Sir Charles did not believe that a treaty would be concluded. In his judgment England would not consent to accept a treaty unless it were an improvement on the existing position, and such a treaty France was not likely to give. But he believed that by negotiating better terms could be obtained, not indeed by treaty, but under the tariff which the French legislature would introduce by Bill. [Footnote: Gambetta kept in touch with Sir Charles throughout on this matter, writing April 16th: "Nous causerons de toutes ces sottes affaires, que je ne peux m"imaginer aussi mal conduites, mais il y a encore de l"espoir, croyez-moi."]
A joint Commission was nominated to sit in London, with Challemel- Lacour and Dilke for its respective heads. The other English Commissioners were Sir C. Rivers Wilson, who was a Treasury official before he became Finance Minister in Egypt; Mr. C. M. Kennedy, head of the Commercial Department of the Foreign Office; and Mr. W. E. Baxter, the member for Dundee. Sir Charles says of the preliminary meetings, which were concerned with a wrangle between him and Challemel-Lacour as to the extent to which M. Leon Say had committed his Government:
"We got no further, but we were both very much pleased with ourselves for the manner in which we argued. Challemel, being an orator and having the use of his own tongue, was at an advantage, but I managed to hold my own, I think, pretty well."
"At the second meeting, May 30th, I began a course of speeches on pig iron and such matters which was destined to continue for many months.
I used to get up my technical terms in the morning (the "jargon," as the French call it), and to forget them immediately after. I believe that on this day I forgot the French for "steel blooms" within five minutes after being most learned in regard to them."
The sittings went on throughout June, 1881, with results in some respects favourable. But the matter had now a political as well as a commercial aspect. It was probable that Gambetta was about to form a Government, though it was unlikely to come into being before the late autumn, after the French general election. On both sides there was a desire to have friendly relations, but public feeling was extremely sensitive in both countries. The occupation of Tunis had produced a certain tension with the Foreign Office; and in France the growing Protectionist movement made it certain that if England, which from 1860 onward had enjoyed special terms in her commerce with France, was again to have a special treaty, it would not be so favourable.
The position in July was that a treaty giving certain advantages to England could be secured at once from M. Ferry"s Ministry, and that a total failure of the negotiations was in itself to be deprecated. Lord Lyons was for concluding the treaty which might be made at once, fearing lest England should be put under the general tariff. Here Sir Charles"s familiarity with Parliament made him invaluable. He perceived that any treaty which could be made at this moment would leave certain leading British industries--notably cottons and woollens--worse off than they had been under the expiring arrangement, and therefore would probably be upset by a vote in the House of Commons. This would be disastrous. It seemed to him better to wait till Gambetta came in, and to do the best he could with the new Government. This decision prevailed, Sir Charles persuading Mr.
Chamberlain to support his view in the Cabinet.
It was decided, however, to insist on prolongation of the existing treaty as a condition of continuing the negotiations, and Sir Charles now proposed to strengthen his hand by a threat of retaliation. He was invited by the Prime Minister to attend a meeting of the Cabinet in regard to commercial treaties on August 6th.
"The result was a despatch from myself to Mr. Adams [Footnote: Afterwards Sir Francis Adams. He was then Charge d"Affaires in Paris, and later Minister in Switzerland. He was at this moment in charge of the Emba.s.sy during Lord Lyons"s absence.] which was not included in the Blue-Book afterwards laid before Parliament. It ended by relating a conversation with the French Amba.s.sador on the previous day, in which I threatened (and this was the reason for not placing the despatch before Parliament) that if we did not come to a satisfactory understanding with France, we should make treaties with Spain, Portugal, and Italy, in which we should reduce the rate of duty on the dear wines produced by those countries, and raise the rate of duty on the less strong wines produced by France. I have always been a reciprocitarian to this extent, and was always backed in using such arguments by Chamberlain, who held the same view in a still stronger form. Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville always prevented any public reference to such matters, but they allowed me to put them in despatches, although not to lay them before Parliament."
On August 17th Gambetta again suggested a private interview, and it was decided that Dilke should cross, ostensibly on a visit to La Bourboule, and hold the interview on his way. [Footnote: Gambetta wrote: "Nons serons strictement seuls. Si! les choses electorales ont fort bien tourne, non sans peine, mais pas de guerre sans blessures." (22 aout, 1881).] On August 22nd Mr. Adams reported that--
"Gambetta was determined that Tirard" (Minister of Commerce in M.
Ferry"s Cabinet) "should fail, in order that his Government should have the glory of succeeding in our negotiations....
"On Thursday, August 25th, I breakfasted with Gambetta, and then went on to La Bourboule. He told me that he was prepared to take office without portfolio, "in order to be able to watch all the others.""
"Tuesday, August 30th, "81.--As to the treaty, Gambetta said that M.
Tirard would not be got rid of in time; some mode must be found of turning the difficulty which he had created. He would see him, and Tirard would probably propose some plan to me when I called on Tuesday" (this might be Thursday). "_I suggested... a treaty with some small country, and the most-favoured-nation clause with us--we giving nothing...._ This was the excellent ultimate outcome." [Footnote: This paragraph is from a note made at the time.]
On September 5th, on his way back from La Bourboule, "I was officially in Paris, and saw the Ministers, Barthelemy Saint-Hilaire, Jules Ferry, and Tirard; and on the next day, Tuesday the 6th, saw Gambetta privately without their knowledge."
At this moment prolongation of the existing treaty had not been accorded, and negotiations were in suspense. Sir Charles frankly "told the Ministers that I did not expect we should be able to agree," and suggested a plan which, without a special commercial treaty, should secure what had up till then been settled in negotiation. France was obliged to renew her treaties with Switzerland and Belgium, and might concede to these countries in detail "those things which up to this point we had obtained in negotiation."
Prolongation of the existing treaty was, however, at last accorded, and conferences were resumed on September 19th in Paris-a change of scene greatly to the Commission"s advantage.
"We now continued to sit day by day in state at the French Foreign Office, which contrasted with the simplicity of Downing Street under the rule of a parsimonious Treasury. The French certainly know how to spend their money, and I fancy that the United Kingdom must suffer in negotiations both from the superior style in which foreign Governments treat negotiators and from our abstention from the practice pursued by foreign Governments of showering decorations upon negotiators. At the French Foreign Office, outside the magnificent room in which the conferences are held, was a great buffet covered with the most costly luxuries, behind which stood tall footmen dressed in the national livery of red and blue, and I think that our manufacturers who came in to give evidence were in some cases not altogether insensible to the attractions offered them. Some of our witnesses, however, were really first-cla.s.s men, and it was a pleasure to hear Mr. Joseph Lee of Manchester, who was afterwards knighted on my suggestion, hammering the French.... When I called the name of Wedgwood as that of my witness upon pottery I noticed the sensation that ran round the French Commission, who were under the impression that "Wedgwood" was a contemporary of Michael Angelo; but, of course, my Wedgwood was not the original, though he was a descendant....
"During my first long visit to Paris the French Government gave me every night the official box at either the Opera or one of the great theatres, and I used to go, not that I cared about the theatre, but because I was able to give hospitality in this way to our leading manufacturers, who were over as our witnesses. We used, indeed, to do a good deal of our business at the theatre. The official boxes having drawing-rooms at the back, we retired into these, and discussed what we were going to say at the Conference the next morning."
But after many sittings negotiations did not seem likely to lead to any settlement, and Sir Charles was anxious to break them off. The French opposed this, urging that prolongation of the treaty would then have been gained for nothing; and they made a good many small concessions on the numerous articles subject to their tariff.
During the sittings Sir Charles Dilke kept Lord Granville posted in a ma.s.s of detail: Ivory and pearl b.u.t.tons reduced to half; vulcanite goods, an improvement on the _status quo_; great and wholly unexpected reduction on biscuits; but starch very bad (this was on "an excellent day for the small things"). Other reports dealt with steel sc.r.a.p, phosphorus, faience, and so forth, and by tabulated figures set off the total of losses and gains.
Lord Granville, thanking him for these constant reports, remarked with serene detachment that they were "as interesting as lists of the betting in the newspapers just before the Derby. I hope you will win the race." He added that in his opinion "Tirard and the Temps were only playing a game of brag."
"At my conference on October 24th I had found Tirard very cross, he apparently having made up his mind that Gambetta intended to turn him out, and having therefore resolved to make the conclusion of a treaty impossible in order to attack his successor and to destroy the treaty if one were made. He suddenly asked for a vast reduction in the English wine duties, and on my refusing to discuss the matter, he replied that after the "enormous concessions" which had been made to us, any French Minister who did not obtain similar concessions from us would be worthy of impeachment. He was very rude to me, and evidently wanted to provoke an immediate rupture."
On this Sir Charles wrote to Mr. Gladstone:
"The Commissioners are in the singular position of trying to arrange the terms of a treaty with a Minister who, if the treaty is made, is likely to become the private member to move its rejection."
"I was not much hampered from London at this time. Mr. Gladstone wrote: "I have nothing to do but commend and concur.""
"On October 28th I determined not to break off negotiations, but simply to finish--that is to say, to go clean through the tariff, and stop when we had no more to say. We then could leave matters open, and begin again in the following month with the new Government which Gambetta was about to form."
Already Sir Charles was being introduced to the future members of what came to be called the "Grand Ministere," and was not favourably impressed:
"On November 2nd, Gambetta having informed me that Rouvier would be his Minister of Commerce, and having asked me to meet him, we dined together at the Cafe Anglais, but I was greatly disappointed in him."
On November 5th Sir Charles left Paris for London, nominally for purposes of consultation; but this was only a pretext to suspend operations till Gambetta came into office, which he did on November 10th. Sir Charles, being then in London, found the British Government of his own opinion, that they could hope for no more than most-favoured-nation treatment; but opinions differed as to how this should be obtained. Mr. Gladstone wanted to give a pledge that the low duty on the lighter wines--which favoured France, since no other country could produce them-should not be raised.
Sir Charles, on the other hand, wanted to threaten the French with a change in the duties, which would favour Italy by letting in the slightly stronger Italian wines at the same rate as "Gladstone" clarets.
On November 19th he was back in Paris, seeing Rouvier and Gambetta, both of whom asked for time to prepare the way for a final meeting of the Commission, and Sir Charles went to his house near Toulon. On December 28th the detail of the French proposals was known, and they were held to be unsatisfactory. Gambetta still insisted that an agreement could and must be reached, but Dilke was of another opinion, and at the thirty- seventh sitting, held on the last day of the year, negotiations were really broken off. The last sitting, held on January 2nd, 1882, was merely formal, and that evening Sir Charles left for London. He had not expected to succeed in concluding a treaty, and he had not concluded one, but he had earned high credit from experts. Lord Granville wrote: "From all sides I hear praises of your knowledge, tact, and judgment." His secretary, Mr.
Austin Lee, [Footnote: Now Sir Henry Austin Lee, K.C.M.G., C.B., Commercial attache for France, Belgium, and Switzerland at the British Emba.s.sy in Paris.] showed him a letter from one of the Under-Secretaries of State in the Foreign Office, who
"said that it was a blessing to have had me at Paris, because any other negotiator would have sent yards of cipher telegram to the Office asking to be allowed to give the French all that they demanded from us, and proving that we must take whatever we could get from them."
The British members of the Commission were unanimous in support of their chairman, and when Gambetta fell and M. de Freycinet became Prime Minister, they refused to hold any further sittings. Lord Lyons was uneasy, and in February, 1882, wrote that the most-favoured-nation treaty was a very forlorn hope." Mr. Gladstone thereupon wished to give his pledge against any raising of the duties.
"I succeeded in stopping this, for I felt sure that we should get it for nothing, as, in fact, we did.
"That we obtained most-favoured-nation treatment without giving way upon our wine duties and sacrificing revenue was a triumph, as we got all the reductions (which on yarns were very large) which we had obtained in the course of the negotiations. These had, after being won by us, been given to the Swiss and Belgians--who were "behind" us, and signed treaties. The result was that there was an increase, not a falling off, in our trade with France." [Footnote: Full information with regard to the negotiations of a new commercial treaty between France and Great Britain, will be found in Commercial No. 37, 1881, and Commercial No. 9, 1882.]
"The foresight shown by Sir Charles Dilke in proposing this arrangement is brought out by the fact that it has been maintained, and given entire satisfaction, during the thirty years and more which have elapsed from its conclusion," says Sir Henry Austin Lee.
M. Hanotaux, in his _France Contemporaine_, observes that Dilke was often a _precurseur_. He certainly was so in an important matter of Imperial policy which connects itself with these negotiations. Leave was granted, through Sir Charles at the Foreign Office, to the Canadian High Commissioner, Sir A. Galt, "to negotiate upon his own account, provided that he concluded no stipulations unfavourable to the mother country. In this, I made a precedent which has been followed," and which was not made without opposition. The Colonial Office, while unable to prevent Canada from acting for herself, prevented Sir Charles at the Foreign Office from acting conjointly with Canada. The matter developed in "the following spring":
"On March 1st (1882) Sir A. Galt asked me to let Kennedy" (Sir C. M.
Kennedy) "of the Foreign Office go to Paris as Second Commissioner for Canada to help make a Franco-Canadian treaty. On the 2nd I agreed, and got Lord Granville"s consent, and the Foreign Office officially asked the Colonial Office, when Lord Kimberley refused. I pressed the matter in angry, but as I think conclusive, minutest Lord Kimberley, however, set his teeth, and refused point blank, and Lord Granville then backed him up, saying that "on a Colonial matter it was impossible to fly in the face of the Colonial Secretary of State." I wrote, 2nd March, 1882:
""I think Lord Kimberley"s decision a great misfortune to British trade and to friendly relations with the Colonies, and wish this minute and opinion to that effect placed on record with the despatch which he wishes to withdraw. We could have stipulated that the mother country should have been ent.i.tled to all reductions made to France, a further advantage which, if Canada is angry at the refusal, may be needed but not obtained.""
"April 20th, 1882: At this moment I called attention to the bearing of our most-favoured-nation-clause treaties on the commercial condition of the British Empire generally, and pointed out that the bearing of the matter on the Colonies would become very important some day; and I found even too much support from the head of the Trade Department, who was a Protectionist, or at least a strong Reciprocitarian, and who at once grasped my idea by arguing that there was a chance that some day there would be formed a British Zollverein, raising discriminating duties upon foreign produce as against that of the British Empire. I had only pointed out the possibility. The representation of Canada by Sir A. Galt at Paris also provoked minutes by me on this question later in the year."
CHAPTER XXVI
GAMBETTA, DISRAELI, ROYAL PERSONAGES, MORIER
I.
The New Year of 1881 had opened for Sir Charles with Gambetta"s greetings:
"Chambre des Deputes.
"CHER AMI,"
"Je vous envoie mes voeux les plus ardents pour tous les succes que vous pouvez desirer dans cette annee qui s"ouvre, et pour la realisation desquels j"ai confiance que votre bon genie continuera a vous sourire.