On his return to France he displayed his old activity; and the most credible witnesses a.s.sert that his faculties showed no marked decline.
Guizot, who saw a good deal of him, writes: "I perceive in the intellect and conduct of Napoleon during the Hundred Days no sign of enfeebling: I find in his judgment and actions his accustomed qualities." In a pa.s.sage quoted above (p. 449) Mollien notes that his master was a prey to la.s.situde after some hours of work, but he says nothing on the subject of disease; and in a man of forty-six, who had lived a hard life and a "fast" life, we should not expect to find the capacity for the sustained intellectual efforts of the Consulate.
Meneval noticed nothing worse in his master"s condition than a tendency to "reverie": he detected no disease. The statement of Pasquier that his genius and his physical powers were in a profound decline is a manifest exaggeration, uttered by a man who did not once see him before Waterloo, who was driven from Paris by him, and strove to discourage his supporters. Still less can we accept the following melodramatic description, by Thiebault, of Napoleon"s appearance on Sunday, June 11th: "His look, once so formidable and piercing, had lost its strength and even its steadiness: his face had lost all expression and all its force: his mouth, compressed, had none of its former witchery: and his gait was as perplexed as his demeanour and gestures were undecided: the ordinary pallor of his skin was replaced by a strongly p.r.o.nounced greenish tinge which struck me."
Let us follow this wreck of a man to the war and see what he accomplished. At dawn on June 12th he entered his landau and drove to Laon, a distance of some seventy miles. On the next day he got through an immense amount of work, and proceeded to Beaumont. On the 15th of June he was up at dawn, mounted his horse, and remained on horseback, directing the operations against the Prussians, for nearly eighteen hours. This time was broken by one spell of rest. Near Charleroi, says Baudus, an officer of Soult"s staff, he was overcome by sleep and heeded not the cheers of a pa.s.sing column: at this Baudus was indignant, but most unjustly so. Napoleon needed these s.n.a.t.c.hes of sleep as a relief to prolonged mental tension. At night he returned to Charleroi, "overcome with fatigue." On the next day he was still very weary, says Segur; he did not exert himself until the battle of Ligny began at 2.30; but he then rode about till nightfall, through a time of terrible heat. Fatigue showed itself again early on the morrow, when he declined to see Grouchy before 8 a.m. Yet his review of the troops and his long discussions on Parisian politics were clearly due, not to torpor, but to the belief that he had sundered the allies, and could occupy Brussels at will; for when he found out his mistake, he showed all the old energy, riding with the vanguard from Quatre Bras to La Belle Alliance through the violent rain.
Whatever, then, were his ailments, they were not incompatible with great and sustained activity. What were those ailments? He is said to have suffered from intermittent affections of the lower bowel, of the bladder, and of the skin, the two last resulting in ischury (Dorsey Gardner"s "Quatre Bras, Ligny, and Waterloo," pp. 31-37; O"Connor Morris, pp. 164-166, note). The list is formidable; but it contains its own refutation. A man suffering from these diseases, unless in their earliest and mildest stages, could not have done what Napoleon did. Ischury, if at all p.r.o.nounced, is a bar to horse exercise.
Doubtless his long rides aggravated any trouble that he had in this respect, for Petiet, who was attached to the staff, noticed that he often dismounted and sat before a little table that was brought to him for the convenience of examining maps; but Petiet thought this was due, not to ill health (about which he says nothing), but to his corpulence ("Souvenirs militaires," pp. 196 and 212). Prince Jerome and a surgeon of the imperial staff a.s.sured Thiers that Napoleon was suffering from a disease of the bladder; but this was contradicted by the valet, Marchand; and if he really was suffering from all, or any one, of the maladies named above, it is very strange that the surgeon allowed him to expose himself to the torrential rain of the night of the 17th-18th for a purpose which a few trusty officers could equally well have discharged (see next chapter). Furthermore, Baron Larrey, Chief Surgeon of the army, who saw Napoleon before the campaign began and during its course, _says not a word about the Emperor"s health_ ("Relation medicale des Campagnes, 1815-1840," pp. 5-11).
Again, the intervals of drowsiness on the 15th and 18th of June, on which the theory of physical collapse is largely based, may be explained far more simply. Napoleon had long formed the habit of working a good deal at night and of seeking repose during a busy day by brief s.n.a.t.c.hes of slumber. The habit grew on him at Elba; and this, together with his activity since daybreak, accounts for his sleeping near Charleroi. The same explanation probably holds good as to his occasional drowsiness at Waterloo. He scarcely closed his eyes before 3.30 a.m.; and he cannot have been physically fit for the unexpectedly long and severe strain of that Sunday. That he began the day well we know from a French soldier named Barral (grandfather of the author of "L"Epopee de Waterloo"), who looked at him carefully at 9.30 a.m., and wrote: "He seemed to me in very good health, extraordinarily active and preoccupied." Decoster, the peasant guide who was with Napoleon the whole day, afterwards told Sir W. Scott that he was calm and confident up to the crisis. Gourgaud, who clung to him during the flight to Paris and thence to Rochefort, notes nothing more serious than great fatigue; Captain Maitland, when he received him on board the "Bellerophon," thought him "a remarkably strong, well-built man."
During the voyage to St. Helena he suffered from nothing worse than _mal de mer_; he ate meat in exceptional quant.i.ty, even in the tropics.
Very noteworthy, too, is Lavalette"s narrative. When he saw Napoleon before his departure from Paris to the Belgian frontier, he found him suffering from depression and a pain in the chest; but he avers that, on the return from Waterloo, apart from one "frightful epileptic laugh," Napoleon speedily settled down to his ordinary behaviour: not a word is added as to his health. (Sir W. Scott, "Life of Napoleon,"
vol. viii., p. 496; Gourgaud, "Campagne de 1815," and "Journal de St.
Helene," vol. ii., Appendix 32; "Narrative of Captain Maitland," p.
208; Lavalette, "Mems.," ch. x.x.xiii.; Houssaye ridicules the stories of his ill-health.)
What is the upshot of it all? The evidence seems to show that, whatever was Napoleon"s condition before the campaign, he was in his usual health amidst the stern joys of war. And this is consonant with his previous experience: he throve on events which wore ordinary beings to the bone: the one thing that he could not endure was the worry of parliamentary opposition, which aroused a nervous irritation not to be controlled and concealed without infinite effort. During the campaign we find very few trustworthy proofs of his decline and much that points to energy of resolve and great rallying power after exertion. If he was suffering from three illnesses, they were a.s.suredly of a highly intermittent nature.
CHAPTER XL
WATERLOO
Would Wellington hold on to his position? This was the thought that troubled the Emperor on the night after the wild chase from Quatre Bras. Before retiring to rest at the Caillou farm, he went to the front with Bertrand and a young officer, Gudin by name, and peered at the enemy"s fires dimly seen through the driving sheets of rain.
Satisfied that the allies were there, he returned to the farm, dictated a few letters on odious parliamentary topics, and then sought a brief repose. But the same question drove sleep from his eyes. At one o"clock he was up again and with the faithful Bertrand plashed to the front through long rows of drenched rec.u.mbent forms. Once more they strained their ears to catch through the hiss of the rain some sound of a m.u.f.fled retirement. Strange thuds came now and again from the depths of the wood of Hougoumont: all else was still. At last, over the slope on the north-east crowned by the St. Lambert Wood there stole the first glimmer of gray; little by little the murky void bodied forth dim shapes, and the watch-fires burnt pale against the orient gleams. It was enough. He turned back to the farm. Wellington could scarcely escape him now.
While the Emperor was making the round of his outposts, a somewhat cryptic despatch from Grouchy reached headquarters. The Marshal reported from Gembloux, at 10 p.m. of the 17th, that part of the Prussians had retired towards Wavre, seemingly with a view to joining Wellington; that their centre, led by Blucher, had fallen back on Perwez in the direction of Liege; while a column with artillery had made for Namur; if he found the enemy"s chief force to be on the Liege _chaussee_, he would pursue them along that road; if towards Wavre, he would follow them thither "in order that they may not gain Brussels, and so as to separate them from Wellington." This last phrase ought surely to have convinced Napoleon that Grouchy had not fully understood his instructions; for to march on Wavre would not stop the Prussians joining Wellington, if they were in force.[503]
Moreover, Napoleon now knew, what Grouchy did not know, that the Prussians were in force at Wavre. It seems strange that the Emperor did not send this important news to his Marshal; but perhaps we may explain this by his absence at the outposts. As it was, no clear statement of the facts of the case was sent off to Grouchy _until 10 a.m. of the 18th_. He then informed his Marshal that, according to all the reports, three bodies of Prussians had made for Wavre. Grouchy "must therefore move thither--in order to approach us, to put yourself within the sphere of our operations, and to keep up your communications with us, pushing before you those bodies of Prussians which have taken this direction and which may have stopped at Wavre, where you ought to arrive as soon as possible." Grouchy, however, was not to neglect Blucher"s troops that were on his right, but must pick up their stragglers and keep up his communications with Napoleon.
Such was the letter; and again we must p.r.o.nounce it far from clear.
Grouchy was not bidden to throw all his efforts on the side of Wavre; and he was not told whether he must attack the enemy at that town, or interpose a wedge between them and Wellington, or support Napoleon"s right. Now Napoleon would certainly have prescribed an immediate concentration of Grouchy"s force towards the north-west for one of the last two objects, had he believed Blucher about to attempt a flank march against the chief French army. Obviously it had not yet entered his thoughts that so daring a step would be taken by a foe whom he pictured as scattered and demoralized by defeat.[504]
As we have seen, the Prussians were not demoralized; they had not gone off in three directions; and Blucher was not making for Liege. He was at Wavre and was planning a master-stroke. At midnight, he had sent to Wellington, through m.u.f.fling, a written promise that at dawn he would set the corps of Bulow in motion against Napoleon"s right; that of Pirch I. was to follow; while the other two corps would also be ready to set out. Wellington received this despatch about 3 a.m. of the 18th, and thereupon definitely resolved to offer battle. A similar message was sent off from Wavre at 9.30 a.m., but with a postscript, in which we may discern Gneisenau"s distrust of Wellington, begging m.u.f.fling to find out accurately whether the Duke really had determined to fight at Waterloo. Meanwhile Bulow"s corps had begun its march from the south-east of Wavre, but with extreme slowness, which was due to a fire at Wavre, to the crowded state of the narrow road, and also to the misgivings of Gneisenau. It certainly was not owing to fear of Grouchy; for at that time the Prussian leaders believed that only 15,000 French were on their track. Not until midday, when the cannonade on the west grew to a roar, did Gneisenau decide to send forward Ziethen"s corps towards Ohain, on Wellington"s left; but thereafter the defence of the Dyle against Grouchy was left solely to Thielmann"s corps.[505]
While this storm was brewing in the east, everything in front of the Emperor seemed to portend a prosperous day. High as he rated Wellington"s numbers, he had no doubt as to the result. "The enemy"s army," he remarked just after breakfast, "outnumbers ours by more than a fourth; nevertheless we have ninety chances out of a hundred in our favour." Ney, who then chanced to come in, quickly remarked: "No doubt, sire, if Wellington were simple enough to wait for you; but I come to inform you that he is retreating." "You have seen wrong," was the retort, "the time is gone for that." Soult did not share his master"s a.s.surance of victory, and once more begged him to recall some of Grouchy"s force; to which there came the brutal reply: "Because you have been beaten by Wellington you think him a great general. And I tell you that Wellington is a bad general, that the English are bad troops, and that this will be the affair of a _dejeuner_." "I hope it may," said Soult. Reille afterwards came in, and, finding how confident the Emperor was, mentioned the matter to D"Erlon, who advised his colleague to return and caution him. "What is the use,"
rejoined Reille; "he would not listen to us."
In truth, Napoleon was in no mood to receive advice. He admitted on the voyage to St. Helena that "he had not exactly reconnoitred Wellington"s position."[506] And, indeed, there seemed to be nothing much to reconnoitre. The Mont St. Jean, or Waterloo, position does not impress the beholder with any sense of strength. The so-called valley, separating the two arrays, is a very shallow depression, nowhere more than fifty feet below the top of the northern slope. It is divided about halfway across by an undulation that affords good cover to a.s.sailants about to attack La Haye Sainte. Another slight rise crosses the vale halfway between this farm and Hougoumont, and facilitates the approach to that part of the ridge. In fact, only on their extreme left could the defenders feel much security; for there the slope is steeper, besides being protected in front by marshy ground, copses, and the hamlets of Papelotte, La Haye, and Smohain.
Napoleon paid little attention to the left wing of the allies. The centre and right centre were evidently Wellington"s weak points, and there, especially near the transverse rise, our leader chiefly ma.s.sed his troops. Yet there, too, the defence had some advantages. The front of the centre was protected by La Haye Sainte, "a strong stone and brick building," says Cotton, "with a narrow orchard in front and a small garden in the rear, both of which were hedged around, except on the east side of the garden, where there was a strong wall running along the high-road." It is generally admitted that Wellington gave too little attention to this farm, which Napoleon saw to be the key of the allied position. Loopholes were made in its south and east walls, but none in the western wall, and half of the barn-door opening on the fields had been torn off for firewood by soldiers overnight. The place was held at first by 376 men of the King"s German Legion, who threw up a barricade at the barn-door, as also on the high-road outside the orchard; but, as the sappers and carpenters were removed to Hougoumont, little could be done.
Far stronger was the chateau of Hougoumont, which had been built with a view to defence. The outbuildings were now loopholed, and scaffolds were erected to enable our men to fire over the garden walls which commanded the orchard. The defence was intrusted to the light companies of the second battalions of Coldstreams and Foot Guards (now the Grenadier Guards); while the wood in front was held by Na.s.sauers and Hanoverians. Cha.s.se"s Dutch-Belgians were posted at the village of Braine la Leud to give further security to Wellington"s right.[507]
Napoleon"s intention was to pierce the allied centre behind La Haye Sainte, where their lines were thin. But he did not know that behind the crest ran a sunken cross-road, which afforded excellent cover, and that the ground, sloping away towards Wellington"s rear, screened his second line and reserves.
It was this peculiarity of the ground, so different from that of the exposed slope behind Ligny, that helped the great master of defensive tactics secretly to meet and promptly to foil every onset of his mighty antagonist.
While under-estimating the strength of Wellington"s position Napoleon over-rated his numbers. As we have seen, he remarked that the allies exceeded the French by more than a fourth. Now, as his own numbers were fully 74,000, he credited the allies with upwards of 92,000. In reality, they were not more than 67,000, as Wellington had left 17,000 at Hal; but if this powerful detachment had been included, Napoleon"s estimate would not have been far wrong. At St. Helena he gave out that his despatch of cavalry towards Hal had induced Wellington to weaken his army to this extent; but Houssaye has shown that the statement is an entire fabrication. The Emperor certainly believed that all Wellington"s troops were close at hand.[508]
The Duke, on his side, would doubtless have retreated had he known that the Prussian advance would be as slow as it was. His composite forces, in which five languages were spoken, were unfit for a long contest with Napoleon"s army. The Dutch-Belgian troops, numbering 17,000, were known to be half-hearted; the 2,800 Na.s.sauers, who had served under Soult in 1813, were not above suspicion; the 11,000 Hanoverians and 5,900 Brunswickers were certain to do their best, but they were mostly raw troops. In fact, Wellington could thoroughly rely only on his 23,990 British troops and the 5,800 men of the King"s German Legion; and among our men there was a large proportion of recruits or drafts from militia battalions. Events were to prove that this motley gathering could hold its own while at rest; but during the subsequent march to Paris Wellington pa.s.sed the scathing judgment that, with the exception of his Peninsular men, it was "the worst equipped army, with the worst staff, ever brought together."[509] This was after he had lost De Lancey, Picton, Ponsonby, and many other able officers; but on the morning of the 18th there was no lack of skill in the placing of the troops, witness General Kennedy"s arrangement of Alten"s division so that it might readily fall into the "chequer"
pattern, which proved so effective against the French hors.e.m.e.n.
Napoleon"s confidence seemed to be well founded: he had 246 cannon against the allies" 156, and his preponderance in cavalry of the line was equally great. Above all, there were the 13,000 footmen of the Imperial Guard, flanked by 3,000 cavaliers. The effective strength of the two armies has been reckoned by Kennedy as in the proportion of four to seven. Why, then, did he not attack at once? There were two good reasons: first that his men had scattered widely overnight in search of food and shelter, and now a.s.sembled very slowly on the plateau; second, that the rain did not abate until 8 a.m., and even then slight drizzles came on, leaving the ground totally unfit for the movements of horse and artillery. Leaving the troops time to form and the ground to improve, the Emperor consulted his charts and took a brief s.n.a.t.c.h of sleep. He then rode to the front; and, as the gray-coated figure pa.s.sed along those imposing lines, the enthusiasm found vent in one rolling roar of "Vive l"Empereur," which was wafted threateningly to the thinner array of the allies. There the leader received no whole-hearted acclaim save from the men who knew him; but among these there was no misgiving. "If," wrote Major Simmons of the 95th, "you could have seen the proud and fierce appearance of the British at that tremendous moment, there was not one eye but gleamed with joy."[510]
The first shots were fired at 11.50 to cover the a.s.sault on the wood of Hougoumont by Prince Jerome Bonaparte"s division of Reille"s corps.
The Na.s.sauers and Hanoverians briskly replied, and Cleeve"s German battery opened fire with such effect that the leading column fell back. Again the a.s.sailants came on in greater force under shelter of a tremendous cannonade: this time they gained a lodgment, and step by step drove the defenders back through the copse. Though checked for a time by the Guards, they mastered the wood south of the house by about one o"clock. There they should have stopped. Napoleon"s orders were for them to gain a hold only on the wood and throw out a good line of skirmishers: all that he wanted on this side was to prevent any turning movement from Wellington"s advanced outposts. Reille also sent orders not to attack the chateau; but the Prince and his men rushed on at those ma.s.sive walls, only to meet with a b.l.o.o.d.y repulse. A second attack fared no better; and though some 12,000 of Reille"s men Finally attacked the mansion on three sides, yet our Guards, when reinforced, beat off every onset of wellnigh ten times their numbers.
For some time the Emperor paid little heed to this waste of energy; at 2 p.m. he recalled Jerome to his side. He now saw the need of husbanding his resources; for a disaster had overtaken the French right centre. He had fixed one o"clock for a great attack on La Haye Sainte by D"Erlon"s corps of nearly 20,000 men. But a delay occurred owing to a cause that we must now describe.
Before his great battery of eighty guns belched forth at the centre and blotted out the view, he swept the horizon with his gla.s.s, and discerned on the skirts of the St. Lambert wood, six miles away, a dark object. Was it a spinney, or a body of troops? His staff officers could not agree; but his experienced eye detected a military formation. Thereupon some of the staff a.s.serted that they must be Blucher"s men, others that they were Grouchy"s. Here he could scarcely be in a doubt. Not long after 10 a.m. he received from Grouchy a despatch, dated from Gembloux at 3 a.m., reporting that the Prussians were retiring in force on Brussels to concentrate or to join Wellington, and that he (Grouchy) was on the point of starting for Sart-a-Walhain and Wavre. He said nothing as to preventing any flank march that the enemy might make from Wavre with a view to joining their allies straightway. Therefore he was not to be looked for on this side of Wavre, and those troops must consequently be Prussians.[511]
All doubts were removed when a Prussian hussar officer, captured by Marbot"s vedettes near Lasne, was brought to Napoleon. He bore a letter from Bulow to m.u.f.fling, stating that the former was on the march to attack the French right wing. In reply to Napoleon"s questions the captain stated that Bulow"s whole corps was in motion, but wisely said nothing about the other two corps that were following.
Such as it was, the news in no way alarmed the Emperor. As Bulow was about to march against the French flank, Grouchy must march on his flank and take his corps _en flagrant delit_. That is the purport of the postscript added to a rather belated reply that was about to be sent off to Grouchy at 1 p.m. It did not reach him till 5 p.m., too late to influence the result, even had he desisted from his attack on Wavre, which he did not.[512]
We return to the Emperor"s actions at half-past one. Dumont"s and Subervie"s light hors.e.m.e.n were sent out towards Frischermont to observe the Prussians; the great battery of eighty guns, placed on the intermediate rise, now opened fire; and under cover of its deadly blasts D"Erlon"s four divisions dipped down into the valley. They were ranged in closely packed battalions spread out in a front of some two hundred men, a formation that Napoleon had not suggested, but did not countermand. The left column, that of Alix, was supported by cavalry on its flank. Part of this division gained the orchard of La Haye Sainte, and attacked the farm buildings on all sides. From his position hard by a great elm above the farm, Wellington had marked this onset, and now sent down a Hanoverian battalion to succour their compatriots; but in the cutting of the main road it was charged and routed by Milhaud"s cuira.s.siers, who pursued them up the slope until the rally sounded. Farther to the east, the French seemed still surer of victory. Bylandt"s Dutch-Belgians, some 3,000 strong, after suffering heavily in their cruelly exposed position, wavered at the approach of Donzelot"s column, and finally broke into utter rout, pelted in their flight with undeserved gibes from the British in their rear. These consisted of Picton"s division, the heroes of Quatre Bras.
Here they had as yet sustained little loss, thanks to the shelter of the hollow cross-road and a hedge.
The French columns now topped the ridge, uttering shouts of triumph, and began to deploy into line for the final charge. This was the time, as Picton well knew, to pour in a volley and dash on with the cold steel; but as he cheered on his men, a bullet struck him in the temple and cut short his brilliant career. His tactics were successful at some points while at others our thin lines barely held up against the ma.s.ses. Certainly no decisive result could have been gained but for the timely onset of Ponsonby"s Union Brigade--the 1st Royal Dragoons, the Scots Greys, and the Inniskillings.
At the time when Lord Uxbridge gave the order, "Royals and Inniskillings charge, the Greys support," Alix"s division was pa.s.sing the cross-road. But as the Royals dashed in, "the head of the column was seized with a panic, gave us a fire which brought down about twenty men, then went instantly about and endeavoured to regain the opposite side of the hedges; but we were upon and amongst them, and had nothing to do but press them down the slope." So wrote Captain Clark Kennedy, who sabred the French colour-bearer and captured the eagle. Equally brilliant was the charge of the Inniskillings, in the centre of the brigade. They rode down Donzelot"s division, jostled its ranks into a helpless ma.s.s, and captured a great number of prisoners.
The Scots Greys, too, succouring the hard-pressed Gordons, fell fiercely on Marcognet"s division. "Both regiments," wrote Major Winchester of the 92nd, "charged together, calling out "Scotland for ever"; the Scots Greys actually walked over this column, and in less than three minutes it was totally destroyed. The gra.s.s field, which was only an instant before as green and smooth as Phoenix Park, was covered with killed and wounded, knapsacks, arms, and accoutrements."[513]
Meanwhile, on the left of the brigade, Vandeleur"s horse and some Dutch-Belgian dragoons drove back Durutte"s men past Papelotte. On its right, the 2nd Life Guards cut up the cuira.s.siers while disordered by the sudden dip of the hollow cross-road; and further to the west, the 1st Dragoon Guards and 1st Life Guards met them at the edge of the plateau, clashed furiously, burst through them, and joined in the wild charge of Ponsonby"s brigade up the opposite slope, cutting the traces of forty French cannon and sabring the gunners.
But Napoleon was awaiting the moment for revenge, and now sent forward a solid force of lancers and dragoons, who fell on our disordered bands with resistless force, stabbing the men and overthrowing their wearied steeds. Here fell the gallant Ponsonby with hundreds of his men, and, had not Vandeleur"s horse checked the pursuit, very few could have escaped. Still, this brigade had saved the day. Two of D"Erlon"s columns had gained a hold on the ridge, until the sudden charge of our hors.e.m.e.n turned victory into a disastrous rout that cost the French upwards of 5,000 men.
As if exhausted by this eager strife, both armies relaxed their efforts for a s.p.a.ce and re-formed their lines. Wellington ordered Lambert"s brigade of 2,200 Peninsular veterans, who had only arrived that morning, to fill the gaps on his left. The Emperor, too, was uneasy, as he showed by taking copious pinches of snuff. He mounted his horse and rode to the front, receiving there the cheers of his blood-stained lancers and battered infantry. Having received another despatch from Grouchy which gave no hope of his speedy arrival, he ordered his cannon once more to waste the British lines and bombard Hougoumont, while Ney led two of D"Erlon"s brigades that were the least shaken to resume the attack on La Haye Sainte. Once more they were foiled at the farm buildings by the hardy Germans, to whom Wellington had sent a timely reinforcement.[514] At Hougoumont also the Guards held firm, despite the fierce conflagration in the barn and part of the chapel. But while his best troops everywhere stood their ground, the Duke saw with concern the gaps in his fighting line. Many of the Dutch-Belgians had made off to the rear; and Jackson, when carrying an order to a reserve Dutch battery to advance--an order that was disobeyed--saw what had become of these malingerers. "I peeped into the skirts of the forest and truly felt astonished: entire companies seemed there with regularly piled arms, fires blazing under cooking kettles, while the men lay about smoking!"[515]
Far different was the scene at the front. There the third act of the drama was beginning. After half an hour of the heaviest cannonade ever known, Wellington"s faithful troops were threatened by an avalanche of cavalry, and promptly fell into the "chequer" disposition previously arranged for the most exposed division, that of Alten. Napoleon certainly hoped either to crush Wellington outright by a mighty onset of horse, or to strip him bare for the _coup de grace_. At the Caillou farm in the morning he said: "I will use my powerful artillery; my cavalry shall charge; and I will advance with my Old Guard." The use of cavalry on a grand scale was no new thing in his wars. By it he had won notable advantages, above all at Dresden; and he believed that footmen, when badly shaken by artillery, could not stand before his squadrons. The French cavalry, 15,000 strong at the outset, had as yet suffered little, and the way had been partly cleared by the last a.s.saults on Hougoumont and La Haye Sainte, where the defenders were wholly occupied in self-defence.
But Ney certainly pressed the first charge too soon. Doubtless he was misled by the retirement of our first line a little way behind the crest to gain some slight shelter from the iron storm. Looking on this prudent move as a sign of retreat he led forward the cuira.s.siers of Milhaud; and as these splendid brigades trotted forward, the _cha.s.seurs a cheval_ of the Guard and "red" lancers joined them. More than 5,000 strong, these hors.e.m.e.n rode into the valley, formed at the foot of the slope, and then, under cover of their artillery, began to breast the slope. At its crest the guns of the allies opened on them point-blank; but, despite their horrible losses, they swept on, charged through the guns and down the reverse slope towards the squares. Volley after volley now tore through with fearful effect, and the survivors swerved to the intervals. Their second and third lines fared little better; astonished at so stout a stand, where they looked to find only a few last despairing efforts, they fell into faltering groups.
"As to the so-called charges," says Basil Jackson, "I do not think that on a single occasion actual collision occurred. I many times saw the cuira.s.siers come on with boldness to within some twenty or thirty yards of a square, when, seeing the steady firmness of our men, they invariably edged away and retired. Sometimes they would halt and gaze at the triple row of bayonets, when two or three brave officers would advance and strive to urge the attack, raising their helmets aloft on their sabres--but all in vain, as no efforts could make the men close with the terrible bayonets, and meet certain destruction."[516]
After the fire of the rear squares had done its work, our cavalry fell on the wavering ma.s.ses; and, as they rode off, the gunners ran forth from the squares and plied them with shot. In a few minutes the mounted host that seemed to have swallowed up the footmen was gone, the red and blue chequers stood forth triumphant, and the guns that should have been spiked dealt forth death. Down below, the confused ma.s.s shaped itself for a new charge while its supports routed our hors.e.m.e.n.
In this second attack Ney received a powerful reinforcement. The Emperor ordered the advance of Kellermann and of Guyot with the heavy cavalry of the Guard, thus raising the number of hors.e.m.e.n to about 10,000. At the head of these imposing ma.s.ses Ney again mounted the slope. But Wellington had strengthened his line by fresh troops, ordering up also Mercer"s battery of six 9-pounders, to support two Brunswick regiments that wavered ominously as the French cannon-b.a.l.l.s tore through them. Would these bewildered lads stand before the wave of hors.e.m.e.n already topping the crest? It seemed impossible. But just then Mercer"s men thundered up between them with the guns, took post behind the raised cross-road, and opened on the galloping hors.e.m.e.n with case-shot. At once the front was strewn with steeds and men; and gunners and infantry riddled the successive ranks, that rushed on only to pile up writhing heaps and bar retreat to the survivors in front.
Some of these sought safety by a dash through the guns, while the greater number struggled and even laid about with their sabres to hew their way out of this _battue_.
Elsewhere the British artillery was too exposed to be defended, and the gunners again fled back to the squares. Once more the cavalry surrounded our footmen, like "heavy surf breaking on a coast beset with isolated rocks, against which the mountainous wave dashes with furious uproar, breaks, divides, and runs hissing and boiling far beyond." Yet, as before, it failed to break those stubborn blocks, and a perplexing pause occurred, varied by partial and spasmodic rushes.
"Will those English never show us their backs"--exclaimed the Emperor, as he strained his eyes to catch the first sign of rout "I fear,"
replied Soult, "they will be cut to pieces first." For the present, it was the cavalry that gave way. Foiled by that indomitable infantry, they were again charged by British and German hussars and driven into the valley.