Howe"s squadron had been const.i.tuted in 1776 with reference to the colonial struggle only, and to shallow water, and therefore was composed, very properly, of cruisers, and of ships of the line of the smaller cla.s.ses; there being several fifties, and nothing larger than a sixty-four. When war with France threatened, the Ministry, having long warning, committed an unpardonable fault in allowing such a force to be confronted by one so superior as that which sailed from Toulon, in April, 1778. This should have been stopped on its way, or, failing that, its arrival in America should have been preceded by a British reinforcement. As it was, the government was saved from a tremendous disaster only by the efficiency of its Admiral and the inefficiency of his antagonist. As is not too uncommon, grat.i.tude was swamped by the instinct of self-preservation from the national wrath, excited by this, and by other simultaneous evidences of neglect. An attempt was made to disparage Howe"s conduct, and to prove that his force was even superior to that of the French, by adding together the guns in all his ships, disregarding their cla.s.ses, or by combining groups of his small vessels against d"Estaing"s larger units. The instrument of the attack was a naval officer, of some rank but slender professional credit, who at this most opportune moment underwent a political conversion, which earned him employment on the one hand, and the charge of apostasy on the other. For this kind of professional arithmetic, Howe felt and expressed just and utter contempt. Two and two make four in a primer, but in the field they may make three, or they may make five. Not to speak of the greater defensive power of heavy ships, nor of the concentration of their fire, the unity of direction under one captain possesses here also that importance which has caused unity of command and of effort to be recognised as the prime element in military efficiency, from the greatest things to the smallest. Taken together, the three elements--greater defensive power, concentration of fire, and unity of direction--const.i.tute a decisive and permanent argument in favor of big ships, in Howe"s days as in our own. Doubtless, now, as then, there is a limit; most arguments can be pushed to an _absurdum_, intellectual or practical. To draw a line is always hard; but, if we cannot tell just where the line has been pa.s.sed we can recognise that one ship is much too big, while another certainly is not. Between the two an approximation to an exact result can be made.
On his return to New York on September 11th, Howe found there Rear-Admiral Hyde Parker[37] with six ships of the line of Byron"s squadron. Considering his task now accomplished, Howe decided to return to England, in virtue of a permission granted some time before at his own request. The duty against the Americans, lately his fellow-countrymen, had been always distasteful to him, although he did not absolutely refuse to undertake it, as did Admiral Keppel.
The entrance of France into the quarrel, and the coming of d"Estaing, refreshed the spirits of the veteran, who moreover scorned to abandon his command in the face of such odds. Now, with the British positions secure, and superiority of force insured for the time being, he gladly turned over his charge and sailed for home; burning against the Admiralty with a wrath common to most of the distinguished seamen of that war. He was not employed afloat again until a change of Ministry took place, in 1782.
[Footnote 19: Charles H., Comte d"Estaing. Born, 1729. Served in India under Lally Tollendal, 1758. After having been taken prisoner at Madras in 1759, exchanged into the navy. Commanded in North America, 1778-80. Guillotined, 1794. W.L.C.]
[Footnote 20: Grandfather of the poet.]
[Footnote 21: The Secretary of Lloyd"s, for the purposes of this work, has been so good as to cause to be specially compiled a summary of the losses and captures during the period 1775-1783. This, so far as it deals with merchantmen and privateers, gives the following results.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------- | BRITISH VESSELS | ENEMY"S VESSELS |---------------------------------+---------------------------------- | Merchantmen | Privateers | Merchantmen | Privateers |----------------+----------------+----------------+----------------- | |Re-taken| |Re-taken| |Re-taken| |Re-taken | Taken |or Ran- | Taken |or Ran- | Taken |or Ran- | Taken |or Ran- | [22] | somed | [22] | somed | [22] | somed | [22] | somed -----+-------+--------+-------+--------+-------+--------+-------+--------- 1775 | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- 1776 | 229 | 51 | --- | --- | 19 | --- | 6 | --- 1777 | 331 | 52 | --- | --- | 51 | 1 | 18 | --- 1778 | 359 | 87 | 5 | --- | 232 | 5 | 16 | --- 1779 | 487 | 106 | 29 | 5 | 238 | 5 | 31 | --- 1780 | 581 | 260 | 15 | 2 | 203 | 3 | 34 | 1 1781 | 587 | 211 | 38 | 6 | 277 | 10 | 40 | --- 1782 | 415 | 99 | 1 | --- | 104 | 1 | 68 | --- 1783 | 98 | 13 | 1 | 1 | 11 | 2 | 3 | --- --------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Footnote 22: Including those re-taken or ransomed. W.L.C.]
[Footnote 23: A spring is a rope taken usually from the quarter (one side of the stern) of a ship, to the anchor. By hauling upon it the battery is turned in the direction desired.]
[Footnote 24: The leader, the _Leviathan_, was excepted, evidently because she lay under the Hook, and her guns could not bear down channel. She was not a fighting ship of the squadron, but an armed storeship, although originally a ship of war, and therefore by her thickness of side better fitted for defence than an ordinary merchant vessel. Placing her seems to have been an afterthought, to close the gap in the line, and prevent even the possibility of the enemy"s ships turning in there and doubling on the van. Thus Howe avoided the fatal oversight made by Brueys twenty years later, in Aboukir Bay.]
[Footnote 25: It may be recalled that a similar disposition was made by the Confederates at Mobile against Farragut"s attack in 1864, and that it was from these small vessels that his flagship _Hartford_ underwent her severest loss. To sailing ships the odds were greater, as injury to spars might involve stoppage. Moreover, Howe"s arrangements brought into such fire all his heavier ships.]
[Footnote 26: A letter to the Admiralty, dated October 8th, 1779, from Vice-Admiral Marriot Arbuthnot, then commander-in-chief at New York, states that "at spring tides there is generally thirty feet of water on the bar at high water."]
[Footnote 27: These four ships were among the smallest of the fleet, being one 74, two 64"s, and a 50. D"Estaing very properly reserved his heaviest ships to force the main channel.]
[Footnote 28: _Flora_, 32; _Juno_, 32; Lark, 32; _Orpheus_, 32; _Falcon_, 16.]
[Footnote 29: I have not been able to find an exact statement of the number; Beatson gives eight regiments, with a reinforcement of five battalions.]
[Footnote 30: It may be interesting to recall that this was the ship on the books of which Nelson"s name was first borne in the navy, in 1771.]
[Footnote 31: Troude attributes d"Estaing"s sortie to a sense of the insecurity of his position; Lapeyrouse Bonfils, to a desire for contest. Chevalier dwells upon the exposure of the situation.]
[Footnote 32: For the respective force of the two fleets see pp. 66, 67, 71.]
[Footnote 33: This account of the manoeuvres of the two fleets is based upon Lord Howe"s dispatch, and amplified from the journal of Captain Henry Duncan of the flagship _Eagle_ which has been published (1902) since the first publication of this work. See "Navy Records Society, Naval Miscellany." Vol. i, p. 161.]
[Footnote 34: At the mouth of Delaware Bay.]
[Footnote 35: _Ante_, p. 62.]
[Footnote 36: Chevalier: "Marine Francaise," 1778.]
[Footnote 37: Later Vice-Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, Bart., who perished in the _Cato_ in 1783. He was father of that Admiral Sir Hyde Parker, who in 1801 was Nelson"s commander-in-chief at Copenhagen, and who in 1778 commanded the _Phoenix_, 44, in Howe"s fleet. (_Ante_, pp. 39, 46.)]
CHAPTER V
THE NAVAL WAR IN EUROPE. THE BATTLE OF USHANT
1778
During the same two months that saw the contest between d"Estaing and Howe in America the only encounter between nearly equal fleets in 1778 took place in European waters. Admiral Keppel, having returned to Spithead after the affair between the _Belle Poule_ and the _Arethusa_,[38] again put to sea on the 9th of July, with a force increased to thirty ships of the line. He had been mortified by the necessity of avoiding action, and of even retiring into port, with the inadequate numbers before under his command, and his mind was fixed now to compel an engagement, if he met the French.
The Brest fleet also put to sea, the day before Keppel, under the command of Admiral the Comte d"Orvilliers. It contained thirty-two ships of the line. Of these, three--64, a 60, and a 50--were not considered fit for the line of battle, which was thus reduced to twenty-nine sail, carrying 2098 guns. To these the British opposed an aggregate of 2278; but comparison by this means only is very rough.
Not only the sizes of the guns, but the cla.s.ses and weight of the vessels need to be considered. In the particular instance the matter is of little importance; the action being indecisive, and credit depending upon manoeuvres rather than upon fighting.
The French admiral was hampered by vacillating instructions, reflections of the unstable impulses which swayed the Ministry.
Whatever his personal wishes, he felt that he was expected to avoid action, unless under very favourable circ.u.mstances. At the moment of sailing he wrote: "Since you leave me free to continue my cruise, I will not bring the fleet back to Brest, unless by positive orders, until I have fulfilled the month at sea mentioned in my instructions, and known to all the captains. Till then I will not fly before Admiral Keppel, whatever his strength; only, if I know him to be too superior, I will avoid a disproportionate action as well as I can; but if the enemy really seeks to force it, it will be very hard to shun." These words explain his conduct through the next few days.
On the afternoon of July 23d the two fleets sighted each other, about a hundred miles west of Ushant, the French being then to leeward.
Towards sunset, they were standing south-west, with the wind at west-north-west, and bore north-east from the enemy, who were lying-to, heads to the northward. The British remaining nearly motionless throughout the night, and the wind shifting, d"Orvilliers availed himself of the conditions to press to windward, and in the morning was found to bear north-west from his opponent.[39] Their relative positions satisfied both admirals for the moment; for Keppel found himself interposed between Brest and the French, while d"Orvilliers, though surrendering the advantage of open retreat to his port, had made it possible, by getting the weather-gage, to fulfil his promise to keep the sea and yet to avoid action. Two of his ships, however, the _Duc de Bourgogne_, 80, and a 74, were still to leeward, not only of their own main body, but also of the British. Keppel sent chasers after them, for the expressed purpose of compelling d"Orvilliers to action in their support,[40] and it was believed by the British that they were forced to return to Brest, to avoid being cut off. They certainly quitted their fleet, which was thus reduced to twenty-seven effective sail. From this time until July 27th the wind continued to the westward, and the wariness of the French admiral baffled all his antagonist"s efforts to get within range. Keppel, having no doubts as to what was expected of him, pursued vigorously, watching his chance. On the morning of July 27th the two fleets [Fig 1, AA, AA], were from six to ten miles apart, wind south-west, both on the port tack,[41] steering north-west; the French dead to windward, in line ahead. The British were in bow-and-quarter line. In this formation, when exact, the ships of a fleet were nearly abreast each other; so ranged, however, that if they tacked all at the same time they would be at once in line of battle ahead close to the wind,--the fighting order.[42] Both fleets were irregularly formed, the British especially so; for Keppel rightly considered that he would not accomplish his purpose, if he were pedantic concerning the order of his going. He had therefore signalled a "General Chase," which, by permitting much individual freedom of movement, facilitated the progress of the whole body. At daylight, the division commanded by Sir Hugh Palliser--the right wing, as then heading--had dropped astern [R]; and at 5.30 A.M. the signal was made to seven of its fastest sailers to chase to windward, to get farther to windward by pressing sail, the object being so to place them relatively to the main body, as to support the latter, if an opportunity for action should offer.
At 9 A.M. the French admiral, wishing to approach the enemy and to see more clearly, ordered his fleet to wear in succession,--to countermarch. As the van ships went round (b) under this signal, they had to steer off the wind (be), parallel to their former line, on which those following them still were, until they reached the point to which the rear ship meantime had advanced (c), when they could again haul to the wind. This caused a loss of ground to leeward, but not more than d"Orvilliers could afford, as things stood. Just after he had fairly committed himself to the manoeuvre, the wind hauled to the southward two points,[43] from south-west to south-south-west, which favoured the British, allowing them to head more nearly towards the enemy (BB). The shift also threw the bows of the French off the line they were following, deranging their order. Keppel therefore continued on the port tack, until all the French (BB), were on the starboard, and at 10.15, being nearly in their wake, he ordered his own ships to tack together (dd), which would bring them into line ahead on the same tack as the French; that is, having the wind on the same side. This put the British in column,[44] still to leeward, but nearly astern of the enemy and following (CC). At this moment a thick rain-squall came up, concealing the fleets one from another for three quarters of an hour. With the squall the wind shifted back to southwest, favouring the British on this tack, as it had on the other, and enabling them to lay up for the enemy"s rear after which (French BB) they were standing and could now bring to action. When the weather cleared, at 11, the French were seen to have gone about again, all the ships together, and were still in the confusion of a partly executed manoeuvre (CC).
Their admiral had doubtless recognised, from the change of wind, and from the direction of the enemy when last visible, that an encounter could not be avoided. If he continued on the starboard tack, the van of the pursuing enemy, whose resolve to force battle could not be misunderstood, would overtake his rear ships, engaging as many of them as he might choose. By resuming the port tack, the heads of the columns would meet, and the fleets pa.s.s in opposite directions, on equal terms as regarded position; because all the French would engage, and not only a part of their rear. Therefore he had ordered his ships to go about, all at the same time; thus forming column again rapidly, but reversing the order so that the rear became the van.
[Ill.u.s.tration]
Keppel so far had made no signal for the line of battle, nor did he now. Recognising from the four days" chase that his enemy was avoiding action, he judged correctly that he should force it, even at some risk. It was not the time for a drill-master, nor a parade. Besides, thanks to the morning signal for the leewardly ships to chase, these, forming the rear of the disorderly column in which he was advancing, were now well to windward, able therefore to support their comrades, if needful, as well as to attack the enemy. In short, practically the whole force was coming into action, although much less regularly than might have been desired. What was to follow was a rough-and-ready fight, but it was all that could be had, and better than nothing.
Keppel therefore simply made the signal for battle, and that just as the firing began. The collision was so sudden that the ships at first had not their colours flying.
The French also, although their manoeuvres had been more methodical, were in some confusion. It is not given to a body of thirty ships, of varying qualities, to attain perfection of movement in a fortnight of sea practice. The change of wind had precipitated an action, which one admiral had been seeking, and the other shunning; but each had to meet it with such shift as he could. The British (CC) being close-hauled, the French (CC), advancing on a parallel line, were four points[45]
off the wind. Most of their ships, therefore, could have gone clear to windward of their opponents, but the fact that the latter could reach some of the leaders compelled the others to support them. As d"Orvilliers had said, it was hard to avoid an enemy resolute to fight. The leading three French vessels[46] (e) hauled their wind, in obedience to the admiral"s signal to form the line of battle, which means a close-hauled line. The effect of this was to draw them gradually away from the hostile line, taking them out of range of the British centre and rear. This, if imitated by their followers, would render the affair even more partial and indecisive than such pa.s.sing by usually was. The fourth French ship began the action, opening fire soon after eleven. The vessels of the opposing fleets surged by under short canvas, (D), firing as opportunity offered, but necessarily much handicapped by smoke, which prevented the clear sight of an enemy, and caused anxiety lest an unseen friend might receive a broadside. "The distance between the _Formidable_, 90, (Palliser"s flagship) and the _Egmont_, 74, was so short," testified Captain John Laforey, whose three-decker, the _Ocean_, 90, was abreast and outside this interval, "that it was with difficulty I could keep betwixt them to engage, without firing upon them, and I was once very near on board the _Egmont_,"--next ahead of the _Ocean_. The _Formidable_ kept her mizzen topsail aback much of the time, to deaden her way, to make the needed room ahead for the _Ocean_, and also to allow the rear ships to close. "At a quarter past one," testified Captain Maitland of the _Elizabeth_, 74, "we were very close behind the _Formidable_, and a midshipman upon the p.o.o.p called out that there was a ship coming on board on the weatherbow. I put the helm up,... and found, when the smoke cleared away, I was shot up under the _Formidable"s_ lee. She was then engaged with the two last ships in the French fleet, and, as I could not fire at them without firing through the _Formidable_, I was obliged to shoot on."[47] Captain Bazely, of the _Formidable_, says of the same incident, "The _Formidable_ did at the time of action bear up to one of the enemy"s ships, to avoid being aboard of her, whose jib boom nearly touched the main topsail weather leech of the _Formidable_. I thought we could not avoid being on board."
Contrary to the usual result, the loss of the rear division, in killed and wounded, was heaviest, nearly equalling the aggregate of the two others.[48] This was due to the morning signal to chase to windward, which brought these ships closer than their leaders. As soon as the British van, ten ships, had pa.s.sed the French rear, its commander, Vice-Admiral Sir Robert Harland, antic.i.p.ating Keppel"s wishes, signalled it to go about and follow the enemy (Fig. 2, V). As the French column was running free, these ships, when about, fetched to windward of its wake. When the _Victory_ drew out of the fire, at 1 P.M., Keppel also made a similar signal, and attempted to wear (c), the injuries to his rigging not permitting tacking; but caution was needed in manoeuvring across the bows of the following ships, and it was not till 2 P.M., that the _Victory_ was about on the other tack (Fig. 2, C), heading after the French. At this time, 2 P.M., just before or just after wearing, the signal for battle was hauled down, and that for the line of battle was hoisted. The object of the latter was to re-form the order, and the first was discontinued, partly because no longer needed, chiefly that it might not seem to contradict the urgent call for a re-formation.
At this time six or seven of Harland"s division were on the weather bow of the _Victory_, to windward (westward), but a little ahead, and standing like her after the French; all on the port tack (Fig. 2).
None of the centre division succeeded in joining the flagship at once.
At 2.30 Palliser"s ship, the _Formidable_ (R), on the starboard tack, pa.s.sed the _Victory_ to leeward, apparently the last of the fleet out of action. A half-hour after this the _Victory_ had been joined by three of the centre, which were following her in close order, the van remaining in the same relative position. Astern of these two groups from van and centre were a number of other ships in various degrees of confusion,--some going about, some trying to come up, others completely disabled. Especially, there was in the south-south-east, therefore well to leeward, a cl.u.s.ter of four or five British vessels, evidently temporarily incapable of manoeuvring.
This was the situation which met the eye of the French admiral, scanning the field as the smoke drove away. The disorder of the British, which originated in the general chase, had increased through the hurry of the manoeuvres succeeding the squall, and culminated in the conditions just described. It was an inevitable result of a military exigency confronted by a fleet only recently equipped. The French, starting from a better formation, had come out in better shape. But, after all, it seems difficult wholly to remedy the disadvantage of a policy essentially defensive; and d"Orvilliers"
next order, though well conceived, was resultless. At 1 P.M.[49] he signalled his fleet to wear in succession, and form the line of battle on the starboard tack (Fig. 2, F). This signal was not seen by the leading ship, which should have begun the movement. The junior French admiral, in the fourth ship from the van, at length went about, and spoke the flagship, to know what was the Commander-in-Chief"s desire.
D"Orvilliers explained that he wished to pa.s.s along the enemy"s fleet from end to end, to _leeward_, because in its disordered state there was a fair promise of advantage, and by going to leeward--presenting his weather side to the enemy--he could use the weather lower-deck guns, whereas, in the then state of the sea, the lee lower ports could not be opened. Thus explained, the movement was executed, but the favourable moment had pa.s.sed. It was not till 2.30 that the manoeuvre was evident to the British.
[Ill.u.s.tration]
As soon as Keppel recognised his opponent"s intention, he wore the _Victory_ again, (d), a few minutes after 3 P.M., and stood slowly down, on the starboard tack _off the wind_, towards his crippled ships in the south-south-east, keeping aloft the signal for the line of battle, which commanded every manageable ship to get to her station (Fig. 3, C). As this deliberate movement was away from the enemy, (F), Palliser tried afterwards to fix upon it the stigma of flight,--a preposterous extravagancy. Harland put his division about at once and joined the Admiral. On this tack his station was ahead of the _Victory_, but in consequence of a message from Keppel he fell in behind her, to cover the rear until Palliser"s division could repair damage and take their places. At 4 P.M. Harland"s division was in the line. Palliser"s ships, as they completed refitting, ranged themselves before or behind his flagship; their captains considering, as they testified, that they took station from their divisional commander, and not from the ship of the Commander-in-Chief. There was formed thus, on the weather quarter of the _Victory_, and a mile or two distant, a separate line of ships, const.i.tuting on this tack the proper rear of the fleet, and dependent for initiative on Palliser"s flagship (Fig.
3, R). At 5 P.M. Keppel sent word by a frigate to Palliser to hasten into the line, as he was only waiting for him to renew the action, the French now having completed their manoeuvre. They had not attacked, as they might have done, but had drawn up under the lee of the British, their van abreast the latter"s centre. At the same time Harland was directed to move to his proper position in the van, which he at once did (Fig. 3, V). Palliser made no movement, and Keppel with extraordinary--if not culpable--forbearance refrained from summoning the rear ships into line by their individual pennants. This he at last did about 7 P.M., signalling specifically to each of the vessels then grouped with Palliser, (except his own flagship), to leave the latter and take their posts in the line. This was accordingly done, but it was thought then to be too late to renew the action. At daylight the next morning, only three French ships were in sight from the decks; but the main body could be seen in the south-east from some of the mastheads, and was thought to be from fifteen to twenty miles distant.
Though absolutely indecisive, this was a pretty smart skirmish; the British loss being 133 killed and 373 wounded, that of the French 161 killed and 513 wounded. The general result would appear to indicate that the French, in accordance with their usual policy, had fired to cripple their enemy"s spars and rigging, the motive-power. This would be consistent with d"Orvilliers" avowed purpose of avoiding action except under favourable circ.u.mstances. As the smoke thickened and confusion increased, the fleets had got closer together, and, whatever the intention, many shot found their way to the British hulls.
Nevertheless, as the returns show, the number of men hit among the French was to the British nearly as 7 to 5. On the other hand, it is certain that the manoeuvring power of the French after the action was greater than that of the British.
Both sides claimed the advantage. This was simply a point of honour, or of credit, for material advantage accrued to neither. Keppel had succeeded in forcing d"Orvilliers to action against his will; d"Orvilliers, by a well-judged evolution, had retained a superiority of manoeuvring power after the engagement. Had his next signal been promptly obeyed, he might have pa.s.sed again by the British fleet, in fairly good order, before it re-formed, and concentrated his fire on the more leewardly of its vessels. Even under the delay, it was distinctly in his power to renew the fight; and that he did not do so forfeits all claim to victory. Not to speak of the better condition of the French ships, Keppel, by running off the wind, had given his opponent full opportunity to reach his fleet and to attack. Instead of so doing, d"Orvilliers drew up under the British lee, out of range, and offered battle; a gallant defiance, but to a crippled foe.
Time was thus given to the British to refit their ships sufficiently to bear down again. This the French admiral should not have permitted.
He should have attacked promptly, or else have retreated; to windward, or to leeward, as seemed most expedient. Under the conditions, it was not good generalship to give the enemy time, and to await his pleasure. Keppel, on the other hand, being granted this chance, should have renewed the fight; and here arose the controversy which set all England by the ears, and may be said to have immortalised this otherwise trivial incident. Palliser"s division was to windward from 4 to 7 P.M., while the signals were flying to form line of battle, and to bear down in the Admiral"s wake; and Keppel alleged that, had these been obeyed by 6 P.M., he would have renewed the battle, having still over two hours of daylight. It has been stated already that, besides the signals, a frigate brought Palliser word that the Admiral was waiting only for him.