"On Friday, March 6th, I saw Herbert Bismarck again twice.... I having expressed anxiety about Zanzibar, he told me that his father had directed him to say that he "considered Zanzibar as independent as Turkey or Russia." It is to my mind shameful that, after this, Lord Granville should have begun and Lord Salisbury have rapidly completed arrangements by which the Zanzibar mainland, the whole trade of which was in our hands, was handed over to Germany."
"On March 7th we discussed Herbert Bismarck"s views on the Cameroons, on German claims in New Guinea (on this head we settled with him), and on Pondoland."
While the difficulties with Germany were being discussed, differences as to Egyptian policy and our relations with France continued.
On January 20th, Egypt once more threatened to break up the Government.
France had proposed an international Commission of Inquiry into the financial situation.
"We discussed a French proposal which, as I wrote to the Chancellor, had at least one advantage--namely, "that it re-forms the majority in the Cabinet by uniting two of the three parties--yours and mine."
Mr. Gladstone, Lord Granville, Kimberley, Derby, Harcourt, the Chancellor, Trevelyan, and Dilke, eight in all, supported taking the new French proposals as a basis. Chamberlain was absent ill.
Northbrook, Hartington, Childers, to my astonishment, and Carlingford were against us. After the Cabinet Hartington wrote to Mr. Gladstone to say that he "could not accept the decision," and Northbrook supported him." Next day, however, "when we turned to Egyptian finance, Trevelyan went over from our side to the other.
Mr. Gladstone announced that what we had decided on the previous day was not to prevent our arguing against the French proposed inquiry, and thus Hartington was kept in."
"On January 23rd I forwarded to Chamberlain a letter from Sandringham, which showed that the Queen had been alarmed at the possibility that my proposed Civil List inquiry might affect not only new grants, but also the Civil List arrangements made at the beginning of the reign. Chamberlain made a Delphic reply that, on the one hand, inquiry would be a farce if it did not include the existing Civil List, but that on the other hand there could be no intention to make any change in the arrangements with the Queen."
"On January 28th, I heard from Sandringham that the Prince of Wales was going to Osborne the next day, and would broach to the Queen his friendliness to the idea of a new settlement of the Civil List.
Chamberlain was anxious that no difficulty should be made by us on the occasion of the marriage of Princess Beatrice. He wrote: "_If alone_, I should wait for something or somebody to turn up. Before Prince Edward wants an allowance who knows what may happen? But I am perfectly ready to follow your lead or to lead to your prompting.""
All arrangements were being made on the a.s.sumption that Lord Hartington would become Prime Minister.
"I had been left by Mr. Gladstone in a certain doubt as to whether I was to be completely responsible for the Redistribution Bill, or whether Hartington was to share the responsibility. I wrote to Hartington: "Mr. Gladstone sends me everything on Redistribution, and expresses no opinion of his own. Northcote and Salisbury write to me only, and the whole thing is more and more in my hands. If I let things drift, it is clear that I shall practically have sole charge of the Bill, for no one else will know anything about it. I do not shrink from this at all. It is work I like. But, as you will probably be called on to form an Administration immediately after the pa.s.sing of the Bill, don"t you think it would look well, and that our people and the Press and the country would like it, if you were to take charge of the Bill? If so, I had better have two or three days" work at it with you."
"Hartington had asked me to stay with him at Hardwick to talk it over, but it was only a Sat.u.r.day to Monday visit from January 10th to 12th, and there were many people in the house, and our whole conversation was but very short; and Hartington continued to show but little desire to work at the detail, and the Bill could only be handled by those who knew its detail."
Although the Opposition leaders had accepted the compact, it was at this time quite uncertain whether the House of Commons would consent to the Redistribution scheme--affecting as it did the interests of every member. The Fourth Party had not been consulted in the arrangement, and inevitable friction followed.
"On January 27th I had a correspondence with Northcote in reference to some mischief which had been made by Randolph Churchill.
Northcote had been told by the Conservative Chief Whip, "Dilke told Randolph that the Government would have given more grouping if we had pressed for it." The Conservative party being angry at the absence of grouping of the boroughs, Northcote had taken up the point, but he now wrote: "Whatever Churchill said must have been in the nature of an inference of his own from what had previously pa.s.sed, from which he had probably gathered that the Government were ready to concede grouping." But there was a lady in the case who had gossiped about what Northcote had said to her, and he promised to write to the offender."
"On January 13th Mr. Gladstone wrote as to the Redistribution Bill: "The difficulty as I see it about communication with Northcote is that he seems to have little weight of influence, and to be afraid or unwilling to a.s.sume any responsibility. I have usually found him reasonable in his own views, but obliged to reserve his judgment until after consulting his friends, which consultations I have found always to end badly. On the other hand, it is, of course, necessary to pay him due respect. What may prove to be best under these circ.u.mstances is--(1) not to be bound always to consult HIM, (2) to consult him freely on the easier and smaller matters, but (3) in a stiff question, such as the numbers of the House may prove to be, to get at Salisbury if possible, under whose wing Northcote will, I think, mostly be content to walk, (4) Or, if Salisbury cannot be got alone, then Northcote and Salisbury would be far preferable to Northcote alone.""
All these difficulties had to be met by Sir Charles. When the Bill actually came before the House, "Mr. Gladstone instructed James to a.s.sist me in the conduct of it. But practically I had it to myself."
Lord Hartington had rendered invaluable service in the preliminary negotiations. But for such laborious work of detail as was needed to carry through this Bill, neither temperament nor surroundings had fitted him. His Hardwick home is thus described by Sir Charles in a letter which he wrote to Mrs. Pattison:
"I am writing in my bedroom, which is--bed and all--that of Mary Queen of Scots, who was the prisoner of Bess of Hardwick. It is a wonderful house, indeed--enormous, and yet completely covered with the tapestry and the pictures of the time.... The cas.e.m.e.nt windows have never been touched since Queen Elizabeth was here, and are enormous. (There is a local proverb which speaks of the hall as "all window and no wall.") The result is that, in spite of heavy hanging curtains, the candles are blown out if you go near the windows....
The portrait of the first Cavendish--who was usher of Cardinal Wolsey, and who married Bess of Hardwick, the richest lady of the day--is exactly like Hartington, but a vulgar Hartington--fat and greasy--a Hartington who might have kept a public-house."
Mr. Chamberlain wrote to Sir Charles at Hardwick concerning his host:
"The true Whig tradition is to keep abreast of the movement which they would willingly restrain, and do nothing to quicken, but it is difficult for a man of Hartington"s temperament to make the sacrifice of pride which these tactics require."
Mr. Chamberlain"s Ipswich speech had made its mark, and Sir Charles notes "the beginning of the terror caused by the unauthorized programme"
in "a letter which I received from Lord Salisbury, who was at Florence, as to my draft Report of the Housing Commission."
"Lord Salisbury had greatly changed his views since he had sketched out socialistic proposals for me in his own hand. He now complained of that which I had said on "the burning questions of expropriation, betterment, and land tenure," and thought that Chamberlain"s evidence had affected the report, and that such views "must now be considered in the light of the doctrines as to land he has recently laid down.""
That letter, received on January 30th, must have been written two days earlier, and evidently at that moment there were plans of forming an administration which should exclude the Radicals.
"On January 28th Harcourt told me that he had stopped the Queen deciding to send for Goschen to form a Whig Ministry if we were beaten or if Mr. Gladstone resigned by telling her that Goschen would refuse, or that, if he consented, no one would join him."
On January 29th, at Birmingham, Mr. Chamberlain made reply to his critics in a speech which added to the Ipswich programme manhood suffrage and payment of members, and which further declared that the sanct.i.ty of public property far exceeded that of private property. If land, for instance, had been "lost or wasted or stolen," some equivalent for it must be found, and some compensation exacted from the wrongdoers.
[Footnote: "The ransom theory," afterwards alluded to (see Chapter XLIV., p. 182).]
These utterances from a member of the Cabinet were not likely to pa.s.s unchallenged.
"On Monday, February 2nd, Chamberlain telegraphed to me that he was coming up on the next day, Tuesday, the 3rd, on purpose to see me on an important matter; and on the morning of the 3rd I received in a secret box the letters about which he was coming. There was one from Mr. Gladstone complaining of the unauthorized programme, and a draft proposed reply, and Chamberlain added: "Take them (Mr. Gladstone"s letters and enclosures from the Whigs) in connection with the _Times_ articles. There is to be a dead set evidently.... There are three possibilities. (1) Mr. Gladstone may wish me to resign. (2) A vote of censure may be proposed in the House of Commons and carried.
(3) Mr. Gladstone may defend me, and in so doing may to all intents and purposes censure me in such a way as to entail my resignation.
The first would not, I think, do me any harm. The second would do me good. The third would not be pleasant. My object in proposed reply is to make Mr. G. speak more plainly, and to let me know where I stand. I have spoken in the first person because (until I see you) I have no right to a.s.sume that you will accept a joint responsibility.
But I think you will, and then if we go out or are forced out there will be a devil of a row. I have been speaking to Schnadhorst to-day on the possibility. He says (you must take the opinion for what it is worth) that it would strengthen us in the country.... I a.s.sume Trevelyan would go with Mr. G.... I shall want to know what you think of it all, and whether you have any alterations to propose in the reply."
"I noted: "I, of course, make common cause. The Whigs want to force him into a row with Mr. G., who, they think, will break him in place of his breaking Hartington after Mr. G. is gone." I admitted to Chamberlain when we met on February 3rd that there was, as he said, a dead set at him, and that the _Pall Mall_ for a wonder was backing it up. On his first point I was sure that Mr. Gladstone did not wish for his resignation, and knew that I should go too. On the second, I doubted any member being ready to bell the cat; and on the third point I was sure that Mr. Gladstone"s defence of Chamberlain would not be such as to entail his resignation."
Sir Charles thought, and told Chamberlain, that the object of the Whigs was to force them "to war with Mr. G. who is strong, and not with Hartington," against whom the Radicals would hold winning cards. "We therefore play into their hands by going NOW." Meanwhile, he took up a fighting att.i.tude towards the rest of the world.
"I had written to Mr. Gladstone very strongly backing up Chamberlain"s right to express his individual opinion upon the questions of the future, and pointing out his patience in not repudiating some of Hartington"s remarks, and saying that I could not let him go out alone."
"On February 4th I heard from Chamberlain ... thanking me for getting Carrington, who represented my Department in the Lords, to make a pro-Chamberlain speech."
This was the more valuable because the whole Press was against the "unauthorized programme." At the same time, Sir Charles did not fail to point out that their position was an unsound one, writing first:
"Our words as to the future are too wide. They would cover my preaching a Republic for two years hence, or your preaching the nationalization of land without compensation for the next Parliament."
He urged also that the precedent which Mr. Chamberlain sought to establish was two-edged.
February 5th, "At night I gave Chamberlain a hint that some day others might turn against him that freedom of speech which he claimed as against Hartington; and he prepared a doc.u.ment which, under the form of standing out for full right of free speech, really yielded the whole point. He covered his retreat with great skill, and the doc.u.ment as corrected by me would be valuable if it could be found. I have no copy, but have memoranda which pa.s.sed between us, in one of which I begged him to keep the draft with my corrections as representing our joint view, inasmuch as it might be important in the future. Chamberlain notes, in a minute which I have, his acceptance of the general doctrine, with a declaration that the present was an exceptional period; that there was a new departure under the franchise reform, that it was essential to give a general direction to the discussion, that his actual proposals were moderate, and such as only to point to, firstly, a revision of taxation which Mr. Gladstone himself had advocated, details being open, but the principle being to secure equality of sacrifice; secondly, the extension of power of local authorities on lines already conceded in Ireland."
The two allies were fighting a hard fight at a critical moment. At such times even the closest friends naturally seek to rea.s.sure each other, and to a letter from Sir Charles Mr. Chamberlain made this reply, January 11th:
"The malice and ingenuity of men is so great that I should be afraid they would some day break our friendship if it had not victoriously stood the strain of public life for so many years. I will swear that I will never do anything knowingly to imperil it, and I hope that we are both agreed that if by any chance either of us should think that he has the slightest cause of complaint he will not keep it to himself for a day, but will have a frank explanation. In this case I shall feel safe, for I am certain that any mistake would be immediately repaired by whoever might be in fault."
CHAPTER x.x.xIX
THE FALL OF KHARTOUM AND THE PENJDEH INCIDENT
"On the morning of Thursday, February 5th, 1885, at 3 a.m., Brett went to Lord Granville with the news of the fall of Khartoum. He used to tell how he had been wholly unable to find the old gentleman, and how the servants had ultimately a.s.serted that their master was at Walmer--which he was not. At the same hour the news was sold by a War Office messenger to one of the News Agencies. The resident clerk at the War Office had written to Thompson, of the War Office, in an unsealed envelope, instead of putting the despatch into a box. It did not matter much on this occasion, but it might matter in a great European war. A Cabinet was immediately summoned for the next day. [Footnote: The following correspondence between Mr. Brett (now Viscount Eslier) and Sir Charles throws light on the summoning of the Cabinet:
War Office,
Thursday morning, 3 a.m.
Here is some bad news.
No Ministers in town, except you and Chamberlain!