremont, as first choice, but that they would cordially support Lincoln or Chase.
On the 24th of April, Trumbull wrote to Lincoln in reference to the Chicago nomination. He said that his own impression was that, as between Lincoln and Seward, the latter would have the larger number of delegates and would be likely to succeed; and that this was the prevailing belief in Washington, even among those who did not want Seward nominated. He was also of the opinion that Seward could not be elected if nominated.
The Congressmen from the doubtful states were generally of that opinion, and his own correspondence from central and southern Illinois pointed the same way. The next question was whether the nomination of Seward could be prevented. It was Trumbull"s opinion that McLean was the only man who could succeed in the convention as against Seward, and he could do so only as a compromise candidate, beginning with a few votes, but being the second choice of a sufficient number to outvote Seward in the end. As to Lincoln"s chances he said:
Now I wish you to understand that I am for you first and foremost, and want our state to send not only delegates instructed in your favor, but your friends, who will stand by you and nominate you if possible, never faltering unless you yourself shall so advise.
In conclusion he asked Lincoln"s opinion about McLean. Lincoln replied in the following letter:
SPRINGFIELD, April 29, 1860.
Hon. L. Trumbull,
My dear Sir: Yours of the 24th was duly received, and I have postponed answering it, hoping by the result at Charleston, to know who is to lead our adversaries, before writing. But Charleston hangs fire, and I wait no longer.
As you request, I will be entirely frank. The taste _is_ in my mouth a little; and this, no doubt, disqualifies me, to some extent, to form correct opinions. You may confidently rely, however, that by no advice or consent of mine shall my pretensions be pressed to the point of endangering our common cause.
Now as to my opinion about the chances of others in Illinois, I think neither Seward nor Bates can carry Illinois if Douglas shall be on the track; and that either of them can, if he shall not be. I rather think McLean could carry it, with Douglas on or off. In other words, I think McLean is stronger in Illinois, taking all sections of it, than either Seward or Bates, and I think Seward the weakest of the three. I hear no objection to McLean, except his age, but that objection seems to occur to every one, and it is possible it might leave him no stronger than the others. By the way, if we should nominate him, how should we save ourselves the chance of filling his vacancy in the court? Have him hold on up to the moment of his inauguration? Would that course be no drawback upon us in the canva.s.s?
Recurring to Illinois, we want something quite as much as, and which is harder to get than, the electoral vote,--the legislature,--and it is exactly on this point that Seward"s nomination would be hard on us. Suppose he should gain us a thousand votes in Winnebago, it would not compensate for the loss of fifty in Edgar.
A word now for your own special benefit. You better write no letter which can be distorted into opposition, or _quasi_-opposition, to me. There are men on the constant watch for such things, out of which to prejudice my peculiar friends against you. While I have no more suspicion of you than I have of my best friend living, I am kept in a constant struggle against questions of this sort. I have hesitated some to write this paragraph, lest you should suspect I do it for my own benefit and not for yours, but on reflection I conclude you will not suspect me. Let no eye but your own see this--not that there is anything wrong or even ungenerous in it, but it would be misconstrued.
Your friend as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
What happened in the Chicago Convention was widely different from the conjectures of these writers, but the result seemed entirely reasonable after it was reached. Lincoln was as radical as Seward--subsequent events proved him to be more so--but his tone and temper had been more conservative, more sedative, more sympathetic toward "our Southern brethren," as he often called them. He had never endorsed the "higher-law doctrine," with which Seward"s name was a.s.sociated; he believed that the South was ent.i.tled, under the Const.i.tution, to an efficient Fugitive Slave Law; he had never incurred the enmity, as Seward had, of the Fillmore men, or of the American party.
These facts, coupled with some personal contact and neighborliness, early attracted the conservative delegates of Indiana. Seward, with his "irrepressible conflict" speech, had been too strong a dose for them, but they were quite willing to take Lincoln, whose phrase, "the house divided against itself," had preceded the irrepressible conflict speech by some months. The example of Indiana bore immediate fruit in other quarters, and especially in Pennsylvania. Curtin, the nominee for governor, was early convinced that Seward could not carry that state, but that Lincoln could. Curtin and Henry S. Lane, the nominee for governor of Indiana, became active torch-bearers for Lincoln.
When those states p.r.o.nounced for Lincoln, the men of Vermont (the most radical of the New England States), who had been waiting and watching in the Babel of discord for some solid and a.s.sured fact, voting meantime for Collamer, turned to Lincoln and gave him their entire vote.
Vermont"s example was more important than her numerical strength, for it disclosed the inmost thoughts of a group of intelligent, high-principled men, who were moved by an unselfish purpose and a solemn responsibility.
Lincoln had now become the cynosure of the conservatives with a first-cla.s.s radical endors.e.m.e.nt to boot, and he deserved both distinctions. His nomination followed on the third ballot.
Dr. William Jayne, Springfield, May 20, wrote to Trumbull:
The National Convention is over and Lincoln is our standard-bearer, much (I doubt not) to his own surprise; I know to the surprise of his friends. They went to Chicago fearful that Seward would be nominated, and ready to unite on any other man, but anxious and zealous for Lincoln. Pennsylvania could agree on no man of her own heartily. Ohio was for Chase and Wade. Indiana was united on Lincoln. That fact made an impression on the New England States. Seward"s friends were quite confident after the balloting commenced. Now, if Douglas is not nominated, we will carry the state by thousands. If D.
is nominated, we will carry the state, but we will have a hard fight to do it.
Out of a large ma.s.s of letters in the Trumbull correspondence touching the nomination of Lincoln, a half-dozen are selected as examples.
Richard Yates, Jacksonville, May 24, 1860, says the Chicago nominations were received with delight, and there is every indication of success in Illinois.
John Tillson, Quincy, May 28, writes that the nominations are highly acceptable here to every one except the Douglas men, who have just found out that Mr. Seward is the purest, ablest, and most consistent statesman of the age.
J. A. Mills, Atlanta, Logan County, June 4: "I have never seen such enthusiasm, at least since 1840, as is now manifested for Lincoln. Scores of Democrats are coming over to us."
B. Lewis, Jacksonville, June 6: "The Charleston Convention has struck the Democratic party with paralysis wherever Douglas was popular as their leader (and that was pretty much all over the free states), and we have now such an opportunity to make an impression as I never saw before.... We are actually making conversions here every day. The fact tells the whole story. In 1858 I anxiously desired to hear of one occasionally, at least as a sign, but I could never hear of a single one. Now it is all gloriously changed."