[Footnote 12: P. 93.]
[Footnote 13: _Traume_, p. 76.]
[Footnote 14: Hegel accepts the clairvoyance of the Pucelle.]
[Footnote 15: See Dr. Dessoir, in _Das Doppel Ich,_ as quoted by Mr.
Myers, _Proceedings_, vol. vi. 213.]
[Footnote 16: _Philosophie des Geistes, Werke,_ vol. vii. 179. Berlin.
1845. The examples and much of the philosophising are in the _Zusatze_, not translated in Mr. Wallace"s version, Oxford, 1894.]
[Footnote 17: _Proceedings_, S.P.R., vol. ii. pp. 201-207, 390-392.]
[Footnote 18: _Elements of Hypnotism_, p. 67.]
[Footnote 19: Possibly Mr. Vincent only means that Elliotson"s experiments, "little more than sober footing" (p. 57), with the sisters Okey, were rubbish. But whether the sisters Okey were or were not honest is a question on which we cannot enter here.]
III
ANTHROPOLOGY AND RELIGION
Among the various forms of science which are reaching and affecting the new popular tradition, we have reckoned Anthropology. Pleasantly enough, Anthropology has herself but recently emerged from that limbo of the unrecognised in which Psychical Research is pining. The British a.s.sociation used to reject anthropological papers as "vain dreams based on travellers" tales." No doubt the British a.s.sociation would reject a paper on clairvoyance as a vain dream based on old wives" fables, or on hysterical imposture. Undeniably the study of such themes is hampered by fable and fraud, just as anthropology has to be ceaselessly on its guard against "travellers" tales," against European misunderstandings of savage ideas, and against civilised notions and scientific theories unconsciously read into barbaric customs, rites, traditions, and usages. Man, _ondoyant et divers_, is the subject alike of anthropology and of psychical research. Man (especially savage man) cannot be secluded from disturbing influences, and watched, like the materials of a chemical experiment in a laboratory. Nor can man be caught in a "primitive" state: his intellectual beginnings lie very far behind the stage of culture in which we find the lowest known races. Consequently the matter on which anthropology works is fluctuating; the evidence on which it rests needs the most sceptical criticism, and many of its conclusions, in the necessary absence of historical testimony as to times far behind the lowest known savages, must be hypothetical.
For these sound reasons official science long looked askance on Anthropology. Her followers were not regarded as genuine scholars, and, perhaps as a result of this contempt, they were often "broken men,"
intellectual outlaws, people of one wild idea. To the scientific mind, anthropologists or ethnologists were a horde who darkly muttered of serpent worship, phallus worship, Arkite doctrines, and the Ten Lost Tribes that kept turning up in the most unexpected places. Anthropologists were said to gloat over dirty rites of dirty savages, and to seek reason where there was none. The exiled, the outcast, the pariah of Science, is, indeed, apt to find himself in odd company. Round the camp-fire of Psychical Research too, in the unofficial, unstaked waste of Science, hover odd, menacing figures of Esoteric Buddhists, _Satanistes_, Occultists, Christian Scientists, Spiritualists, and Astrologers, as the Arkites and Lost Tribesmen haunted the cradle of anthropology.
But there was found at last to be reason in the thing, and method in the madness. Evolution was in it. The acceptance, after long ridicule, of palaeolithic weapons as relics of human culture, probably helped to bring Anthropology within the sacred circle of permitted knowledge. Her topic was full of ill.u.s.trations of the doctrine of Mr. Darwin. Modern writers on the theme had been antic.i.p.ated by the less systematic students of the eighteenth century--Goguet, de Brosses, Millar, Fontenelle, Lafitau, Boulanger, or even Hume and Voltaire. As pioneers these writers answer to the early mesmerists and magnetists, Puysegur, Amoretti, Ritter, Elliotson, Mayo, Gregory, in the history of Psychical Research. They were on the same track, in each case, as Lubbock, Tylor, Spencer, Bastian, and Frazer, or as Gurney, Richet, Myers, Janet, Dessoir, and Von Schrenck-Notzing. But the earlier students were less careful of method and evidence.
Evidence! that was the stumbling block of anthropology. We still hear, in the later works of Mr. Max Muller, the echo of the old complaints.
Anything you please, Mr. Max Muller says, you may find among your useful savages, and (in regard to some anthropologists) his criticism is just.
You have but to skim a few books of travel, pencil in hand, and pick out what suits your case. Suppose, as regards our present theme, your theory is that savages possess broken lights of the belief in a Supreme Being.
You can find evidence for that. Or suppose you want to show that they have no religious ideas at all; you can find evidence for that also. Your testimony is often derived from observers ignorant of the language of the people whom they talk about, or who are themselves prejudiced by one or other theory or bias. How can you pretend to raise a science on such foundations, especially as the savage informants wish to please or to mystify inquirers, or they answer at random, or deliberately conceal their most sacred inst.i.tutions, or have never paid any attention to the subject?
To all these perfectly natural objections Mr. Tylor has replied.[1]
Evidence must be collected, sifted, tested, as in any other branch of inquiry. A writer, "of course, is bound to use his best judgment as to the trustworthiness of all authors he quotes, and, if possible, to obtain several accounts to certify each point in each locality." Mr. Tylor then adduces "the test of recurrence," of undesigned coincidence in testimony, as Millar had already argued in the last century.[2] If a mediaeval Mahommedan in Tartary, a Jesuit in Brazil, a Wesleyan in Fiji, one may add a police magistrate in Australia, a Presbyterian in Central Africa, a trapper in Canada, agree in describing some a.n.a.logous rite or myth in these diverse lands and ages, we cannot set down the coincidence to chance or fraud. "Now, the most important facts of ethnography are vouched for in this way."
We may add that even when the ideas of savages are obscure, we can often detect them by a.n.a.lysis of the inst.i.tutions in which they are expressed.[3]
Thus anthropological, like psychical or any other evidence, must be submitted to conscientious processes of testing and sifting. Contradictory instances must be hunted for sedulously. Nothing can be less scientific than to s.n.a.t.c.h up any traveller"s tale which makes for our theory, and to ignore evidence, perhaps earlier, or later, or better observed, which makes against it. Yet this, unfortunately, in certain instances (which will be adduced) has been the occasional error of Mr. Huxley and Mr.
Spencer.[4] Mr. Spencer opens his "Ecclesiastical Inst.i.tutions" by the remark that "the implication [from the reported absence of the ideas of belief in persons born deaf and dumb] is that the religious ideas of civilised men are not innate" (who says they are?), and this implication Mr. Spencer supports by "proofs that among various savages religious ideas do not exist." "Sir John Lubbock has given many of these." But it would be well to advise the reader to consult Roskoff"s confutation of Sir John Lubbock, and Mr. Tylor"s masterly statement.[5] Mr. Spencer cited Sir Samuel Baker for savages without even "a ray of superst.i.tion" or a trace of worship. Mr. Tylor, twelve years before Mr. Spencer wrote, had demolished Sir Samuel Baker"s a.s.sertion,[6] as regards many tribes, and so shaken it as regards the Latukas, quoted by Mr. Spencer. The G.o.dless d.i.n.kas have "a good deity and heaven-dwelling creator," carefully recorded years before Sir Samuel"s "rash denial." We show later that Mr. Spencer, relying on a single isolated sentence in Brough Smyth, omits all his essential information about the Australian Supreme Being; while Mr.
Huxley--overlooking the copious and conclusive evidence as to their ethical religion--charges the Australians with having merely a non-moral belief in casual spirits. We have also to show that Mr. Huxley, under the dominance of his theory, and inadvertently, quotes a good authority as saying the precise reverse of what he really does say.
If the facts not fitting their theories are little observed by authorities so popular as Mr. Huxley and Mr. Spencer; if _instantiae contradictoriae_ are ignored by them, or left vague; if these things are done in the green tree, we may easily imagine what shall be done in the dry. But we need not war with hasty _vulgarisateurs_ and headlong theorists.
Enough has been said to show the position of anthropology as regards evidence, and to prove that, if he confines his observations to certain anthropologists, the censures of Mr. Max Muller are justified. It is mainly for this reason that the arguments presently to follow are strung on the thread of Mr. Tylor"s truly learned and accurate book, "Primitive Culture."
Though but recently crept forth, _vix aut ne vix quidem_, from the chill shade of scientific disdain, Anthropology adopts the airs of her elder sisters among the sciences, and is as severe as they to the Cinderella of the family, Psychical Research. She must murmur of her fairies among the cinders of the hearth, while they go forth to the ball, and dance with provincial mayors at the festivities of the British a.s.sociation. This is ungenerous, and unfortunate, as the records of anthropology are rich in unexamined materials of psychical research. I am unacquainted with any work devoted by an anthropologist of renown to the hypnotic and kindred practices of the lower races, except Herr Bastian"s very meagre tract, "uber psychische Beobachtungen bei Naturvolkern."[7] We possess, none the less, a ma.s.s of scattered information on this topic, the savage side of psychical phenomena, in works of travel, and in Mr. Tylor"s monumental "Primitive Culture." Mr. Tylor, however, as we shall see, regards it as a matter of indifference, or, at least, as a matter beyond the scope of his essay, to decide whether the parallel supernormal phenomena believed in by savages, and said to recur in civilisation, are facts of actual experience, or not.
Now, this question is not otiose. Mr. Tylor, like other anthropologists, Mr. Huxley, Mr. Herbert Spencer, and their followers and popularisers, constructs on anthropological grounds, a theory of the Origin of Religion.
That origin anthropology explains as the result of early and fallacious reasonings on a number of biological and psychological phenomena, both normal and (as is alleged by savages) supernormal. These reasonings led to the belief in souls and spirits. Now, first, anthropology has taken for granted that the Supreme Deities of savages are envisaged by them as "spirits." This, paradoxical as the statement may appear, is just what does not seem to be proved, as we shall show. Next, if the supernormal phenomena (clairvoyance, thought-transference, phantasms of the dead, phantasms of the dying, and others) be real matters of experience, the inferences drawn from them by early savage philosophy may be, in some degree, erroneous. But the inferences drawn by materialists who reject the supernormal phenomena will also, perhaps, be, let us say, incomplete.
Religion will have been, in part, developed out of facts, perhaps inconsistent with materialism in its present dogmatic form. To put it less trenchantly, and perhaps more accurately, the alleged facts "are not merely dramatically strange, they are not merely extraordinary and striking, but they are "odd" in the sense that they will not easily fit in with the views which physicists and men of science generally give us of the universe in which we live" (Mr. A.J. Balfour, President"s Address, "Proceedings," S.P.R. vol. x. p. 8, 1894).
As this is the case, it might seem to be the business of Anthropology, the Science of Man, to examine, among other things, the evidence for the actual existence of those alleged unusual and supernormal phenomena, belief in which is given as one of the origins of religion.
To make this examination, in the ethnographic field, is almost a new labour. As we shall see, anthropologists have not hitherto investigated such things as the "Fire-walk" of savages, uninjured in the flames, like the Three Holy Children. The world-wide savage practice of divining by hallucinations induced through gazing into a smooth deep (crystal-gazing) has been studied, I think, by no anthropologist. The veracity of "messages" uttered by savage seers when (as they suppose) "possessed" or "inspired" has not been criticised, and probably cannot be, for lack of detailed information. The "physical phenomena" which answer among savages to the use of the "divining rod," and to "spiritist" marvels in modern times, have only been glanced at. In short, all the savage parallels to the so-called "psychical phenomena" now under discussion in England, America, Germany, Italy, and France, have escaped critical a.n.a.lysis and comparison with their civilised counterparts.
An exception among anthropologists is Mr. Tylor. He has not suppressed the existence of these barbaric parallels to our modern problems of this kind.
But his interest in them practically ends when he has shown that the phenomena helped to originate the savage belief in "spirits," and when he has displayed the "survival" of that belief in later culture. He does not ask "Are the phenomena real?" he is concerned only with the savage philosophy of the phenomena and with its relics in modern spiritism and religion. My purpose is to do, by way only of _ebauche_, what neither anthropology nor psychical research nor psychology has done: to put the savage and modern phenomena side by side. Such evidence as we can give for the actuality of the modern experiences will, so far as it goes, raise a presumption that the savage beliefs, however erroneous, however darkened by fraud and fancy, repose on a basis of real observation of actual phenomena.
Anthropology is concerned with man and what is in man--_humani nihil a se alienum putat_. These researches, therefore, are within the anthropological province, especially as they bear on the prevalent anthropological theory of the Origin of Religion. By "religion" we mean, for the purpose of this argument, the belief in the existence of an Intelligence, or Intelligences not human, and not dependent on a material mechanism of brain and nerves, which may, or may not, powerfully control men"s fortunes and the nature of things. We also mean the additional belief that there is, in man, an element so far kindred to these Intelligences that it can transcend the knowledge obtained through the known bodily senses, and may possibly survive the death of the body. These two beliefs at present (though not necessarily in their origin) appear chiefly as the faith in G.o.d and in the Immortality of the Soul.
It is important, then, to trace, if possible, the origin of these two beliefs. If they arose in actual communion with Deity (as the first at least did, in the theory of the Hebrew Scriptures), or if they could be proved to arise in an una.n.a.lysable _sensus numinis_, or even in "a perception of the Infinite" (Max Muller), religion would have a divine, or at least a necessary source. To the Theist, what is inevitable cannot but be divinely ordained, therefore religion is divinely preordained, therefore, in essentials, though not in accidental details, religion is true. The atheist, or non-theist, of course draws no such inferences.
But if religion, as now understood among men, be the latest evolutionary form of a series of mistakes, fallacies, and illusions, if its germ be a blunder, and its present form only the result of progressive but unessential refinements on that blunder, the inference that religion is untrue--that nothing actual corresponds to its hypothesis--is very easily drawn. The inference is not, perhaps, logical, for all our science itself is the result of progressive refinements upon hypotheses originally erroneous, fashioned to explain facts misconceived. Yet our science is true, within its limits, though very far from being exhaustive of the truth. In the same way, it might be argued, our religion, even granting that it arose out of primitive fallacies and false hypotheses, may yet have been refined, as science has been, through a mult.i.tude of causes, into an approximate truth.
Frequently as I am compelled to differ from Mr. Spencer both as to facts and their interpretation, I am happy to find that he has antic.i.p.ated me here. Opponents will urge, he says, that "if the primitive belief" (in ghosts) "was absolutely false, all derived beliefs from it must be absolutely false?" Mr. Spencer replies: "A germ of truth was contained in the primitive conception--the truth, namely, that the power which manifests itself in consciousness is but a differently conditioned form of the power which manifests itself beyond consciousness." In fact, we find Mr. Spencer, like Faust as described by Marguerite, saying much the same thing as the priests, but not quite in the same way. Of course, I allow for a much larger "germ of truth" in the origin of the ghost theory than Mr. Spencer does. But we can both say "the ultimate form of the religious consciousness is" (will be?) "the final development of a consciousness which at the outset contained a germ of truth obscured by mult.i.tudinous errors."[8]
"One G.o.d, one law, one element, And one far-off divine event, To which the whole creation moves."
Coming at last to Mr. Tylor, we find that he begins by dismissing the idea that any known race of men is devoid of religious conceptions. He disproves, out of their own mouths, the allegations of several writers who have made this exploded a.s.sertion about "G.o.dless tribes." He says: "The thoughts and principles of modern Christianity are attached to intellectual clues which run back through far pre-Christian ages to the very origin of human civilisation, _perhaps even of human existence_."[9]
So far we abound in Mr. Tylor"s sense. "As a minimum definition of religion" he gives "the belief in spiritual beings," which appears "among all low races with whom we have attained to thoroughly intimate relations." The existence of this belief at present does not prove that no races were ever, at any time, dest.i.tute of all belief. But it prevents us from positing the existence of such creedless races, in any age, as a demonstrated fact. We have thus, in short, no opportunity of observing, _historically_, man"s development from blank unbelief into even the minimum or most rudimentary form of belief. We can only theorise and make more or less plausible conjectures as to the first rudiments of human faith in G.o.d and in spiritual beings. We find no race whose mind, as to faith, is a _tabula rasa_.
To the earliest faith Mr. Tylor gives the name of _Animism_, a term not wholly free from objection, though "Spiritualism" is still less desirable, having been usurped by a form of modern superst.i.tiousness. This Animism, "in its full development, includes the belief in souls and in a future state, in controlling deities and subordinate spirits." In Mr. Tylor"s opinion, as in Mr. Huxley"s, Animism, in its lower (and earlier) forms, has scarcely any connection with ethics. Its "spirits" do not "make for righteousness." This is a side issue to be examined later, but we may provisionally observe, in pa.s.sing, that the ethical ideas, such as they are, even of Australian blacks are reported to be inculcated at the religious mysteries (_Bora_) of the tribes, which were inst.i.tuted by and are performed in honour of the G.o.ds of their native belief. But this topic must be reserved for our closing chapters.
Mr. Tylor, however, is chiefly concerned with Animism as "an ancient and world-wide philosophy, of which belief is the theory, and worship is the practice." Given Animism, then, or the belief in spiritual beings, as the earliest form and minimum of religious faith, what is the origin of Animism? It will be seen that, by Animism, Mr. Tylor does not mean the alleged early theory, implicitly if not explicitly and consciously held, that all things whatsoever are animated and are personalities.[10] Judging from the behaviour of little children, and from the myths of savages, early man may have half-consciously extended his own sense of personal and potent and animated existence to the whole of nature as known to him. Not only animals, but vegetables and inorganic objects, may have been looked on by him as persons, like what he felt himself to be. The child (perhaps merely because _taught_ to do so) beats the naughty chair, and all objects are persons in early mythology. But this _feeling_, rather than theory, may conceivably have existed among early men, before they developed the hypothesis of "spirits," "ghosts," or souls. It is the origin of _that_ hypothesis, "Animism," which Mr. Tylor investigates.
What, then, is the origin of Animism? It arose in the earliest traceable speculations on "two groups of biological problems:
(1) "What is it that makes the difference between a living body and a dead one; what causes waking, sleep, trance, disease, and death?"
(2) "What are those human shapes which appear in dreams and visions?"[11]
Here it should be noted that Mr. Tylor most properly takes a distinction between sleeping "dreams" and waking "visions," or "clear vision." The distinction is made even by the blacks of Australia. Thus one of the Kurnai announced that his _Yambo_, or soul, could "go out" during sleep, and see the distant and the dead. But "while any one might be able to communicate with the ghosts, _during sleep_, it was only the wizards who were able to do so in waking hours." A wizard, in fact, is a person susceptible (or feigning to be susceptible) when awake to hallucinatory perceptions of phantasms of the dead. "Among the Kulin of Wimmera River a man became a wizard who, as a boy, had seen his mother"s ghost sitting at her grave."[12] These facts prove that a race of savages at the bottom of the scale of culture do take a formal distinction between normal dreams in sleep and waking hallucinations--a thing apt to be denied.
Thus Mr. Herbert Spencer offers the ma.s.sive generalisation that savages do not possess a language enabling a man to say "I dreamed that I saw,"
instead of "I saw" ("Principles of Sociology," p. 150). This could only be proved by giving examples of such highly deficient languages, which Mr.
Spencer does not do.[13] In many savage speculations there occur ideas as subtly metaphysical as those of Hegel. Moreover, even the Australian languages have the verb "to see," and the substantive "sleep." Nothing, then, prevents a man from saying "I saw in sleep" (_insomnium_, [Greek: enupnion]).
We have shown too, that the Australians take an essential distinction between waking hallucinations (ghosts seen by a man when awake) and the common hallucinations of slumber. Anybody can have these; the man who sees ghosts when awake is marked out for a wizard.
At the same time the vividness of dreams among certain savages, as recorded in Mr. Im Thurn"s "Indians of Guiana," and the consequent confusion of dreaming and waking experiences, are certain facts. Wilson says the same of some negroes, and Mr. Spencer ill.u.s.trates from the confusion of mind in dreamy children. They, we know, are much more addicted to somnambulism than grown-up people. I am unaware that spontaneous somnambulism among savages has been studied as it ought to be.
I have demonstrated, however, that very low savages can and do draw an essential distinction between sleeping and waking hallucinations.
Again, the crystal-gazer, whose apparently telepathic crystal pictures are discussed later (chap. v.), was introduced to a crystal just because she had previously been known to be susceptible to waking and occasionally veracious hallucinations.