[Ill.u.s.tration]
At daylight on the following morning, January 26th, the ships began changing their places, the French being then seven or eight miles distant in the south-south-east. At 7 A.M. they were seen to be approaching in line of battle, under a press of sail, heading for the British van. The _Canada_, which had begun at 5 A.M. to tackle her 200-odd fathoms of cable, was obliged to cut, whereby "we lost the small bower anchor and two cables with one 8-inch and one 9-inch hawsers, which were bent for springs." The ship had to work to windward to close with the fleet, and was therefore ordered by the Rear-Admiral to keep engaging under way, until 10.50, when a message was sent her to anchor in support of the rear. The action began between 8.30 and 9 A.M., the leading French ship heading for the British van, seemingly with the view of pa.s.sing round and inside it.
Against this attempt Hood"s precautions probably were sufficient; but as the enemy"s vessel approached, the wind headed her, so that she could only fetch the third ship. The latter, with the vessels ahead and astern, sprung their batteries upon her. "The crash occasioned by their destructive broadsides was so tremendous on board her that whole pieces of plank were seen flying from her off side, ere she could escape the cool concentrated fire of her determined adversaries."[111]
She put her helm up, and ran along outside the British line, receiving the first fire of each successive ship. Her movement was imitated by her followers, some keeping off sooner, some later; but de Gra.s.se in his flagship not only came close, but pointed his after yards to the wind,[112] to move the slower. As he ported his helm when leaving the _Barfleur_, this brought these sails aback, keeping him a still longer time before the British ships thrown to the rear. "In this he was supported by those ships which were astern, or immediately ahead of him. During this short but tremendous conflict in that part of the field of battle, nothing whatever could be seen of them for upwards of twenty minutes, save de Gra.s.se"s white flag at the main-topgallant masthead of the _Ville de Paris_, gracefully floating above the immense volumes of smoke that enveloped them, or the pennants of those ships which were occasionally perceptible, when an increase of breeze would waft away the smoke."[113]
[Ill.u.s.tration]
Though most gallantly done, no such routine manoeuvre as this could shake Hood"s solidly a.s.sumed position. The attempt was repeated in the afternoon, but more feebly, and upon the centre and rear only. This also was ineffectual; and Hood was left in triumphant possession of the field. The losses in the several affairs of the two days had been: British, 72 killed, 244 wounded; French, 107 killed, 207 wounded.
Thenceforth the French fleet continued cruising to leeward of the island, approaching almost daily, frequently threatening attack, and occasionally exchanging distant shots; but no serious encounter took place. Interest was centred on Brimstone Hill, where alone on the island the British flag still flew. De Gra.s.se awaited its surrender, flattering himself that the British would be forced then to put to sea, and that his fleet, increased by successive arrivals to thirty-two of the line, would then find an opportunity to crush the man who had outwitted and out-manoeuvred him on January 25th and 26th.
In this hope he was deceived by his own inaptness and his adversary"s readiness. Hood was unable to succour Brimstone Hill, for want of troops; the French having landed six thousand men, against which the British twenty-four hundred could effect nothing, either alone or in cooperation with the garrison, which was but twelve hundred strong.
The work capitulated on the 13th of February. De Gra.s.se, who had neglected to keep his ships provisioned, went next day to Nevis and anch.o.r.ed there to empty the storeships. That evening Hood called his captains on board, explained his intentions, had them set their watches by his, and at 11 P.M. the cables were cut one by one, lights being left on the buoys, and the fleet silently decamped, pa.s.sing round the north end of St. Kitts, and so towards Antigua. When de Gra.s.se opened his eyes next morning, the British were no longer to be seen. "Nothing could have been more fortunately executed," wrote Lord Robert Manners, "as not one accident happened from it. Taking the whole in one light, though not successful in the point we aimed at, nevertheless it was well conducted, and has given the enemy a pretty severe check; and if you give him half the credit the enemy does, Sir Samuel Hood will stand very high in the public estimation."
Hood"s intention had been to return to Barbados; but on the 25th of February he was joined, to windward of Antigua, by Rodney, who had arrived from England a week earlier, bringing with him twelve ships of the line. The new Commander-in-Chief endeavoured to cut off de Gra.s.se from Martinique, but the French fleet got in there on the 26th.
Rodney consequently went to Santa Lucia, to refit Hood"s ships, and to prepare for the coming campaign, in which it was understood that the conquest of Jamaica was to be the first object of the allies.
An important condition to their success was the arrival of a great convoy, known to be on its way from Brest to repair the losses which Kempenfelt"s raid and subsequent bad weather had inflicted in December. Hood suggested to Rodney to halve the fleet, which then numbered thirty-six of the line, letting one part cruise north of Dominica, between that island and Deseada, while the other guarded the southern approach, between Martinique and Santa Lucia. Rodney, however, was unwilling to do this, and adopted a half-measure,--Hood"s division being stationed to windward of the north end of Martinique, reaching only as far north as the lat.i.tude of Dominica, while the center and rear were abreast of the centre and south of Martinique; all in mutual touch by intermediate vessels. It would seem--reading between the lines--that Hood tried to stretch his cruising ground northwards, in pursuance of his own ideas, but Rodney recalled him.
The French convoy consequently pa.s.sed north of Deseada, convoyed by two ships of the line, and on the 20th of March reached Martinique safely. De Gra.s.se"s force was thus raised to thirty-five of the line, including two 50-gun ships, as against the British thirty-six. At the end of the month Rodney returned to Santa Lucia, and there remained at anchor, vigilantly watching the French fleet in Fort Royal by means of a chain of frigates.
The problem now immediately confronting de Gra.s.se--the first step towards the conquest of Jamaica--was extremely difficult. It was to convoy to Cap Francois the supply vessels essential to his enterprise, besides the merchant fleet bound for France; making in all one hundred and fifty unarmed ships to be protected by his thirty-five sail of the line, in face of the British thirty-six. The trade-wind being fair, he purposed to skirt the inner northern edge of the Caribbean Sea; by which means he would keep close to a succession of friendly ports, wherein the convoy might find refuge in case of need.
With this plan the French armament put to sea on the 8th of April, 1782. The fact being reported promptly to Rodney, by noon his whole fleet was clear of its anchorage and in pursuit. Then was evident the vital importance of Barrington"s conquest of Santa Lucia; for, had the British been at Barbados, the most probable alternative, the French movement not only would have been longer unknown, but pursuit would have started from a hundred miles distant, instead of thirty. If the British had met this disadvantage by cruising before Martinique, they would have encountered the difficulty of keeping their ships supplied with water and other necessaries, which Santa Lucia afforded. In truth, without in any degree minimizing the faults of the loser, or the merits of the winner, in the exciting week that followed, the opening situation may be said to have represented on either side an acc.u.mulation of neglects or of successes, which at the moment of their occurrence may have seemed individually trivial; a conspicuous warning against the risk incurred by losing single points in the game of war.
De Gra.s.se was tremendously handicapped from the outset by the errors of his predecessors and of himself. That the British had Santa Lucia as their outpost was due not only to Barrington"s diligence, but also to d"Estaing"s slackness and professional timidity; and it may be questioned whether de Gra.s.se himself had shown a proper understanding of strategic conditions, when he neglected that island in favour of Tobago and St. Kitts. Certainly, Hood had feared for it greatly the year before. That the convoy was there to embarra.s.s his movements, may not have been the fault of the French admiral; but it was greatly and entirely his fault that, of the thirty-six ships pursuing him, twenty-one represented a force that he might have crushed in detail a few weeks before,--not to mention the similar failure of April, 1781.[114]
Large bodies of ships commonly will move less rapidly than small. By 2.30 P.M. of the day of starting, Rodney"s look-outs had sighted the French fleet; and before sundown it could be seen from the mastheads of the main body. At 6 next morning, April 9th, the enemy, both fleet and convoy, was visible from the deck of the _Barfleur_, the flagship of Hood"s division, then in the British van. The French bore north-east, distant four to twelve miles, extending from abreast of the centre of Dominica northwards towards Guadeloupe. The British had gained much during the night, and their centre was now off Dominica to leeward of the enemy"s rear, which was becalmed under the island. Some fourteen or fifteen of the French van, having opened out the channel between Dominica and Guadeloupe, felt a fresh trade-wind, from east by north, with which they steered north; and their number was gradually increased as individual ships, utilising the catspaws, stole clear of the high land of Dominica. Hood"s division in like manner, first among the British, got the breeze, and, with eight ships, the commander of the van stood north in order of battle. To the north-west of him were two French vessels, separated from their consorts and threatened to be cut off (i). These stood boldly down and crossed the head of Hood"s column; one pa.s.sing so close to the leading ship, the _Alfred_, that the latter had to bear up to let her pa.s.s. Rodney had hoisted a signal to engage at 6.38 A.M., but had hauled it down almost immediately, and Hood would not fire without orders. These ships therefore rejoined their main body unharmed. At 8.30 the French hoisted their colours, and shortly afterwards the vessels which had cleared Dominica tacked and stood south, opposite to Hood.
De Gra.s.se now had recognised that he could not escape action, if the convoy kept company. He therefore directed the two 50-gun ships, _Experiment_ and _Sagittaire_, to accompany it into Guadeloupe, where it arrived safely that day (Position 1, dd); and he decided that the fleet should ply to windward through the channel between Dominica and Guadeloupe, nearly midway in which lies a group of small islands called Les Saintes,--a name at times given to the battle of April 12th. By this course he hoped not only to lead the enemy away from the convoy, but also to throw off pursuit through his superior speed, and so to accomplish his mission unharmed. The French ships, larger, deeper, and with better lines than their opponents, were naturally better sailers, and it may be inferred that even coppering had not entirely overcome this original disadvantage of the British.
At the very moment of beginning his new policy, however, a subtle temptation a.s.sailed de Gra.s.se irresistibly, in the exposed position of Hood"s column (h); and he met it, not by a frank and hearty acceptance of a great opportunity, but by a half-measure. Hood thoroughly crushed, the British fleet became hopelessly inferior to the French; Hood damaged, and it became somewhat inferior: possibly it would be deterred from further pursuit. De Gra.s.se decided for this second course, and ordered part of his fleet to attack. This operation was carried out under the orders of the Marquis de Vaudreuil, the second in command. The ships engaged in it bore down from the windward, attacked Hood"s rear ships, stood along northward (f) on the weather side of his column at long range, and, having pa.s.sed ahead, tacked (t) in succession and formed again in the rear, (f^2) whence they repeated the same manoeuvre (Positions 1 and 2). Thus a procession of fifteen ships kept pa.s.sing by eight, describing a continuous curve of elliptical form. They were able to do this because Hood was condemned to a low speed, lest he should draw too far away from the British centre (a) and rear (c), still becalmed under Dominica (Position 2).
The French, having choice of distance, kept at long gunshot, because they were deficient in carronades, of which the British had many.
These guns, of short range but large calibre, were thus rendered useless. Could they have come into play, the French rigging and sails would have suffered severely. This first engagement (Position 1) lasted, by Hood"s log, from 9.48 to 10.25 A.M. It was resumed in stronger force (Position 2) at 14 minutes past noon, and continued till 1.45 P.M., when firing ceased for that day; Rodney hauling down the signal for battle at 2. Between the two affairs, which were identical in general character, Hood"s column was reinforced, and great part of the British centre also got into action with some of the French main body, though at long range only. "Except the two rear ships," wrote Rodney to Hood that night, "the others fired at such a distance that I returned none."
[Ill.u.s.tration]
The injuries to the British ships engaged were not such as to compel them to leave the fleet. The _Royal Oak_ lost her main topmast, and that of the _Warrior_ fell two days later, not improbably from wounds; but in these was nothing that the ready hands of seamen could not repair so as to continue the chase. Rodney, therefore, contented himself with reversing the order of sailing, putting Hood in the rear, whereby he was able to refit, and yet follow fast enough not to be out of supporting distance. This circ.u.mstance caused Hood"s division to be in the rear in the battle of the 12th. One of the French ships, the _Caton_, 64, had been so injured that de Gra.s.se detached her into Guadeloupe. It must be remembered that a crippled ship in a chased fleet not only embarra.s.ses movement, but may compromise the whole body, if the latter delay to protect it; whereas the chaser keeps between his lame birds and the enemy.
During the night of the 9th the British lay-to for repairs. The next morning they resumed the pursuit, turning to windward after the enemy, but upon the whole losing throughout the 10th and the 11th. At daylight of the 10th the French, by the logs of Hood and Cornwallis, were "from four to five leagues distant," "just in sight from the deck." During that night, however, the _Zele_, 74, had collided with the _Jason_, 64; and the latter was injured so far as to be compelled to follow the _Caton_ into Guadeloupe. At sunset of that day Rodney signalled a general chase to windward, the effect of which was to enable each ship to do her best according to her captain"s judgment during the dark hours. Nevertheless, on the morning of the 11th the French seem again to have gained, for Hood, who, it will be remembered, was now in the rear, notes that at 10 A.M. twenty-two French sail (not all the fleet) could be counted _from the masthead_; Cornwallis, further to windward, could count thirty-three. Troude, a French authority, says that at that time nearly all the French had doubled The Saintes, that is, had got to windward of them, and it looked as though de Gra.s.se might succeed in throwing off his pursuer.
Unluckily, two ships, the _Magnanime_, 74, and the _Zele_, 74, the latter of which had lost her main topmast, were several miles to leeward of the French main body. It was necessary to delay, or to drop those vessels. Again, trivial circ.u.mstances conspired to further a great disaster, and de Gra.s.se bore down to cover the crippled ships; so losing much of his hard-won ground, and entailing a further misfortune that night. Rodney hung doggedly on, relying on the chapter of accidents, as one who knows that all things come to him who endures. To be sure, there was not much else he could do; yet he deserves credit for unremitting industry and pluck. During the afternoon, the signals noted in the British logs--to call in all cruisers and for the fleet to close--attest mutely the movement of de Gra.s.se in bearing down,--coming nearer.
[Ill.u.s.tration]
During the night, at 2 A.M. of April 12th, the _Zele_ and de Gra.s.se"s flagship, the _Ville de Paris_, 110, crossing on opposite tacks, came into collision. The former lost both foremast and bowsprit. It has been stated by John Paul Jones, who by permission of Congress embarked a few months later on board the French fleet as a volunteer, and doubtless thus heard many personal narratives, that this accident was due to the deficiency of watch-officers in the French navy; the deck of the _Zele_ being in charge of a young ensign, instead of an experienced lieutenant. It was necessary to rid the fleet of the _Zele_ at once, or an action could not be avoided; so a frigate was summoned to tow her, and the two were left to make their way to Guadeloupe, while the others resumed the beat to windward. At 5 A.M.
she and the frigate were again under way, steering for Guadeloupe, to the north-west, making from five to six miles (Position 3, a); but in the interval they had been nearly motionless, and consequently when day broke at 5.30 they were only two leagues from the _Barfleur_, Hood"s flagship, which, still in the British rear, was then standing south on the port tack. The body of the French, (Position 3), was at about the same distance as on the previous evening,--ten to fifteen miles,--but the _Ville de Paris_ (c) not more than eight. Just before 6 A.M. Rodney signalled Hood, who was nearest, to chase the _Zele_; and four of the rearmost ships of the line were detached for that purpose (b). De Gra.s.se, seeing this, signalled his vessels at 6 A.M.
to close the flagship, making all sail; and he himself bore down to the westward (cc"), on the port tack, but running free, to frighten away Rodney"s chasers. The British Admiral kept them out until 7 o"clock, by which time de Gra.s.se was fairly committed to his false step. All cruisers were then called in, and the line was closed to one cable.[115] Within an hour were heard the opening guns of the great battle, since known by the names of the 12th of April, or of The Saintes, and, in the French navy, of Dominica. The successive losses of the _Caton_, _Jason_, and _Zele_, with the previous detachment of the two 50-gun ships with the convoy, had reduced the French numbers from thirty-five to thirty effective vessels. The thirty-six British remained undiminished.
The British appear to have been standing to the south on the port tack at daylight; but, soon after sending out the chasers, Rodney had ordered the line of bearing (from ship to ship) to be north-north-east to south-south-west, evidently in preparation for a close-hauled line of battle on the starboard tack, heading northerly to an east wind.
Somewhat unusually, the wind that morning held at south-east for some time, enabling the British to lie up as high as east-north-east on the starboard tack (Position 3, d), on which they were when the battle joined; and this circ.u.mstance, being very favourable for gaining to windward,--to the eastward,--doubtless led to the annulling of the signal for the line of bearing, half an hour after it was made, and the subst.i.tution for it of the line of battle ahead at one cable. It is to be inferred that Rodney"s first purpose was to tack together, thus restoring Hood to the van, his natural station; but the accident of the wind holding to the southward placed the actual van--regularly the rear--most to windward, and rendered it expedient to tack in succession, instead of all together, preserving to the full the opportunity which chance had extended for reaching the enemy. In the engagement, therefore, Hood commanded in the rear, and Rear-Admiral Drake in the van. The wind with the French seems to have been more to the eastward than with the British,--not an unusual circ.u.mstance in the neighbourhood of land.
As Rodney, notwithstanding his haste, had formed line from time to time during the past three days, his fleet was now in good order, and his signals were chiefly confined to keeping it closed. The French, on the other hand, were greatly scattered when their Commander-in-Chief, in an impulse of hasty, unbalanced judgment, abandoned his previous cautious policy and hurried them into action. Some of them were over ten miles to windward of the flagship. Though they crowded sail to rejoin her, there was not time enough for all to take their stations properly, between daylight and 8 A.M., when the firing began. "Our line of battle was formed under the fire of musketry,"[116] wrote the Marquis de Vaudreuil, the second in command, who, being in the rear of the fleet on this occasion, and consequently among the last to be engaged, had excellent opportunity for observation. At the beginning it was in de Gra.s.se"s power to postpone action, until the order should be formed, by holding his wind under short canvas; while the mere sight of his vessels hurrying down for action would have compelled Rodney to call in the ships chasing the _Zele_, the rescue of which was the sole motive of the French manoeuvre. Instead of this, the French flagship kept off the wind; which precipitated the collision, while at the same time delaying the preparations needed to sustain it.
To this de Gra.s.se added another fault by forming on the port tack, the contrary to that on which the British were, and standing southerly towards Dominica. The effect of this was to bring his ships into the calms and baffling winds which cling to the sh.o.r.e-line, thus depriving them of their power of manoeuvre. His object probably was to confine the engagement to a mere pa.s.s-by on opposite tacks, by which in all previous instances the French had thwarted the decisive action that Rodney sought. Nevertheless, the blunder was evident at once to French eyes. "What evil genius has inspired the admiral?" exclaimed du Pavillon, Vaudreuil"s flag-captain, who was esteemed one of the best tacticians in France, and who fell in the battle.
[Ill.u.s.tration]
As the two lines drew near to one another, standing, the French south, the British east-north-east, the wind shifted back to the eastward, allowing the French to head higher, to south-south-east, and knocking the British off to north-north-east (Position 4). The head of the French column thus pa.s.sed out of gunshot, across the bows of Rodney"s leading vessel, the _Marlborough_, (m), which came within range when abreast the eighth ship. The first shots were fired by the _Brave_, 74, ninth in the French line, at 8 A.M. The British captain then put his helm up and ran slowly along, north-north-west, under the lee of the French, towards their rear. The rest of the British fleet followed in his wake. The battle thus a.s.sumed the form of pa.s.sing in opposite directions on parallel lines; except that the French ships, as they successively cleared the point where the British column struck their line, would draw out of fire, their course diverging thenceforth from that of the British approach. The effect of this would be that the British rear, when it reached that point, would be fresh, having undergone no fire, and with that advantage would encounter the French rear, which had received already the fire of the British van and centre. To obviate this, by bringing his own van into action, de Gra.s.se signalled the van ships to lead south-south-west, parallel with the British north-north-east (4, a). The engagement thus became general all along the lines; but it is probable that the French van was never well formed. Its commander, at all events, reached his post later than the commander of the rear did his.[117]
At five minutes past eight, Rodney made a general signal for close action, followed immediately by another for the leading ships to head one point to starboard--towards the enemy--which indicates that he was not satisfied with the distance first taken by the _Marlborough_.
The _Formidable_, his flagship, eighteenth in the column, began to fire at 8.23;[118] but the _Barfleur_, Hood"s flagship, which was thirty-first, not till 9.25. This difference in time is to be accounted for chiefly by the light airs near Dominica, contrasted with the fresh trades in the open channel to the northward, which the leading British vessels felt before their rear. De Gra.s.se now, too late, had realised the disastrous effect which this would have upon his fleet. If he escaped all else, his ships, baffled by calms and catspaws while the British had a breeze, must lose the weather-gage, and with it the hope of evading pursuit, hitherto his chief preoccupation. Twice he signalled to wear,--first, all together, then in succession,--but, although the signals were seen, they could not be obeyed with the enemy close under the lee. "The French fleet,"
comments Chevalier justly, "had freedom of movement no longer. A fleet cannot wear with an enemy"s fleet within musket-range to leeward."
The movement therefore continued as described, the opposing ships slowly "sliding by" each other until about 9.15, when the wind suddenly shifted back to south-east again. The necessity of keeping the sails full forced the bows of each French vessel towards the enemy (Position 5), destroying the order in column, and throwing the fleet into _echelon_, or, as the phrase then was, into bow and quarter line.[119] The British, on the contrary, were free either to hold their course or to head towards the enemy. Rodney"s flagship (5, a) luffed, and led through the French line just astern of the _Glorieux_, 74, (g), which was the nineteenth in their order. She was followed by five ships; and her next ahead also, the _Duke_ (d), seeing her chief"s movement, imitated it, breaking through the line astern of the twenty-third French. The _Glorieux_, on the starboard hand of Rodney"s little column, received its successive broadsides. Her main and mizzen masts went overboard at 9.28, when the _Canada_, third astern of the _Formidable_, had just pa.s.sed her; and a few moments later her foremast and bowsprit fell. At 9.33 the _Canada_ was to windward of the French line. The flagship _Formidable_ was using both broadsides as she broke through the enemy"s order. On her port hand, between her and the _Duke_, were four French ships huddled together (c), one of which had paid off the wrong way; that is, after the shift of wind took her aback, her sails had filled on the opposite tack from that of the rest of her fleet.[120] These four, receiving the repeated broadsides, at close quarters, of the _Formidable_, _Duke_, and _Namur_, and having undergone besides the fire of the British van, were very severely mauled. While these things were happening, the _Bedford_, the sixth astern of the _Formidable_, perhaps unable to see her next ahead in the smoke, had luffed independently (b), and was followed by the twelve rearmost British ships, whom she led through the French order astern of the _Cesar_, 74, (k), twelfth from the van.
This ship and her next ahead, the _Hector_, 74, (h), suffered as did the _Glorieux_. The _Barfleur_, which was in the centre of this column of thirteen, opened fire at 9.25. At 10.45 she "ceased firing, having pa.s.sed the enemy"s van ships;" that is, she was well on the weather side of the French fleet. Some of the rearmost of Hood"s division, however, were still engaged at noon; but probably all were then to windward of the enemy.
[Ill.u.s.tration]
The British ships ahead of the _Duke_, the van and part of the centre, in all sixteen sail, had continued to stand to the northward. At the time Rodney broke the line, several of them must have pa.s.sed beyond the French rear, and out of action. One, the _America_, the twelfth from the van, wore without signals, to pursue the enemy, and her example was followed at once by the ship next ahead, the _Russell_, Captain Saumarez. No signal following, the _America_ again wore and followed her leaders, but the _Russell_ continued as she was, now to windward of the French; by which course she was able to take a conspicuous share in the closing scenes. At 11.33 Rodney signalled the van to tack, but the delay of an hour or more had given the _Russell_ a start over the other ships of her division "towards the enemy" which could not be overcome.
The effect of these several occurrences had been to transfer the weather-gage, the position for attack, to the British from the French, and to divide the latter also into three groups, widely separated and disordered (Position 6). In the centre was the flagship _Ville de Paris_ with five ships (c). To windward of her, and two miles distant, was the van, of some dozen vessels (v). The rear was four miles away to leeward (r). To restore the order, and to connect the fleet again, it was decided to re-form on the leewardmost ships; and several signals to this effect were made by de Gra.s.se. They received but imperfect execution. The manageable vessels succeeded easily enough in running before the wind to leeward, but, when there, exact.i.tude of position and of movement was unattainable to ships in various degrees of disability, with light and baffling side airs. The French were never again in order after the wind shifted and the line was broken; but the movement to leeward left the dismasted _Glorieux_, (g), _Hector_, (h), and _Cesar_, (k), motionless between the hostile lines.
It has been remarked, disparagingly, that the British fleet also was divided into three by the manoeuvre of breaking the line. This is true; but the advantage remained with it incontestably, in two respects. By favor of the wind, each of the three groups had been able to maintain its general formation in line or column, instead of being thrown entirely out, as the French were; and pa.s.sing thus in column along the _Glorieux_, _Hector_, and _Cesar_, they wrought upon these three ships a concentration of injury which had no parallel among the British vessels. The French in fact had lost three ships, as well as the wind. To these certain disadvantages is probably to be added a demoralisation among the French crews, from the much heavier losses resultant upon the British practice of firing at the hull. An officer present in the action told Sir John Ross[121] afterwards that the French fired very high throughout; and he cited in ill.u.s.tration that the three trucks[122] of the British _Princesa_ were shot away. Sir Gilbert Blane, who, though Physician to the Fleet, obtained permission to be on deck throughout the action, wrote ten days after it, "I can aver from my own observation that the French fire slackens as we approach, and is totally silent when we are close alongside." It is needless to say that a marked superiority of fire will silence that of the bravest enemy; and the practice of aiming at the spars and sails, however suited for frustrating an approach, substantially conceded that superiority upon which the issue of decisive battle depends. As ill.u.s.trative of this result, the British loss will be stated here. It was but 243 killed and 816 wounded in a fleet of thirty-six sail. The highest in any one ship was that of the _Duke_, 73 killed and wounded.
No certain account, or even very probable estimate, of the French loss has ever been given. None is cited by French authorities. Sir Gilbert Blane, who was favourably placed for information, reckoned that of the _Ville de Paris_ alone to be 300. There being fifty-four hundred troops distributed among the vessels of the fleet, the casualties would be proportionately more numerous; but, even allowing for this, there can be no doubt that the loss of the French, to use Chevalier"s words, "was certainly much more considerable" than that reported by the British. Six post-captains out of thirty were killed, against two British out of thirty-six.
Rodney did not make adequate use of the great opportunity, which accident rather than design had given him at noon of April 12th. He did allow a certain liberty of manoeuvre, by discontinuing the order for the line of battle; but the signal for close action, hoisted at 1 P.M., was hauled down a half-hour later. Hood, who realised the conditions plainly visible, as well as the reasonable inferences therefrom, wished the order given for a general chase, which would have applied the spur of emulation to every captain present, without surrendering the hold that particular signals afford upon indiscreet movements. He bitterly censured the Admiral"s failure to issue this command. Had it been done, he said:--
"I am very confident we should have had twenty sail of the enemy"s ships before dark. Instead of that, he pursued only under his topsails (sometimes his foresail was set and at others his mizzen topsail aback) the greatest part of the afternoon, though the _flying_ enemy had all the sail set their very shattered state would allow."[123]
To make signal for a general chase was beyond the competence of a junior admiral; but Hood did what he could, by repeated signals to individual ships of his own division to make more sail, by setting all he could on the _Barfleur_, and by getting out his boats to tow her head round. Sir Gilbert Blane unintentionally gives a similar impression of laxity.
"After cutting the French line, the action during the rest of the day was partial and desultory, the enemy never being able to form, and several of the [our] ships being obliged to lie by and repair their damages. As the signal for the line was now hauled down, every ship annoyed the enemy as their respective commanders judged best."[124]
For this indolent abandonment of the captains to their own devices, the correctest remedy was, as Hood indicated, the order for a general chase, supplemented by a watchful supervision, which should check the over-rash and stimulate the over-cautious. If Hood"s account of the sail carried by Rodney be correct, the Commander-in-Chief did not even set the best example. In this languid pursuit, the three crippled French ships were overhauled, and of course had to strike; and a fourth, the _Ardent_, 64, was taken, owing to her indifferent sailing.
Towards sunset the flagship _Ville de Paris_, 110,[125] the finest ship of war afloat, having been valiantly defended against a host of enemies throughout great part of the afternoon, and having expended all her ammunition, hauled down her colours. The two British vessels then immediately engaged with her were the _Russell_ and the _Barfleur_, Hood"s flagship, to the latter of which she formally surrendered; the exact moment, noted in Hood"s journal, being 6.29 P.M.
At 6.45 Rodney made the signal for the fleet to bring-to (form line and stop) on the port tack, and he remained lying-to during the night, while the French continued to retreat under the orders of the Marquis de Vaudreuil, who by de Gra.s.se"s capture had become commander-in-chief. For this easy-going deliberation also Hood had strong words of condemnation.
"Why he should bring the fleet to because the _Ville de Paris_ was taken, I cannot reconcile. He did not pursue under easy sail, so as never to have lost sight of the enemy in the night, which would clearly and most undoubtedly have enabled him to have taken almost every ship the next day.... Had I had the honour of commanding his Majesty"s n.o.ble fleet on the 12th, I may, without much imputation of vanity, say the flag of England should now have graced the sterns of _upwards_ of twenty sail of the enemy"s ships of the line."[126]
Such criticisms by those not responsible are to be received generally with caution; but Hood was, in thought and in deed, a man so much above the common that these cannot be dismissed lightly. His opinion is known to have been shared by Sir Charles Douglas, Rodney"s Captain of the Fleet;[127] and their conclusion is supported by the inferences to be drawn from Rodney"s own a.s.sumptions as to the condition of the French, contrasted with the known facts. The enemy, he wrote, in a.s.signing his reasons for not pursuing, "went off in a _close connected body_,[128] and might have defeated, by rotation, the ships that had come up with them." "The enemy _who went off in a body of twenty-six ships of the line_,[128] might, by ordering two or three of their best sailing ships or frigates to have shown lights at times, and by changing their course, have induced the British fleet to have followed them, while the main of their fleet, by hiding their lights, might have hauled their wind, and have been far to windward by daylight, and intercepted the captured ships, and the most crippled ships of the English;" and he adds that the Windward Islands even might have been endangered. That such action was in a remote degree possible to a well-conditioned fleet may be guardedly conceded; but it was wildly improbable to a fleet staggering under such a blow as the day had seen, which had changed its commander just as dark came on, and was widely scattered and disordered up to the moment when signals by flags became invisible.
The facts, however, were utterly at variance with these ingenious suppositions. Instead of being connected, as Rodney represents, de Vaudreuil had with him next morning but ten ships; and no others during the whole of the 13th. He made sail for Cap Francois, and was joined on the way by five more, so that at no time were there upwards of fifteen[129] French ships of the line together, prior to his arrival at that port on April 25th. He there found four others of the fleet. The tale of twenty-five survivors, from the thirty engaged on April 12th, was completed by six which had gone to Curacao, and which did not rejoin until May. So much for the close connected body of the French. It is clear, therefore, that Rodney"s reasons ill.u.s.trate the frame of mind against which Napoleon used to caution his generals as "making to themselves a picture" of possibilities; and that his conclusion at best was based upon the ruinous idea, which a vivid imagination or slothful temper is p.r.o.ne to present to itself, that war may be made decisive without running risks. That Jamaica even was saved was not due to this fine, but indecisive battle, but to the hesitation of the allies. When de Vaudreuil reached Cap Francois, he found there the French convoy safely arrived from Guadeloupe, and also a body of fifteen Spanish ships of the line. The troops available for the descent upon Jamaica were from fifteen to twenty thousand. Well might Hood write: "Had Sir George Rodney"s judgment, after the enemy had been so totally put to flight, borne any proportion to the high courage, zeal and exertion, so very manifestly shown by every captain, _all_ difficulty would now have been at an end. We might have done just as we pleased, instead of being at this hour upon the defensive."[130]
The allies, however, though superior in numbers, did not venture to a.s.sume the offensive. After the battle, Rodney remained near Guadeloupe until the 17th of April, refitting, and searching the neighbouring islands, in case the French fleet might have entered some one of them. For most of this time the British were becalmed, but Hood remarks that there had been wind enough to get twenty leagues to the westward; and there more wind probably would have been found. On the 17th Hood was detached in pursuit with ten sail of the line; and a day or two later Rodney himself started for Jamaica. Left to his own discretion, Hood pushed for the Mona Pa.s.sage, between Puerto Rico and Santo Domingo, carrying studding-sails below and aloft in his haste.
At daybreak of the 19th he sighted the west end of Puerto Rico; and soon afterwards a small French squadron was seen. A general chase resulted in the capture of the _Jason_ and _Caton_, sixty-fours, which had parted from their fleet before the battle and were on their way to Cap Francois. A frigate, the _Aimable_, 32, and a sloop, the _Ceres_, 18, also were taken. In reporting this affair to Rodney, Hood got a thrust into his superior. "It is a very mortifying circ.u.mstance to relate to you, Sir, that the French fleet which you put to flight on the 12th went through the Mona Channel on the 18th, only the day before I was in it."[131] A further proof of the utility of pursuit, here hinted at, is to be found in the fact that Rodney, starting six days later than de Vaudreuil, reached Jamaica, April 28th, only three days after the French got into Cap Francois. He had therefore gained three days in a fortnight"s run. What might not have been done by an untiring chase! But a remark recorded by Hood summed up the frame of mind which dominated Rodney: "I lamented to Sir George on the 13th that the signal for a general chase was not made when that for the line was hauled down and that he did not continue to pursue so as to keep sight of the enemy all night, to which he only answered, "Come, we have done very handsomely as it is.""[132]
Rodney stayed at Jamaica until the 10th of July, when Admiral Hugh Pigot arrived from England to supersede him. This change was consequent upon the fall of Lord North"s ministry, in March, 1782, and had been decided before the news of the victory could reach England.
Admiral Keppel now became the head of the Admiralty. Rodney sailed for home from Port Royal on the 22d of July; and with his departure the war in the West Indies and North America may be said to have ended.
Pigot started almost immediately for New York, and remained in North American waters until the end of October, when he returned to Barbados, first having detached Hood with thirteen ships of the line from the main fleet, to cruise off Cap Francois. It is of interest to note that at this time Hood took with him from New York the frigate _Albemarle_, 28, then commanded by Nelson, who had been serving on the North American station. These various movements were dictated by those of the enemy, either actually made or supposed to be in contemplation; for it was an inevitable part of the ill-effects of Rodney"s most imperfect success, that the British fleet was thenceforth on the defensive purely, with all the perplexities of him who waits upon the initiative of an opponent. Nothing came of them all, however, for the war now was but lingering in its death stupor. The defeat of de Gra.s.se, partial though it was; the abandonment of the enterprise upon Jamaica; the failure of the attack upon Gibraltar; and the success of Howe in re-victualling that fortress,--these had taken all heart out of the French and Spaniards; while the numerical superiority of the allies, inefficiently though it had been used heretofore, weighed heavily upon the imagination of the British Government, which now had abandoned all hope of subduing its American Colonies. Upon the conclusion of peace, in 1783, Pigot and Hood returned to England, leaving the Leeward Islands" Station under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Hughes, an officer remembered by history only through Nelson"s refusing to obey his orders not to enforce the Navigation Acts, in 1785.
[Footnote 105: James Saumarez, Lord de Saumarez, G.C.B. Born, 1757.
Commander, 1781. Captain, 1782. Captain of _Russell_ in Rodney"s action, 1782. Knighted for capture of frigate _Reunion_, 1793. Captain of _Orion_ in Bridport"s action, at St. Vincent, and at the Nile (when he was second in command). Rear-Admiral and Baronet, 1801. Defeated French and Spaniards off Cadiz, July 12th, 1801. Vice-Admiral, 1805.
Vice-Admiral of England and a peer, 1831. Died, 1836.]