SEVENTH MINUNDERSTANDING: PRAGMATISM IGNORES THE THEORETICAL INTEREST.
This would seem to be an absolutely wanton slander, were not a certain excuse to be found in the linguistic affinities of the word "pragmatism," and in certain offhand habits of speech of ours which a.s.sumed too great a generosity on our reader"s part. When we spoke of the meaning of ideas consisting "in their "practical"
consequences", or of the "practical" differences which our beliefs make to us; when we said that the truth of a belief consists in its "working" value, etc.; our language evidently was too careless, for by "practical" we were almost unanimously held to mean OPPOSED to theoretical or genuinely cognitive, and the consequence was punctually drawn that a truth in our eyes could have no relation to any independent reality, or to any other truth, or to anything whatever but the acts which we might ground on it or the satisfactions they might bring. The mere existence of the idea, all by itself, if only its results were satisfactory, would give full truth to it, it was charged, in our absurd pragmatist epistemology.
The solemn attribution of this rubbish to us was also encouraged by two other circ.u.mstances. First, ideas ARE practically useful in the narrow sense, false ideas sometimes, but most often ideas which we can verify by the sum total of all their leadings, and the reality of whose objects may thus be considered established beyond doubt. That these ideas should be true in advance of and apart from their utility, that, in other words, their objects should be really there, is the very condition of their having that kind of utility,--the objects they connect us with are so important that the ideas which serve as the objects" subst.i.tutes grow important also. This manner of their practical working was the first thing that made truths good in the eyes of primitive men; and buried among all the other good workings by which true beliefs are characterized, this kind of subsequential utility remains.
The second misleading circ.u.mstance was the emphasis laid by Schiller and Dewey on the fact that, unless a truth be relevant to the mind"s momentary predicament, unless it be germane to the "practical"
situation,--meaning by this the quite particular perplexity,--it is no good to urge it. It doesn"t meet our interests any better than a falsehood would under the same circ.u.mstances. But why our predicaments and perplexities might not be theoretical here as well as narrowly practical, I wish that our critics would explain.
They simply a.s.sume that no pragmatist CAN admit a genuinely theoretic interest. Having used the phrase "cash-value" of an idea, I am implored by one correspondent to alter it, "for every one thinks you mean only pecuniary profit and loss." Having said that the true is "the expedient in our thinking," I am rebuked in this wise by another learned correspondent:
"The word expedient has no other meaning than that of self-interest.
The pursuit of this has ended by landing a number of officers of national banks in penitentiaries. A philosophy that leads to such results must be unsound."
But the word "practical" is so habitually loosely used that more indulgence might have been expected. When one says that a sick man has now practically recovered, or that an enterprise has practically failed, one usually means I just the opposite of practically in the literal sense. One means that, altho untrue in strict practice, what one says is true in theory, true virtually, certain to be true. Again, by the practical one often means the distinctively concrete, the individual, particular, and effective, as opposed to the abstract, general, and inert. To speak for myself, whenever I have emphasized the practical nature of truth, this is mainly what has been in my mind. "Pragmata"
are things in their plurality; and in that early California address, when I described pragmatism as holding that the meaning of any proposition can always be brought down to some particular consequence in our future practical experience, whether pa.s.sive or active, expressly added these qualifying words: the point lying rather in the fact that the experience must be particular than in the fact that it must be active,--by "active" meaning here "practical" in the narrow literal sense. [Footnote: The ambiguity of the word "practical" comes out well in these words of a recent would-be reporter of our views: "Pragmatism is an Anglo-Saxon reaction against the intellectualism and rationalism of the Latin mind.... Man, each individual man is the measure of things. He is able to conceive one but relative truths, that is to say, illusions.
What these illusions are worth is revealed to him, not by general theory, but by individual practice. Pragmatism, which consists in experiencing these illusions of the mind and obeying them by acting them out, is a PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT WORDS, a philosophy of GESTURES AND OF ACTS, which abandons what is general and olds only to what is particular." (Bourdeau, in Journal des. debats, October 89, 1907.)] But particular consequences can perfectly well be of a theoretic nature. Every remote fact which we infer from an idea is a particular theoretic consequence which our mind practically works towards. The loss of every old opinion of ours which we see that we shall have to give up if a new opinion be true, is a particular theoretic as well as a particular practical consequence. After man"s interest in breathing freely, the greatest of all his interests (because it never fluctuates or remits, as most of his physical interests do), is his interest in consistency, in feeling that what he now thinks goes with what he thinks on other occasions.
We tirelessly compare truth with truth for this sole purpose. Is the present candidate for belief perhaps contradicted by principle number one? Is it compatible with fact number two? and so forth. The particular operations here are the purely logical ones of a.n.a.lysis, deduction, comparison, etc.; and altho general terms may be used ad libitum, the satisfactory practical working of the candidate--idea consists in the consciousness yielded by each successive theoretic consequence in particular. It is therefore simply idiotic to repeat that pragmatism takes no account of purely theoretic interests. All it insists on is that verity in act means VERIFICATIONS, and that these are always particulars. Even in exclusively theoretic matters, it insists that vagueness and generality serve to verify nothing.
EIGHTH MISUNDERSTANDING: PRAGMATISM IS SHUT UP TO SOLIPSISM.
I have already said something about this misconception under the third and fourth heads, above, but a little more may be helpful. The objection is apt to clothe itself in words like these: "You make truth to consist in every value except the cognitive value proper; you always leave your knower at many removes (or, at the uttermost, at one remove) from his real object; the best you do is to let his ideas carry him towards it; it remains forever outside of him," etc.
I think that the leaven working here is the rooted intellectualist persuasion that, to know a reality, an idea must in some inscrutable fashion possess or be it. [Footnote: Sensations may, indeed, possess their objects or coalesce with them, as common sense supposes that they do; and intuited differences between concepts may coalesce with the "eternal" objective differences; but to simplify our discussion. here we can afford to abstract from these very special cases of knowing.] For pragmatism this kind of coalescence is inessential. As a rule our cognitions are only processes of mind off their balance and in motion towards real termini; and the reality of the termini, believed in by the states of mind in question, can be guaranteed only by some wider knower [Footnote: The transcendental idealist thinks that, in some inexplicable way, the finite states of mind are identical with the transfinite all-knower which he finds himself obliged to postulate in order to supply a fundamentum far the relation of knowing, as he apprehends it.
Pragmatists can leave the question of ident.i.ty open; but they cannot do without the wider knower any more than they can do without the reality, if they want to prove a case of knowing. They themselves play the part of the absolute knower for the universe of discourse which serves them as material for epistemologizing. They warrant the reality there, and the subject"s true knowledge, there, of it.
But whether what they themselves say about that whole universe is objectively true, i.e., whether the pragmatic theory of truth is true really, they cannot warrant,--they can only believe it To their hearers they can only propose it, as I propose it to my readers, as something to be verified ambulando, or by the way is which its consequences may confirm it]. But if there is no reason extant in the universe why they should be doubted, the beliefs are true in the only sense in which anything can be true anyhow: they are practically and concretely true, namely. True in the mystical mongrel sense of an Ident.i.tatsphilosophie they need not be; nor is there any intelligible reason why they ever need be true otherwise than verifiably and practically. It is reality"s part to possess its own existence; it is thought"s part to get into "touch" with it by innumerable paths of verification.
I fear that the "humanistic" developments of pragmatism may cause a certain difficulty here. We get at one truth only through the rest of truth; and the reality, everlastingly postulated as that which all our truth must keep in touch with, may never be given to us save in the form of truth other than that which we are now testing. But since Dr. Schiller has shown that all our truths, even the most elemental, are affected by race-inheritance with a human coefficient, reality per se thus may appear only as a sort of limit; it may be held to shrivel to the mere PLACE for an object, and what is known may be held to be only matter of our psyche that we fill the place with. It must be confessed that pragmatism, worked in this humanistic way, is COMPATIBLE with solipsism. It joins friendly hands with the agnostic part of kantism, with contemporary agnosticism, and with idealism generally. But worked thus, it is a metaphysical theory about the matter of reality, and flies far beyond pragmatism"s own modest a.n.a.lysis of the nature of the knowing function, which a.n.a.lysis may just as harmoniously be combined with less humanistic accounts of reality. One of pragmatism"s merits is that it is so purely epistemological. It must a.s.sume realities; but it prejudges nothing as to their const.i.tution, and the most diverse metaphysics can use it as their foundation. It certainly has no special affinity with solipsism.
As I look back over what I have written, much of it gives me a queer impression, as if the obvious were set forth so condescendingly that readers might well laugh at my pomposity. It may be, however, that concreteness as radical as ours is not so obvious. The whole originality of pragmatism, the whole point in it, is its use of the concrete way of seeing. It begins with concreteness, and returns and ends with it. Dr. Schiller, with his two "practical" aspects of truth, (1) relevancy to situation, and (2) subsequential utility, is only filling the cup of concreteness to the brim for us. Once seize that cup, and you cannot misunderstand pragmatism. It seems as if the power of imagining the world concretely MIGHT have been common enough to let our readers apprehend us better, as if they might have read between our lines, and, in spite of all our infelicities of expression, guessed a little more correctly what our thought was. But alas! this was not on fate"s programme, so we can only think, with the German ditty:--
"Es waer" zu schoen gewesen, Es hat nicht sollen sein."
IX
THE MEANING OF THE WORD TRUTH [Footnote: Remarks at the meeting of the American Philosophical a.s.sociation, Cornell University, December, 1907.]
My account of truth is realistic, and follows the epistemological dualism of common sense. Suppose I say to you "The thing exists"-- is that true or not? How can you tell? Not till my statement has developed its meaning farther is it determined as being true, false, or irrelevant to reality altogether. But if now you ask "what thing?" and I reply "a desk"; if you ask "where?" and I point to a place; if you ask "does it exist materially, or only in imagination?" and I say "materially"; if moreover I say "I mean that desk" and then grasp and shake a desk which you see just as I have described it, you are willing to call my statement true. But you and I are commutable here; we can exchange places; and, as you go bail for my desk, so I can go bail for yours.
This notion of a reality independent of either of us, taken from ordinary social experience, lies at the base of the pragmatist definition of truth. With some such reality any statement, in order to be counted true, must agree. Pragmatism defines "agreeing" to mean certain ways of "working," be they actual or potential. Thus, for my statement "the desk exists" to be true of a desk recognized as real by you, it must be able to lead me to shake your desk, to explain myself by words that suggest that desk to your mind, to make a drawing that is like the desk you see, etc. Only in such ways as this is there sense in saying it agrees with THAT reality, only thus does it gain for me the satisfaction of hearing you corroborate me.
Reference then to something determinate, and some sort of adaptation to it worthy of the name of agreement, are thus const.i.tuent elements in the definition of any statement of mine as "true".
You cannot get at either the reference or the adaptation without using the notion of the workings. THAT the thing is, WHAT it is, and WHICH it is (of all the possible things with that what) are points determinable only by the pragmatic method. The "which" means a possibility of pointing, or of otherwise singling out the special object; the "what" means choice on our part of an essential aspect to conceive it by (and this is always relative to what Dewey calls our own "situation"); and the "that" means our a.s.sumption of the att.i.tude of belief, the reality-recognizing att.i.tude. Surely for understanding what the word "true" means as applied to a statement, the mention of such workings is indispensable. Surely if we leave them out the subject and the object of the cognitive relation float-in the same universe, "tis true--but vaguely and ignorantly and without mutual contact or mediation.
Our critics nevertheless call the workings inessential. No functional possibilities "make" our beliefs true, they say; they are true inherently, true positively, born "true" as the Count of Chambord was born "Henri-Cinq." Pragmatism insists, on the contrary, that statements and beliefs are thus inertly and statically true only by courtesy: they practically pa.s.s for true; but you CANNOT DEFINE WHAT YOU MEAN by calling them true without referring to their functional possibilities. These give its whole LOGICAL CONTENT to that relation to reality on a belief"s part to which the name "truth" is applied, a relation which otherwise remains one of mere coexistence or bare withness.
The foregoing statements reproduce the essential content of the lecture on Truth in my book PRAGMATISM. Schiller"s doctrine of "humanism," Dewey"s "Studies in logical theory," and my own "radical empiricism," all involve this general notion of truth as "working,"
either actual or conceivable. But they envelop it as only one detail in the midst of much wider theories that aim eventually at determining the notion of what "reality" at large is in its ultimate nature and const.i.tution.
X
THE EXISTENCE OF JULIUS CAESAR [Footnote: Originally printed under the t.i.tle of "Truth versus Truthfulness," in the Journal of Philosophy.]
My account of truth is purely logical and relates to its definition only. I contend that you cannot tell what the WORD "true" MEANS, as applied to a statement, without invoking the CONCEPT OF THE STATEMENTS WORKINGS.
a.s.sume, to fix our ideas, a universe composed of two things only: imperial Caesar dead and turned to clay, and me, saying "Caesar really existed." Most persons would naively deem truth to be thereby uttered, and say that by a sort of actio in distans my statement had taken direct hold of the other fact.
But have my words so certainly denoted THAT Caesar?--or so certainly connoted HIS individual attributes? To fill out the complete measure of what the epithet "true" may ideally mean, my thought ought to bear a fully determinate and unambiguous "one-to-one-relation" to its own particular object. In the ultrasimple universe imagined the reference is uncertified. Were there two Caesars we shouldn"t know which was meant. The conditions of truth thus seem incomplete in this universe of discourse so that it must be enlarged.
Transcendentalists enlarge it by invoking an absolute mind which, as it owns all the facts, can sovereignly correlate them. If it intends that my statement SHALL refer to that identical Caesar, and that the attributes I have in mind SHALL mean his attributes, that intention suffices to make the statement true.
I, in turn, enlarge the universe by admitting finite intermediaries between the two original facts. Caesar HAD, and my statement HAS, effects; and if these effects in any way run together, a concrete medium and bottom is provided for the determinate cognitive relation, which, as a pure ACTIO IN DISTANS, seemed to float too vaguely and unintelligibly.
The real Caesar, for example, wrote a ma.n.u.script of which I see a real reprint, and say "the Caesar I mean is the author of THAT."
The workings of my thought thus determine both its denotative and its connotative significance more fully. It now defines itself as neither irrelevant to the real Caesar, nor false in what it suggests of him. The absolute mind, seeing me thus working towards Caesar through the cosmic intermediaries, might well say: "Such workings only specify in detail what I meant myself by the statement being true. I decree the cognitive relation between the two original facts to mean that just that kind of concrete chain of intermediaries exists or can exist."
But the chain involves facts prior to the statement the logical conditions of whose truth we are defining, and facts subsequent to it; and this circ.u.mstance, coupled with the vulgar employment of the terms truth and fact as synonyms, has laid my account open to misapprehension. "How," it is confusedly asked, "can Caesar"s existence, a truth already 2000 years old, depend for its truth on anything about to happen now? How can my acknowledgment of it be made true by the acknowledgment"s own effects? The effects may indeed confirm my belief, but the belief was made true already by the fact that Caesar really did exist."
Well, be it so, for if there were no Caesar, there could, of course, be no positive truth about him--but then distinguish between "true"
as being positively and completely so established, and "true" as being so only "practically," elliptically, and by courtesy, in the sense of not being positively irrelevant or UNtrue. Remember also that Caesar"s having existed in fact may make a present statement false or irrelevant as well as it may make it true, and that in neither case does it itself have to alter. It being given, whether truth, untruth, or irrelevancy shall be also given depends on something coming from the statement itself. What pragmatism contends for is that you cannot adequately DEFINE the something if you leave the notion of the statement"s functional workings out of your account. Truth meaning agreement with reality, the mode of the agreeing is a practical problem which the subjective term of the relation alone can solve.
NOTE. This paper was originally followed by a couple of paragraphs meant to conciliate the intellectualist opposition.
Since you love the word "true" so, and since you despise so the concrete working of our ideas, I said, keep the word "truth" for the saltatory and incomprehensible relation you care so much for, and I will say of thoughts that know their objects in an intelligible sense that they are "truthful."
Like most offerings, this one has been spurned, so I revoke it, repenting of my generosity. Professor Pratt, in his recent book, calls any objective state of FACTS "a truth," and uses the word "trueness" in the sense of "truth" as proposed by me. Mr. Hawtrey (see below, page 281) uses "correctness" in the same sense. Apart from the general evil of ambiguous vocabularies, we may really forsake all hope, if the term "truth" is officially to lose its status as a property of our beliefs and opinions, and become recognized as a technical synonym for "fact."
XI
THE ABSOLUTE AND THE STRENUOUS LIFE [Footnote: Reprinted from the Journal of Philosophy, etc., 1906.]
Professor W. A. Brown, in the Journal for August 15, approves my pragmatism for allowing that a belief in the absolute may give holidays to the spirit, but takes me to task for the narrowness of this concession, and shows by striking examples how great a power the same belief may have in letting loose the strenuous life.
I have no criticism whatever to make upon his excellent article, but let me explain why "moral holidays" were the only gift of the absolute which I picked out for emphasis. I was primarily concerned in my lectures with contrasting the belief that the world is still in process of making with the belief that there is an "eternal" edition of it ready-made and complete. The former, or "pluralistic" belief, was the one that my pragmatism favored.
Both beliefs confirm our strenuous moods. Pluralism actually demands them, since it makes the world"s salvation depend upon the energizing of its several parts, among which we are. Monism permits them, for however furious they may be, we can always justify ourselves in advance for indulging them by the thought that they WILL HAVE BEEN expressions of the absolute"s perfect life. By escaping from your finite perceptions to the conception of the eternal whole, you can hallow any tendency whatever. Tho the absolute DICTATES nothing, it will SANCTION anything and everything after the fact, for whatever is once there will have to be regarded as an integral member of the universe"s perfection. Quietism and frenzy thus alike receive the absolute"s permit to exist. Those of us who are naturally inert may abide in our resigned pa.s.sivity; those whose energy is excessive may grow more reckless still.
History shows how easily both quietists and fanatics have drawn inspiration from the absolutistic scheme. It suits sick souls and strenuous ones equally well.
One cannot say thus of pluralism. Its world is always vulnerable, for some part may go astray; and having no "eternal" edition of it to draw comfort from, its partisans must always feel to some degree insecure. If, as pluralists, we grant ourselves moral holidays, they can only be provisional breathing-spells, intended to refresh us for the morrow"s fight. This forms one permanent inferiority of pluralism from the pragmatic point of view. It has no saving message for incurably sick souls. Absolutism, among its other messages, has that message, and is the only scheme that has it necessarily. That const.i.tutes its chief superiority and is the source of its religious power. That is why, desiring to do it full justice, I valued its apt.i.tude for moral-holiday giving so highly.
Its claims in that way are unique, whereas its affinities with strenuousness are less emphatic than those of the pluralistic scheme.
In the last lecture of my book I candidly admitted this inferiority of pluralism. It lacks the wide indifference that absolutism shows.
It is bound to disappoint many sick souls whom absolutism can console. It seems therefore poor tactics for absolutists to make little of this advantage. The needs of sick souls are surely the most urgent; and believers in the absolute should rather hold it to be great merit in their philosophy that it can meet them so well.