Trumbull suggested to them that if Governor Seward went into the Cabinet, as many people considered to be his due, it did not necessarily follow that he would control the patronage of New York. Mr. Mann, however, thought that this would be inevitable. He and Mr. Bryant and Mr. Noyes expressed the opinion that Seward did not desire to go into the Cabinet unless he could control the patronage and thus serve his friends. They said they had no name to propose as a New York member of the Cabinet, but they did not want the load of the Albany plunderers put upon them, and that if it were so the party in New York would be ruined.
The purport of this interview was communicated by Trumbull to Lincoln by letter dated Washington, December 2, 1860. Lincoln replied as follows:
_Private_
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Dec. 8, 1860.
HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL.
MY DEAR SIR: Yours of the 2nd is received. I regret exceedingly the anxiety of our friends in New York, of whom you write; but it seems to me the sentiment in that State which sent a united delegation to Chicago in favor of Gov. Seward ought not and must not be snubbed, as it would be, by the omission to offer Gov. S. a place in the Cabinet. _I will myself take care of the question of "corrupt jobs"_ and see that justice is done to all our friends of whom you wrote, as well as others.
I have written to Mr. Hamlin on this very subject of Gov. S.
and requested him to consult fully with you. He will show you my note and enclosures to him; and then please act as therein requested.
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
The enclosures were a formal tender of the office of Secretary of State to Seward and a private letter to him urging his acceptance of the appointment. The note to Hamlin requested that if he and Trumbull concurred in the step, the letters should be handed to Seward. They were promptly delivered.
As matters stood at that time it was certainly due to Seward that a place in the Cabinet should be offered to him and that it should be the foremost place. He was still the intellectual premier of the party and n.o.body could impair his influence but himself. The princ.i.p.al scheme at Albany, to which Bryant and his colleagues alluded, was a "gridiron"
street railroad bill for New York City, for which Weed was the political engineer.
Trumbull saw Horace Greeley at this time. The latter would not recommend taking a Cabinet officer from New York at all, but he did suggest giving the mission to France to John C. Fremont. If this advice had been followed, and Fremont had been kept out of the country, Lincoln would have been spared one of the most terrible thorns in the side of his Administration; but fate ordained otherwise, for when Cameron was taken into the Cabinet it became necessary to provide a place for Dayton, and Paris was chosen for that purpose.
The Cameron affair was the greatest embarra.s.sment that Lincoln had to deal with before his inauguration. It was a fact of evil omen that David Davis, one of the delegates of Illinois to the Chicago Convention, a.s.suming to speak by authority, made promises that Simon Cameron, of Pennsylvania, and Caleb Smith, of Indiana, should have places in the Cabinet if Lincoln were elected. In so doing, Davis went counter to the only instructions he had ever received from Lincoln on that subject. The day before the nomination was made, the editor of the Springfield _Journal_ arrived at the rooms of the Illinois delegation with a copy of the _Missouri Democrat_, in which Lincoln had marked three pa.s.sages and made some of his own comments on the margin. Then he added, in words underscored: "Make no contracts that will bind me." Herndon says that this paper was read aloud to Davis, Judd, Logan, and himself. Davis then argued that Lincoln, being at Springfield, could not judge of the necessities of the situation in Chicago, and, acting upon that view of the case, went ahead with his negotiations with the men of Pennsylvania and Indiana, and made the promises as above stated.[45]
Gideon Welles, in his book on Lincoln and Seward, says there was but one member of the Cabinet appointed "on the special urgent recommendation and advice of Seward and his friends, but that gentleman was soon, with Seward"s approval, transferred to Hyperborean regions in a way and for reasons never publicly made known." That man was Cameron.
The implication here is that Simon Cameron was appointed a member of Lincoln"s Cabinet in consequence of Seward"s influence, and at his desire. That Seward and Weed labored for Cameron"s appointment, and that Weed had private reasons for doing so, is true, but the controlling factor was something of earlier date. David Davis had left his comfortable home at Bloomington and gone to Springfield to redeem his convention pledges. He camped alongside of Lincoln and laid siege to him. He had a very strong case _prima facie_. He had not only worked for Lincoln with all his might, but he had paid three hundred dollars out of his own pocket for the rent of the Lincoln headquarters during the convention. This seems like a small sum now, but it was three times as much as Lincoln himself could have paid then for any political purpose.
Moreover, Davis had actually succeeded in what he had undertaken.[46]
A. K. McClure says, in his book on "Lincoln and Men of War Times" (p.
139), that the men who immediately represented Cameron on that occasion (John P. Sanderson and Alexander c.u.mmings) really had little influence with the Pennsylvania delegation, and that the change of votes from Cameron to Lincoln was not due to this barter.
Nicolay and Hay say that after the election Lincoln invited Cameron to come to Springfield, but they produce no evidence to that effect. On the other hand, Gideon Welles, quoting from an interview with Fogg, of New Hampshire (a first-rate authority), says that Cameron tried to get an invitation to Springfield, but that Lincoln would not give it; that a little later Cameron invited Leonard Swett to his home at Lochiel, Pennsylvania, and that while there Swett took upon himself to extend such an invitation in Lincoln"s name, and that Lincoln, although surprised, was obliged to acquiesce in what Swett had done.[47] Swett, it may be remarked, was the _Fidus Achates_ of David Davis at all times.
Cameron came to Springfield with a troop of followers, and the result was that, on the 31st of December, Lincoln handed him a brief note saying that he intended to nominate him for Secretary of the Treasury, or Secretary of War, at the proper time.
Almost immediately thereafter he received a shock from A. K. McClure in the form of a telegram saying that the appointment of Cameron would split the party in Pennsylvania and do irreparable harm to the new Administration. He invited McClure to come to Springfield and give him the particular reasons, but McClure does not tell us what the reasons were. Evidently they were graver and deeper than a mere faction fight in the party, or a question whether Cameron or Curtin should have the disposal of the patronage. They included personal as well as political delinquencies, but McClure declined to put them in writing.
After hearing them, Lincoln wrote another letter to Cameron dated January 3, 1861, asking him to decline the appointment that had been previously tendered to him, and to do so at once by telegraph. Cameron did not decline. Consequently Lincoln repeated the request ten days later, January 13.
In the mean time Trumbull, having learned that a place in the Cabinet--probably the Treasury--had been offered to Cameron, wrote a letter to Lincoln, dated January 3, advising him not to appoint him. To this letter Lincoln wrote the following reply:
_Very Confidential_
SPRINGFIELD, ILL., Jan. 7, 1861.
HON. LYMAN TRUMBULL,
MY DEAR SIR: Yours of the 3d is just received.... Gen. C. has not been offered the Treasury and I think will not be. It seems to me not only highly proper but a _necessity_ that Gov. Chase shall take that place. His ability, firmness, and purity of character produce this propriety; and that he alone can reconcile Mr. Bryant and his cla.s.s to the appointment of Gov.
S. to the State Department produces the necessity. But then comes the danger that the protectionists of Pennsylvania will be dissatisfied; and to clear this difficulty Gen. C. must be brought to cooperate. He would readily do this for the War Department. But then comes the fierce opposition to his having any Department, threatening even to send charges into the Senate to procure his rejection by that body. Now, what I would most like, and what I think he should prefer too, under the circ.u.mstances, would be to retain his place in the Senate, and if that place has been promised to another let that other take a respectable and reasonably lucrative place abroad. Also, let Gen. C."s friends be, with entire fairness, cared for in Pennsylvania and elsewhere. I may mention before closing that besides the very fixed opposition to Gen. C. he is more amply recommended for a place in the Cabinet than any other man....
Yours as ever,
A. LINCOLN.
It is easy to read two facts between these lines: first, that although Lincoln had written a letter four days earlier withdrawing his offer to Cameron, some influence had intervened to cause new hesitations; second, that Lincoln knew that Cameron ought not to be taken into the Cabinet at all, and that he was now seeking some way to buy him off. The cause of the new hesitation was that David Davis was clinging to him like a burr.
The last observation in the letter to Trumbull, that Cameron was more amply recommended for a place in the Cabinet than any other man, points to the activity of Seward and Weed in Cameron"s behalf, of which Welles gives details in the interview with Fogg above mentioned.
Before Lincoln"s letter of the 7th reached Trumbull, the latter wrote the following, giving his objections to Cameron more in detail:
WASHINGTON, Jan. 10, 1861.
HON. A. LINCOLN,
MY DEAR SIR: My last to you was written in a hurry--in the midst of business in the Senate, and I have not a precise recollection of its terms--but I desire now to write you a little more fully in regard to this Cameron movement, and in doing so, I have no other desire than the success of our Administration. Cameron is very generally regarded as a trading, unscrupulous politician. He has not the confidence of our best men. He is a great manager and by his schemes has for the moment created an apparent public sentiment in Penna. in his favor. Many of the persons who are most strenuously urging his appointment are doubtless doing it in antic.i.p.ation of a compensation. It is rather an ungracious matter to interfere to oppose his selection and hence those who believe him unfit and unworthy of the place [Copy illegible] seems to me he is totally unfit for the Treasury Department. You may perhaps ask, how, if these things are true, does he have so many friends, and such, to support him, and such representative men. I am surprised at it, but the world is full of great examples of men succeeding for a time by intrigue and management. Report says that C. secured Wilmot in his favor by a.s.surances of support for the Senate, and then secured Cowan by abandoning W. at the last. The men who make the charges against Cameron are not all, I am sure, either his personal enemies, or governed by prejudice. Another very serious objection to Cameron is his connection with Gov. Seward. The Governor is a man who acts through others and men believe that Cameron would be his instrument in the Cabinet. It is my decided conviction that C."s selection would be a great mistake and it is a pity he is [Copy illegible] Gov. Seward"s appointment is acquiesced in by all our friends. Some wish it were not so, but regard it rather as a necessity, and are not disposed to complain. There is a very general desire here to have Gov. Chase go into the Cabinet and in that wish I most heartily concur. In my judgment you had better put Chase in the Cabinet and leave Cameron out, even at the risk of a rupture with the latter, but I am satisfied he can be got along with. He is an exacting man, but in the end will put up with what he can get. He cannot get along in hostility to you, and when treated fairly, and as he ought to be, will acquiesce. This letter is, of course, strictly confidential.
There is a reaction here and the danger of an attack on Washington is, I think, over.
Very truly your friend,
LYMAN TRUMBULL.
The newspapers soon got hold of the fact that a place in the Cabinet had been offered to Cameron. They did not learn that he had been asked to decline it. Letters began to reach Trumbull urging him to use his influence to prevent such a calamity. For example:
James H. Van Alen, New York, January 8, says honest men of all parties were shocked by the rumor of Cameron"s appointment to the Treasury. This evening Judge Hogeboom and Mr. Opdycke leave for Springfield and Messrs. D. D. Field and Barney for Washington to make their urgent protest against the act. Says he has written to Lincoln and forwarded extracts from congressional doc.u.ments in relation to Simon Cameron"s actions as commissioner to settle the claims of the half-breed Winnebago Indians. Refers to the _Congressional Globe_, 25th Congress, 3d Session, p. 194.
E. Peck, Springfield, January 10, says all the Chicago members of the legislature took such steps as they could to prevent the appointment of Cameron, believing him not to be a proper man for any place in the Cabinet. If he goes in, it will not be as the head of the Treasury Department. Understands that Chase was offered the Treasury, but did not accept.
C. H. Ray, Springfield, January 16, thinks that the Cameron business should be brought to a halt by some decisive action among the Republicans in Senate and House. Says Lincoln sees the error into which he has fallen, and would, most likely, be glad to recede; but, except a dozen letters, he hears only from the Cameron and Weed gang.
E. Peck, Springfield, February 1, says David Davis is quite "huffy" because of the objections raised to Cameron and because Smith, of Indiana, is not at once admitted to the Cabinet.
William Butler (state treasurer), Springfield, February 7, says that last evening he had a confidential conversation with Lincoln, who told him that the appointment of Cameron, or his intimation to Cameron that he would offer him a place in the Cabinet, had given him more trouble than anything else that he had yet encountered. He had made up his mind that after reaching Washington he would first send for Cameron and say to him that he intended to submit the question of his appointment to the Republican Senators; that he should call them together for consultation, but would leave Cameron out, as the question to be considered would be solely in reference to him; and that he (Lincoln) wished to deal frankly and for the good of the party. Butler thinks it would be disastrous to Cameron to go into the Cabinet under such circ.u.mstances.
Norman B. Judd, of Chicago, was also expecting a place in the Cabinet.
He was a lawyer by profession and general attorney of the Chicago and Rock Island Railroad. He had been a member of the State Senate, where he contributed largely to Trumbull"s first election to the United States Senate, after which he had been devoted to Trumbull"s political interests and no less to Lincoln"s. He was chairman of the Republican State Committee and a member of the National Committee. He had been a delegate-at-large to the Chicago Convention, where he had worked untiringly and effectively for Lincoln"s nomination. He was not a man of ideas, but was fertile in expedients. In politics he was a "trimmer,"
sly, cat-like, and mysterious, and thus he came to be considered more fa.r.s.eeing then he really was; but he was jovial, companionable, and popular with the boys who looked after the primaries and the nominating conventions. Both as a legislator and a party manager his reputation was good, but his qualities were those of the politician rather than of the statesman. He was certainly the equal of Caleb Smith and the superior of Cameron. If he had been taken into the Cabinet, he would not have been ejected without a.s.signable reasons nine months later. It was known immediately after the November election that he expected a Cabinet position and that Trumbull favored him.
January 3, 1861, Judd wrote to Trumbull that he had heard no word from Lincoln, but he had heard indirectly from Butler (state treasurer) that Lincoln "never had a truer friend than myself and there was no one in whom he placed greater confidence; still circ.u.mstances embarra.s.sed him about a Cabinet appointment." Judd understood this to mean that he would not be appointed and he took it very much to heart. Doubtless the circ.u.mstance that most embarra.s.sed Lincoln was the same that operated in Cameron"s case. David Davis was insisting that his pledge to the Indiana delegates should be made good.
January 6, Lincoln made an early call on Gustave Koerner at his hotel in Springfield, before the latter was out of bed. Koerner gives the following account of it in his "Memoirs":[48]
I unbolted the door and in came Mr. Lincoln. "I want to see you and Judd. Where is his room?" I gave him the number, and presently he returned with Judd while I was dressing.
"I am in a quandary," he said; "Pennsylvania is ent.i.tled to a Cabinet office. But whom shall I appoint?" "Not Cameron," Judd and myself spoke up simultaneously. "But whom else?" We suggested Reeder or Wilmot. "Oh," said he, "they have no show.