The Life of the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles W. Dilke.
Vol. 2.
by Stephen Gwynn.
CHAPTER x.x.xIV
HOME AFFAIRS
OCTOBER, 1883-DECEMBER, 1884
I.
The interval between the Sessions of 1883 and 1884 was critical for the question of electoral reform which interested Liberals beyond all other questions, but involved the risk of bringing dissensions in the Cabinet to the point of open rupture. As the months went by, Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Hartington used less and less concealment of their differences, while it was well known to all the Cabinet that the alliance between Chamberlain and Dilke was complete and unconditional. Whoever broke with Chamberlain broke with Dilke. Fortunately a certain bond of personal sympathy, in spite of divergent views, existed between Lord Hartington and Sir Charles Dilke, and this bond largely helped to hold Mr.
Gladstone"s Government together.
In the negotiations which followed between the leaders of the two great Parties, Sir Charles Dilke was able to show the full measure of his value to the State. It was of first-rate importance that the Liberal Party should possess at that moment a representative with whom Lord Salisbury found it congenial to treat, and whom the most advanced Liberals trusted unreservedly to treat with Lord Salisbury.
The same confidence could hardly have been given by them to Lord Hartington, who held that "equalization of the franchise was pressing mainly on account of the pledges that had been given, and not much for any other reason." [Footnote: Letter to Mr. Gladstone of October 24th, 1883, quoted by Mr. Bernard Holland in his _Life of the Duke of Devonshire_, vol. i., p. 395.] Most Liberals took a very different view of the need for this reform. Further, Lord Hartington held that franchise and redistribution should be treated simultaneously, and he was unwilling to extend the franchise in Ireland.
At a Cabinet on October 25th, 1883, the question of simultaneous or separate treatment of the problems had been settled. Mr. Gladstone, says Sir Charles, "made a speech which meant franchise first and the rest nowhere." On the Irish question, Sir Charles was instructed to get accurate statistics as to the effects of equalizing the franchise between boroughs and counties, and "on Friday, November 16th," he notes, "I wrote to Chamberlain: "I have some awful figures for poor Hartington to swallow--700,000 county householders in the Irish counties."" Lord Hartington still stuck to his point of linking redistribution and franchise.
But on November 22nd,
"Mr. Gladstone read a long and admirable memorandum in favour of the views held by him, by Chamberlain, and by me, as to franchise and redistribution--that is, franchise first, with a promise of redistribution but no Bill; and Hartington received no support after this from any members of the Cabinet."
There were, however, matters in which Lord Hartington"s Conservative tendencies found an ally in the Prime Minister. On November 28th, 1883, at the Committee of the Cabinet on Local Government,
"Chamberlain noted: "Mr. Gladstone hesitates to disfranchise the freeholders in boroughs--persons voting as householders in boroughs and as freeholders in the counties in which the boroughs are const.i.tuted. I am in favour of one man one vote, and told him so."
Our not getting one man one vote was entirely Mr. Gladstone"s fault, for the Cabinet expected and would have taken it, Hartington alone opposing, as he opposed everything all through."
The question of widening the franchise in Ireland was still unsettled, and Mr. Chamberlain and Lord Hartington both made allusion to it in public speeches at this moment. The speeches, apart from their marked difference in general tone, were on this point in flat contradiction to each other, and on December 2nd Lord Hartington wrote to Mr. Gladstone with a threat of resignation. On that day he delivered at Accrington a long eulogy of the Whigs, who had "formed a connecting link between the advanced party and those cla.s.ses which, possessing property, powers, and influence, are naturally averse to change." The Whigs it was, he contended, who had by their guidance and their action reduced changes in the direction of popular reform to the "calm and peaceful process of const.i.tutional acts."
"At this moment there was a conflict raging between Chamberlain and Hartington, and in their autumn speeches each of them pretty plainly attacked the other"s policy. Chamberlain wrote to me: "Why does Hartington think _aloud_ when he thinks one thing and is going to do the other? And why does he snub the Caucus when he has made up his mind to do exactly what they want? If he cannot learn to be a little more diplomatic, he will make a devil of a rum leader!" A little later Chamberlain gave me "pa.s.sages from a speech which _ought_ to be delivered: "Yes, gentlemen, I entirely agree with Lord Hartington. It is the business and duty of Radicals to lead great popular movements, and if they are fortunate enough to kindle the fire of national enthusiasm and to stir the hearts of the people, then it will be the high prerogative of the great Whig n.o.ble who has been waiting round the corner to direct and guide and moderate the movement which he has done all in his power to prevent and discourage.""
"The storm between Hartington and Chamberlain having broken out again, Chamberlain wrote to me on December 5th, enclosing a letter of reproof from Mr. Gladstone, and saying: "I replied casuistically that I would endeavour to exclude from my speeches the slightest reference to Hartington, but that he was really too trying. I reminded Mr. G. that I had asked if I were free to argue the question, and that he had said: Yes--no one taking exception." In the following week Chamberlain came to town and dined with me, and we discussed the matter. Although Mr. Gladstone had blown Chamberlain up, he was really much more angry with Hartington."
It appears from the _Life of the Duke of Devonshire_ that Mr. Gladstone continued through December his attempts to mediate. [Footnote: See _Life of the Duke of Devonshire_, by Mr. Bernard Holland, vol. i, p. 398 _et seq_.] The matter is thus related by Sir Charles, though not from first- hand knowledge, since he went to Toulon in the middle of December, and stayed there till January 8th, 1884:
"During my absence I had missed one Cabinet, the first that I ever missed, and perhaps the only one. It was held suddenly on January 3rd, and I could not arrive in time. Mr. Gladstone had come up from Hawarden under the impression that Hartington was going to resign, because we would not produce a redistribution scheme along with franchise. On the morning of the 3rd, however, he received a letter in which Hartington gave way on the understanding that Mr. Gladstone would state the general heads of his redistribution scheme. The subject was not named at the Cabinet of the 3rd, which dealt with Egypt only. But the Cabinet adjourned to the 4th, and on January 4th discussed South Africa, and also ... received a statement from Mr.
Gladstone as to his intention to state the heads of our redistribution scheme in "very general terms." On the 10th I noted: "The Cabinets have resulted in peace between Lord Hartington and Mr.
Gladstone, but the Reform Bill will be less complete than I had hoped." "Mr. Gladstone calmed Hartington by promising not to run away from us after franchise and before redistribution, which was what Hartington feared he meant to do.""
Discussion upon the detail of the Bill was resumed, and on January 23rd, 1884,
"the Chancellor (Lord Selborne), Hartington, Kimberley, and Dodson, supported by Mr. Gladstone, forced, against Harcourt, Chamberlain, and myself, a decision not to attach any condition of residence to the property vote."
"On January 28th there was a meeting of the Committee of the Cabinet on the Franchise Bill in Mr. Gladstone"s room. Chamberlain was anxious to "make Hartington go out on franchise." I asked him how he thought it was to be done, and he replied: "If he is restive now, raise the question of Mr. Gladstone"s statement on redistribution, and oppose all limitations in that statement"; and he added that Mr.
Gladstone had only agreed to make the statement unwillingly to quiet Hartington, and that if Hartington were not quieted Mr. Gladstone would go back about it. Chamberlain and I on this occasion tried to make the Franchise Bill more Radical, but failed, Mr. Gladstone opposing us on old-fashioned grounds."
"Chamberlain came to me" (on April 26th) "about a plan which Mr.
Gladstone was to broach at the next Cabinet, for putting off the operation of the Franchise Act until January 1st, "86, in order to give time for redistribution to be dealt with. We decided to oppose it, on the ground that it would not improbably lead to our being forced into holding an election on the old franchise."
At the beginning of the Session Sir Charles helped on the general policy of Radicalism by one of his many minor electoral reforms. This was a Bill to extend over the United Kingdom the right of keeping the poll open till eight o"clock at night, which he had secured as a privilege for Londoners in 1878. He notes that on February 11th he "fought with Tory obstructives as to hours of polling, and won"; but the violent resistance which was offered at first did not continue, and the Bill pa.s.sed quietly in July, after time had been given to discuss it in the const.i.tuencies.
"On this day (July 22nd) I had a long and curious conversation with Healy as to Irish redistribution and as to the hours of poll in counties, with regard to which he was against extension, but said that he was forced to support it in public. He told me that his private opinion was that the Land Act had quieted Ireland."
The "Representation of the People" Bill, as the franchise measure was called, was introduced on February 28th, 1884, and made steady progress, Liberals finding their task facilitated by the difficulties of their opponents.
"On May 7th I wrote to Chamberlain to say that I had to speak at a house dinner of the Devonshire Club that night, and to ask him if there was anything he wanted said, to which he replied: "Note Randolph Churchill"s letter to Salisbury with reference to the Conservative Caucus, and the vindication of the Birmingham one." It was impossible not to notice this important letter, which revolutionized politics for some time."
"_May 14th_.--After the Cabinet I was informed by Chamberlain that a week earlier, on Wednesday, May 7th, Randolph Churchill had sent to him to know whether, if he broke with the Conservatives, the Birmingham Liberals would support him as an independent candidate."
Sir Charles"s letter to his agent at this time sums up the political position:
"The Tory game is to delay the franchise until they have upset us upon Egypt, before the Franchise Bill has reached the Lords.... Our side will be in a humour to treat as traitors any who do not insist that the one Bill and nothing else shall be had in view--in face of the tremendous struggle impending in the Lords."
"On _May 13th_ I had received a letter from Mr. Gladstone in answer to one from me in a matter which afterwards became important, and but for Chamberlain"s strong stand would have forced me to leave the Government. I had so strong an opinion in favour of woman"s suffrage that I could not undertake to vote against it, even when proposed as an amendment to a great Government Bill."
Sir Charles had written as follows:
"ANTIBES, "_Easter Eve_, "84.
"I had thought till lately that the Woman"s Suffrage division in Committee on the Franchise Bill would have been so hollow that my absence from it would not have mattered; but as I find that Grosvenor thinks that it will not be hollow, it becomes my duty to write to you about it. I myself think Grosvenor wrong; the woman"s suffrage people claim some 250 "friends," but this they do by counting all who, having voted with them once, have abstained from voting for many years, and who are really foes. The division can only be a close one if the Tory party as a body support the view which is Northcote"s, I believe, and was Disraeli"s, but many of the leaders would be bitterly opposed to such a course. Mr. Disraeli left the woman"s suffrage amendment an open question on his own Reform Bill, and forbade the Government Whips to tell against the amendment, but the ma.s.s of the Tory party voted in the majority. On this next occasion there will be a larger Liberal vote against the change than there was last year, and I do not believe that there will be a larger Tory vote in its favour. But, supposing that I am wrong and Grosvenor right, I should feel no difficulty in voting against the amendment on the grounds of tactics which would be stated, provided that Fawcett and Courtney, who are the only other thick-and-thin supporters of woman"s suffrage in the Government, voted also, but I cannot vote if they abstain. Under these circ.u.mstances what had I better do?"
Mr. Gladstone wrote back on May 11th:
"The question as to the votes of members of the Government on woman"s suffrage is beyond me, and I have always intended to ask the Cabinet, and (like the Gordon rescue) at the proper time. The distinction appears to me as clear as possible between supporting a thing in its right place and forcing it into its wrong place. To nail on to the extension of the franchise, founded upon principles already known and in use, a vast social question, which is surely ent.i.tled to be considered as such, appears to me in principle very doubtful. When to this is added the admirable pretext--nay, the fair argument--it would give to the House of Lords for "putting off" the Bill, I cannot see the ground for hesitation. But I quite understand what (I believe) is your view, that there should be one rule for all the members of the Government."
"This was an important letter. The words "(like the Gordon rescue) at the proper time" seem to show that Mr. Gladstone had already made up his mind to send an expedition to Khartoum, although he would not say so. The body of the letter proved that Mr. Gladstone had a very strong opinion against me on the main point, and the consultation of the Cabinet (which was dead against woman suffrage), and the one rule for all members of the Government, meant that he intended to force my vote by a Cabinet resolution, and, killing two birds with one stone, to attack at the same time Fawcett, who had walked out on several questions, and announced his intention of walking out on others.
"By May 22nd I had finally made up my mind that I could not vote against the woman franchise amendment--even as a mere matter of tactics and deference to others--if Courtney and Fawcett went out on the matter. I could not speak to them about it because of the "Cabinet secret" doctrine. Childers had been directed by the Cabinet to sound Courtney, because he was Courtney"s official superior in the Treasury. Childers was to offer Courtney that if he would vote against the amendment he should be allowed to speak for woman franchise on the merits, and that none of its opponents in the Cabinet (that is, all except myself) should speak against it on the merits. I noted: "On the whole I think that we shall walk out, and not be turned out for so doing." I again explained my position to Mr. Gladstone.... I felt that the majority of those voting for woman franchise on this occasion would be Tories, voting for party reasons, and in order to upset the Bill. I was therefore unwilling to go out on this occasion, but thought I could not do otherwise than make common cause with Courtney. On the merits of woman franchise I had and have a strong opinion. I always thought the refusal of it contrary to the public interest. The refusal of the franchise also affects the whole position of women most unfavourably." [Footnote: Mrs. Fawcett wrote thanking him "in the name of the friends of Women"s Suffrage. Your being a member of the Cabinet made your position in the matter one of special difficulty; but I do a.s.sure you that our grat.i.tude is real and unfeigned."]
On May 24th Sir Charles told the Cabinet what "I had told Mr. Gladstone in a letter which I had written to him on Easter Eve, and renewed on the occasion when he made the reply which has been quoted above."
When the amendment was reached, Dilke, with Fawcett and Courtney, abstained. This led to serious trouble. Sir Charles wrote on June 12th in his Diary:
"Hartington is very angry with me for not voting, and wants me turned out for it. He has to vote every day for things which he strongly disapproves, and this makes the position difficult. He says that my position was wholly different from that of Fawcett and Courtney, because I was a party to the decision of the Cabinet, and that custom binds the minority in the collective decision of Her Majesty"s servants. This is undoubtedly the accepted theory. Poor Hibbert was made to vote. [Footnote: Sir John Tomlinson Hibbert (d.
1908), at this time Financial Secretary to the Treasury, was an able administrator, and held office in Mr. Gladstone"s four administrations. He a.s.sisted materially in the pa.s.sing of the Execution within Gaols Act, Married Women"s Property Act, and Clergy Disabilities Act, and was keenly interested in the reform of the Poor Law.] I fear the Cabinet put the yoke, not of political necessity, but of their personal prejudice against woman suffrage, on the necks of their followers."
The matter came up at a Cabinet on June 14th, and was made worse because a letter from Lord Hartington, "offensive in tone," had been circulated by accident. However, Mr. Gladstone issued a minute about my walking out on woman"s suffrage, which concluded by a proposal, if his colleagues concurred, to request me to remain in the Government. Thus ended a personal crisis which, to use the French phrase, had been "open" since my letter to Mr. Gladstone dated "Antibes, Easter Eve."
"Chamberlain wrote to me: "It is settled"; and I wrote back: "It is settled. I would not have asked you to stand by me, as I have no const.i.tutional case, and your conduct in so doing could not be defended. I always count on your friendship, but this would have been too much." He replied: "We are both right. You could not ask me, but if you had been requested to resign I should have gone too."
Chamberlain had previously informed the Cabinet that, though he differed from me about woman"s suffrage, and regretted the course that I had felt myself obliged to take, he intended to stand by me "to the fullest extent."" [Footnote: The further negotiations with regard to Franchise and Redistribution in 1884, and the "compact"
which ended them, are dealt with in Chapter x.x.xVI., infra, pp.
63-79.]