Navarino was pa.s.sed on the 11th of September. Lord Cochrane made no halt, as he saw that a British squadron, under Sir Edward Codrington, was there watching the Ottoman fleet and forbidding its egress. He accordingly at once proceeded northwards, and entered the Gulf of Patras on the 17th of September. On that day, in antic.i.p.ation of the visit which he proposed to pay them, he forwarded proclamations to the inhabitants of the western coast. "People of Albania!" he wrote in one of them, "although you have so long suffered under the Mussulman yoke; although your love of liberty has been so long kept down by a dark and cruel despotism, the hour of your deliverance is not distant, and if you will you can hasten it. Europe takes a lively interest in your destiny; your fellow-countrymen are hastening to aid you. But all depends on the energy which you yourselves display: the support which we offer you, to be efficacious, requires on your part redoubled zeal and patriotism in the actual and decisive moment. Brave Albanians!

your happy future, the security of your families, and the honour of your religion, are in your hands; your bold and steady co-operation will ensure your own salvation and our success!"

The intended expedition was prevented. It had been arranged that Lord Cochrane should wait near Cape Papas for the arrival of General Church"s army and convey it to Western Greece, in the hope of putting it to better service in that region. But the land force was long in coming, and before its arrival Lord Cochrane had to write to the Government, explaining his recent movement and the reasons which compelled him to abandon the project of fighting in Albania. "Having proceeded to the Gulf of Patras," he said, "in order to co-operate with General Church in his intended expedition to Western Greece, I thought it would be conducive to the public service to invest the fort of Vasiladi, until, by the arrival of the forces of the general, more important operations could be undertaken; and accordingly that island was immediately blockaded by the boats of the squadron, and now continues surrounded by the vessels belonging to the Missolonghites, who have undertaken to maintain the blockade until it shall surrender.

The _Karteria_, the _Sauveur_, and two of the gunboats, were immediately detached with orders to take or destroy all the enemy"s vessels within the Gulf of Lepanto, whilst the _h.e.l.las_ went to the anchorage of Kalamos, in order to ascertain from the officers in arms what prospect there was of general co-operation; and I regret to say that the want of union among the chiefs and the prospect of some kind of accommodation with the enemy seemed to paralyse all their energies.

I therefore detached all the squadron under Admiral Miaoulis to Syra and Naxos, to aid the Candiots and Chiots, should they continue inclined to a.s.sert their independence. I have to add that I received an indirect communication from the British Admiral, intimating his desire that no new or further operations should be undertaken in that quarter; for which reason I am about to proceed elsewhere, under the impression that nothing should be left undone to stir up the population of Greece to a sense of their duty to themselves and to their country."

The communication referred to was conveyed by Lord Ingestre, commander of the _Philomel_, who hailed the _h.e.l.las_ on the 27th of September, to deliver a message from Sir Edward Codrington. "Whereas I am informed by Sir Frederick Adam," wrote the English Admiral, "that Lord Cochrane, with the Greek fleet, is about to embark the army of General Church in the neighbourhood of Cape Papas, for the purpose of conveying them to the coast of Albania, you are hereby directed to make known to the commander of that expedition that I consider it my duty, in the present state of affairs, to prevent such a measure being carried into execution, and that I shall shortly present myself in that neighbourhood for that purpose." Lord Cochrane knew that, if it would be personally very distasteful to him to be in collision with the naval force of his own country, it would, on public grounds and in the interests of Greek independence, be wholly inexcusable for him to act in violation of Sir Edward Codrington"s message. Therefore he complied with it and went back to the Archipelago, there to do other work, while England was serving Greece in her own way.

The service was to be rendered at last. After spending a year in diplomatic formalities, Great Britain and Russia had, in the spring of 1827, openly renewed their arguments with the Porte in favour of Greek independence. These arguments having been rejected, the two Christian powers were in consultation as to the next course to be pursued, when France, partly urged thereto by her schemes for the acquisition of Algiers, then a Turkish dependency, offered to take part in the defence of Greece. The result was a treaty signed in London, on behalf of the three states, on the 6th of July, having for its object the enforcement of the St. Petersburg protocol of the 4th of April, 1826.

It insisted that Greece should have internal freedom, though under va.s.salage to Turkey; and provided that, if the contending parties did not agree to an armistice within a month, there should be a forcible intervention.

The Greeks welcomed the proposals made to them in consequence of this treaty; but they were rejected by the Turkish Government, notwithstanding the appearance of English, French, and Russian warships in the eastern part of the Mediterranean. Reshid Pasha and Ibrahim continued their efforts to bring the whole insurgent district into thorough subjection, and accordingly the patriotic Greeks and their foreign supporters continued to act on the defensive. Lord Cochrane and a few others, indeed, were eager to secure action bolder than ever, considering that, when the settling-time arrived, the limits of independent Greece would be augmented if a larger area was then the scene of zealous opposition to the Turkish power. This it was that chiefly induced the efforts to quicken the revolt in Albania, and when Lord Cochrane was prevented by Sir Edward Codrington from persevering in his work in that quarter, he lost no time in sailing round to the eastern side of Greece, there to do his utmost towards rousing the people of Candia and other islands into an a.s.sertion of their independence, in order that they too might have a claim to be included in the liberation of the Greeks.

The message from Sir Edward Codrington to Lord Cochrane, which has been quoted, was dated the 25th of September. It was written immediately after an interview of the English commander and Admiral de Rigny, who was in charge of the French squadron, with Ibrahim Pasha.

To him they had formally announced that they were instructed to insist upon a cessation of hostilities, and that they should promptly act upon their instructions. Ibrahim answered that he had orders from the Sultan to continue the war, but he promised to communicate with his sovereign, and pledged himself to abstain from hostilities until the answer arrived and was reported to the allied fleets. Before that answer came a fortunate series of accidents, arising out of Lord Cochrane"s expedition to the Albanian coast, turned the current of diplomacy and secured for Greece more freedom than had been antic.i.p.ated.

Lord Cochrane, attended by his Greek vessels, had left the neighbourhood of Cape Papas on the 27th of September. But, though deeming himself bound in honour to that course, he was willing to allow a part of his force to remain in the neighbourhood and watch the progress of events, especially as that part was at the time separated from him and lying in the Gulf of Lepanto. It consisted of the _Karteria_, under Captain Abney Hastings, the _Sauveur_, under Captain Thomas, and two gunboats, each mounting a 32-pounder. For a week this little squadron, ignorant of the arrangement between the allied admirals and Ibrahim Pasha, watched a Turkish force that was moored in the Scala of Salona, and comprised one large Algerine schooner carrying twenty bra.s.s guns, a brig of fourteen guns, six smaller brigs and schooners, two gunboats, and two armed transports. These vessels were protected by batteries on the level sh.o.r.e and other batteries on overhanging rocks. On the 30th of September, Captains Hastings and Thomas proceeded to attack them, and did so with excellent effect. The solid shot of the _Sauveur_ and the gunboats soon silenced the batteries; the red-hot sh.e.l.ls of the _Karteria_ made havoc of the enemy"s vessels, four being defeated within half-an-hour. Soon the _Sauveur_ and the gunboats joined in the attack on the shipping, and, in the end, seven vessels were destroyed and three captured.

The news of that victory, as soon as it was conveyed to Navarino, where nearly all the naval force of the Turks was lying, roused the anger of Ibrahim Pasha, who complained that the allied powers, while binding him to inaction, allowed the Greeks to carry on the war. On the 1st of October, he sent out thirty war-ships with orders to enter the Gulf of Lepanto and punish Hastings and Thomas for their recent exploits. Sir Edward Codrington, however, pursued them, and drove them back to Navarino. Ibrahim Pasha, not easily to be baffled, himself left Navarino, on the evening of the 3rd, with fourteen of his stoutest vessels. Again Sir Edward Codrington gave chase, and this second squadron also was compelled by him to return to port. Ibrahim Pasha, however, was not to be robbed of his revenge. He dared not leave Navarino by sea, but he sent thence a land force, which marched up to the northern side of the Morea, and did serious mischief to the wornout fragment of an army which General Church was slowly conducting from Corinth to Papas, there to be embarked for Albania. Only by the unlooked-for valour of young Kolokotrones and his section was the rout of the whole army averted. Nor was Ibrahim satisfied with this act of retaliation. His troops scoured all the adjoining country, burning villages and laying waste the olive-groves and fig-gardens which were the only source of subsistence to the luckless natives.

Thereby Sir Edward Codrington and his allies were in turn incensed.

They decided that the time had come for direct interference in the struggle, and for the expulsion of the Ottoman forces from the Morea.

In the afternoon of the 20th of October, five and twenty line-of-battle ships, frigates, and sloops entered the Bay of Navarino. Ten of them were English, seven were French, and eight were Russian, and they carried in all 1172 guns. Twenty thousand Ottoman troops watched them from the fortresses of Navarino and Sphakteria, and, as they entered the harbour, they saw some eighty Turkish and Egyptian vessels, mounting about 2000 guns, drawn up in the shape of a horseshoe to receive them. They had come only to threaten; but accident, or design on the part of the enemy, brought about a most momentous battle.

A volley from the Ottomans began the fight, which was continued for four hours with stolid energy on both sides. The English and French vessels, being foremost, carried on the chief contest with the enemy"s shipping; the Russians had to silence the batteries before they could enter the harbour, but then their Admiral, Count Heyden, did his full share of the deadly work. The fighting lasted till sunset; but by that time many of the enemy"s hulks were in flames, and all through the night these flames spread from one vessel to another till nearly all were destroyed. At daybreak, only twenty-nine out of the eighty were afloat, and six thousand or more Moslems had been slain, burnt, or drowned. Many of the vessels of the allies were seriously damaged, and of their crews a hundred and seventy-five men were killed, and four hundred and fifty wounded.

That was the battle of Navarino. "I have the honour to inform you,"

wrote Sir Edward Codrington to the Greek Government, "that, according to the decision of my colleagues, Count Heyden and Rear-Admiral de Rigny, and myself, the combined fleet entered this port at two o"clock on the 20th, that some of the ships of the Turko-Egyptian fleet first began a fire of musketry, and then fired cannon-shot, which led very shortly to a general battle, which lasted till dark, and that the consequence of this has been the destruction of the whole of the Turkish fleet, except a few corvettes and brigs. Most of the ships of the allied fleets have received so much injury that they must go into port; but if the Greek vessels of war are employed against their enemy instead of destroying the commerce of the allies, they may henceforth easily obstruct the movements of any Turkish force by sea."

CHAPTER XXI.

THE FIRST CONSEQUENCES OF THE INTERFERENCE OF THE ALLIED POWERS AND THE BATTLE OF NAVARINO.--LORD COCHRANE"S INTENDED SHARE IN FABVIER"S EXPEDITION TO CHIOS.--ITS ABANDONMENT.--HIS CRUISE AMONG THE ISLANDS AND ABOUT NAVARINO.--HIS EFFORTS TO REPRESS PIRACY.--HIS RETURN TO THE ARCHIPELAGO.--THE MISCONDUCT OF THE GOVERNMENT.--LORD COCHRANE"S COMPLAINTS.--HIS LETTERS TO THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ALLIED POWERS, ACQUITTING HIMSELF OF COMPLICITY IN GREEK PIRACY.--HIS FURTHER COMPLAINTS TO THE GOVERNMENT.--HIS RESOLUTION TO VISIT ENGLAND.--HIS LETTER TO COUNT CAPODISTRIAS EXPLAINING AND JUSTIFYING THAT RESOLUTION.--HIS DEPARTURE FROM GREECE, AND ARRIVAL AT PORTSMOUTH.--HIS LETTER TO M. EYNARD.

[1827-1828.]

Heartily rejoicing at the benefit conferred on Greece by the battle of Navarino, Lord Cochrane could not but be troubled to think that the overthrow of the Turkish and Egyptian fleet, which he had laboured so zealously to effect, and which, had he received any adequate support from the Government or the people, would have been a work as easy for him as the enterprises in which he had been so notably successful in former times and other countries, had to be done by the officers and ships of foreign nations instead of by him and the native fleet of which, by name, he was commander-in-chief. The battle being won, however, he tried, with no flagging of his energy, to complete the triumph that had been thus begun, and, if anything was easy to a people so wanting in patriotism, made easier.

He was at Poros at the time of the battle. On his way thither he had fallen in with the _Enterprise_, the first of the steamers built in England, and which, with others that never were completed at all, ought to have been completed nearly two years before. The _Enterprise_ had been so badly constructed, that now that she arrived, she was of very little use. Lord Cochrane was now trying to improve her sailing powers, and at the same time attempting to collect a really manageable crew for the _h.e.l.las_, and to bring together other vessels fit for naval work. In these labours there was no less difficulty than had befallen him on former occasions. The _h.e.l.las_ was in want of water; but the inhabitants of Poros refused to supply it, on the plea that they had no more than was needed for their lemon-gardens. Some carpentering was urgently needed by the _Enterprise_; but, as it had to be done on Sunday, the workmen declined to touch a hammer, notwithstanding the exhortations of a priest who promised them absolution, and even threatened to excommunicate them if they failed in their duty to the country in this pressing time of its necessity.

Of those sorts were the obstacles that occurred each day, and rendered futile all the efforts of Lord Cochrane and his officers.

On the 27th of October, Lord Cochrane again set sail from Poros in the _h.e.l.las_, accompanied by the _Sauveur_, and the corvette which he had lately taken from the Turks, to which the name of _Hydra_ was now given, and proceeded to Chios. That island, the scene of previous disasters, had since 1822 been left in the hands of the Turks. Colonel Fabvier was now attempting to recover it for Greece, and Lord Cochrane entered heartily into the work. He arrived on the 30th, and spent two days in vigorous co-operation with the land force that had reached the island a day before. His share in this enterprise, however, was brief.

He was visited on the 2nd of November first by Captain Le Blanc, bearing a message from Admiral de Rigny, and afterwards by Captain Hamilton, who produced a copy of a letter addressed on the 24th of October to the Legislative a.s.sembly by the Admirals of the three allied powers. "We will not suffer Greece," they there said, "to send any expedition to cruise or blockade, except between Lepanto and Volo, comprehending Salamis, Egina, Hydra, and Spetzas. We will not suffer the Greeks to carry insurrection into either Chios or Albania, and, by so doing, to expose the inhabitants to the cruel reprisals of the Turks. We regard as null and void all letters of marque given to cruisers found beyond the above limits; and the ships-of-war of the allied powers will everywhere have orders to detain them. There remains no longer any pretence for them. The maritime armistice is, in fact, observed on the side of the Turks, since their fleet no longer exists. Take care of yours, for we will destroy it also, if the case requires it, to put an end to a system of maritime pillage which will end by putting you out of the protection of the law of nations."

By that letter, Lord Cochrane was constrained to abandon his intended work at Chios. He could excuse the angry terms in which it was couched, since the anger was only directed against the same unpatriotic conduct which he had all along been denouncing. He was painfully aware that, with the exception of his own flag-ship and the few vessels commanded by English officers, his fleet was chiefly composed of pirates, who only took temporary service under the national flag in order to fill up their idle time, or to make their public service an occasion for further clandestine pursuit of their lawless avocations. From the first he had persistently and fiercely denounced this piracy, and from the day on which he had heard of the victory at Navarino he had resolved to make it a special business to do all in his power to root out the evil. "The destruction of the Ottoman fleet by that of the allied powers," he had said in a proclamation dated the 29th of October, "having delivered the Greek fleet from the cares which had necessarily occupied its attention, and the commander of the maritime forces of Greece having the right to take due measures for the extinction of piracy, to preserve the honour of the State, and to protect the people and property of friendly nations, it is now made known that ships of less than a hundred tons"

burden are not to have arms on board, unless they are first provided with express commissions, so registered, and numbered in such a manner that the number shall be conspicuously noted on the ship. All other vessels of the size defined which shall be found at sea with arms will be considered as pirates, and the crews shall be brought to trial, and, if found guilty, be executed."

For the brief remainder of his service in Greece, indeed, Lord Cochrane made it his princ.i.p.al duty to do all in his power towards the suppression of piracy. The admirals of the allies having insisted that the Greek vessels should do nothing but watch their own coasts within a distance of twelve miles from the sh.o.r.e, he proceeded to the southern part of the Morea, making only a short tour, in order to meet the primates of Samos, Naxia, Paros, Candia, and other islands, and ascertain from them the condition of the people and their power of resistance to the Turks and to their piratical enemies of their own race. The information gained by him was not satisfactory. He found that here, as in the mainland and the nearer islands, patriotism was weak and misrule oppressive. Everywhere the people were the victims of their own want of patriotism and of the tyranny of foes, both Moslem and Christian.

He was off Cerigo on the 15th of November. There, having heard that the residue of the Turkish and Egyptian fleet was preparing to put to sea with all the available force, apparently to carry on the war in Candia, he at once sailed on to the south-eastern promontory of the Morea, and, during a fortnight, maintained the blockade on both sides of Navarino, between Coron and Prodana. There also he was able to carry on his war against pirates. "The _h.e.l.las_ being off the island of Prodana, a few miles to the north of Navarino," he reported to the Government, describing an important adventure of the 21st of November, "I sent two boats for the purpose of procuring wood from the island.

The boats, being fired upon from persons near to some vessels in a cove, returned with a report that there were Turks upon the island. In consequence of this report, the corvette _Hydra_ was directed to enter by the northern pa.s.sage, whilst the _h.e.l.las_ entered to the southward of the island, and both vessels anch.o.r.ed opposite to the place where the supposed Turkish vessels were at anchor. It was immediately perceived, however, that the vessels were not Turkish, and, on examination, one proved to be a schooner under the Greek flag. It was soon discovered that a Dutch vessel at anchor in the same port had been seized, without the slightest pretence, by the schooner and plundered of almost everything that could be removed, and, moreover, that the captain and crew had been most barbarously flogged, for the purpose of ascertaining where the proceeds of the outward cargo were deposited."

Lord Cochrane wrote to the same effect to the Governor of Zante. "I have left the piratical vessel with a petty officer and sufficient crew to blockade Prodana, until you can send and seize the pirates, should you think proper, as they have been plundering and annoying the trade of the Ionian Islands. I send two of the pirates in irons, in order that, obtaining further information, you may deal with them and with the others according to the law of nations."

That instance of the policy adopted by Lord Cochrane will help to show how he set himself to put down piracy. The work was not easy, as the lawless conduct was secretly authorised by the Government, and practised with very little secresy by great numbers of the national vessels. It was in vain that he issued the proclamation of the 27th of October, that has been quoted; in vain, too, that he sent two gunboats to visit all the princ.i.p.al ports, with fresh injunctions against piracy and with authority to compel obedience to those injunctions, if necessary, by force. Good work, however, was done by these gunboats, in conjunction with two brigs detached for the purpose, in escorting neutral trading vessels through the waters most infested by the sea-robbers.

Slowly and painfully the conviction was forced upon Lord Cochrane that, after all his previous failures in attempting to turn the lawless Greeks into honest patriots and to convert their ill-manned ships into members of an efficient navy, his labours were now more useless than ever. After a fortnight"s cruising about Navarino, he retraced his course and anch.o.r.ed, on the 3rd of December, off Egina, where the so-called Government was then located. To it he wrote on that day, asking for directions as to his mode of procedure. "The squadron under my command," he said, "has been in the blockade of Coron, Modon, and Navarino, and I have to inform your excellencies that there yet exists in the port of Navarino a naval force, under the Turkish flag, superior to the force under my command. I have, therefore, felt it my duty to repair to this port, in order that I may obtain instructions for my guidance, more especially as the Turkish squadron is ready for sea, and said to be destined for Candia, with ten thousand men, intending there to repeat the barbarities which the want of provisions in the Morea renders it impossible they can longer perpetrate in that quarter. There is also a great number of captive women and children about to be transported as slaves, and the only force of the allied powers off Navarino consists of a small brig, the _Pelican_, which is totally inadequate to impede the naval operations of the Turks. Under these circ.u.mstances, I beg to be explicitly informed whether I am to consider that "the armistice _de facto_"

continues, and if you have any doubt on the subject that you will be pleased candidly to inform me, that I may not be led into error and so increase the evils by doing anything in opposition to the intentions of the allied powers."

That letter was answered by a personal visit from the members of the Government, when Lord Cochrane was informed that the triumvirate was so embarra.s.sed by the demands of the allied powers for rest.i.tution on account of piracies committed with its approval that it could neither do nor sanction anything at all. He was told that even the scanty means that he had had for supporting the fleet out of the revenues of the islands could no longer be allowed to him, as every dollar that could any how be collected would be required for other purposes.

Still, however, the Government expected him to continue his work, and he was even asked to do work from which, both for his own honour and in the interests of Greece, he felt bound to abstain. "I have received your letter," he wrote to the Secretary, about ten days afterwards, from Poros, "informing me that it is the desire of the Government that a national vessel shall be despatched to Chios, in the event of my being prevented from personally proceeding in the _h.e.l.las_ to that island. In reply to this intimation, I have to state to you that it is impossible for me, consistently with the duties which I owe to Greece, to place the national squadron, whilst it shall continue under my command, or any part thereof, under circ.u.mstances to be treated by the ships-of-war of the allied powers after the manner set forth in the letter of the 24th of October, addressed by the three admirals to the Legislative a.s.sembly,--a determination which is even more painful to me than the grief I feel at finding myself involved, notwithstanding all my precautions, in the restrictions and penalties justly laid upon privateers and pirates. I cannot trust myself to say more on this subject, lest I should be led by my feelings to pa.s.s the bounds which I prescribe to myself as an officer when treating of the conduct of the Government which he serves. If Chios remains unprotected, if Candia is deprived of the aid it might receive from the national marine, and if the ships-of-war are incapacitated from extending the bounds of Greece, I have the consolation of knowing that I have used my utmost endeavours to prevent the evils I foresaw. One of these, however, I was far from antic.i.p.ating,--namely, that the revenues which I was authorised to collect for the service of the marine would have been withdrawn from my control and expended for other purposes; more particularly that sums so diverted should be placed to the account of the marine, without the objects for which they were employed having received my sanction or even been known by me.

"I have struggled during eight months in the service of Greece against difficulties far greater than all I ever encountered before; and I would most willingly continue to contend with these, did I find the slightest co-operation in any quarter. But, as the Government has withdrawn _de facto_ the resources decreed, and the seamen decline to embark without pay in advance, and the funds, arising from the philanthropy of other European nations, which supplied the navy with the means of subsistence, are wholly exhausted, I have no alternative but to lay the ships up in port, until means to defray the expenses of the navy shall be found. I have myself, during the last month, paid the Greeks in the naval service; but whilst I see that even the share of prizes claimed by Government is diverted from its proper use, I shall not continue to be answerable for future expenses, nor for the liquidation of the just claims of the foreign officers, which they have had the patience to leave in arrears for many months."

It had come to this. Lord Cochrane had been devoting all his energies to the service of Greece; and now he found himself deserted by his employers, or only retained in the hope that he would be an unpaid agent in piratical and lawless proceedings.

That last circ.u.mstance was to him the most painful of all. Having done his utmost to restrain the piracy that was rife, he was still regarded by the governing triumvirate as only the most powerful instrument for achievements that were little better than piratical; and the same cruel misrepresentation of his functions was common among his enemies in England and other parts of Europe. Colour for this misrepresentation appeared in the celebrated letter written by the three admirals on the 24th of October, which, describing the national fleet as a mere crowd of "Greek corsairs," by implication included Lord Cochrane and his English supporters in the same opprobrium. This had not at first been perceived by him. On his detecting the insult, he wrote to the representatives of the three powers three letters, which here need to be quoted in his justification.

The first was addressed, on the 13th of December, to Captain Le Blanc, commander of the _Junon_. "The silence respecting the regular forces under my orders," he said, "observed in the letter of the admirals of the mediating powers, dated October the 24th, 1827, appearing to make no distinction between them and the mere pirates, hanging over both the same accusations, and subjecting consequently the former to the restrictions wisely adopted towards the latter, makes it my duty, both towards the country which I serve, towards the officers under my command, and towards myself, to protest publicly and in the face of Europe, against the interpretations to which such a doc.u.ment seems to give foundation. The detailed account of the conduct of those ships of war which are under my immediate orders, and which compose the national squadron of Greece, will prove that no neutral vessel whatever has been seized, driven out of its course, or stopped by them under any pretext whatever, with the exception of such as have broken the blockade of Lepanto, the detention of which is legalized by the act above mentioned. These facts are undeniable. The conduct of the officers of the national squadron has been conformable, in all points, to the laws of nations and to the instructions issued by the admirals, in their character of representatives of the mediating Powers. No hostility has been committed by the national vessels against the territory or the forces of the Turco-Egyptian Government, placed beyond the prescribed limits of Lepanto. But, if such be the state of things, I have the right of sending on a mission, for the public service, ships of war beyond these limits, and, availing myself of that right, I have despatched two (the one to Corfu, and the other to Syra), the destination of which relates to the finances of the navy.

Be pleased, sir, to communicate the contents of this letter to Admiral de Rigny, with whom you have communicated verbally on the subject, and explain to him the propriety of this step, to avoid explanations with which it is not necessary that the public should intermix."

The second letter, dated the 5th of January, 1828, was to the commander of the Russian frigate _Constantine_. "Although I am aware,"

wrote Lord Cochrane, "that his excellency, Count Heyden, when he affixed his signature to the letter of the Admirals, addressed to the Legislative a.s.sembly of Greece, dated the 24th of October, could not attest, of his own knowledge, the truth of the imputations contained in the said doc.u.ment; yet, as the public may not recollect that the recent arrival of the Count precluded the possibility of his being in the slightest degree acquainted with facts regarding the regular naval service under my command, I expect from the Count, that so soon as he shall have informed himself on the subject, he will take the necessary steps to remove an evil impression which he unconsciously has contributed to produce, and thus save me, in as far as the Count is concerned, the necessity, always disagreeable, even of a satisfactory refutation of the imputations cast upon me as Commander-in-Chief of the Greek fleet."

The third letter was to Commodore Hamilton, of the _Cambrian_, who had been left by Sir Edward Codrington to represent the British squadron in the Archipelago. "The Government of Greece having acquiesced in the offer made by the three Powers to mediate in her behalf," wrote Lord Cochrane, "it became my duty to obey the decision of the admirals representing those Powers, when duly communicated. But whilst my official situation demands acquiescence on points of a public nature, it is far otherwise when the Admirals give reasons affecting the character of the regular naval service of Greece, in justification of restrictions imposed by them on the movements of the squadron I command, accompanied by threats to destroy the Greek vessels of war, in order to prevent a.s.serted piracy. You, sir, who are accurately acquainted with facts, and now possess ample means of ascertaining the truth here upon the spot, must know, or may learn, that no neutral vessel has been seized or disturbed in her course by the national squadron on the high seas, nor any vessel detained, except those acting in violation of the blockades acknowledged by these very Admirals. Is it not then extraordinary that such limitations and menaces on false grounds should originate with persons whose high official situations would seem to sanction imputation under their signatures? I have told the French and Russian commanders, and I hope you will a.s.sure the British Admiral, that I shall be loth to trespa.s.s on public attention with explanations, to refute their joint letter of the 24th of October, in justification of those under my orders; but it will become me so to do unless a satisfactory interpretation shall be given to expressions which, at present, seem even more particularly personal to myself."

That was almost the last letter written by Lord Cochrane in Greece for many months. Finding his position as First Admiral of the Greek navy, without work to do or crews to direct, unbearable, he had resolved upon a fresh expedient for attempting to improve the state of affairs.

Before that, however, he made a last attempt to gain support from the nominal Government, and uttered a last protest against its mode of procedure. "I have strenuously endeavoured," he wrote on the 18th of December, "to avoid laying before you any complaint, more particularly concerning acts done by your excellencies; but there is a point at which such forbearance on my part would become a dereliction of my duty as an officer in the service of Greece, amounting even to treason against the State. So long as the evils extended no further than the depriving the ships-of-war of their crews, and preventing the brulottes from being equipped for service; so long as the injury occasioned by the granting of numerous licences to privateers only prevented naval operations from being carried on against the enemy, I remained silent. But now that the conduct of those privateers has brought down upon the Greek nation a threat of being placed out of the law of nations, and has involved the national squadron, unmeritedly, in the disgrace attached to those who have been guilty of unlawful acts, it is my duty to notify to your excellencies that I consider all authorities given without my intervention to armed vessels, of any description, for belligerent purposes, to be illegal, and that I have given orders to the national vessels under my authority to seize them, wherever they may be found, that they may be judged according to the law of nations." "I have been waiting with anxiety," he wrote in another letter, a few days later, "for the occurrence of events which would have rendered it unnecessary for me to enter into any correspondence with your excellencies on pecuniary matters; but, unfortunately, my antic.i.p.ations on this head having been disappointed, and the squadron being without even the provisions necessary for the maintenance of the few men required on board the ships when at anchor, it has become an imperious duty no longer to delay calling upon your excellencies to fulfil the engagement entered into relative to the appropriation of two-thirds of the revenues of the islands, which you have thought fit to apply to other purposes."

To neither letter was any satisfactory answer sent by the authorities, and Lord Cochrane, after all his previous troubles, believed that none would ever be obtained. He therefore suddenly resolved to leave Greece for a time, to go himself to England and France, and there, by personal communication with the leading Philh.e.l.lenes, to describe the actual condition of Greece, and to see if any better state of affairs could be brought about. This resolution he announced on the 1st of January, 1828, to Count Capodistrias, who, having been elected President of Greece nearly nine months before, and having accepted that office, had not yet thought fit to enter upon it or to do anything towards repairing the shattered fortunes and retrieving the violated honour of the State of which he was nominally the head.

"On my return home from Brazil," said Lord Cochrane, in this memorable letter, "I was pressed by various friends of Greece to engage in the service of a people struggling to free themselves from oppression and slavery. My inclination was consonant to theirs. It was stipulated that, for the objects in view, six steam-vessels should be rapidly built, and that two old vessels of war, or Indiamen, should be purchased and manned with foreign seamen. The engines for the steam-vessels were to be high-pressure, these being the easiest constructed and managed; and two American frigates, when finished, were also to be placed under my authority. The failure of the engineer, through disgraceful ignorance or base treachery, in the proper construction of the engines--the want of funds to procure the old vessels of war or Indiamen with foreign seamen--and the retention of one of the frigates built in North America, deprived me of the whole of the stipulated force, except the _h.e.l.las_. It is needless to remark that with one frigate I was unable to effect that which has since required eleven European ships of the line, aided by many frigates and smaller vessels, to accomplish. Under these circ.u.mstances, it became my duty to confine myself to desultory operations, secretly conducted against the enemy.

"The difficulties I have had to contend with, even in these excursions," he continued, "can best be appreciated by the few foreign European officers who accompanied me. The obstinate refusal of the Greek seamen to embark or perform the smallest service without being paid in advance--the contempt with which the elder portion of the seamen treated every endeavour to promote regularity and maintain silence in exercising the great guns and other evolutions, rendered their improvement hopeless; and the enlistment of young seamen, whilst the old were rejected, has been rendered extremely difficult by reason of the influence of the latter, and by the prejudice excited against a regular naval service by influential individuals, whose power and importance are thereby diminished in the maritime islands. The frequent mutinies or resistance to authority, and the numerous instances in which I have been obliged to return to port or abstain from going to sea are recorded, as to dates and circ.u.mstances, in the log-book of the _h.e.l.las_, together with the disgraceful conduct of the crew in the stripping and robbing of prisoners, and their want of coolness in the presence of an enemy--exemplified on our attacking a small frigate and a corvette near Clarenza, and by the firing of upwards of four hundred round shot, on a subsequent occasion, at the corvette now named _Hydra_, without hitting the hull of that vessel four times, although she was within a hundred yards of the _h.e.l.las_. Such was the confusion excited by the contiguity even of so inferior an enemy. It is not my intention to trouble you at present with detail; yet I cannot suffer to pa.s.s unnoticed that certain commanders, and the seamen of the majority of the fireships--in the use of which vessels rested my last hopes--failed in their duty on the only two important occasions when their services were required; once at Alexandria in the presence of the enemy, as the brave Kanaris can well testify; and again by the crews abandoning their duty and embarking in privateers, many of them after having received pay in advance for their services. Indeed--encouraged by privateering licenses--insubordination, outrage, and piracy have arrived at such a pitch that these very national fireships, stripped not only of their rigging, but of their anchors and cables, are now drifting about the harbour of Poros. A neutral boat, detained by the _h.e.l.las_ for violation of blockade, has been plundered by those sent in charge of her; and scarcely a vessel can pa.s.s between the islands, or along the sh.o.r.e, without the pa.s.sengers and property being exposed to brutal violence and plunder. A darker period is yet approaching if decisive measures are not adopted for the suppression of outrages like these.

"I am ready to serve Greece, and to aid in any way in the accomplishment of the arduous task you have undertaken; but, on the fullest consideration of circ.u.mstances, I feel that I should practise a deception were I to contribute to the belief that the few foreign officers in the naval service can put a stop to these disorders, which must finally involve the character of that very service, already prematurely brought in question by the conduct of vessels unlawfully commissioned by the temporary Government. I have, in consequence of this opinion, come to the resolution to exert myself to procure adequate means to execute the duties of an office in which my efforts. .h.i.therto have been all counteracted; and I the more readily adopt this resolution as, during the winter months, it is impossible to navigate the _h.e.l.las_ in these narrow seas with a crew of young inexperienced Greek seamen, and still more impracticable to manage her with old ones of Turkish habits. I may, indeed, add that, until the communication addressed on the 24th of October by the three admirals to the Legislative a.s.sembly shall be cancelled, it is hopeless to attempt any naval enterprise in favour of Greece, even had Admiral de Rigny not super-added his commands "that all Greek vessels, armed for war, found beyond twelve miles from the sh.o.r.es of continental Greece, between Volo and Lepanto, shall be destroyed." I repeat that I have taken my determination, not from any private feeling of disgust at the above disgraceful restrictions brought by the temporary Government; nor from their misappropriation of the revenues allotted to maritime purposes, and the consequent want of pay, stores, and even provisions for the ships of war; nor from the painful feeling that the crippled ships of the enemy are thereby enabled to depart in security, dragging with them four thousand Grecian captives to slavery; nor from the impossibility of reducing their maritime fortifications, while the Greeks, unpunished, are the chief violators of the blockade; but I have resolved to proceed to England without loss of time, that I may render better service to Greece. If you aid me with means, my object as to seamen will be ensured. Sober, steady men can be obtained from the northern nations, who will do their duty, and, since precept is useless, teach the Greeks by example. Then piracy may cease and commerce may flourish. Be your intention in regard to the steam-vessels still in England what it may, foreign seamen are indispensable to the interests of Greece and to your own; and the expense of bringing them here will be little increased if these steamers, fitted under my inspection, shall become the means of their conveyance. The hardship of a winter"s voyage to the North, in a small vessel, I shall deem amply repaid if I can accomplish these objects, expose the injustice and impolicy of certain measures, and bring the real wants of Greece to the knowledge of a liberal and enlightened administration."

On the same New Year"s Day Lord Cochrane wrote, explaining his resolution, to Dr. Gosse, who, of all the Philh.e.l.lenes in Greece, had rendered him most efficient service in his thankless task, and most zealously encouraged him, throughout a long series of failures for which he was in no way answerable, to persevere in struggling for success. "My dear friend and fellow-sufferer," he said, "in conformity with your wish and opinion, I have tolerated my mental load of grievances until the new year; but as it is essential to commence it well in order that measures may prosper to the end, I have resolved to put my intention in execution, regardless of the officious tongues of those of microscopic views who may deem that my time might be well employed in balancing the rivalships of barbarous seamen or protecting the movable stores of the immovable _h.e.l.las_. In my present state of official insignificance I could render no other service. I have stated a few of my reasons in a letter to Capodistrias, for his private information, when he shall a.s.sume the office of president. I hope these will suffice, and that he will communicate his desire, which shall be duly attended to."

In accordance with his new resolution, Lord Cochrane transferred the command of the _h.e.l.las_, and such control of the whole navy as was possible, to Admiral Miaoulis. He left Poros in the little schooner _Unicorn_, on the 10th of January, and arrived at Portsmouth on the 11th of February. "The anxiety and disappointment," he said, writing to M.

Eynard from Portsmouth on the following day, "which I experienced in regard to the steam-vessels and other means that were to have been placed at my disposal are trifling, when compared to the distress I have felt at finding my only remaining hope of rendering effectual service to Greece destroyed by the impossibility of inducing the Greek seamen to submit to the slightest restraint on their inclinations, or to render the most trifling service without being paid in advance, or to perform such service after being so paid, if it suited their interest or convenience to evade the fulfilment of their engagement. More than six crews have pa.s.sed under my review on board the _h.e.l.las_ in the course of as many months, exclusive of those in other vessels, and, notwithstanding all that has been written to praise the courage of the Greek seamen, they are collectively the greatest cowards I have ever met with. No service of any difficulty or danger can be undertaken with such men without the greatest risk of being compromised by the confusion they create, and the impossibility of causing orders to be obeyed. Indeed, though styled Commander-in-Chief of the Greek Naval Forces, I have, since the 12th of April last, when I hoisted my flag, been, in truth, under the control of wild and frantic savages, whose acts are guided by momentary impulses or heedless avidity to grasp some immediate pecuniary or petty advantage, regardless of any prospect of future benefit, however great, to their country or to themselves. To give you an idea of the character of men suddenly emanc.i.p.ated from a state of the most degrading and abject slavery, in which state cunning, deception, and fraud, if not absolutely requisite, were convenient and profitable, of their present arrogancy, ignorance, despotism, and cruelty, when safe opportunity offers for revenge, would require that a diary should be laid before you of events which have actually occurred. The confidence you were pleased to repose in me, and the friendly offices for which I am indebted to you would have imposed upon me the task of transmitting to you such detail, had the state of my mind, hara.s.sed by constant contrarieties, permitted.

"Leaving to a future period, then, minute recital of distressing occurrences, permit me to make a few observations as to the course that appears to be necessary to be pursued in order to save Greece from impending ruin:--1st. The chief leaders of the different factions should be removed from Greece,--those who have education, on missions to different states, as envoys, consuls, etc., and the others, as circ.u.mstances will permit. Else Greece will be a theatre of plunder and discord whilst they hold authority or have means to interfere in public affairs. 2ndly. Troops to the amount of four thousand, at least, are required to enforce obedience to salutary laws and regulations. 3rdly. Five hundred seamen from the northern nations of Europe or North America are indispensable for the suppression of piracy and to prevent the plunder of the islands. 4thly. Young Greek seamen should be employed by the civilized nations in their vessels of war and commerce. 5thly. The settlement of persons from all quarters of Europe, in numbers affording mutual protection, should be encouraged. Of course education at home, but more especially abroad, will improve the rising generation. For all those people now at the age of maturity in Greece there is no hope of amelioration. In regard to myself, I am ready, according to my engagement, to render any service in my power to Greece, and I shall feel great satisfaction if I am enabled to do so; but it is no part of my contract to place myself under the control of lawless savages. What might we not have done had the steam-vessels and five hundred good seamen been employed in Greece, when, with these barbarians, we have doubled the number of Greek national vessels of war, and destroyed twice as many of the enemy"s squadron? I hope the President Capodistrias will not put his foot on sh.o.r.e in Greece, unless accompanied by a military force. If he does, he will afford corroborative proof of the impossibility of establishing a new order of things by the instrumentality of men who feel interested in the continuance of ancient habits and abuses."[12]

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