From note-making of that sort, Lord Cochrane turned to more serious business. The batteries of Callao and of San Lorenzo, a little island in the bay which helped to form the port, mounted one hundred and sixty guns, and more than twice as many were at the command of vessels there lying-to. Direct attack of a force so very much superior to that of the Chilian fleet seemed out of the question. Therefore Lord Cochrane bethought him of a subterfuge. Learning that two North American war-ships were expected at Callao, he determined to personate them with the _O"Higgins_ and _Lautaro_, and so enter the port under alien colours. It was then carnival-time, and on the 21st of February, deeming that the Spaniards were more likely to be off their guard, he proposed "to make a feint of sending a boat ash.o.r.e with despatches, and in the mean time suddenly to dash at the frigates and cut them out." Unfortunately a dense fog set in, which lasted till the 28th, and made it impossible for him to effect his purpose before the carnival was over. Let the sequel be told in his own words.
"On the 28th, hearing heavy firing and imagining that one of the ships was engaged with the enemy, I stood with the flag-ship into the bay. The other ships, imagining the same thing, also steered in the direction of the firing, when, the fog clearing for a moment, we discovered each other, as well as a strange sail near us. This proved to be a Spanish gunboat, with a lieutenant and twenty men, who, on being made prisoners, informed us that the firing was a salute in honour of the Viceroy, who had that morning been on a visit of inspection to the batteries and shipping, and was then on board the brig-of-war _Pezuela_, which we saw crowding sail in the direction of the batteries. The fog, again coming on, suggested to me the possibility of a direct attack. Accordingly, still maintaining our disguise under American colours, the _O"Higgins_ and _Lautaro_ stood towards the batteries, narrowly escaping going ash.o.r.e in the fog. The Viceroy, having no doubt witnessed the capture of the gunboat, had, however, provided for our reception, the garrison being at their guns, and the crews of the ships-of-war at their quarters. Notwithstanding the great odds, I determined to persist in an attack, as our withdrawing, without firing a shot, would produce an effect upon the minds of the Spaniards the reverse of that intended. I had sufficient experience in war to know that moral effect, even if the result of a degree of temerity, will not unfrequently supply the place of superior force.
"The wind falling light, I did not venture on laying the flag-ship and the _Lautaro_ alongside the Spanish frigates, as I at first intended, but anch.o.r.ed with springs on our cables, abreast of the shipping, which was arranged in a half-moon of two lines, the rear-rank being judiciously disposed so as to cover the intervals of the ships in the front line. A dead calm succeeded, and we were for two hours exposed to a heavy fire from the batteries, in addition to that from the two frigates, the brigs _Pezuela_ and _Maypeu_, and seven or eight gunboats. Nevertheless the northern angle of one of the princ.i.p.al forts was silenced by our fire. As soon as a breeze sprang up, we weighed anchor, standing to and fro in front of the batteries, and returning their fire, until Captain Guise, who commanded the _Lautaro_, being severely wounded, that ship sheered off and never again came within range. As, from want of wind, or doubt of the result, neither the _San Martin_ nor the _Chacabuco_ had ever got within fire, the flag-ship was thus left alone, and I was reluctantly compelled to relinquish the attack. I withdrew to the island of San Lorenzo, about three miles distant from the forts; the Spaniards, though nearly quadruple our numbers, exclusive of their gunboats, not venturing to follow us.
"The action having been commenced in a fog, the Spaniards imagined that all the Chilian vessels were engaged. They were not a little surprised, as it again cleared, to find that their own frigate, the quondam _Maria Isabella_, was almost their only opponent. So much were they dispirited by this discovery that, as soon as possible after the close of the contest, their ships-of-war were dismantled, the topmasts and spars being formed into a double boom across the anchorage, so as to prevent approach. The Spaniards were also previously unaware of my being in command of the Chilian squadron. On becoming acquainted with this fact, they bestowed upon me the not very complimentary t.i.tle of "El Diablo," by which I was afterwards known amongst them."
Two hundred and forty years before, almost to a day, Sir Francis Drake--whom, of all English seamen, Lord Cochrane most resembled in chivalrous daring and in chivalrous hatred of oppression--had secretly led his little _Golden Hind_ into the harbour of Callao, and there despoiled a Spanish fleet of seventeen vessels; for which and for his other brave achievements he won the nickname of El Dracone. Drake the Dragon and Cochrane the Devil were kinsmen in n.o.ble hatred, and n.o.ble punishment, of Spanish wrong-doing.
Retiring to San Lorenzo, after the fight in Callao Bay on the 28th of February, Lord Cochrane occupied the island, and from it blockaded Callao for five weeks. On the island he found thirty-seven Chilian soldiers, whom the Spaniards had made prisoners eight years before.
"The unhappy men," he said, "had ever since been forced to work in chains under the supervision of a military guard--now prisoners in turn; their sleeping-place during the whole of this period being a filthy shed, in which they were every night chained by one leg to an iron bar." Yet worse, as he was informed by the poor fellows whom he freed from their misery, was the condition of some Chilian officers and seamen imprisoned in Lima, and so cruelly chained that the fetters had worn bare their ankles to the bone. He accordingly, under a flag of truce, sent to the Spanish Viceroy, Don Joaquim de la Pezuela, offering to exchange for these Chilian prisoners a larger number of Spaniards captured by himself and others. This proposal was bluntly refused by the Viceroy, who took occasion, in his letter, to avow his surprise that a British n.o.bleman should come to fight for a rebel community "unacknowledged by all the powers of the globe."
Lord Cochrane replied that "a British n.o.bleman was a free man, and therefore had a right to a.s.sist any country which was endeavouring to re-establish the rights of aggrieved humanity." "I have," he added, "adopted the cause of Chili with the same freedom of judgment that I previously exercised when refusing the offer of an admiral"s rank in Spain, made to me not long ago by the Spanish amba.s.sador in London."
Except in blockading Callao and repairing his ships little was done by Lord Cochrane during his stay at San Lorenzo. On the 1st of March he went into the harbour again and opened a destructive fire upon the Spanish gunboats, but as these soon sought shelter under the batteries, which the _O"Higgins_ and the _Lautaro_ were not strong enough to oppose, the demonstration did not last long. Unsuccessful also was an attempt made upon the batteries, with the aid of an explosion-vessel, on the 22nd of March. The explosion-vessel, when just within musket-range, was struck by a round shot, and foundered, thus spoiling the intended enterprise. But other plans fared better.
At the beginning of April, Lord Cochrane left San Lorenzo and proceeded to Huacho, a few leagues north of Callao. Its inhabitants were for the most part in sympathy with the republican cause, and the Spanish garrison fled at almost the first gunshot, leaving a large quant.i.ty of government property and specie in the hands of the a.s.sailants. Much other treasure, which proved very serviceable to the impoverished Chilian exchequer, was captured by the little fleet during a two months" cruise about the coast of Peru, both north and south of Callao. Everywhere, too, the Spanish cause was weakened, and the natives were encouraged to share in the great work of South American rebellion against a tyranny of three centuries" duration. "It was my object," said Lord Cochrane, "to make friends of the Peruvian people, by adopting towards them a conciliatory course, and by strict care that none but Spanish property should be taken. Confidence was thus inspired, and the universal dissatisfaction with Spanish rule speedily became changed into an earnest desire to be freed from it."
Having cruised about the Peruvian coast during April and May, Lord Cochrane returned to Valparaiso on the 16th of June. "The objects of the first expedition," he said, "had been fully accomplished, namely, to reconnoitre, with a view to future operations, when the squadron should be rendered efficient; but more especially to ascertain the inclinations of the Peruvians--a point of the first importance to Chili, as being obliged to be constantly on the alert for her own newly-acquired liberties so long as the Spaniards were in undisturbed possession of Peru. To the accomplishment of these objects had been superadded the restriction of the Spanish naval force to the shelter of the forts, the defeat of their military forces wherever encountered, and the capture of no inconsiderable amount of treasure."
That was work enough to be done by four small ships, ill-manned and ill-provisioned, during a five months" absence from Valparaiso; and the Chilians were not ungrateful.
Their grat.i.tude, however, was not strong enough to make them zealous co-operators in his schemes for their benefit. Lord Cochrane was eager to start upon another expedition, in which he hoped for yet greater success. But for this were needed preparations which the poverty and mismanagement of the Chilian Government made almost impossible. He asked for a thousand troops with which to facilitate a second attack on Callao. This force, certainly not a large one, was promised, but, when he was about to embark, only ninety soldiers were ready, and even then a private subscription had to be raised for giving them decent clothing instead of the rags in which they appeared. For the a.s.sault on Callao, also, an ample supply of rockets was required. An engineer named Goldsack had gone from England to construct them, and, that there might be no stinting in the work, Lord Cochrane offered to surrender all his share of prize-money. The offer was refused; but, to save money, their manufacture was a.s.signed to some Spanish prisoners, who showed their patriotism in making them so badly that, when tried, they were found utterly worthless. There were other instances of false economy, whereby Lord Cochrane"s intended services to his Chilian employers were seriously hindered. The vessels were refitted, however, and a new one, an American-built corvette, named the _Independencia_, of twenty-eight guns, was added to the number.
After nearly three months" stay at Valparaiso, he again set sail on the 12th of September, 1819. Admiral Blanco was his second in command, and his squadron consisted of the _O"Higgins_, the _San Martin_, the _Lautaro_, the _Independencia_, the _Galvarino_, the _Araucano_, and the _Puyrredon_, mounting two hundred and twenty guns in all. There were also two old vessels, to be used as fireships.
The fleet entered Callao Roads on the 29th of September. On this occasion there was no subterfuge. On the 30th Lord Cochrane despatched a boat to Callao with a flag of truce, and a challenge to the Viceroy to send out his ships--nearly twice as strong as those of Chili in guns and men--for a fair fight in the open sea. The challenge was bluntly rejected, and an attack on the batteries and the ships in harbour was then planned. On the 1st of October, the smaller vessels reconnoitred the bay, and there was some fighting, in which the _Araucano_ was damaged. Throughout the night of the 2nd, a formidable attack was attempted, in which the main reliance was placed in the Goldsack rockets; but, in consequence of the treacherous handling of the Spanish soldiers who had filled them, they proved worse than useless, doing nearly as much injury to the men who fired them as to the enemy. Only one gunboat was sunk by the sh.e.l.ls from a raft commanded by Major Miller, who also did some damage to the forts and shipping. On the night of the 4th, Lord Cochrane amused himself, while a fireship was being prepared, by causing a burning tar-barrel to be drifted with the tide towards the enemy"s shipping. It was, in the darkness, supposed to be a much more formidable antagonist, and volleys of Spanish shot were spent upon it. On the following evening a fireship was despatched; but this also was a failure. A sudden calm prevented her progress. She was riddled through and through by the enemy"s guns, and, rapidly gaining water in consequence, had to be fired so much too soon that she exploded before getting near enough to work any serious mischief among the Spanish shipping.
By these misfortunes Lord Cochrane was altogether disheartened. The rockets, on which he had chiefly relied, had proved worthless, and, one fireship having been wasted, he did not care to risk the loss of the other. He found too that the Spaniards, profiting by the warning which he had previously given, had so strengthened their booms that it was quite impossible, with the small force at his command, to get at them or to reach the port. His store of provisions, also, was nearly exhausted, and the fresh supply promised from Chili had not arrived.
He therefore reluctantly, for the time, abandoned his project for taking Callao.
He continued to watch the port for a few weeks, however, hoping for some chance opportunity of injuring it; and, in the interval, sent three hundred and fifty soldiers and marines, under Lieutenant-Colonel Charles and Major Miller, in the _Lautaro_, the _Galvarino_, and the remaining fireship, commanded by Captain Guise, to attack Pisco and procure from it and the neighbourhood the requisite provisions. This was satisfactorily done; but the sickness of many of his men caused his further detention at Santa, whither he had gone from Callao. On the 21st of November the sick were sent to Valparaiso, in the charge of the _San Martin_, the _Independencia_, and the _Araucano_. With the remaining ships, the _O"Higgins_, the _Lautaro_, the _Galvarino_, and the _Puyrredon_, Lord Cochrane proceeded to the mouth of the River Guayaquil. There, on the 28th of the month, he captured two large Spanish vessels, one of twenty and the other of sixteen guns, laden with timber, and took possession of the village of Puna. At Guayaquil there was another delay of a fortnight, owing to a mutiny attempted by Captains Guise and Spry, whose treacherous disposition has already been mentioned.
Not till the middle of December was he able to escape from the troubles brought upon him by others, and to return to work worthy of his great name and character. Then, however, sending one of his ships, with the prizes, to Valparaiso, and leaving two others to watch the Peruvian coast, he started, with only his flag-ship, upon an enterprise as brilliant in conception and execution as any in his whole eventful history. "The Chilian people," he said, "expected impossibilities; and I. had for some time been revolving in my mind a plan to achieve one which should gratify them, and allay my own wounded feelings. I had now only one ship, so that there were no other inclinations to consult; and I felt quite sure of Major Miller"s concurrence where there was any fighting to be done. My design was, with the flag-ship alone, to capture by a _coup de main_ the numerous forts and garrison of Valdivia, a fortress previously deemed impregnable, and thus to counteract the disappointment which would ensue in Chili from our want of success at Callao. The enterprise was a desperate one; nevertheless, I was not about to do anything desperate, having resolved that, unless I was fully satisfied as to its practicability, I would not attempt it. Rashness, though often imputed to me, forms no part of my composition. There is a rashness without calculation of consequences; but with that calculation well-founded, it is no longer rashness. And thus, now that I was unfettered by people who did not second my operations as they ought to have done, I made up my mind to take Valdivia, if the attempt came within the scope of my calculations."
Valdivia was the stronghold and centre of Spanish attack upon Chili from the south, just as were Lima and Callao on the north. To reach it Lord Cochrane had to sail northwards along the coast of Peru and Chili to some distance below Valparaiso. This he did without loss of time, to work out an excellent strategy which will be best understood from his own report of it.
"The first step," he said, "clearly was to reconnoitre Valdivia. The flag-ship arrived on the 18th of January, 1820, under Spanish colours, and made a signal for a pilot, who--as the Spaniards mistook the _O"Higgins_ for a ship of their own--promptly came off, together with a complimentary retinue of an officer and four soldiers, all of whom were made prisoners as soon as they came on board. The pilot was ordered to take us into the channels leading to the forts, whilst the officer and his men, knowing there was little chance of their finding their way on sh.o.r.e again, thought it most conducive to their interests to supply all the information demanded, the result being increased confidence on my part as to the possibility of a successful attack.
Amongst other information obtained was the expected arrival of the Spanish brig _Potrillo_, with money on board for the payment of the garrison.
"As we were busily employing ourselves in inspecting the channels, the officer commanding the garrison began to suspect that our object might not altogether be pacific, a suspicion which was confirmed by the detention of his officer. Suddenly a heavy fire was opened upon us from the various forts, to which we did not reply, but, our reconnoissance being now complete, withdrew beyond its reach. Two days were occupied in reconnoitring. On the third day the _Potrillo_ hove in sight, and she, being also deceived by our Spanish colours, was captured without a shot, twenty thousand dollars and some important despatches being found on board."
That first business having been satisfactorily achieved, Lord Cochrane proceeded to Concepcion, there to ask and obtain from its Chilian governor, General Freire, a force of two hundred and fifty soldiers, under Major Beauchef, a French volunteer. In Talcahuano Bay, moreover, he found a Chilian schooner, the _Montezuma_, and a Brazilian brig, the _Intrepido_. He attached the former to his service, and accepted the volunteered aid of the latter. With this augmented but still insignificant force, very defective in some important respects, he returned to Valdivia. "The flag-ship," he said, "had only two naval officers on board, one of these being under arrest for disobedience of orders, whilst the other was incapable of performing the duty of lieutenant; so that I had to act as admiral, captain and lieutenant, taking my turn in the watch--or rather being constantly on the watch--as the only available officer was so incompetent."
"We sailed from Talcahuano on the 25th of January," the narrative proceeds, "when I communicated my intentions to the military officers, who displayed great eagerness in the cause--alone questioning their success from motives of prudence. On my explaining to them that, if unexpected projects are energetically put in execution, they almost invariably succeed in spite of odds, they willingly entered into my plans.
"On the night of the 29th, we were off the island of Quiriquina, in a dead calm. From excessive fatigue in the execution of subordinate duties, I had lain down to rest, leaving the ship in charge of the lieutenant, who took advantage of my absence to retire also, surrendering the watch to the care of a midshipman, who fell asleep.
Knowing our dangerous position, I had left strict orders that I was to be called the moment a breeze sprang up; but these orders were neglected. A sudden wind took the ship unawares, and the midshipman, in attempting to bring her round, ran her upon the sharp edge of a rock, where she lay beating, suspended, as it were, upon her keel; and, had the swell increased, she must inevitably have gone to pieces.
"We were forty miles from the mainland, the brig and schooner being both out of sight. The first impulse, both of officers and crew, was to abandon the ship, but, as we had six hundred men on board, whilst not more than a hundred and fifty could have entered the boats, this would have been but a scramble for life. Pointing out to the men that those who escaped could only reach the coast of Arauco, where they would meet nothing but torture and inevitable death at the hands of the Indians, I with some difficulty got them to adopt the alternative of attempting to save the ship. The first sounding gave five feet of water in the hold, and the pumps were entirely out of order. Our carpenter, who was only one by name, was incompetent to repair them; but, having myself some skill in carpentry, I took off my coat, and by midnight, got them into working order, the water in the meanwhile gaining on us, though the whole crew were engaged in baling it out with buckets.
"To our great delight, the leak did not increase, upon which I got out the stream anchor and commenced heaving off the ship; the officers clamoured first to ascertain the extent of the leak; but this I expressly forbade, as calculated to damp the energy of the men, whilst, as we now gained on the leak, there was no doubt the ship would swim as far as Valdivia, which was the chief point to be regarded, the capture of the fortress being my object, after which the ship might be repaired at leisure. As there was no lack of physical force on board, she was at length floated; but the powder magazine having been under water, the ammunition of every kind, except a little upon deck and in the cartouche-boxes of the troops, was rendered unserviceable; though about this I cared little, as it involved the necessity of using the bayonet in our antic.i.p.ated attack; and to facing this weapon the Spaniards had, in every case, evinced a rooted aversion."
The _O"Higgins_, thus bravely saved from wreck, was soon joined by the _Intrepido_ and the _Montezuma_, and these vessels being now most fit for action, as many men as possible were transferred to them, and the _O"Higgins_ was ordered to stand out to sea, only to be made use of in case of need. The _Montezuma_ now became the flag-ship, and with her and her consort Lord Cochrane sailed into Valdivia Harbour on the 2nd of February.
"The fortifications of Valdivia," he said, "are placed on both sides of a channel three quarters of a mile in width, and command the entrance, anchorage, and river leading to the town, crossing their fire in all directions so effectually that, with proper caution on the part of the garrison, no ship could enter without suffering severely, while she would be equally exposed at anchor. The princ.i.p.al forts on the western sh.o.r.e are placed in the following order:--El Ingles, San Carlos, Amargos, Chorocomayo, Alto, and Corral Castle. Those on the eastern side are Niebla, directly opposite Amargos, and Piojo; whilst on the island of Manzanera is a strong fort mounted with guns of large calibre, commanding the whole range of the entrance channel. These forts and a few others, fifteen in all, would render the place in the hands of a skilful garrison almost impregnable, the sh.o.r.es on which they stand being inaccessible by reason of the surf, with the exception of a small landing-place at Fort Ingles.
"It was to this landing-place that we first directed our attention, anchoring the brig and schooner off the guns of Fort Ingles on the afternoon of February the 3rd, amidst a swell which rendered immediate disembarkation impracticable. The troops were carefully kept below; and, to avert the suspicion of the Spaniards, we had trumped up a story of our having just arrived from Cadiz and being in want of a pilot. They told us to send a boat for one. To this we replied that our boats had been washed away in the pa.s.sage round Cape Horn.
Not being quite satisfied, they began to a.s.semble troops at the landing-place, firing alarm-guns, and rapidly bringing up the garrisons of the western forts to Fort Ingles, but not molesting us.
"Unfortunately for the credit of the story about the loss of the boats, which were at the time carefully concealed under the lee of the vessels, one drifted astern, so that our object became apparent, and the guns of Fort Ingles, under which we lay, forthwith opened upon us, the first shots pa.s.sing through the sides of the _Intrepido_ and killing two men, so that it became necessary to land in spite of the swell. We had only two launches and a gig. I directed the operation in the gig, whilst Major Miller, with forty-four marines, pushed off in the first launch, under the fire of the party at the landing-place, on to which they soon leaped, driving the Spaniards before them at the point of the bayonet. The second launch then pushed off from the _Intrepido_, while the other was returning; and in this way, in less than an hour, three hundred men had made good their footing on sh.o.r.e.
"The most difficult task, the capture of the forts, was to come. The only way in which the first, Fort Ingles, could be approached, was by a precipitous path, along which the men could only pa.s.s in single file, the fort itself being inaccessible except by a ladder, which the enemy, after being routed by Major Miller, had drawn up.
"As soon as it was dark, a picked party, under the guidance of one of the Spanish prisoners, silently advanced to the attack. This party having taken up its position, the main body moved forward, cheering and firing in the air, to intimate to the Spaniards that their chief reliance was on the bayonet. The enemy, meanwhile, kept up an incessant fire of artillery and musketry in the direction of the shouts, but without effect, as no aim could be taken in the dark.
"Whilst the patriots were thus noisily advancing, a gallant young officer, Ensign Vidal, got under the inland flank of the fort, and, with a few men, contrived to tear up some pallisades, by which a bridge was made across the ditch. In that way he and his small party entered and formed noiselessly under cover of some branches of trees, while the garrison, numbering about eight hundred soldiers, were directing their whole attention in an opposite direction.
"A volley from Vidal"s party convinced the Spaniards that they had been taken in flank. Without waiting to ascertain the number of those who had outflanked them, they instantly took to flight, filling with a like panic a column of three hundred men drawn up behind the fort.
The Chilians, who were now well up, bayoneted them by dozens as they attempted to gain the forts; and when the forts were opened to receive them the patriots entered at the same time, and thus drove them from fort to fort into the Castle of Corral, together with two hundred more who had abandoned some guns advantageously placed on a height at Fort Chorocomayo. The Corral was stormed with equal rapidity, a number of the enemy escaping in boats to Valdivia, others plunging into the forest. Upwards of a hundred fell into our hands, and on the following morning the like number were found to have been bayoneted. Our loss was seven men killed and nineteen wounded.
"On the 5th, the _Intrepido_ and _Montezuma_, which had been left near Fort Ingles, entered the harbour, being fired at in their pa.s.sage by Fort Niebla, on the eastern sh.o.r.e. On their coming to an anchor at the Corral, two hundred men were again embarked to attack Forts Niebla, Carb.o.n.e.ro, and Piojo. The _O"Higgins_ also appeared in sight off the mouth of the harbour. The Spaniards thereupon summarily abandoned the forts on the eastern side; no doubt judging that, as the western forts had been captured without the aid of the frigate, they had, now that she had arrived, no chance of successfully defending them.
"On the 6th, the troops were again embarked to pursue the flying garrison up the river, when we received a flag of truce, informing us that the enemy had abandoned the town, after plundering the private houses and magazines, and with the governor, Colonel Montoya, had fled in the direction of Chiloe. The booty which fell into our hands, exclusive of the value of the forts and public buildings, was considerable, Valdivia being the chief military depot in the southern side of the continent. Amongst the military stores were upwards of 50 tons of gunpowder, 10,000 cannon-shot, 170,000 musket-cartridges, a large quant.i.ty of small arms, 128 guns, of which 53 were bra.s.s and the remainder iron, the ship _Dolores_--afterwards sold at Valparaiso for twenty thousand dollars--with public stores sold for the like value, and plate, of which General Sanchez had previously stripped the churches of Concepcion, valued at sixteen thousand dollars."
Those prizes compensated over and over again for the loss of the _Intrepido_, which grounded in the channel, and the injuries done to the _O"Higgins_ on her way to Valdivia.
But the value of Lord Cochrane"s capture of this stronghold was not to be counted in money. By its daring conception and easy completion the Spaniards, besides losing their great southern starting-point for attacks on Chili and the other states that were fighting for their freedom, lost heart, to a great extent, in their whole South American warfare. They saw that their insurgent colonists had now found a champion too bold, too cautious, too honest, and too prosperous for them any longer to hope that they could succeed in their efforts to win back the dependencies which were shaking off the thraldom of three centuries.
CHAPTER VIII.
LORD COCHRANE"S RETURN TO VALPARAISO.--HIS ILL-TREATMENT BY THE CHILIAN SENATE.--THE THIRD EXPEDITION TO PERU.--GENERAL SAN MARTIN.--THE CAPTURE OF THE "ESMERALDA," AND ITS ISSUE.--LORD COCHRANE"S SUBSEQUENT WORK.--SAN MARTIN"S TREACHERY.--HIS a.s.sUMPTION OF THE PROTECTORATE OF PERU.--HIS BASE PROPOSALS TO LORD COCHRANE.--LORD COCHRANE"S CONDEMNATION OF THEM.--THE TROUBLES OF THE CHILIAN SQUADRON.--LORD COCHRANE"S SEIZURE OF TREASURE AT ANCON, AND EMPLOYMENT OF IT IN PAYING HIS OFFICERS AND MEN.--HIS STAY AT GUAYAQUIL.--THE ADVANTAGES OF FREE TRADE.--LORD COCHRANE"S CRUISE ALONG THE MEXICAN COAST IN SEARCH OF THE REMAINING SPANISH FRIGATES.--THEIR ANNEXATION BY PERU.--LORD COCHRANE"S LAST VISIT TO CALLAO.
[1820-1822.]
Lord Cochrane returned to Valparaiso on the 27th of February, 1820.
By General O"Higgins, the Supreme Director, and by the populace he was enthusiastically received. But Zenteno, the Minister of Marine, and other members of the Government, jealous of the fresh renown which he had won by his conquest of Valdivia, showed their jealousy in various offensive ways.
In antic.i.p.ation of his failure they had prepared an elaborate charge of insubordination, in that he had not come back direct from Callao. Now that he had triumphed, they sought at first to have him reprimanded for attempting so hazardous an exploit, and afterwards to rob him of his due on the ground that his achievement was insignificant and valueless. When they were compelled by the voice of the people to declare publicly that "the capture of Valdivia was the happy result of an admirably-arranged plan and of the most daring execution," they refused to award either to him or to his comrades any other recompense than was contained in the verbal compliment; and, on his refusing to give up his prizes until the seamen had been paid their arrears of wages, he was threatened with prosecution for detention of the national property.
The threat was impotent, as the people of Chili would not for a moment have permitted such an indignity to their champion. But so irritating were this and other attempted persecutions to Lord Cochrane that, on the 14th of May, he tendered to the Supreme Director his resignation of service under the Chilian Government. That proposal was, of course, rejected; but with the rejection came a promise of better treatment.
The seamen were paid in July, and the Valdivian prize-money was nominally awarded. Lord Cochrane"s share amounted to 67,000 dollars, and to this was added a grant of land at Rio Clara. But the money was never paid, and the estate was forcibly seized a few years afterwards.
Other annoyances, which need not here be detailed, were offered to Lord Cochrane, and thus six months were wasted by Zenteno and his a.s.sociates in the Chilian senate. "The senate," said Lord Cochrane, "was an anomaly in state government. It consisted of five members, whose functions were to remain only during the first struggles of the country for independence; but this body had now a.s.sumed a permanent right to dictatorial control, whilst there was no appeal from their arbitrary conduct, except to themselves. They arrogated the t.i.tle of "Most Excellent," whilst the Supreme Director was simply "His Excellency;" his position, though nominally head of the executive, being really that of mouthpiece to the senate, which, a.s.suming all power, deprived the Executive Government of its legitimate influence, so that no armament could be equipped, no public work undertaken, no troops raised, and no taxes levied, except by the consent of this irresponsible body. For such a clique the plain, simple good sense of the Supreme Director was no match. He was led to believe that a crooked policy was a necessary evil of government, and, as such a policy was adverse to his own nature, he was the more easily induced to surrender its administration to others who were free from his conscientious principles." Those sentences explain the treatment to which, now and afterwards, Lord Cochrane was subjected.
He was allowed, however, to do further excellent service to the nation which had already begun to reward him with nothing but ingrat.i.tude. As soon as the Chilian Government could turn from its spiteful exercise to its proper duty of consolidating the independence of the insurgents from Spanish dominion, it was resolved to despatch as strong a force as could be raised for another and more formidable expedition to Peru, whereby at the same time the Peruvians should be freed from the tyranny by which they were still oppressed, and the Chilians should be rid of the constant danger that they incurred from the presence of a Spanish army in Lima, Callao, and other garrisons, ready to bear down upon them again and again, as it had often done before. In 1819 Lord Cochrane had vainly asked for a suitable land force with which to aid his attack upon Callao. It was now resolved to organize a Liberating Army, after the fashion of that with which Bolivar had n.o.bly scoured the northern districts of South America, and to place it under the direction of General San Martin, in co-operation with whom Lord Cochrane was to pursue his work as chief admiral of the fleet.
San Martin had fought worthily in La Plata, and he had earned the grat.i.tude of the Chilians by winning back their freedom in conjunction with O"Higgins in 1817. Vanity and ambition, however, had since unhinged him, and he now proved himself a champion of liberty very inferior, both in prowess and in honesty, to Bolivar.