[Footnote 465: Houssaye"s "1815," p. 277.]
[Footnote 466: Guizot, "Mems.," ch. iii.; De Broglie, "Mems.," bk.
ii., ch. ii.; Fleury, vol. i., p. 259.]
[Footnote 467: Peyrusse, "Memorial," p. 277.]
[Footnote 468: As Wellington pointed out ("Despatches," May 5th, 1815), the phrase "il s"est livre a la vindicte publique" denotes public justice, _not_ public vengeance. At St. Helena, Napoleon told Gourgaud that he came back _too soon_ from Elba, _believing that the Congress had dissolved!_ (Gourgaud"s "Journals," vol. ii., p. 323.)]
[Footnote 469: "Diary," April 15th and 18th, 1815.]
[Footnote 470: "Parl. Debates"; Romilly"s "Diary," vol. ii., p. 360.]
[Footnote 471: Napoleon told c.o.c.kburn during his last voyage that he bestowed this const.i.tution, not because it was a wise measure, but as a needful concession to popular feeling. The continental peoples were not fit for representative government as England was ("Last Voyages of Nap.," pp. 115, 137). So, too, he said to Gourgaud he was wrong in summoning the Chambers at all "_especially as I meant to dismiss them as soon as I was a conqueror_" (Gourgaud, "Journal," vol. i., p. 93).]
[Footnote 472: Mercer"s "Waterloo Campaign," vol. i., p. 352. For Fleury de Chaboulon"s mission to sound Austria, see his "Mems.," vol.
ii., and Madelin"s "Fouche," ch. xxv.]
[Footnote 473: In the "English Hist. Review" for July, 1901, I have published the correspondence between Sir Hudson Lowe (Quartermaster-General of our forces in Belgium up to May, 1815) and Gneisenau, m.u.f.fling, and Kleist. These two last were _most reluctant_ to send forward Prussian troops into Belgium to guard the weak frontier fortresses from a _coup de main_: but Lowe"s arguments prevailed, thus deciding the main features of the war.]
[Footnote 474: "F.O.," France, No. 116. On June 9th the Duke charged Stuart, our envoy at Ghent, to defend this course, on the ground that Blucher and he had many raw troops, and could not advance into France with safety and invest fortresses until the Russians and Austrians co-operated.]
[Footnote 475: Sir H. Vivian states ("Waterloo Letters," No. 70) that the Duke intended to give a ball on June 21st, the anniversary of Vittoria. See too Sir E. Wood"s "Cavalry in the Waterloo Campaign,"
ch. ii.]
[Footnote 476: "F.O.," France, No. 115. A French royalist sent a report, dated June 1st, recommending "point d"engagement avec Bonaparte.... Il faut user l"armee de Bonaparte: elle ne peut plus se recruter."]
[Footnote 477: Ropes"s "Campaign of Waterloo," ch. v.; Chesney, "Waterloo Lectures," p. 100; Sir H. Maxwell"s "Wellington" (vol. ii., p. 14); and O"Connor Morris, "Campaign of 1815," p. 97.]
[Footnote 478: Janin, "Campagne de Waterloo," p. 7.]
[Footnote 479: Petiet, "Souvenirs militaires," p. 195.]
[Footnote 480: Credit is primarily due to Constant de Rebecque, a Belgian, chief of staff to the Prince of Orange, for altering the point of concentration from Nivelles, as ordered by Wellington, to Quatre Bras; also to General Perponcher for supporting the new movement. The Belgian side of the campaign has been well set forth by Boulger in "The Belgians at Waterloo" (1901).]
[Footnote 481: Gourgaud, "Campagne de 1815," ch. iv.]
[Footnote 482: Houssaye, "1815," pp. 133-138, 186, notes.]
[Footnote 483: Hamley, "Operations of War," p. 187.]
[Footnote 484: For Gerard"s delays see Houssaye, p. 158, and Horsburgh, "Waterloo," p. 36. Napoleon"s tardiness is scarcely noticed by Houssaye or by Gourgaud; but it has been censured by Jomini, Charras, Clausewitz, and Lord Wolseley.]
[Footnote 485: Ollech (p. 125) sees in it a conditional offer of help to Blucher. But on what ground? It states that the Prince of Orange has one division at Quatre Bras and other troops at Nivelles: that the British reserve would reach Genappe at noon, and their cavalry Nivelles at the same hour. How could Blucher hope for help from forces so weak and scattered? See too Ropes (note to ch. x.). Horsburgh (ch.
v.) shows that Wellington believed his forces to be more to the front than they were: he traces the error to De Lancey, chief of the staff.
But it is fair to add that Wellington thought very highly of De Lancey, and after his death at Waterloo severely blamed subordinates.]
[Footnote 486: Stanhope, "Conversations," p. 109.]
[Footnote 487: Reiche, "Memoiren," vol. ii., p. 183.]
[Footnote 488: The term _corps_ is significant. Not till 3.15 did Soult use the term _armee_ in speaking of Blucher"s forces. The last important sentence of the 2 p.m. despatch is not given by Houssaye (p.
159), but is printed by Ropes (p. 383), Siborne (vol. i., p. 453), Charras (vol. i., p. 136), and Ollech (p. 131). It proves that _as late as 2 p.m._ Napoleon expected an easy victory over the Prussians.]
[Footnote 489: The best authorities give the Prussians 87,000 men, and the French 78,000; but the latter estimate includes the corps of Lobau, 10,000 strong, which did not reach Fleurus till dark.]
[Footnote 490: I follow Houssaye"s solution of this puzzle as the least unsatisfacty, but it does not show why Napoleon should have been so perplexed. D"Erlon debouched from the wood of Villers Perwin _exactly where he might have been expected_. Was Napoleon puzzled because the corps was heading south-east instead of east?]
[Footnote 491: Delbruck ("Gneisenau," vol. ii., p. 190) shows how the storm favoured the attack.]
[Footnote 492: I here follow Delbruck"s "Gneisenau" (vol. ii., p. 194) and Charras (vol. i., p. 163). Reiche ("Mems.," vol ii., p. 193) says that his corps of 30,800 men lost 12,480 on the 15th and 16th: he notes that Blucher and Nost.i.tz probably owed their escape to the plainness of their uniforms and headgear.]
[Footnote 493: "Waterloo Letters," Nos. 163 and 169, prove that the time was 3 p.m. and not 3.30; see also Kincaid"s account in Fitchett"s "Wellington"s Men" (p. 120).]
[Footnote 494: "Waterloo Letters," No. 169.]
[Footnote 495: See Houssaye, p. 205, for the sequence of these events.]
[Footnote 496: Ollech, pp. 167-171. Colonel Basil Jackson, in his "Waterloo and St. Helena" (printed for private circulation), p. 64, states that he had been employed in examining and reporting on the Belgian roads, and did so on the road leading south from Wavre. This report had been sent to Gneisenau, and must have given him greater confidence on the night of the 16th.]
[Footnote 497: O"Connor Morris, p. 176, approves Napoleon"s criticism, and censures Gneisenau"s move on Wavre: but surely Wavre combined more advantages than any other position. It was accessible for the whole Prussian army (including Bulow); it was easily defensible (as the event proved); and it promised a reunion with Wellington for the defence of Brussels. Houssaye says (p. 233) that Gneisenau did not at once foresee the immense consequences of his action. Of course he did not, because he was not sure of Wellington; but he took all the steps that might lead to immense consequences, if all went well.]
[Footnote 498: m.u.f.fling, "Pa.s.sages," p. 238: Charras, vol. i., p. 226, discredits it.]
[Footnote 499: Basil Jackson, _op. cit._, p. 24; Cotton, "A Voice from Waterloo," p. 20.]
[Footnote 500: Grouchy suppressed this despatch, but it was published in 1842.]
[Footnote 501: Mercer, vol. i., p. 270.]
[Footnote 502: Petiet, "Souvenirs militaires," p. 204.]
[Footnote 503: Ropes, pp. 212, 246, 359. I follow the "received"
version of this despatch. For a comparison of it with the "Grouchy"
version see Horsburgh, p. 155, note.]
[Footnote 504: Ropes, pp. 266, 288; Houssaye, p. 316, with a good note.]
[Footnote 505: Ollech, pp. 187-192; Delbruck"s "Gneisenau," vol. ii., p. 205. I cannot credit the story told by Hardinge in 1837 to Earl Stanhope ("Conversations," p. 110), that, on the night of the 16th June, Gneisenau sought to dissuade Blucher from joining Wellington.
Hardinge only had the story at second hand, and wrongly a.s.signs it to Wavre. On the afternoon of the 17th Gneisenau ordered Ziethen _to keep open communications with Wellington_ (Ollech, p. 170). The story that Wellington rode over to Wavre on the night of the 18th on his horse "Copenhagen" is of course a myth.]
[Footnote 506: "Blackwood"s Magazine," October, 1896; "Cornhill,"
January, 1901.]
[Footnote 507: Beamish"s "King"s German Legion," vol. ii., p. 352. Sir Hussey Vivian a.s.serts that the allied position was by no means strong; but General Kennedy, in his "Notes on Waterloo" (p. 68), p.r.o.nounces it "good and well occupied." A year previously Wellington noted it as a good position. Sir Hudson Lowe then suggested that it should be fortified: "Query, in respect to the construction of a work at Mt.
Jean, being the commanding point at the junction of two princ.i.p.al chaussees" ("Unpublished Memoirs").]
[Footnote 508: Wellington has been censured by Clausewitz, Kennedy and Chesney for leaving so large a force at Hal. Perhaps he desired to protect the King of France at Ghent, though he was surely relieved of responsibility by his despatch of June 18th, 3 a.m., begging the Duc de Berri to retire with the King to Antwerp. It seems to me more likely that he was so confident of an early advance of the Prussians (see his other despatch of the same hour and Sir A. Frazer"s statement--"Letters," p. 553--"We expected the Prussian co-operation early in the day") as to a.s.sume that Napoleon would stake all on an effort against his right; and in that case the Hal force would have crushed the French rear, though it was very far off.]