It was not only on the dreams of sleep, so easily forgotten as they are, that the savage pondered, in his early speculations about the life and the soul. He included in his materials the much more striking and memorable experiences of waking hours, as we and Mr. Tylor agree in holding.
Reflecting on these things, the earliest savage reasoners would decide: (1) that man has a "life" (which leaves him temporarily in sleep, finally in death); (2) that man also possesses a "phantom" (which appears to other people in their visions and dreams). The savage philosopher would then "combine his information," like a celebrated writer on Chinese metaphysics. He would merely "combine the life and the phantom," as "manifestations of one and the same soul." The result would be "an apparitional soul," or "ghost-soul."
This ghost-soul would be a highly accomplished creature, "a vapour, film, or shadow," yet conscious, capable of leaving the body, mostly invisible and impalpable, "yet also manifesting physical power," existing and appearing after the death of the body, able to act on the bodies of other men, beasts, and things.[14]
When the earliest reasoners, in an age and in mental conditions of which we know nothing historically, had evolved the hypothesis of this conscious, powerful, separable soul, capable of surviving the death of the body, it was not difficult for them to develop the rest of Religion, as Mr. Tylor thinks. A powerful ghost of a dead man might thrive till, its original owner being long forgotten, it became a G.o.d. Again (souls once given) it would not be a very difficult logical leap, perhaps, to conceive of souls, or spirits, that had never been human at all. It is, we may say, only _le premier pas qui coute_, the step to the belief in a surviving separable soul. Nevertheless, when we remember that Mr. Tylor is theorising about savages in the dim background of human evolution, savages whom we know nothing of by experience, savages far behind Australians and Bushmen (who possess G.o.ds), we must admit that he credits them with great ingenuity, and strong powers of abstract reasoning. He may be right in his opinion. In the same way, just as primitive men were keen reasoners, so early bees, more clever than modern bees, may have evolved the system of hexagonal cells, and only an early fish of genius could first have hit on the plan, now hereditary of killing a fly by blowing water at it.
To this theory of metaphysical genius in very low savages I have no objection to offer. We shall find, later, astonishing examples of savage abstract speculation, certainly not derived from missionary sources, because wholly out of the missionary"s line of duty and reflection.
As early beasts had genius, so the earliest reasoners appear to have been as logically gifted as the lowest savages now known to us, or even as some Biblical critics. By Mr. Tylor"s hypothesis, they first conceived the extremely abstract idea of Life, "that which makes the difference between a living body and a dead one."[15] This highly abstract conception must have been, however, the more difficult to early man, as, to him, all things, universally, are "animated."[16] Mr. Tylor ill.u.s.trates this theory of early man by the little child"s idea that "chairs, sticks, and wooden horses are actuated by the same sort of personal will as nurses and children and kittens.... In such matters the savage mind well represents the childish stage."[17]
Now, nothing can be more certain than that, if children think sticks are animated, they don"t think so because they have heard, or discovered, that they possess souls, and then transfer souls to sticks. We may doubt, then, if primitive man came, in this way, by reasoning on souls, to suppose that all things, universally, were animated. But if he did think all things animated--a corpse, to his mind, was just as much animated as anything else. Did he reason: "All things are animated. A corpse is not animated. Therefore a corpse is not a thing (within the meaning of my General Law)"?
How, again, did early man conceive of Life, before he identified Life (1) with "that which makes the difference between a living body and a dead one" (a difference which, _ex hypothesi_, he did not draw, _all_ things being animated to his mind) and (2) with "those human shapes which appear in dreams and visions"? "The ancient savage philosophers probably reached the obvious inference that every man had two things belonging to him, a life and a phantom." But everything was supposed to have "a life," as far as one makes out, before the idea of separable soul was developed, at least if savages arrived at the theory of universal animation as children are said to do.
We are dealing here quite conjecturally with facts beyond our experience.
In any case, early man excogitated (by the hypothesis) the abstract idea of Life, _before_ he first "envisaged" it in material terms as "breath,"
or "shadow." He next decided that mere breath or shadow was not only identical with the more abstract conception of Life, but could also take on forms as real and full-bodied as, to him, are the hallucinations of dream or waking vision. His reasoning appears to have proceeded from the more abstract (the idea of Life) to the more concrete, to the life first shadowy and vaporous, then clothed in the very aspect of the real man.
Mr. Tylor has thus (whether we follow his logic or not) provided man with a theory of active, intelligent, separable souls, which can survive the death of the body. At this theory early man arrived by speculations on the nature of life, and on the causes of phantasms of the dead or living beheld in "dreams and visions." But our author by no means leaves out of sight the effects of alleged supernormal phenomena believed in by savages, with their parallels in modern civilisation. These supernormal phenomena, whether real or illusory, are, he conceives, facts in that ma.s.s of experiences from which savages constructed their belief in separable, enduring, intelligent souls or ghosts, the foundation of religion.
While we are, perhaps owing to our own want of capacity, puzzled by what seem to be two kinds of early philosophy--(1) a sort of instinctive or unreasoned belief in universal animation, which Mr. Spencer calls "Animism" and does not believe in, (2) the reasoned belief in separable and surviving souls of men (and in things), which Mr. Spencer believes in, and Mr. Tylor calls "Animism"--we must also note another difficulty. Mr.
Tylor may seem to be taking it for granted that the earliest, remote, unknown thinkers on life and the soul were existing on the same psychical plane as we ourselves, or, at least, as modern savages. Between modern savages and ourselves, in this regard, he takes certain differences, but takes none between modern savages and the remote founders of religion.
Thus Mr. Tylor observes:
"The condition of the modern ghost-seer, whose imagination pa.s.ses on such slight excitement into positive hallucination, is rather the rule than the exception among uncultured and intensely imaginative tribes, whose minds may be thrown off their balance by a touch, a word, a gesture, an unaccustomed noise."[18]
I find evidence that low contemporary savages are _not_ great ghost-seers, and, again, I cannot quite accept Mr. Tylor"s psychology of the "modern ghost-seer." Most such favoured persons whom I have known were steady, unimaginative, unexcitable people, with just one odd experience. Lord Tennyson, too, after sleeping in the bed of his recently lost father on purpose to see his ghost, decided that ghosts "are not seen by imaginative people."
We now examine, at greater length, the psychical conditions in which, according to Mr. Tylor, contemporary savages differ from civilised men.
Later we shall ask what may be said as to possible or presumable psychical differences between modern savages and the datelessly distant founders of the belief in souls. Mr. Tylor attributes to the lower races, and even to races high above their level, "morbid ecstasy, brought on by meditation, fasting, narcotics, excitement, or disease." Now, we may still "meditate"--and how far the result is "morbid" is a matter for psychologists and pathologists to determine. Fasting we do not practise voluntarily, nor would we easily accept evidence from an Englishman as to the veracity of voluntary fasting visions, like those of Cotton Mather.
The visions of disease we should set aside, as a rule, with those of "excitement," produced, for instance, by "devil-dances." Narcotic and alcoholic visions are not in question.[19] For our purpose the _induced_ trances of savages (in whatever way voluntarily brought on) are a.n.a.logous to the modern induced hypnotic trance. Any supernormal acquisitions of knowledge in these induced conditions, among savages, would be on a par with similar alleged experiences of persons under hypnotism.
We do not differ from known savages in being able to bring on non-normal psychological conditions, but we produce these, as a rule, by other methods than theirs, and such experiments are not made on _all_ of us, as they were on all Red Indian boys and girls in the "medicine-fast," at the age of p.u.b.erty.
Further, in their normal state, known savages, or some of them, are more "suggestible" than educated Europeans at least.[20] They can be more easily hallucinated in their normal waking state by suggestion. Once more, their intervals of hunger, followed by gorges of food, and their lack of artificial light, combine to make savages more apt to see what is not there than are comfortable educated white men. But Mr. Tylor goes too far when he says "where the savage could see phantasms, the civilised man has come to amuse himself with fancies."[21] The civilised man, beyond all doubt, is capable of being _enfantosme_.
In all that he says on this point, the point of psychical condition, Mr.
Tylor is writing about known savages as they differ from ourselves. But the savages who _ex hypothesi_ evolved the doctrine of souls lie beyond our ken, far behind the modern savages, among whom we find belief not only in souls and ghosts, but in moral G.o.ds. About the psychical condition of the savages who worked out the theory of souls and founded religion we necessarily know nothing. If there be such experiences as clairvoyance, telepathy, and so on, these unknown ancestors of ours may (for all that we can tell) have been peculiarly open to them, and therefore peculiarly apt to believe in separable souls. In fact, when we write about these far-off founders of religion, we guess in the dark, or by the flickering light of a.n.a.logy. The lower animals have faculties (as in their power of finding their way home through new unknown regions, and in the ants" modes of acquiring and communicating knowledge to each other) which are mysteries to us. The terror of dogs in "haunted houses" and of horses in pa.s.sing "haunted" scenes has often been reported, and is alluded to briefly by Mr.
Tylor. Balaam"s a.s.s, and the dogs which crouched and whined before Athene, whom Eumaeus could not see, are "cla.s.sical" instances.
The weakness of the anthropological argument here is, we must repeat, that we know little more about the mental condition and experiences of the early thinkers who developed the doctrine of Souls than we know about the mental condition and experiences of the lower animals. And the more firmly a philosopher believes in the Darwinian hypothesis, the less, he must admit, can he suppose himself to know about the twilight ages, between the lower animal and the fully evolved man. What kind of creature was man when he first conceived the germs, or received the light, of Religion? All is guess-work here! We may just allude to Hegel"s theory that clairvoyance and hypnotic phenomena are produced in a kind of temporary _atavism_, or "throwing hack" to a remotely ancient condition of the "sensitive soul" (_f.u.klende Seele_). The "sensitive"
[unconditioned, clairvoyant] faculty or "soul" is "a disease when it becomes a state of the self-conscious, educated, self-possessed human being of civilisation."[22] "Second sight," Hegel thinks, was a product of an earlier day and earlier mental condition than ours.
Approaching this almost untouched subject--the early psychical condition of man--not from the side of metaphysical speculations like Hegel, but with the instruments of modern psychology and physiology, Dr. Max Dessoir, of Berlin, following, indeed, M. Taine, has arrived, as we saw, at somewhat similar conclusions. "This fully conscious life of the spirit,"
in which we moderns now live, "seems to rest upon a substratum of reflex action of a hallucinatory type." Our actual modern condition is _not_ "fundamental," and "hallucination represents, at least in its nascent condition, the main trunk of our psychical existence."[23]
Now, suppose that the remote and unknown ancestors of ours who first developed the doctrine of souls had not yet spread far from "the main trunk of our psychical existence," far from constant hallucination. In that case (at least, according to Dr. Dessoir"s theory) their psychical experiences would be such as we cannot estimate, yet cannot leave, as a possibility influencing religion, out of our calculations.
If early men were ever in a condition in which telepathy and clairvoyance (granting their possibility) were prevalent, one might expect that faculties so useful would be developed in the struggle for existence. That they are deliberately cultivated by modern savages we know. The Indian foster-mother of John Tanner used, when food was needed, to suggest herself into an hypnotic condition, so that she became _clairvoyante_ as to the whereabouts of game. Tanner, an English boy, caught early by the Indians, was sceptical, but came to practise the same art, not unsuccessfully, himself.[24] His reminiscences, which he dictated on his return to civilisation, were certainly not feigned in the interests of any theories. But the most telepathic human stocks, it may be said, ought, _ceteris paribus_, to have been the most successful in the struggle for existence. We may infer that the _cetera_ were not _paria_, the clairvoyant state not being precisely the best for the practical business of life. But really we know nothing of the psychical state of the earliest men. They may have had experiences tending towards a belief in "spirits,"
of which we can tell nothing. We are obliged to guess, in considerable ignorance of the actual conditions, and this historical ignorance inevitably besets all anthropological speculation about the origin of religion.
The knowledge of our nescience as to the psychical condition of our first thinking ancestors may suggest hesitation as to taking it for granted that early man was on our own or on the modern savage level in "psychical"
experience. Even savage races, as Mr. Tylor justly says, attribute superior psychical knowledge to neighbouring tribes on a yet lower level of culture than themselves. The Finn esteems the Lapp sorcerers above his own; the Lapp yields to the superior pretensions of the Samoyeds. There may be more ways than one of explaining this relative humility: there is Hegel"s way and there is Mr. Tylor"s way. We cannot be certain, _a priori_, that the earliest man knew no more of supernormal or apparently supernormal experiences than we commonly do, or that these did not influence his thoughts on animism.
It is an example of the chameleon-like changes of science (even of "science falsely so called" if you please) that when he wrote his book, in 1871, Mr. Tylor could not possibly have antic.i.p.ated this line of argument.
"Psychical planes" had not been invented; hypnotism, with its problems, had not been much noticed in England. But "Spiritualism" was flourishing.
Mr. Tylor did not ignore this revival of savage philosophy. He saw very well that the end of the century was beholding the partial rehabilitation of beliefs which were scouted from 1660 to 1850. Seventy years ago, as Mr.
Tylor says, Dr. Macculloch, in his "Description of the Western Islands of Scotland," wrote of "the famous Highland second sight" that "ceasing to be believed it has ceased to exist."[25]
Dr. Macculloch was mistaken in his facts. "Second sight" has never ceased to exist (or to be believed to exist), and it has recently been investigated in the "Journal" of the Caledonian Medical Society. Mr. Tylor himself says that it has been "reinstated in a far larger range of society, and under far better circ.u.mstances of learning and prosperity."
This fact he ascribes generally to "a direct revival from the regions of savage philosophy and peasant folklore," a revival brought about in great part by the writings of Swedenborg. To-day things have altered. The students now interested in this whole cla.s.s of alleged supernormal phenomena are seldom believers in the philosophy of Spiritualism in the American sense of the word.[26]
Mr. Tylor, as we have seen, attributes the revival of interest in this obscure cla.s.s of subjects to the influence of Swedenborg. It is true, as has been shown, that Swedenborg attracted the attention of Kant. But modern interest has chiefly been aroused and kept alive by the phenomena of hypnotism. The interest is now, among educated students, really scientific.
Thus Mr. William James, Professor of Psychology in the University of Harvard, writes:
"I was attracted to this subject (Psychical Research) some years ago by my love of fair play in Science."[27]
Mr. Tylor is not incapable of appreciating this att.i.tude. Even the so-called "spirit manifestations," he says, "should be discussed on their merits," and the investigation "would seem apt to throw light on some most interesting psychological questions." Nothing can be more remote from the logic of Hume.
The ideas of Mr. Tylor on the causes of the origin of religion are now criticised, not from the point of view of spiritualism, but of experimental psychology. We hold that very probably there exist human faculties of unknown scope; that these conceivably were more powerful and prevalent among our very remote ancestors who founded religion; that they may still exist in savage as in civilised races, and that they may have confirmed, if they did not originate, the doctrine of separable souls. If they _do_ exist, the circ.u.mstance is important, in view of the fact that modern ideas rest on a denial of their existence.
Mr. Tylor next examines the savage and other _names_ for the ghost-soul, such as shadow (_umbra_), breath (_spiritus_), and he gives cases in which the _shadow_ of a man is regarded as equivalent to his _life_. Of course, the shadow in the sunlight does not resemble the phantasm in a dream. The two, however, were combined and identified by early thinkers, while _breath_ and _heart_ were used as symbols of "that in men which makes them live," a phrase found among the natives of Nicaragua in 1528.
The confessedly symbolical character of the phrase, "it is _not_ precisely the heart, but that in them which makes them live," proves that to the speaker life was _not_ "heart" or "breath," but that these terms were known to be material word-counters for the conception of life.[1]
Whether the earliest thinkers identified heart, breath, shadow, with life, or whether they consciously used words of material origin to denote an immaterial conception, of course we do not know. But the word in the latter case would react on the thought, till the Roman inhaled (as his life?) the last breath of his dying kinsman, he well knowing that the Manes of the said kinsman were elsewhere, and not to be inhaled.
Subdivisions and distinctions were then recognised, as of the Egyptian _Ka_, the "double," the Karen _kelah_, or "personal life-phantom"
(_wraith_), on one side, and the Karen _thah_, "the responsible moral soul," on the other. The Roman _umbra_ hovers about the grave, the _manes_ go to Orcus, the _spiritus_ seeks the stars.
We are next presented with a crowd of cases in which sickness or lethargy is ascribed by savages to the absence of the patient"s spirit, or of one of his spirits. This idea of migratory spirit is next used by savages to explain certain proceedings of the sorcerer, priest, or seer. His soul, or one of his souls is thought to go forth to distant places in quest of information, while the seer, perhaps, remains lethargic. Probably, in the struggle for existence, he lost more by being lethargic than he gained by being clairvoyant!
Now, here we touch the first point in Mr. Tylor"s theory, where a critic may ask, Was this belief in the wandering abroad of the seer"s spirit a theory not only false in its form (as probably it is), but also wholly unbased on experiences which might raise a presumption in favour of the existence of phenomena really supernormal? By "supernormal" experiences I here mean such as the acquisition by a human mind of knowledge which could not be obtained by it through the recognised channels of sensation. Say, for the sake of argument, that a person, savage or civilised, obtains in trance information about distant places or events, to him unknown, and, through channels of sense, unknowable. The savage will explain this by saying that the seer"s soul, shadow, or spirit, wandered out of the body to the distant scene. This is, at present, an unverified theory. But still, for the sake of argument, suppose that the seer did honestly obtain this information in trance, lethargy, or hypnotic sleep, or any other condition. If so, the modern savage (or his more gifted ancestors) would have other grounds for his theory of the wandering soul than any ground presented by normal occurrences, ordinary dreams, shadows, and so forth. Again, in human nature there would be (if such things occur) a potentiality of experiences other and stranger than materialism will admit as possible. It will (granting the facts) be impossible to aver that there is _nihil in intellectu quod non prius in sensu_. The soul will be not _ce qu"un vain peuple pense_ under the new popular tradition, and the savage"s theory of the spirit will be, at least in part, based on other than normal and every-day facts. That condition in which the seer acquires information, not otherwise accessible, about events remote in s.p.a.ce, is what the mesmerists of the mid-century called "travelling clairvoyance."
If such an experience be _in rerum natura_, it will not, of course, justify the savage"s theory that the soul is a separable ent.i.ty, capable of voyaging, and also capable of existing after the death of the body. But it will give the savage a better excuse for his theory than normal experiences provide; and will even raise a presumption that reflection on mere ordinary experiences--death, shadow, trance--is not the sole origin of his theory. For a savage so acute as Mr. Tylor"s hypothetical early reasoner might decline to believe that his own or a friend"s soul had been absent on an expedition, unless it brought back information not normally to be acquired. However, we cannot reason, _a priori_, as to how far the logic of a savage might or might not go on occasion.
In any case, a scientific reasoner might be expected to ask: "Is this alleged acquisition of knowledge, _not_ through the ordinary channels of sense, a thing _in rerum natura_?" Because, if it is, we must obviously increase our list of the savage"s reasons for believing in a soul: we must make his reasons include "psychical" experiences, and there must be an X region to investigate.
These considerations did not fail to present themselves to Mr. Tylor. But his manner of dealing with them is peculiar. With his unequalled knowledge of the lower races, it was easy for him to examine travellers" tales about savage seers who beheld distant events in vision, and to allow them what weight he thought proper, after discounting possibilities of falsehood and collusion. He might then have examined modern narratives of similar performances among the civilised, which are abundant. It is obvious and undeniable that if the supernormal acquisition of knowledge in trance is a _vera causa_, a real process, however rare, Mr. Tylor"s theory needs modifications; while the character of the savage"s reasoning becomes more creditable to the savage, and appears as better bottomed than we had been asked to suppose. But Mr. Tylor does not examine this large body of evidence at all, or, at least, does not offer us the details of his examination. He merely writes in this place:
"A typical spiritualistic instance may be quoted from Jung-Stilling, who says that examples have come to his knowledge of sick persons who, longing to see absent friends, have fallen into a swoon, during which they have appeared to the distant objects of their affection."[29]
Jung-Stilling (though he wrote before modern "Spiritualism" came in) is not a very valid authority; there is plenty of better evidence than his, but Mr. Tylor pa.s.ses it by, merely remarking that "modern Europe has kept closely enough to the lines of early philosophy." Modern Europe has indeed done so, if it explains the supernormal acquisition of knowledge, or the hallucinatory appearance of a distant person to his friend by a theory of wandering "spirits." But facts do not cease to be facts because wrong interpretations have been put upon them by savages, by Jung-Stilling, or by anyone else. The real question is, Do such events occur among lower and higher races, beyond explanation by fraud and fortuitous coincidence? We gladly grant that the belief in Animism, when it takes the form of a theory of "wandering spirits," is probably untenable, as it is a.s.suredly of savage origin. But we are not absolutely so sure that in this aspect the theory is not based on actual experiences, not of a normal and ordinary kind. If so, the savage philosophy and its supposed survivals in belief will appear in a new light. And we are inclined to hold that an examination of the ma.s.s of evidence to which Mr. Tylor offers here so slight an allusion will at least make it wise to suspend our judgment, not only as to the origins of the savage theory of spirits, but as to the materialistic hypothesis of the absence of a psychical element in man.
I may seem to have outrun already the limits of permissible hypothesis. It may appear absurd to surmise that there can exist in man, savage or civilised, a faculty for acquiring information not accessible by the known channels of sense, a faculty attributed by savage philosophers to the wandering soul. But one may be permitted to quote the opinion of M. Charles Richet, Professor of Physiology in the Faculty of Medicine in Paris. It is not cited because M. Richet is a professor of physiology, but because he reached his conclusion after six years of minute experiment. He says: "There exists in certain persons, at certain moments, a faculty of acquiring knowledge which has no _rapport_ with our normal faculties of that kind."[30]