"Mahdi must be smashed up. Mahdi is most unpopular, and with care and time could be smashed.... If you decide on smashing Mahdi, then send another hundred thousand pounds, and send 200 Indian troops to Wady Haifa, and an officer to Dongola under pretence to look out quarters for troops.... At present it would be comparatively easy to destroy Mahdi." Gordon had also telegraphed to Baring to recommend that 3,000 black Egyptian troops should be kept in the Soudan, and completely throwing over the evacuation policy. Baring added for himself: "There are obviously many contradictions in General Gordon"s different proposals"; but he went on to express his agreement in Gordon"s new policy, strongly supported the selection of Zebehr, and sneered at us for having regard to uninstructed opinion in England. On the same day Gordon telegraphed: "If a hundred British troops were sent to a.s.souan or Wady Halfa, they would run no more risk than Nile tourists, and would have the best effect." At the same time Baring said: "I certainly would not risk sending so small a body as 100 men." It will be seen in how great a difficulty the Government were placed; but Baring"s position was, in fact, as difficult as our own. We were evidently dealing with a wild man under the influence of that climate of Central Africa which acts even upon the sanest men like strong drink.
"On the same day Gordon telegraphed to us completely changing his ground about Suakim. He had previously prevented our doing anything except trying to relieve the towns blockaded, but on March 1st told us to do something to draw the Hadendowa down to Suakim. On the 2nd, General Graham having beaten the Arabs at Teb, the Admiral asked us to send more troops and to threaten Osman Digna"s main force, a suggestion which concurred with Gordon"s. And on March 5th the Cabinet met and decided that, while it was impossible to send Zebehr to the Soudan, General Graham was to be allowed to attack Osman Digna"s main force.... Chamberlain then suggested that I should go to Egypt: Hartington evidently thought that somebody should go, and thought he had better go himself. Lord Granville would not have either, as might have been expected.... I suggested a way out of the Zebehr difficulty, and wrote to Chamberlain: "If I were sent out to do this, I believe I should get away the forces from the interior and have Zebehr elected, entirely without our action, by the Notables at Khartoum. On the whole, this would do if we did not do it. This would, in my opinion, be improved by Turkish approval under Turkish suzerainty, but that you do not like." Chamberlain answered: "Perhaps we cannot help having Zebehr, but surely we ought not to promote him, directly or indirectly; not only because he is a slave- hunter, but also because he will probably attack Egypt sooner or later, and very likely with the help of our subsidy." I replied: "I am quite clear that we must not set up Zebehr, but if we retire we cannot prevent his election by the Notables; and they would elect him." In the meantime Gordon had completely thrown over Baring"s suggestion that Zebehr should be sent (but so sent that he and Gordon should not be in the Soudan together) by telegraphing that the combination at Khartoum of Zebehr and himself was "an absolute necessity," and that it would be "absolutely necessary" for him to stay at Khartoum with Zebehr for four months; and Stewart had now completely come over to Gordon"s policy about Zebehr personally. On the other hand, Baring and the military authorities in Egypt were unanimously opposed to the idea of sending a small British force to Wady Halfa.
"On March 7th it was decided to give an inland district to the Abyssinians, but not to offer them a port (which was what they wanted), on account of its not being ours to give away from the Turks. The Cabinet would not hear of receiving a Turkish Commissioner at Cairo.
"On March 11th we further considered pressing demands from Gordon and Baring for Zebehr. Mr. Gladstone had taken to his bed, but was known to be strongly in favour of sending Zebehr. The Cabinet were unanimous the other way, and Hartington was sent to see Mr.
Gladstone, we waiting till he returned. When he came back, he laconically stated what had pa.s.sed as follows: "He thinks it very likely that we cannot make the House swallow Zebehr, but he thinks he could." Morley has told this, but the words which he took verbally from me are less good. [Footnote: _Life of Gladstone_, vol.
iii., p. 159.] Baring on the 6th had recommended a further attack on Osman Digna, which he thought might open the Berber route. On the 9th we received Gordon"s replies to our telegrams of the 5th, showing that he had done nothing towards the evacuation of Khartoum except by sending away the sick. He admitted that it was possible that "Zebehr, who hates the tribes, did stir up the fires of revolt, in hopes that he would be sent to quell it. It is the irony of fate that he will get his wish if sent up." On the same day Baring informed us that it was clear that Gordon now had no influence outside Khartoum, and that he contemplated the despatch of British troops. The Anti-Slavery Society had strongly protested against the employment of Zebehr, and they pointed out to us the records of murders "in which this man has stood the foremost and the princ.i.p.al actor.... Countenance ... of such an individual by the British Government would be a degradation for England and a scandal to Europe." W. E. Forster, amid loud cheers from the Conservatives, protested in advance in the House of Commons against the policy of sending Zebehr. On March 11th we had received in the morning from Baring twelve telegrams from Gordon, of the most extraordinary nature, which Baring had answered: "I am most anxious to help and support you in every way, but I find it very difficult to understand exactly what it is you want." Besides deciding that Zebehr could not be sent, the Cabinet changed its mind about the employment of Turks in the Red Sea, and decided that they could not be allowed to go there at present.
"On March 13th the matter was again considered by a Cabinet, which was not called a Cabinet as Mr. Gladstone was in bed and Chamberlain was at Birmingham, and on the 14th we met again, still retaining our opinion; and on Sunday, the 16th, Mr. Gladstone at last unwillingly gave up Zebehr as impossible. [Footnote: _Life of Granville_, vol.
ii., p. 388.]
"I had been at this time working out the facts connected with the two routes to Khartoum in case an expedition should be sent, and had made up my own mind in favour of the Nile route; Wolseley still being the other way.
"On March 17th, I wrote to Lord Northbrook to protest against a proclamation which had been issued by the Admiral and General at Suakim offering a reward for Osman Digna, and I wrote also to Hartington upon the same subject, stating that I would not defend it, and that if it were "not disapproved, and the disapproval made public, I cannot remain a member of the Government." Northbrook would not admit that he had disapproved it, but Hartington did, and also informed me that Northbrook had telegraphed. Lord Granville agreed with me that the proclamation was not defensible, and it was as a fact withdrawn, although the Admiral was very angry.
"Mr. Gladstone had gone down to Coombe, near Wimbledon. On March 22nd we held a Cabinet without him.... Harcourt was now writing to me in favour of the view "that we must get out of Egypt as soon as possible at any price. The idea of our administering it or of the Egyptian army defending it is equally out of the question." On the 25th we had another Cabinet without Mr. Gladstone. Turning to Gordon, we decided that a force was not to be sent to Berber; but I noted in my diary: "It will _have_ to be sent next autumn, I believe"; but when I said to Berber, it must be remembered, of course, that there were two ways of reaching Berber, and Lord Hartington, Brett, and I, now turned steadily to the consideration of which of those two ways should be taken. It will be remembered that we already had a report in print as to the Suakim-Berber route.
[Footnote: See p. 33; "We had drawn up a route from Suakim to Berber."] We now obtained from Wolseley a general report, which was afterwards printed and circulated to the Cabinet on April 8th. Lord Wolseley, preparing for the sending of a military force to Khartoum this autumn, stated that his force must be exclusively British, for he doubted whether the very best of our Indian regiments could stand the charges of the Arabs, besides which our natives took the field enc.u.mbered with followers. Lord Roberts, who was not given to boasting, told me, long afterwards, that he, on the other hand, was sure that he could have marched from Suakim to the Nile and Khartoum with an exclusively Indian force. It is the case that our best Gurkha troops have sometimes stood when white troops have run.
Wolseley had now come round to a boat expedition, which I had been for a long time urging, upon information which I had obtained for myself from the Admiralty, and which was afterwards printed by the Foreign Intelligence Committee at the Admiralty, and circulated to the Cabinet in April, a further doc.u.ment upon the subject being circulated to the Cabinet in May. It must be remembered that the date of pa.s.sing the cataracts was settled for us by the high Nile, and that there was only one time of year at which the expedition could be safely sent.
"The Cabinet of March 25th further decided that Graham must soon be brought away from Suakim.
"On the next evening, March 26th, when the Ministers were dining with the Speaker, we received a very unpleasant telegram from Baring, pointing, we thought, to a possible resignation unless it was promised to send an expedition to Khartoum. I suggested the following answer: "We adhere to our instructions of the 25th, 160 Secret. We cannot send an expedition now, and entertain the gravest objection to contemplating an expedition in the autumn." This answer was rejected in favour of one suggested by Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville. Our telegram 160 Secret had been an absolute refusal, and my additional words had been intended by me slightly to open the door, which was as much as I could hope that the Cabinet would do.
But the telegram actually sent on March 28th (165 Secret, extended in 191) was to the effect that we were unable to alter the instructions, and it was accompanied by two long despatches, virtually written by Harcourt, and afterwards laid before Parliament, explaining our reasons for not sending Zebehr and for not sending an expedition. Gordon had been communicating with us with difficulty, as the telegraph was broken from time to time, but he had told us that if he was to evacuate Khartoum he wished to resign his commission and to take all his steam vessels and stores to the equatorial provinces, "which he would consider under the King of the Belgians." This Baring had told him he must not do. Baring had rejected every possible alternative except the sending of Zebehr, and Zebehr we could not have sent. In discussing the question of an expedition to Khartoum, Baring had told us that Gordon was "not in any immediate danger. He has provisions for six months." Gordon himself had telegraphed: "As I have been inconsistent about Zebehr, it is my fault, and I should bear the blame if Zebehr is sent, and should put up with the inconvenience if he is not." He had himself told us that he had provisions for six months, but had after this informed us that provisions were still coming in freely to Khartoum--as late as after March 15th, a week later than the date at which he had told us that he had six months"
provisions in the town. I had made up my mind that we must send an expedition, but I did not agree with Baring that it was physically possible to send an expedition at this moment, and thought that if sent at high Nile it would be in time. On the 23rd, after Gordon"s defeat, by treachery and shooting, of the two black Pashas, Gordon telegraphed: "I think we are now safe, and that as the Nile rises we shall account for the rebels." This we received on March 31st.
"On March 27th there was a Cabinet without Chamberlain, who was listening to George Russell"s speech which I had got him leave to make, and without Mr. Gladstone, who was still ill. The Cabinet decided against an expedition to Khartoum, but the Chancellor" (Lord Selborne) "gave us to understand that he should resign if one were not sent in the autumn, and Harcourt intimated that he should resign if one were sent. Lord Granville observed that no Cabinet could last a day if it was to be exposed to going to pieces on differences as regards the future. Harcourt proposed to "clear out" of Egypt immediately. Lord Granville won an easy victory over him by proving that only three weeks ago he had wanted to take Egypt under our protection. Harcourt then said that as long ago as November, 1883, he had spoken in favour of clearing out. "Yes," said Lord Granville, "so you did; but I said three weeks ago."
"On March 29th there was a Cabinet at Coombe Warren. Mr. Gladstone seemed pretty well, and had at least one good laugh. He still regretted Zebehr. The Cabinet considered Gordon, what we should do with slavery at Suakim, and House of Commons business."
About this date the main body of the British troops was withdrawn from Suakim in accordance with the decision of March 25th. They had inflicted defeats on Osman Digna at El Teb, and again at Tamanieb; many Dervishes and not a few English had been killed, but no effect of moment had been produced, and the road to Berber was not opened.
A new complication now arose. Egypt was presented with Europe"s total claims for the losses to Europeans in the burnings at Alexandria. They amounted to four millions and a half. How was this demand to be met?
Under the Law of Liquidation established in 1880, Egypt could not borrow without the consent of the five Powers who had const.i.tuted the Commission of Liquidation. The demand presented to Egypt had to be considered by the one Power which was now _de facto_ supreme in Egypt.
"On April 2nd there was an important Cabinet called on Egyptian finance. It began, of course, on something else. We discussed the future of Suakim; the replies to be given in the House on the next day as to Gordon; and then Childers" views upon Egyptian finance; while we were considering these, there came a letter from Northcote with the questions that he intended to put on the next day"
(questions which could only be answered by a full statement of policy on all the points of the Egyptian problem). "After going back to this, we went on again to finance, and decided to call a conference of the Great Powers to alter the Law of Liquidation. Mr.
Gladstone had unwillingly consented to meet the Powers by proposing to reduce the charge for the British army; and he was anxious to get the money for the British taxpayer out of a borrowing operation on the future value of the Ca.n.a.l Shares. Chamberlain and I decided that if he did this the Tories would declare that Mr. Gladstone had become a pensioner on the bounty of Lord Beaconsfield. There was some talk at this Cabinet as to whether we should guarantee the Egyptian debt, to which I was opposed. Chamberlain had at one time been friendly to such an operation, but had now "gone round" on the ground that we could not "carry it against the Tories and the Radicals." "Is there anything else?" said Chamberlain to Mr.
Gladstone as the Cabinet was breaking up. "No," said Mr. Gladstone, "we have done our Egyptian business and we are an Egyptian Government.""
II.
From this time forward the "Egyptian Government" at Westminster had two main subjects of concern--the question of extricating Gordon with the garrisons, and the question of dealing with the international situation, partly diplomatic and partly financial. France, increasingly unfriendly to Great Britain, was above all unfriendly in regard to Egypt: while Bismarck, doing his best to foment this quarrel, was at the same time weakening Great Britain by menaces in Africa and Australasia, and the danger of a Russian advance in Central Asia hung like a thundercloud over the whole situation. [Footnote: Sir Charles wrote to Mr. Brett on November 15th, 1884: "I told Herbert Bismarck when he was here that it was very silly of his father to get in the way of our Egypt plans, for France would not go to war about them, and therefore, after threatening, he would have to look on and see the things he had threatened against done quietly."]
There were three groups of opinion in the Government in regard to the Soudan. The first was for an expedition which should carry with it the consequence of occupation more or less prolonged. Another was against any expedition and in favour of immediate evacuation. A third section-- including Sir Charles Dilke and Mr. Chamberlain--accepted the need of an expedition, but was determined that occupation should not follow. It was inc.u.mbent on this last-named group to suggest a positive policy, and Dilke, as will be seen, had his plan ready. There was a further decision to be taken. When once an expedition was in contemplation, the route and the character of the expedition had to be fixed. On this matter also Sir Charles had early formed a resolve, but neither he nor anyone else could pin the Cabinet to a clear course of action.
"At this time" (April 2nd) "Chamberlain wrote to me of Egypt: "Once more Hartington, and you and I, are at opposite poles. For one, I do not mean to be forced any further in the direction of protectorate."
"Although they would not admit it, the Cabinet were rapidly coming round at this time to an autumn Gordon expedition, and Chamberlain wrote to me: "I believe it will come to this in the end"; while Northbrook was in favour of an expedition. I then made up a list from private information showing that six of us were favourable to an expedition, as against five the other way--several members having made no statement either way. Those for an expedition were Hartington, Northbrook, the Chancellor (Lord Selborne), Derby, Chamberlain, and myself; and those against it, Mr. Gladstone, Lord Granville, Harcourt, Kimberley, and Dodson. On April 21st, Egypt was discussed without decision, though with the note by me: "The majority now begin to see that an October expedition is certain."
"On the 23rd a Cabinet ... considered the possibility of reaching Berber.... After the Cabinet of April 23rd, I advocated a naval expedition by the Nile on the ground that the Admiralty were likely to do the thing better than the War Office. [Footnote: A review by Sir Charles in the _Athenaeum_ of October 24th, 1908, deals with the _Life of Lord Northbrook_, by Sir Bernard Mallet, and his allusions to Lord Northbrook"s consideration, as early as April, of a "rescue and retire" expedition by the Nile route for the autumn, "it being a.s.sumed that the boats then ordered could not pa.s.s the various cataracts before High Nile." See _Life of Lord Northbrook_, pp.
185-186. A review by Sir Charles of March 28th, 1908, in the same paper, of _Modern Egypt_, by the Earl of Cromer, also deals with Lord Northbrook"s pressure for a Nile Expedition in March, 1884.] On April 28th, Berber, Khartoum, and Gordon, on which there was nothing new, but Hartington insisted on a large and important military expedition."
"On April 29th Baring had now come over about Egypt, and attended a Cabinet to state his views. I saw him privately, and settled with him the details for a possible Nile expedition "small and early."
The difficulty was at the sixth cataract. He also broached to me his scheme for a new control by the four Powers already represented on the Caisse de la Dette--namely, England, France, Austria, and Italy, with an English president."
"At the next Cabinet there was a proposal by Hartington that there should be a vote of thanks to Sir Gerald Graham and Admiral Hewett for the Suakim expedition--a proposal which the Cabinet rejected, having had quite enough of votes of thanks on the former occasion when Wolseley and Beauchamp Seymour were in question. The next matter was what we should say about our Law of Liquidation Conference, on which there arose an awkward question as to what should happen in the probable case of the representatives of the Powers not being unanimous. There was every reason to suppose that the French would not agree to anything, and precedents went to show that unanimity was necessary to render valid the decisions of a conference. Indeed, there was no precedent as regards questions of principle which told the other way; and at the Congress of Berlin Prince Bismarck had stated, as recorded in the first protocol, that as regarded substantive proposals it was an incontestable principle that the minority should not be bound to acquiesce in a vote of a majority.
"Then came the consideration of the action to be taken by the Egyptian Government towards Mr. O"Kelly, M.P., [Footnote: Mr. James O"Kelly, then M.P. for Koscommon, a very adventurous war correspondent. He died in 1916.] Parnell"s friend, who had been trying to join the Mahdi. We next considered Lord Salisbury"s relations towards Tewfik as Khedive, as affected by the violent attacks of many Conservative members, put up by Broadley, upon Tewfik"s character. Randolph Churchill had made a most ferocious series of attacks upon the Khedive, without one atom of truth in them. It is a curious example of his forgetful flightiness, that when, a few years later, he went to Egypt, he was struck with wonder at the Khedive"s refusal to receive him. The terms of the French acceptance of our invitation to the Conference were discussed, as were the House of Commons questions as to Gordon, and the offer of Mr. Guy Dawnay, M.P., to go as a messenger to Gordon at his own cost. Then followed the internal condition of Egypt, as to which Baring"s views were stated by me; then Harrar; then the employment of negroes or Turks for the Egyptian army; then the Turks at Suakim; then the Somali coast.
"On the same day I had an interview with the ex-Khedive Ismail, who had gone downhill. He always had a certain difficulty in collecting his ideas and putting them into words, but on this occasion it went farther than I had previously known. He wished to impress on me the necessity for defending Egypt against the Mahdi at some given point upon the Nile, when occurred that incident of his continually working up to the name of the place and forgetting it. [Footnote: See Chapter x.x.x., Vol. I., p. 487.]
"On May 5th there was a Cabinet. We considered the vote of censure as to Gordon, and decided that time must be given for it; and I then had some correspondence with Northbrook across the table as to an expedition. I said: "Northbrook, I should be glad to know all you know against the Nile route. Ismail, who knows all about it, thinks it quite possible." Northbrook replied: "My objections are uncertainty of getting steamers up at all (we know nothing of the 140 miles beyond Wady Halfa), and necessity of a.s.sistance from natives, which may not be given. Key" (Sir Cooper Key) "is in rather a delicate position, as he does not like to go against Wolseley, whose opinion is for the Nile, and the responsibility is with the W.O."
"On May 7th there was another Cabinet. It was decided that Nubar need not be brought to London for the Conference, that a fresh place in some other unhappy portion of the world must be found for Clifford Lloyd; [Footnote: A Resident Magistrate who had come violently into collision with the Nationalists in Ireland, and who had also proved himself a storm centre in Egypt, as he afterwards did in Mauritius.] and one was found, and he again fought with the local authorities as he had fought in Ireland and in Egypt. With regard to the att.i.tude of France, it was decided that we could not, so long as we remained in Egypt, put up with a new international control. It was decided to bring the Turks to Suakim, although this decision was afterwards reversed. We then wasted much of our time on the consideration of what should be our att.i.tude on the vote of censure which was pending in the House. Harcourt had drawn an amendment for Mr. Gladstone on which they had agreed. Chamberlain and I had agreed to support a mere negative, and we talked the others over....
"On May 11th Fitzmaurice wrote to me complaining that no definite instructions had been given him with regard to the conduct of the Gordon debate" (on the vote of censure), [Footnote: See _Hansard_, vol. cclx.x.xviii., 3rd series, debate of May 13th, 1884] "as was usual in such important cases, but stating that he expected me to speak. On the next day, May 12th, I learnt that Hartington had refused to speak, although he was finally made to do so by Mr.
Gladstone. On Tuesday, May 13th, I made a good speech from 12.10 to 1.10 a.m.--too late for the reporters. "The debate has (I noted in my diary) been the best I ever heard. Mr. Gladstone was not so good as usual, while Hartington and I were neither better nor worse than usual. But Churchill, Forster, Cowen, John Morley, and Beach, all spoke far above their usual level; and the rest were good. A memorable debate, which I do not expect to see excelled for interest and fire, and I am glad to have had the honour to wind it up for the Liberal party." Afterwards I noted that it "does not read well."
"On May 14th Cabinet again decided that Nubar must not come over for the Conference; discussed internal affairs of Egypt, then the Conference again; and then called in Sir Evelyn Baring and discussed with him the same matters of Clifford Lloyd, Nubar, Conference, the Turks and the Red Sea ports, what was to be said to Waddington about the Conference, and the detail of a scheme of Childers upon Egyptian finance, which was extraordinarily unpopular with the Cabinet.
"On May 17th at noon there was a full Cabinet (Spencer being present), and a long one. The first matter discussed was the Queen and Conference, [Footnote: Proposed Conference of the Powers on the Law of Liquidation.] and a strong objection on the part of Mr.
Gladstone to tell Parliament anything about the Conference.
Chamberlain wrote to me on this: "What a queer twist this objection of Mr. G. is!" To which I replied: "I really wish he would have gone to Coombe for this lovely day and let us go on without him. He has wasted an hour and a half. Mr. G. will fight a whole day in Cabinet to avoid telling Parliament something, and then after all will tell them twice as much in reply to Ashmead Bartlett." On this Chamberlain wrote:
"Here lies Mr. G., who has left us repining, While he is, no doubt, still engaged in refining; And explaining distinctions to Peter and Paul, Who faintly protest that distinctions so small Were never submitted to saints to perplex them, Until the Prime Minister came up to vex them."
[Footnote: These were notes pa.s.sed during the sitting of the Cabinet. On Mr. Gladstone"s inconvenient habit of giving information at question time, see Vol. I., pp. 307, 384, 459, 535; and _infra_, p. 118.]
"The Cabinet decided to send a telegram to Gordon through Zebehr, in order to obtain safe conveyance for it, offering free use of money among the tribes.
"To Grant Duff I wrote on May 17th: "The Queen is much against our arrangements with France. If we "let them out" we spoil them, and if we don"t we shall be condemned for a "secret negotiation with France by a moribund Cabinet." Yet, though we look very wrong, we _are_ right.""
"On the 19th it was decided that the Nile was to be patrolled by the Navy as far as Wady Halfa."
This was in the direction of the military policy which Sir Charles favoured, but in which he was not to succeed. His diplomatic proposals now have to be considered.
"At this time I sent a box round the Cabinet as to the neutralization of Egypt, Northbrook a.s.senting. In a minute dated May 22nd, Lord Northbrook wrote: "I am disposed to think it would be wise to propose at once an international guarantee of the neutrality of Egypt, (1) It would give a substance and solidity to the French a.s.surances." (To Grant Duff I wrote on the 22nd: "We have got from France an engagement not to go to Egypt when we come away, and never at any future time, except by the authority of Europe.") "(2) Without it I hardly see a chance of escaping from annexation.... All the circ.u.mstances of Egypt ... point to this solution, and ... the release of Egypt from the Soudan makes the solution possible."
Chamberlain wrote: "I agree entirely with Dilke and Northbrook. (1) As to the intrinsic importance of such a proposal. If adopted it secures every essential British interest, and promises relief from the intolerable burden of a continued occupation. I am strongly in favour of making the proposal at once. It will give a real guarantee to the Powers of our good faith and intention to clear out of the country. (2) I attach great importance to it as forming a definite policy.... To make Egypt the "Belgium of the East" is an object easily popularized. The phrase will carry the proposal." Kimberley wrote: "I agree with Northbrook and Dilke. The neutralization of Egypt will be a gain in itself, irrespective altogether of the question of its internal administration. It would also ... render it easy to establish a firm domestic Government in so far as it would put an end to the rivalries ... which exercise a very disturbing influence on all Egyptian affairs.--K." This minute received the support of the signatures of the Chancellor, Harcourt, and Childers.
Lord Derby wrote: "I agree so entirely with the views of Lord Northbrook and Sir Charles Dilke that I need add nothing to what they have written. There is only one alternative in the long-run; guaranteed neutrality or annexation.--D., May 23." Carlingford also agreed, but Hartington strongly dissented; and although Lord Granville agreed with us, Hartington"s dissent was so fierce that he succeeded in preventing Mr. Gladstone from expressing an opinion, and the view taken by ten members of the Cabinet remained without effect.
"... On May 24th, the next matter discussed was the neutralization of Egypt, which Mr. Gladstone decided, in face of Hartington"s minute, was "not to be immediately proposed."" [Footnote: The offer of neutralization was, however, made. See _infra_, Chapter x.x.xVIII., pp. 94, 97.]
"We then returned to our old business of Waddington and the Conference. Mr. Gladstone next complained that he had been catechized in the House of Commons on Monday, May 19th, as to whether he "told most lies on Monday or on Thursday." We then discussed the desirability of making a statement in the House as to the number of years that our troops would remain in Egypt; Northbrook and Hartington suggesting either five years or three years from January, 1885, and Carlingford suggesting one year, in which he was supported by the Prime Minister and myself; but three years prevailed. Next came Morocco; and then a Gordon expedition--Mr. Gladstone speaking strongly against it.
"On May 27th there was a Cabinet before the Whitsuntide recess. It was decided what statement was to be made to Parliament about the Conference. Lord Granville had told Waddington that we should not stay more than five years in Egypt at the outside, and Hartington, who himself had been willing to limit our stay to three years, now fought violently against a limitation even to five. Chamberlain wrote to me: "As usual--the question having been twice settled, Hartington, in a minority of one, raises the whole question again.
It is direct, unmitigated, and unconcealed obstruction." We then discussed the expedition to Khartoum and the making of a Suakim- Berber railway, but it was decided that orders were not yet to be given. On the next day Mr. Gladstone, who had gone to Hawarden, wrote: