"Had gunpowder and its adaptation to artillery," he there said, "been discovered and perfected by an individual, and had its wonderful power been privately tested, indisputably proved, and reported to a Government, or to a council of military men, at the period when the battering-ram and cross-bow were chief implements in war, it is probable that the civilians would have treated the author as a wild visionary, and that the professional council, true to the _esprit de corps_, would have spurned the supposed insult to their superior understanding. Science and the arts, both of peace and war, nevertheless, in despite of all such r.e.t.a.r.ding causes, have advanced, and probably will advance, until effects and consequences accrue which the imagination can scarcely contemplate.
"It is not, however, my intention to intrude observations of an ordinary nature, but to endeavour to rectify an erroneous opinion which appears to prevail, that consequences disastrous to this country may be antic.i.p.ated from the introduction of steam-ships into maritime warfare. I am desirous of showing that the use of steam-ships of war, though at present available by rival nations, need not necessarily diminish the security of our commerce; that still less need it necessarily endanger our national existence, which appears to be apprehended by those who allege the necessity of devoting millions of money to the defence of our coasts. I contend that there is nothing in the expected new system of naval warfare, through the employment of steam-vessels, that can justify such expensive and derogatory precautions, because there are equally new, and yet secret, means of conquest, which no devices. .h.i.therto used in maritime warfare could resist or evade.
"That the like prejudice or incredulity which in all probability would have scouted the invention of gunpowder, if offered to notice under the circ.u.mstances above supposed, may exist to a considerable extent in the present case, is extremely likely; yet I do not the less advisedly affirm, that with this all-powerful auxiliary invasion may be rendered impossible, and our commerce secure, by the speedy and effectual destruction of all a.s.semblages of steam-ships, and, if necessary, of all the navies of the whole world, which, for ever after, might be prevented from inconveniently increasing. Away then with the sinister forebodings which have originated the recent devices for protruding through the sterns of sluggish ships of war additional guns for defence in fight! Away with the projected plans of "protective forts and ports" of cowardly refuge! Let the manly resolution be taken, when occasion shall require, vigorously to attack the enemy, instead of preparing elaborate means of defence. Fact.i.tious ports on the margin of the Channel cannot be better protected than those which exist, respecting which I pledge any professional credit I may possess, that whatever hostile force might therein be a.s.sembled could be destroyed within the first twenty-four hours favourable for effective operations, in defiance of forts and batteries, mounted with the most powerful ordnance now in use.
"In the capacity of an officer all hope seemed to be precluded, that in time of peace I could render service to my country. A new light, however, has beamed through the cloud, for in the pursuit of my vocation as an amateur engineer it has become apparent that a plan, which I deemed available only in war, may contribute to prevent the naval department from being paralysed by wasteful perversion of its legitimate support. Protective harbours (save as screens from wind and sea) may be likened to nets wherein fishes, seeking to escape, find themselves inextricably entangled; or to the guardian care of a shepherd, who should pen his flock in a fold to secure it from a marching army. No effective protection could be afforded in such ports against a superior naval force equipped for purposes of destruction; whilst their utility as places of refuge from steam privateers is quite disproportioned to their cost--privateers could neither tow off merchant vessels from our sh.o.r.e, nor regain their own, if appropriate measures shall be adopted to intercept them.
"Impressions in favour of so expensive, so despondent, and so inadequate a scheme, can have no better origin than specious reports, emanating from delusive opinions derived from a very limited knowledge of facts. The hasty adoption of such measures, and the voting away the vast sums required to carry them into execution, are evils seriously to be deprecated. It is, therefore, greatly to be desired that those in power should pause before proceeding further in such a course. It behoves them to consider in all its bearings, and in all its consequences, the contemplated system of stationary maritime defence, subject, as that system may become, to the overwhelming influence of the secret plan which I placed in their hands, similar to that which I presented in 1812 to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, who referred its consideration confidentially to Lord Keith, Lord Exmouth, and the two Congreves, professional and scientific men, by whom it was p.r.o.nounced to be infallible, under the circ.u.mstances detailed in my explanatory statement.
"Thirty-three years is a long time to retain an important secret, especially as I could have used it with effect in defence of my character when cruelly a.s.sailed (as I have shown at length in a representation to the Government), and could have practically employed it on various occasions to my private advantage. I have now, however, determined to solicit its well-merited consideration, in the hope, privately, if possible, to prove the comparative inexpedience of an expenditure of some 12,000,000l. or 20,000,000l. sterling for the construction of forts and harbours, instead of applying ample funds at once to remodel and renovate the navy--professionally known to be susceptible of immense improvement--including the removal from its swollen bulk of much that is c.u.mbrous and prejudicial.
"However injudicious it might be thought to divulge my plan, at least until energetically put in execution for an adequate object; yet, if its disclosure is indispensable to enable a just and general estimate to be formed of the merits of the mongrel terraqueous scheme of defence now in contemplation, as compared with the mighty power and protective ubiquity of the floating bulwarks of Britain, I am satisfied that the balance would be greatly in favour of publicity. It would demonstrate that there could be no security in those defences and those asylums, on the construction of which it is proposed to expend so many millions of the public money; it might, therefore, have the effect of preventing such useless expenditure, and of averting the obviously impending danger of future parsimonious naval administration, abandonment of essential measures of nautical improvement, and the national disgrace of maritime degradation--all inseparable from an unnatural hermaphrodite union between a distinguished service, which might still further be immeasurably exalted, and the most extravagant, derogatory, inefficient, and preposterous project that could be devised for the security and protection of an insular, widely-extended, colonial and commercial State."
A few months after that letter had been written, Lord Dundonald"s hopes that his secret plans would be accepted by the Government were revived. In 1846, his friend Lord Auckland took office as First Lord of the Admiralty; and by him, with very little delay, it was proposed to submit the plans to the judgment of a competent committee of officers. This was all that Lord Dundonald had asked for, and he gladly accepted the proposal. The officers chosen were Sir Thomas Hastings, then Surveyor General of the Ordnance, Sir J. F. Burgoyne, and Lieutenant-Colonel J. S. Colquhoun. By them the project was carefully considered, and on the 16th of January, 1847, they tendered their official report upon it. "These plans," it was there said, "may be cla.s.sed under three heads:--1st. One, on which an opinion may be formed with experiment, for concealing or masking offensive warlike operations; and we consider that, under many particular circ.u.mstances, the method of his lordship may be made available as well by land as by sea, and we therefore suggest that a record of this part of Lord Dundonald"s plans should be deposited with the Admiralty, to be made use of when, in the judgment of their lordships, the opportunity for employing it may occur. 2nd. One, on which experiments would be required before a satisfactory conclusion could be arrived at. 3rd.
Nos. 1 and 2 combined for the purpose of hostile operations. After mature consideration, we have resolved that it is not desirable that any experiment should be made. We a.s.sume it to be possible that the plan No. 2 contains power for producing the sweeping destruction the inventor ascribes to it; but it is clear this power could not be retained exclusively by this country, because its first employment would develop both its principle and application. We considered, in the next place, how far the adoption of the proposed secret plans would accord with the feelings and principles of civilized warfare. We are of unanimous opinion that plans Nos. 2 and 3 would not be so. We therefore recommend that, as. .h.i.therto, plans Nos. 2 and 3 should remain concealed. We feel that great credit is due to Lord Dundonald for the right feeling which prompted him not to disclose his secret plans, when serving in war as naval commander-in-chief of the forces of other nations, and under many trying circ.u.mstances, in the conviction that these plans might eventually be of the highest importance to his own country."
That report was, in the main, highly gratifying to Lord Dundonald. It recognized the efficacy of his plans, and recommended their partial use, at any rate, in time of need. "Permit me to express, as far as I am able," he wrote to Lord Auckland on the 27th of January, "my deep sense of obligation to your lordship in causing my plans of war to be thoroughly investigated by the most competent authorities, and for the extremely kind terms in which you have informed me of the satisfactory result. With regard to their disposal, I submit that it would be advisable to retain them inviolate until a period shall arrive when the use of them may be deemed beneficial to the interests of the country, I have to observe, as to the opinions of the commission, that plans Nos. 2 and 3 would not accord with the principles and feeling of civilized warfare, that the new method resorted to by the French, of firing horizontal sh.e.l.ls and carcases, is stated by a commission of scientific and practical men appointed by the French Government to ascertain their effects, to be so formidable that "it would render impossible the success of any enterprise attempted against their vessels in harbour," and that, "for the defence of roadsteads, or for the attack of line-of-battle ships, becalmed or embayed, its effect would be infallible,"--namely, by blowing up or burning our ships, to the probable destruction of the lives of all their crews. I submit that, against such batteries as these, the adoption of my plans Nos. 2 and 3 would be perfectly justifiable."
That the French, not yet forgetful of the injuries inflicted on them in the last great war, and in the frequent wars of previous centuries, were still hoping and planning for an opportunity of retaliation, and that their plans needed to be carefully watched and counteracted, were convictions strongly impressed upon Lord Dundonald in these years; and in 1848 he had a singular verification of them. "I enclose a paper of some consequence," wrote Lord Auckland to him on the 30th of June. "It contains the plan which, in contemplation of war, has been submitted to the French Provisional Government for naval operations. It is, perhaps, little more than the pamphlet of the Prince de Joinville, carried out methodically and in detail, and the writer seems to me to antic.i.p.ate a far more exclusive playing of the game only on one side than we should allow to be the case; but, nevertheless, such a mode of warfare would be embarra.s.sing and mischievous, and I should like to have from you your views of a counter project to it, and your criticisms upon it."
The report here forwarded to Lord Dundonald by Lord Auckland, ent.i.tled "La Puissance Maritime de la France," and designed to show that "une guerre maritime est plus a redouter pour l"Angleterre que pour la France," besides affording curious confirmation of Lord Dundonald"s opinions, is a doc.u.ment very memorable in itself. Its main idea was that in naval warfare victory is to be obtained, not by mere numbers, but by superiority in ships and guns. "In the present condition of our marine," said its author, "we must give up fleet-fighting. The English can arm more fleets than we can, and we cannot maintain a war of fleets with England without exposing ourselves to losses as great as those we experienced under the First Empire. Though during twenty years, however, our warfare, as carried on by fleets, was disastrous, that of our cruisers was nearly always successful. By again sending these forth, with instructions not to compromise themselves with an enemy superior to them in numbers, we shall inflict great loss on English commerce. To attack that commerce is to attack the vital principle of England--to strike her to the heart."
That was the view advanced under Louis Philippe"s reign by the Prince de Joinville; but it was much more elaborately worked out by the advocate of naval energy in days immediately preceding Prince Louis Napoleon"s accession to power. "What I propose," he said, "is a war founded on this principle of striking at English commerce. In a naval war between two nations, one of which has a very large commerce, and the other very little, military forces are of small consequence. In the end, peace must become a necessity to the power which has much to lose and little to gain. Let us see what took place in America during the disputes on the Oregon question. Despite the immense superiority of the English navy, the Americans maintained their pretensions.
England found out that their well-equipped frigates and countless privateers were sufficient to carry on a war against her commerce in all parts of the globe; whilst all the damage she could do to America was the destruction of a few coast-towns, by which she could gain neither honour nor profit; and so she decided to preserve peace by yielding the question. It is this American system that we in France must adopt. Renouncing the glory of fleet victories, we must make active war on the commercial shipping of Great Britain. If America with her small means could gain such an advantage over England, what results may we not expect to obtain with a hundred and fifty ships of war and three hundred corsairs armed with long-range guns?"
The report recommended that the naval force of France should be organized in twenty "corsair-divisions." These were to have Cherbourg for their head-quarters; one to look after the merchant-shipping in the British Channel; another to watch the mouth of the Thames; and a third to cruise along the Dutch and German coasts, so as to intercept our Baltic trade; and all these were to be aided by a line of telegraphs from Brest to Dunkirk, in correspondence with a line of scouts ranged along the French coast, with orders to communicate to the central station at Cherbourg every movement of British merchantmen. Three similar divisions were to be formed at Brest, charged respectively with the oversight of the East and West Indian shipping as it pa.s.sed Cape Clear, of the Azores, and of the Irish Coast. A seventh division, stationed at Rochefort, was to watch for a favourable opportunity of co-operating with the other six, if desirable, in transporting an army to Ireland. An eighth division was to watch the neighbourhood of Gibraltar, and four others were to be stationed in various parts of the Mediterranean. Three other divisions were to cruise along the North American coast, to hara.s.s our commerce with the United States, to intercept the trade of Canada and the neighbouring colonies, and, in spring time, to capture the produce of the Newfoundland fisheries. Three smaller divisions were to be charged with the annoyance of our West Indian Islands and the destruction of their commerce; and the remaining two were to scour the coasts of South America. A separate and formidable establishment of screw-frigates was to have for its head-quarters a port of refuge to be constructed in Madagascar, whence operations were to be directed in all quarters against our East Indian possessions and their extensive trade.
"In addition to these means," it was further said in the report, "the Departmental Councils should each arm one steam-frigate, commanded by an officer of the navy born in the department. The prizes captured by each should in this case be at the disposal of the Departmental Councils, a portion being devoted to defraying the expenses of the vessel, and the remainder applied to the execution of public works within the department." "As regards the defence of French ports, this may be best effected by flat-bottomed hulks, armed with long-range guns adapted to horizontal firing. The chances against invasion are greatly in favour of France, on account of the superiority of her land force, and the facility of transporting troops by railway to the locality attacked." "A great point will be the perfect training of the French squadron by annual evolutions, and with double or treble the requisite number of officers. If these suggestions are carried out, France will establish at sea what Russia has done on land, to the injury and restriction of British commerce, which must be seriously damaged, without material harm being done to ourselves. This loss of commerce will especially affect the working cla.s.ses of England, and thus bring about a democratic inundation which will compel her to a speedy submission."
Those were the chief proposals of the secret memoir which, falling into the hands of the British Government, so far alarmed it as to lead it to call upon the Earl of Dundonald for his opinions as to the best way of meeting the threatened danger. "This doc.u.ment," he wrote in his reply to Lord Auckland, "describes a plan of maritime operations undoubtedly more injurious to the interests of England than that pursued by France in former wars. There is nothing new, however, in the opinions promulgated. They have long been familiar to British naval officers, whose wonder has been that the wide-spread colonial commerce of England has never yet been effectually a.s.sailed. It is true that the advice given in the memoir derives more importance now from the fact that the application of steam-power to a system of predatory warfare const.i.tutes every harbour a port of naval equipment, requiring to be watched, not in the pa.s.sive manner of former blockades, but effectively by steam-vessels having their fires kindled at least during the obscurity of night. The cost and number of such blockades need not be dwelt on, nor the indefinite period to which prudence on the part of the enemy, and vigilance on that of the blockading force, might prolong a war. One hundred millions sterling added to our national debt would solve a doubt whether the most successful depredation on British commerce could produce consequences more extensive and permanently injurious. The memoir obviously antic.i.p.ates that "l"usage des canons bombes, dont les atteintes ont un si prodigieux effet," will prevent our blockading ships from approaching the sh.o.r.es of France, and that thus their steam-vessels might escape un.o.bserved during night, even with sailing-vessels in tow. This is no vague conjecture, but a consequence which a.s.suredly will follow any hesitation on our part to counteract the system extensively adopted, and now under the consideration of the National a.s.sembly, of arming all batteries with projectiles, whereby to burn or blow up our ships of war--a fate which even the precaution of keeping out of range could not avert, by reason of the incendiary and explosive missiles whereby "les pet.i.ts bailments a vapeur pouront attaquer les plus gros vaisseaux." It is impossible to retaliate by using similar weapons. Forts and batteries are incombustible. Recourse must therefore be had to other means, whereby to overcome fortifications protecting expeditionary forces and piratical equipments."
The means recommended by Lord Dundonald, it need hardly be said, were the secret war-plans which he had developed nearly forty years before, and the efficacy of which had recently been again admitted by the committee appointed to investigate them in 1846. It is not allowable, of course, to quote the paragraphs in which Lord Dundonald once more explained them and urged their adoption in case of need. The only objection offered to them was that they were too terrible for use by a civilized community. "These means," he replied, "all powerful, are nevertheless humane when contrasted with the use of sh.e.l.ls and carcases by ships at sea, and most merciful, as competent to avert the bloodshed that would attend the contemplated "descente en Angleterre ou en Ireland," and other hostile schemes recommended in the memoir."
That letter was forwarded to Lord Auckland from Halifax, where Lord Dundonald then was, in the beginning of August. "a.s.suredly the reasons which you give for the use of the means suggested are such as it is difficult to controvert," wrote Lord Auckland on the 18th; "but I would at least defer my a.s.sent or dissent to the time when the question may be more pressing than it is at present." "I would postpone my own reflections on the "secret plans,"" he wrote again on the 1st of September, "and would fain hope that events will allow the Government long to postpone all decision upon them. I agree with you, however, in much that you say upon their principle, and am well satisfied that to no hands better than yours could the execution of any vigorous plans be entrusted."
When, however, as will be seen on a latter page, an opportunity did arise for enforcing those plans against another power than France, their execution was not permitted to Lord Dundonald.
Strongly as he himself was impressed with their importance, they formed only a part of a complete system of opinions respecting the defence of England at which he arrived by close study and long experience. These have already been partially indicated. He did not wish that his plans should be lightly made use of; but, believing that they would ultimately become a recognised means of warfare, and that even without them a great revolution would soon take place in ways of fighting, he deprecated as useless and wasteful the elaborate fortifications which were in his time beginning to be extensively set up at Dover, Portsmouth, and other possible points of attack upon England, and urged, with no less energy, that vast improvements ought to be made in the construction and employment of ships of war.
Fortifications, he considered, were only desirable for the protection of the special ports and depots around which they were set up; and even for that purpose they ought to be so compact as to need no more than a few troops and local garrisons for their occupation. To have them so complicated and numerous as to require the exclusive attention of all or nearly all the military force of England, appeared to him only a source of national weakness. His own achievements at Valdivia and elsewhere showed him that skilful seamanship on the part of an invader would render them much less sufficient for the defence of the country than was generally supposed. If all our soldiers were scattered along various parts of the coast, it would not be difficult for the enemy, by a bold and sudden onslaught, or still more by a feint of the sort in which he himself was master, to take possession of one, and then there would be no concentrated army available to prevent the onward march of the a.s.sailant. Much wiser would it be to leave the seaboard comparatively unprotected from the land, and to have a powerful army so arranged as to be ready for prompt resistance of the enemy, if, by any means, he had gained a footing on the sh.o.r.e.
To prevent that footing being gained, however, Lord Dundonald was quite as eager as any champion of monster fortifications could be; but this prevention, he urged, must be by means of moveable ships, and not by immoveable land-works. A strong fleet of gunboats, stationed all along the coast, and with carefully-devised arrangements for mutual communication, so that at any time their force could be speedily concentrated in one or more important positions, would be far more efficacious and far more economical than the more popular expedients for the military defence of England. He heartily believed, in fact, in the old and often-proved maxim that the sea was England"s wall, and he desired to have that wall guarded by a force able to watch its whole extent and pa.s.s at ease from one point to another as occasion required.
Desiring that thus the coast should be immediately protected by efficient gunboats, he desired no less to augment the naval strength of the country by means of improved war-ships as much like gunboats as possible. To large ships, if constructed in moderation and applied to special purposes, he was not averse; but he set a far higher value upon small and well-armed vessels, able to pa.s.s rapidly from place to place and to navigate shallow seas. "Give me," he often said, "a fast small steamer, with a heavy long-range gun in the bow, and another in the hold to fall back upon, and I would not hesitate to attack the largest ship afloat." His opinion on this point also was confirmed by his own experience--most notably in the exploits of his little _Speedy_ in the Mediterranean--and by the whole history of English naval triumphs. Since the time when the so-called Invincible Armada of Spain entered the British Channel, designed to conquer England by means of its huge armaments, and when the bulky galleons and galea.s.ses of Philip"s haughty sailors were chased and worried by the smaller barks and pinnaces of Drake, Hawkins, Frobisher, and the other sea-captains of Elizabeth, who sailed round and round their foe, and darted in and out of his unwieldy ma.s.s of shipping, never failing to inflict great injury, while his volleys of artillery pa.s.sed harmlessly over their decks to sink into the sea, there had been abundant proof of the constant superiority of small warships over large. A "mosquito fleet," as he called it, was what Lord Dundonald wished to see developed; a swarm of active little vessels, just large enough to carry one or two powerful guns, which could go anywhere and do anything, to which the larger crafts of the enemy would afford convenient targets, but which, small and nimble, would be much less likely to be themselves attacked, and, even if attacked and sunk, would entail far less loss than would ensue from the destruction of a large war-ship. "As large a gun as possible, in a vessel as small and swift as possible, and as many of them as you can put upon the sea,"
was Lord Dundonald"s ideal. For this he argued during half a century; for this he laboured hard and long in the exercise of his inventive powers. In 1826, the plan of the war-steamers which he was to have taken to Greece was explained to Lord Exmouth--no slight authority on naval matters. "Why, it"s not only the Turkish fleet," exclaimed the veteran, "but all the navies in the world, that you will be able to conquer with such craft as these."
CHAPTER XXVI
THE EARL OF DUNDONALD"S CLAIM FOR THE RESTORATION OF THE ORDER OF THE BATH.--HIS GOOD SERVICE PENSION.--THE INVESTIGATION OF HIS SECRET WAR-PLANS.--HIS PAMPHLET ON NAVAL AFFAIRS.--HIS INSTALLATION AS A G.O.B.--HIS CANDIDATURE FOR ELECTION AS A SCOTCH REPRESENTATIVE PEER.--THE QUEEN"S PERMISSION TO HIS WEARING THE BRAZILIAN ORDER OF THE "CRUZIERO."--HIS APPOINTMENT AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE NORTH AMERICAN AND WEST INDIAN STATION.
[1839-1848.]
The restoration of his naval rank to the Earl of Dundonald in 1832, was slowly followed by other acts reversing the injustice of previous years by which a large portion of his life had been embittered.
"Your lordship and the Admiralty," he wrote to Lord Minto, then at the head of naval affairs, on the 30th of March, 1839, "may have been surprised that I have never solicited any appointment since my reinstatement in the naval service by his late Majesty, whose memory I shall ever cherish for this magnanimous act of justice. The cause, my lord, has not been from any reluctance on my part, but from a feeling which, I have no doubt, will appear satisfactory to your lordship, if you do me the favour to read the enclosed copy of a letter which I have written this day to the Marquess of Lansdowne as President of the Council." The letter to Lord Lansdowne referred in great part to Lord Dundonald"s rotary-engine, and to his secret war-plan, which he expressed his willingness to put in execution if ever it was required.
"Your lordship and the Privy Council, however," it was added, "will not fail to observe that, if it shall ever be the intention of the Government, under any circ.u.mstances, again to employ me in the naval service, it would be quite inconsistent with the character of that service, as well as my own reputation, for me to a.s.sume command, unless the Order of the Bath, gained on the 12th of April, 1809, now thirty years ago, shall be restored to me."
"I hope it will appear to your lordship," said Lord Dundonald, in a letter to Lord Melbourne, dated the 11th July, 1839, "that my services as a naval officer have been useful and honourable to my country; and, referring to those services and to the peculiar opportunities I have since had of acquiring further professional knowledge, I may say, without vanity, that her Majesty has no officer in her navy more experienced than myself; and yet, from the extraordinary circ.u.mstances of my case, I am the only flag-officer in her Majesty"s service who, if called upon to take a command, could not do so consistently with his own honour and the respect due to those who might be appointed to serve under him. For where is the officer who could not conveniently call to mind, that I, who when only a captain was a Knight of the Bath, was deprived of that honour, and that now, though a flag-officer, I have not been deemed worthy of having it restored?" "I am sensible," wrote Lord Dundonald in another letter to the Premier, written eight days later, "that the act of justice which I experienced from the late King, under the ministry of Earl Grey, of which your lordship was a distinguished member, in restoring me to my naval rank, was a great favour, inasmuch as it evinced a considerate feeling towards me; and I was then fully satisfied with it, under the impression that it would be viewed by the public, and especially by the navy, as a testimony of the belief of the Government, at that time, that I was innocent of the offence that had been laid to my charge, and also that I should stand as good a chance as most of my brother officers (and perhaps, from my experience, a better) of being called to active service. I did not then foresee that the restoration of my naval rank alone would be viewed as a half-measure. Still less did I antic.i.p.ate that, in the event of my being offered an appointment, I should be incapacitated from accepting it by reason of the feelings of other officers that I still laboured under some imputation which would render it derogatory to them to serve under me.
But it is now impossible for me to conceal from myself the fact that, while the navy generally is kindly disposed towards me, and would rejoice to see me fully reinstated in all that I once enjoyed, I am considered by many to remain as completely precluded from active service as if my name had never more appeared in the Navy List, I trust, my lord, that it cannot be thought reasonable to reduce me to the inglorious condition of a retired or yellow admiral at home, and at the same time to deny me the privilege of acquiring either emolument or distinction in foreign service."
Lord Dundonald"s hope was that, on the occasion of her Majesty"s marriage, there would be a bestowal of honours, which would afford a convenient opportunity for the restoration of his dignity as a Knight of the Bath. But in this he was disappointed.
A minor favour was conferred upon him, however, and in a very gratifying way, eighteen months later. "You are probably aware," wrote Lord Minto to him on the 3rd of January, 1841, "that the death of Sir Henry Bayntam has vacated one of the pensions for good and meritorious service. Before I left town a few days ago I made my arrangements to enable me to confer this pension upon you, if you should think it worthy of your acceptance, either as evidence of the high estimation in which I have ever held your services, or as convenient in a pecuniary point of view. Although you are one of the few who have not applied for this, I do not fear that any one of the numerous claimants can show so good a t.i.tle to it."
That compliment was accepted by Lord Dundonald in a spirit answering to that in which it was offered. Yet his reasonable anxiety for a rest.i.tution of the Order of the Bath was not abated, and thereupon he was engaged in a correspondence with the Earl of Haddington, then First Lord of the Admiralty, during the early part of 1842, which was closed by the intimation, bitterly disappointing to Lord Dundonald, that the Cabinet Council declined recommending the Queen to comply with his earnest request.
Equally disappointing was the result of another application with the same object which he made to Sir Robert Peel in the autumn of 1844.
"Her Majesty"s servants," wrote Sir Robert Peel on the 7th of November, "have had under consideration the letter which I received from your lordship, bearing date the 10th of September. On reference to the proceedings which were adopted in the year 1832, it appears that, previously to the restoration of your lordship to your rank in the navy, a free pardon under the Great Seal was granted to your lordship; and adverting to that circ.u.mstance, and to the fact that thirty years have now elapsed since the charges to which the free pardon had reference were the subject of investigation before the proper judicial tribunal of the country, her Majesty"s servants cannot consistently with their duty advise the Queen to reopen an inquiry into these charges."
Lord Dundonald failed to see, in the partial reversal, twelve years before, of the unjust treatment to which he had been subjected eighteen years before that, a reason for refusing to inquire whether there was any injustice yet to be atoned for. He had not, however, very much longer to wait for the object which he sought.
One of his grounds for desiring a public recognition of the efficacy of his secret war-plans was a reasonable belief that, if it was seen that through half a lifetime he had steadfastly avoided using for his private advantage what might have been to him a vast source of wealth, in order that the secret might be reserved solely for the benefit of his country, it would be acknowledged to be incredible that, for insignificant ends, he could have resorted to the gross and clumsy fraud attributed to him at the Stock Exchange trial. And in this expectation he was right. Nearly all the reparation that was now possible quickly followed upon the investigation into the war-plans that was referred to in the last chapter.
While the investigation was pending he was pained by a letter from Sir Thomas Hastings, not unkind in itself, but showing that his real motives for courting that investigation were not understood. "I made a communication to-day," wrote Sir Thomas on the 27th of November, 1846, "that the commission had entered on its duties, and received instructions to inform you that it would be desirable, before the commission proceeded further, to ascertain your lordship"s views as to the nature of the remuneration you would expect from Government in the event of your plans being reported on favourably."
Lord Dundonald"s reply was characteristic. "You intimate a wish on the part of Government," he wrote on the 1st of December, "to ascertain my views in regard to the "remuneration" I expect, in the event of my plans being favourably reported on. I reply that I devoted these plans, thirty-five years ago, to the service of my country, that I have reserved them through the most adverse and trying circ.u.mstances, satisfied that at some future time I should prove my character to be above pecuniary considerations or mercenary motives. I have looked forward to the restoration of those honours, of which I was most unjustly bereaved, and to freedom from mental anguish, endured throughout an isolation from society of one-third of a century. I cannot contrast with such sufferings, nor with my plans, any sum that Government could bestow. Nevertheless, I have implicitly relied that collateral deprivations and losses would be taken into consideration by some future, just, and impartial Administration. I do most earnestly hope that the period has now arrived."
That letter was communicated by Sir Thomas Hastings to Lord Auckland.
"I return the letter," he wrote to Sir Thomas on the 16th of December, "which Lord Dundonald wrote to you upon the remuneration which he would expect in the event of a favourable report upon his plans; namely, first, his restoration to the honours of which he was deprived; and, secondly, a consideration of collateral deprivations and losses. I am sorry to acquaint you that the first condition is one to which I am not authorized to promise an acquiescence. It is not necessary that I should discuss the difficulties which occur to the restoration in question. I can only express my own deep regret that they should exist, and that the hopes which have been entertained by Lord Dundonald should be disappointed. For myself, I personally regard him. I look upon his naval career as most remarkable and most honourable; and I must lament whatever may seem to detract from the advantage and grace of his return to the navy."
"Sir Thomas Hastings," wrote Lord Dundonald to Lord Auckland on the following day, "has sent me your sympathizing note on the decision of the Cabinet Council in regard to the first item, designated as "the remuneration I would expect in the event of a favourable report on my plans." Now, after the expression of my deep sense of grat.i.tude to your lordship for having brought the question before the Cabinet, I do most sincerely rejoice that "the first condition is one to which you are not authorized to promise an acquiescence." I could not deem acquiescence a remuneration, nor could I value it otherwise than as evidence of conviction, produced by facts and the tenor of a whole life, of my incapability of descending to base acts for gain at any period of my existence, especially at a moment when I can prove that I had objects of the highest national importance and the most brilliant personal prospects in view. In confirmation of disinterestedness, I further hold my retention of the "secret war-plans" for a period of thirty-five years, notwithstanding frequent opportunities to use them to my incalculable private advantage. The merit of these plans, though I am well aware of their value, is yet officially unp.r.o.nounced by the commission appointed to report. Therefore, the preceding facts being doubtful, I repeat that I do most sincerely rejoice that the Cabinet Council have manifested that their decision neither depends on favour nor on the value of the plans themselves. Foreseeing that, whatever may be the ultimate determination, it must be founded on facts and justified by an exposition of my conduct and character, I am preparing a doc.u.ment which, whatever may be my fate pending the brief remainder of my existence, will justify my memory when grievous wrongs shall cease to prey on a mind which, save from the consciousness of rect.i.tude, would in brief time have bowed my head with humiliation to the ground." The doc.u.ment there referred to was a pamphlet ent.i.tled "Observations on Naval Affairs, and on some Collateral Subjects." In it were concisely enumerated Lord Dundonald"s services as a British naval officer, and the hardships brought upon him by the unmerited Stock Exchange trial. The pamphlet was published in February, 1847, and immediately excited considerable attention. "I hope the difficulties which have prevented the realization of your wishes may be removed shortly," wrote Sir Thomas Hastings on the 2nd of March.
"But services so distinguished, and a career so splendid and full of professional instruction as your lordship"s, can never be blotted out or rendered dim in the annals of the naval history of our country." "I have had the kindest note possible from the Marquess of Lansdowne,"
said Lord Dundonald, in a letter written on the 27th of April. "Lord Auckland was at our house on Sat.u.r.day, and spoke in the kindest and most feeling manner. I hear from all quarters that the pamphlet has made and is making a great impression, and I have every hope that all will end well."
All did end well. The public announcement, on the highest authority, of the value of his secret war-plans, and the consequent exhibition of his disinterested patriotism in so long preserving them for his country"s use, followed by the bold appeal made by him to the public through his pamphlet, brought success at last to his long-continued efforts to obtain a restoration of his dignity as a Knight of the Bath. His best friends in the Cabinet, especially Lords Lansdowne and Auckland, had influence, though not all the influence they desired, upon other Cabinet and Privy Councillors who were opposed to the tardy act of justice. But they did not wait for the a.s.sent of all. On the 6th of May Lord Lansdowne represented the case to her Majesty the Queen, and received her promise that, with or without the approval of her Privy Councillors, she would confer the next vacant Order of the Bath upon Lord Dundonald.
Fortunately a vacancy occurred immediately, through the death of Admiral Sir Davige Gould. "Lord Auckland has called," wrote Lord Dundonald on the 9th of May, "and informed me officially that the Queen has placed at his disposal the vacant Order of the Bath; and that, in conformity with the intention with which it was so placed, he was to deliver it to me." "I have information from the palace," he wrote a few days later, "that her Majesty has had conversation as to the justice of some further atonement for the injuries that have been inflicted on me, and that she said it was subject of regret that such was not in her power; but, should the subject be entertained by her advisers, her concurrence would not be wanting."
That further act of justice was never rendered; but Lord Dundonald rejoiced that the more important measure--that which, by restoring the dignity wrongfully taken from him, would do more than anything else to set him right in the eyes of the world--was at last adopted. "It gives me sincere pleasure," wrote Lord John Russell on the 12th of May, in answer to a letter thanking him for the conduct of his Administration, "that the last act of the Government has been so gratifying to you.
Your services to your country are recorded among those of the most brilliant of a war signalised by heroic achievements. I will lay before her Majesty the expression of your grat.i.tude, and I can a.s.sure you that the Queen has sanctioned with the greatest satisfaction the advice of her ministers."
On the 25th of May--the order being dated the 22nd--Lord Dundonald was gazetted as a Knight Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath; and this act of grace was rendered more graceful by the personal interest shown by Prince Albert, who, as Grand Master of the Order, dispensed with the customary formalities and delays, and, on the following morning, caused a warrant to be sent to him, in order that he might wear the cross at the birthday drawing-room, which he attended by her Majesty"s command on the 27th of May. Thus another step was made in the way of retribution for the injuries inflicted on him in 1814 and in the ensuing years.
"To-day," he wrote on the 12th of July, "there was a grand muster at the palace of all the Knights Grand Crosses, and many inferior Crosses, and I was installed. Lord Ellenborough was one of my sponsors, and the Duke of Wellington shook hands with me, and expressed his satisfaction at my restoration to the Order. I am glad to tell you that the ceremony of knighting, of which I was afraid, was not resorted to; so my knightship dates back to the 27th of April, 1809."