For the rest, we pa.s.sed the following night very quietly in our quarters, posted our sentinels, and dressed our wounds. One of our horses was so severely wounded that it died soon after.
The following morning Oli determined upon taking up the position a.s.signed to his division at Cojohuacan, about six miles further on; and however Alvarado and the other cavaliers might beg of him not to separate the two divisions, yet he would not alter his determination.
Christobal de Oli was a man of uncommon bravery, whose pride was wounded at the unsuccessful attempt we had made upon the causeway, and he accused Alvarado of inconsiderateness for having ordered the attack.
Nothing, therefore, could induce him to stay, and he marched off with his men to Cojohuacan.
The separation of the two divisions was very impolitic at this juncture; for if the Mexicans had been aware of the smallness of our numbers, and had attacked either of the divisions during the five following days, before the brigantines had arrived, we should with difficulty have escaped destruction. Both divisions, therefore, remained as quiet as the enemy would allow them, though not a day pa.s.sed by that the Mexicans did not land troops to annoy us in our camp, and, if possible, to entice us into places where we should be unable to act, and they could attack us to greater advantage.
Sandoval, as we have seen, left Tezcuco with his division four days after the feast of Corpus Christi, and marched towards Iztapalapan. His route lay through townships which were either subject to, or in alliance with Tezcuco. As soon as he arrived at Iztapalapan, he commenced his military operations by burning down the greater portion of the houses which stood on the mainland.
It was not long before large bodies of Mexican troops arrived for the protection of Iztapalapan, with whom Sandoval had a severe skirmish, and drove them back again to their canoes; but still they continued to shower their arrows and darts upon him, and wounded several of his men.
During this conflict a thick smoke was seen to rise from several signal fires which had been lighted on the surrounding hills. This had been a signal to call in all the canoes of Mexico and of the other towns situated on the lake, as Cortes had just run out from Tezcuco with the thirteen brigantines.
The first attack our general made with this fleet was against a rocky height on an island near Mexico. This place had been strongly fortified, and was garrisoned by a great number of Mexicans and inhabitants of other townships. All the canoes of Mexico, Xochimilco, Cojohuacan, Huitzilopuzco, Iztapalapan, and Mexicalzinco, had united in a body to oppose Cortes, which was the reason why the attack was carried on with so little vigour against Sandoval, who, however, was not able to do the enemy much damage, as most of the houses stood in the water; though, in the commencement of the attack, our allies had made many prisoners. In Iztapalapan, Saudoval found himself on a peninsula in the lake, and the only way by which he could reach Cojohuacan was by a causeway which ran half way through the lake, on which he would have been a.s.sailed from both sides by the enemy, without his being able to defend himself with much advantage.
When Cortes observed the vast number of canoes which kept continually crowding around the brigantines, he began to feel alarmed, and this not without reason, for their number amounted to above 4000. He therefore abandoned his attack upon the rock, and selected a position with his brigantines, where he would be able to observe all the enemy"s movements, and steer off in any direction he might choose. He likewise issued orders to the respective commanders of the brigantines not to commence an attack on the canoes before the wind, which had just commenced blowing from the land, should have increased. When the Mexicans found our fleet was moving off again, they not incorrectly ascribed it to fear, and they immediately advanced with their canoes to fall upon the brigantines. There now suddenly arose a stiffish breeze, our rowers pulled with all their might, and Cortes ordered the brigantines to run right in among the canoes. Numbers were bored into the ground, many of the enemy killed and wounded, and all the rest of the canoes turned round, and made off at a rapid rate, to seek refuge between the houses built in the lake, where they could not be followed by the brigantines. This was our first naval engagement, and Cortes gained the victory, thanks be to the Almighty.
After this encounter he steered for Cojohuacan, where Oli had taken up his position. Here again he fell in with large bodies of the enemy, who lay in wait for him at a point of considerable danger, and attempted to carry off two of the brigantines. They attacked him at the same time from their canoes, and from the tops of the temples. Cortes now fired in upon them with the cannon, and killed great numbers. The artillerymen fired away so incessantly upon this occasion, that all their powder was consumed, and some of them had their faces and hands burnt. Cortes then despatched the smallest brigantine to Iztapalapan, to bring away all the powder Sandoval had with him there, and wrote word to him not on any account to quit that place. He himself staid the two next days with Oli, on whose position the enemy continued their attacks without intermission.
I must now also relate what took place at this time in Tlacupa, where I was stationed with Alvarado.
When we received intelligence that Cortes had run out with the brigantines, we advanced along our causeway up to the bridge, but this time with greater precaution. Our cavalry was stationed in front of the causeway, while the remaining troops moved along in a close body up to the bridge, the crossbow-men and musketeers keeping up an incessant fire upon the enemy. In this way we renewed the attack each day, and repaired the gaps in the causeway, but three of our men had been killed.
In the meantime the enemy did Sandoval considerable damage from the tops of the houses which stood in the water, and he therefore resolved to attack those which he was best able to get at. Quauhtemoctzin then sent off a large body of troops to the a.s.sistance of the town, with commands to cut through the causeway in Sandoval"s rear. Cortes observing a vast number of canoes going in the direction of Iztapalapan, instantly steered with the brigantines for the same place, and ordered Oli, with the whole of his division, to shape his course thither along the causeway. They found the Mexicans already hard at work in cutting through the causeway, and concluded from this that Sandoval was destroying the houses which stood in the water. They found him, as they had suspected, already in the heat of an engagement with the enemy, who, however, retired on the approach of the brigantines.
Cortes now ordered Sandoval to quit Iztapalapan with his troops, and to take up his position at Tepeaquilla, in front of the causeway, which leads from this place to Mexico. This Tepeaquilla is at present dedicated to our dear lady of Guadaloupe, where so many miracles have happened, and still daily take place.
CHAPTER CLI.
_How Cortes a.s.signs particular stations to the twelve brigantines, the thirteenth being considered unfit for service._
Cortes, our officers, and the whole of the troops were now convinced that it was impossible to fight our way to the city along the causeways, unless we were covered on each side by a couple of the brigantines. Our general therefore joined four of these to Alvarado"s division, he himself retaining six others near his head-quarters, which he had taken up where Oli was stationed; the remaining two he sent to Sandoval, for the smallest brigantine was not considered of sufficient bulk to make head against the large canoes, and was taken out of the service altogether, and the men distributed among the crews of the other twelve.
As soon as the brigantines arrived at our station Alvarado placed two on each side of the causeway, which were to cover us as we advanced to the attack of the bridges. We now fought with better success than we had previously done for the brigantines kept off the canoes, and prevented them from attacking our flanks; so that we now succeeded in forcing some of the bridges, and in destroying several of the enemy"s entrenchments.
The conflict, however, was no less severe; on the contrary, the Mexicans made so good a use of their lances, arrows, and slings, that, although our jackets were thickly quilted with cotton, they wounded the greater part of our men; nor did they desist from the attack till night came on; but they had the great advantage over us, that they could relieve their troops from time to time, by pouring in fresh men, and could shower innumerable quant.i.ties of stones, arrows, and lances, upon our brigantines, from the tops of the houses. Indeed I cannot find a more appropriate expression than shower, although they alone can feel its full force who were present on the occasion. If we did at times succeed, with the utmost exertion, to force an entrenchment or a bridge, and we omitted to station a strong detachment to guard it, the enemy returned in the night, made another opening in the causeway, threw up larger entrenchments, and dug deep pits, which immediately filled with water, and these they covered slightly over, that we might sink down into them in the midst of the battle of the following day, when the canoes would hasten up to profit by the confusion, and carry off our men prisoners.
For this purpose numbers of canoes were lying wait in places where they were out of the reach of our brigantines, though they were always ready at hand, if their a.s.sistance was required. But the enemy had provided in another artful way to render our brigantines useless in certain spots of the lake, by driving numbers of stakes into the water, whose tops were just below the surface; so that it was often impossible for our vessels to avoid them, and they consequently stuck fast, and left our troops open to the attacks of the canoes.
I have before mentioned of what little use the cavalry was to us in our operations on the causeway; for whenever they did drive the Mexicans before them up to the bridges, the latter leaped into the water, and retreated behind the entrenchments which they had thrown up on the causeway itself, where other bodies of the enemy stood ready to receive them armed with extremely long lances, with which, and various kinds of projectiles, they severely wounded our horses; so that the owners of the horses were very unwilling to risk them in such unequal conflict; for at that time the ordinary price of a horse was from 800 to 1000 pesos.
When night came on, and released us from the attacks of the enemy, we returned to our encampment, and attended to our wounds, which we dressed with bandages steeped in oil. There was likewise a soldier among our troops, named Juan Catalan, who charmed the wounds, and the Lord Jesus blessed this man"s exertions in a manner that he invariably succeeded in his cures. Indeed, if all our wounded, each day we renewed the attack, had remained behind in our camp, none of the companies could ever have sallied out with more than twenty men at a time. When our friends of Tlascalla observed how this man charmed the wounds, and how every one who was wounded applied to him for a.s.sistance, they likewise brought him all their wounded, and these were so very numerous, that his only occupation throughout the day consisted in charming wounds.
Our officers and ensigns were most exposed to the enemy"s weapons, and were oftener wounded in consequence; for which reason a fresh set of men were each day appointed to carry our tattered colours. With all these hardships we had to suffer, it will at least be thought that we had plenty of food. But of this we were likewise deprived, and we should have thought ourselves fortunate if we had only had some refreshing food for our wounded; we had not even a cake of maise! Miserable indeed was our distress! The only means we had of keeping soul and body together was by eating herbs and cherries, and at last we had nothing to subsist on but wild figs; Cortes and Sandoval"s divisions fared no better than ours, and the Mexicans likewise continued the attack upon them from morning to night. Every blessed day that came they were obliged to advance fighting their way up to the bridges along the causeway; for the Mexicans, and the troops which lay in the other towns of the lake, merely awaited the morning dawn, when the signals were given from the summit of the great temple of Huitzilopochtli to rush out upon us both by land and water.
The operations of the besieged were carried on with perfect order, and it was previously settled where the different bodies of their troops were to direct the attack.
As we began to experience that our daily advancing along the causeway each time cost us a loss of men, besides that we gained little advantage by it, for the Mexicans returned in the night, and again took possession of the points we had forced, we determined to alter our plan of operations, and took up a position on a more s.p.a.cious part of the causeway, where several towers rose up together, and where we should be able to quarter ourselves for the night. Though we were miserably off here, and had nothing to protect us from the rain, nor to cover us from the piercing rays of the sun, we were not to be deterred from our purpose. The Indian females who baked our bread were obliged to remain behind in Tlacupa, protected by our cavalry, and the Tlascallans, who at the same time covered our rear, that the enemy might not fall upon us from the mainland. After these precautions had been adopted, we began to carry out our princ.i.p.al object, which was to make ourselves master of the houses in the suburbs, and of the intervening ca.n.a.ls. These last were then immediately filled up, and the houses pulled down; for, as I have before mentioned, it was difficult to destroy them by fire, as they were detached, and stood in the water. It was from the tops of the houses that we received most injury from the enemy; so that, by destroying these, we gained a considerable advantage. Whenever we had taken one of the enemy"s entrenchments, a bridge, or forced any other strong position, we were obliged to occupy the spot night and day with our troops, which we regulated in the following manner:--Each company watched by turns; the first from the evening time until midnight; the second from midnight until a couple of hours before daylight; and the third from that time till morning, when they were relieved by forty other men. The watch was each time relieved by a like number, though none of these watches left the spot; but when the following arrived, the former lay themselves on the bare ground, and took a little repose; so that when daylight came there were always one hundred and twenty men collected together ready for action. On other nights, when we expected some sudden attack, the whole of the men marched up at once, and remained under arms until the enemy approached. We had every reason to be upon our guard, for we learnt from several Mexican officers, whom we had taken prisoners in the different engagements, that Quauhtemoctzin and his generals had come to the determination of falling some day or night suddenly upon our encampment on the causeway; and concluded that, after they had destroyed us, they might easily make themselves masters of the two other causeways occupied by Sandoval and Cortes. To accomplish this finishing stroke, the nine towns lying in the lake, besides Tlacupa, Escapuzalco, and Tenayucan, were to cooperate with them. While we should thus be attacked on every side, they meant to carry off the Indian females with our baggage, which we had left behind in Tlacupa.
As soon as we received this information, we sent notice of it to the Tlascallans and our cavalry, who were stationed at Tlacupa, and ordered them to be particularly upon their guard, and to keep a sharp look out all day and night. Nor was it long before the enemy put their scheme into operation; for one midnight an immense body of Mexicans came storming up against us; a couple of hours after another such a body; and with daylight a third came pouring forth. At one time they moved up with the utmost silence; at another they came fiercely along with hideous yells; and it was terrible to behold the innumerable quant.i.ties of lances, stones, and arrows they showered upon us. Though they wounded many of our men, we valiantly maintained our ground, and drove them back with great loss. The Mexicans had at the same time attacked the cavalry and Tlascallans on the mainland at Tlacupa; the latter suffered severely, as they were never much upon their guard during night-time.
In this way, amidst rain, wind, frost, up to our ancles in mud, and covered with wounds, we patiently bore our fatigues, with a morsel of maise cake, a few herbs and figs to stay our hunger, which was the more gnawing from the incessant exertions of our bodily strength. Yet, however bravely we might fight, we advanced but slowly, and the little advantages we gained cost us a number of killed and wounded. The bridges we forced were as often retaken by the enemy, and if we filled up an opening in the causeway new gaps were made, and this continued day after day, until the Mexicans altered their plan of operations, as will shortly be seen.
After thus enumerating these continued scenes of bloodshed and slaughter which took place at our station, and those of Cortes and Sandoval, the reader will ask, what advantage we had derived in destroying the aqueduct of Chapultepec? I must confess, very little; for the enemy received, during the night-time, a plentiful supply of water as well as of provisions from the towns surrounding Mexico, by means of their light canoes.
In order to cut off these supplies, Cortes determined that two brigantines should cruise about the lake during the whole of the night to capture these canoes, and it was agreed that the provisions found in them should be equally distributed among the three divisions. Although we sensibly felt the absence of our brigantines during the attacks which the enemy made upon us in the night-time, yet we soon began to find what great advantage we had gained by thus diminishing the enemy"s supplies.
No day pa.s.sed without our brigantines capturing several of these transports laden with maise, fowls, and other necessaries of life, though a few always managed to elude our vessels and slip into the town.
The Mexicans, therefore, were determined if possible to rid themselves of these troublesome brigantines, and thought of the following stratagem: They fitted out thirty large pirogues, manned with their best rowers and most courageous warriors, which they ran out during the night-time and concealed them among the reeds of the lake, where they could not be seen by the brigantines. At a short distance from the place where the pirogues lay concealed, stakes had been driven into the water, of which it was intended our two vessels should run foul. In the twilight the enemy sent out two or three canoes which were covered with green boughs, as if laden with provisions for Mexico; and these received instructions to move off in a direction where it was presumed they would be pursued by our brigantines.
As soon as our brigantines espied the two canoes they went in pursuit of them, the latter keeping close into the reeds, and continually nearing the spot where the pirogues lay in ambush. The greater exertions the canoes made to escape, the more eager were our brigantines in pursuit, and when these were close in upon the spot where the pirogues lay concealed, the latter suddenly darted forth from the reeds, and attacked the brigantines on all sides. In an instant all the officers, soldiers, and sailors were wounded, nor could the brigantines seek refuge in flight, as they had become entangled among the stakes. In this unfortunate affair we lost one of the brigantines and two of our officers, one of whom, named Portillo, a man of great courage, and who had served in Italy, was killed on the spot; the other was Pedro Barba, a very clever officer, who died of his wounds three days after. Both these brigantines belonged to Cortes" division, and he was sorely grieved at the loss we had thus sustained; but we very shortly after paid the enemy out in their own coin, as will presently be seen.
In the meantime Cortes and Sandoval, with their divisions, had many severe encounters with the enemy, but particularly Cortes, as he insisted that all the houses which were taken should be immediately pulled down, and the gaps in the causeway filled up. So that every inch of ground was rendered secure and level, of which possession was taken.
Alvarado had received similar instructions from our general, and was not to pa.s.s over any bridge or ca.n.a.l before the part which intersected the causeway was completely filled up; nor to advance beyond any house until it was levelled to the ground.
These commands were strictly adhered to, and with the woodwork and stones of the houses which we pulled down we filled up the openings in the causeways. In all these operations, and indeed during the whole of the siege, our Tlascallan friends lent us the most efficient services.
When the Mexicans found we were thus by degrees pulling down their houses and filling up the ca.n.a.ls, they determined to alter their plan of operation, and commenced by cutting a wide and deep opening in that part of the causeway lying between us and the city; they deepened the lake on each side of this opening, and threw up entrenchments near it; strong stakes were then driven into the water to keep off our brigantines, or that they might run foul of them on coming to our a.s.sistance. Besides this, great numbers of canoes full of men were constantly lurking in places where we could not see them, with orders not to rush out upon us before we had advanced up to the entrenchments on the causeway.
One Sunday morning large bodies of the enemy came advancing towards us from three different points, and fell so fiercely upon us that it was with much difficulty we could maintain our ground. I had forgotten to mention that Alvarado had posted half of the cavalry on the causeway, for they no longer ran so great a risk of being killed, as most of the houses lay in ruins, and there was more s.p.a.ce for them to manoeuvre in, without their being exposed to the attacks of the enemy from the house-tops or from the lake. The enemy, as I have just said, advanced bravely from three different points, one body from the quarter where the deep gap had been made in the causeway, the other from the direction where the houses lay in ruins, the third from the side of Tlacupa, so that we were almost surrounded. Our cavalry, with the Tlascallans, had the good fortune to cut their way through the dense crowds which fell upon our rear, while our foot bravely opposed the two other bodies, which, after a few moments" desperate fighting began to give ground; but this was a mere stratagem of the Mexicans to allow us to take possession of the first entrenchment, and after a short stand they even retreated beyond the second. We thought we had already gained the victory, and waded through the shallow part of the water in vigorous pursuit of the enemy up to some large buildings and towers; while they, to deceive us the more effectually, constantly faced about to fling their arrows at us; and, when we in the least expected it, they suddenly turned round upon us and in an instant we were surrounded and attacked with excessive fury from all sides. It was impossible to resist their overwhelming numbers, and we began to retreat towards the causeway in the best order we could, with our ranks firmly closed. The first opening in the causeway which we had just taken from the enemy was already occupied by numerous canoes, so that we were compelled to make for the opening which the enemy had recently cut, where the water was very deep, and additional large holes had been dug. Here we had no other resource left than to make our way, either by swimming or wading through; but most of us got into the deep holes, when the canoes were instantly at hand to take advantage of our perilous situation.
On this occasion five of our men were made prisoners, and immediately taken into the presence of Quauhtemoctzin; and most of us were severely wounded. The brigantines certainly made every attempt to a.s.sist us, but were unable to come near enough, owing to the heavy stakes that had been driven into the water, between which they stuck fast, and were instantly a.s.sailed by showers of missiles from the house-tops and the numberless canoes, by which two of the rowers were killed, and the greater part of the troops on board wounded.
It was indeed a real wonder that all of us did not perish in these deep gaps. I myself was in extreme danger, for several Mexicans had already laid hands on me, but I succeeded in freeing one of my arms, and the Almighty gave me power to cut my way through the enemy, though I was severely wounded in the arm, and just as I had reached a place of safety I fell down breathless and exhausted. This sudden prostration of strength was no doubt owing to the extraordinary exertions I had made to disengage myself from the enemy"s grasp, and to the quant.i.ty of blood I had lost. I gave myself up for lost when the Mexicans laid hold of me, and commended my soul to G.o.d and the holy Virgin.
Alvarado, with the cavalry, had hard work to keep off the numerous bodies who attacked our rear from the side towards Tlacupa, and had not advanced up to this fearful pa.s.sage; there was only one cavalry soldier, recently arrived from Spain, who ventured too far, and perished with his horse. Alvarado was already coming up to our a.s.sistance, with a small body of horse, but fortunately not before we had made good our retreat beyond the deep gap; for, had he arrived a few minutes earlier, we should, no doubt, have faced about, fought our way back again into the town, and the Mexicans would certainly have cut us off to a man.
This battle took place on a Sunday, and the Mexicans were so elated with the victory they had gained over us, that they fell upon our camp with renewed courage, and in so large a body that they would certainly have taken it by storm but for our cannon and the desperate courage we displayed for the preservation of our lives. During this night, the whole of us remained under arms ready for action, and the horses stood ready saddled and bridled. Cortes was excessively grieved at the defeat we had sustained, and despatched a letter to Alvarado by one of the brigantines in which he told him not, under any circ.u.mstances, in future to pa.s.s beyond a gap or opening in the causeway before it had been quite filled up; and to keep the horses saddled all day and night, and to observe the utmost vigilance.
Our recent defeat having taught us prudence, we set about filling up the larger opening with the utmost expedition, and completed the work in four days; though it was a labour of great difficulty, and we were the whole time exposed to the attacks of the enemy, who killed six of our men and wounded several others. During the night, each company watched by turns to prevent the Mexicans from destroying our day"s work.
As the Mexicans were encamped over against us, we could observe how they regulated their night watches: they were relieved four times during the night, and the men posted at such distances around a large fire, which was kept up till morning, that they could not be seen excepting at the moments when they poked the fire or when the next watch came to relieve.
On some nights the fire became extinguished by the rain, but it was instantly relit; though everything was done in the utmost silence and not a word was exchanged, for they only communicated with each other by whistling. Many a time when we heard the guard approaching to relieve the watch, our crossbow-men and musketeers would shoot in among them at random, but without doing them the slightest injury, as they were posted in places which, even during broad daylight, were beyond the reach of our fire, particularly behind a deep ditch, which they had recently dug, and strengthened by a palisade and breastwork. The Mexicans never omitted to return the compliment, and let fly many an arrow at us in the same way.
The conflict on the causeway was daily renewed, and we always made our attacks in the best order possible, so that we soon became masters of the fosse just mentioned, behind which the enemy encamped at nights, but we had each time to encounter vast bodies of men, and the whole of us were more or less wounded. After fighting the whole day until nightfall, there was naturally nothing further to be done than to return to our former position; but each time we commenced our retreat, other bodies of the enemy fell furiously upon us. The Mexicans were confident they should, one time or other, be able to annihilate us during one of these retreats, and they rushed upon us with the very fury of tigers, and came in so close upon us that we were compelled to fight foot to foot. But after a time, when we had got more accustomed to their mode of fighting, we first ordered the Tlascallans off the causeway; for these were very numerous, and delighted in combating with the Mexicans, under our immediate protection, though they only embarra.s.sed our movements, of which the enemy were sly enough to take advantage. As soon as we considered the Tlascallans sufficiently in advance of us, we firmly closed our ranks and began our retreat, which was covered by our crossbow-men and musketeers, and by the four brigantines, which kept up with us, two on each side of the causeway. When we reached our encampment we dressed our wounds with bandages steeped in warm oil, and ate our supper off the maize-cakes, the herbs, and the figs which were sent us from Tlacupa. When this was finished, a strong detachment was again posted for the night at the opening in the causeway, and when daylight broke forth the battle was renewed. Such was our life, day after day; and however early we might march out, we always found the enemy ready to receive us, or they had already advanced up to our outposts and defied us to the combat under the most abusive language.
Cortes, with his division, fared no better than we did; the fighting was continued night and day, and many of his men were killed and wounded.
For the rest, matters stood with him exactly as they did with us on the causeway of Tlacupa, and two brigantines still continued cruizing on the lake at night-time to intercept the canoes laden with water and provisions for Mexico.
On one occasion two Mexicans of distinction were captured, who informed Cortes that forty pirogues and a great number of canoes lay hid among the reeds of the lake to make another attempt upon the two brigantines.
Our general returned these men many thanks for what they had communicated, made them some presents, and promised to bestow considerable lands upon them after Mexico should be taken; they then described to him the spot where the armed pirogues lay in ambush, and the different places where the heavy stakes had been driven in, of which it was intended the brigantines should run foul while pursuing the pirogues in their sham flight.
Cortes was now determined to pay the enemy out in their own coin, and in the night-time concealed six of our brigantines in a place where the reeds stood very thick, at about a mile distant from the spot where the pirogues lay in ambuscade. Each brigantine was entirely covered with green boughs, and the men on board were ordered not to make the least noise during the whole of the night. Very early next morning, Cortes ordered one of our other brigantines to run out as usual to waylay the convoys of provisions going to Mexico. Both the above-mentioned distinguished Mexicans were taken on board to point out the place where the pirogues lay concealed, as our brigantine was purposely to steer in that direction. As soon as the Mexicans observed the brigantine approaching, they run out two of their canoes into the lake to allure the brigantine to their pursuit. The stratagem was laid on both sides in the very same way, and it was now only to be seen which should outdo the other. Our brigantine sharply pursued the two canoes, which were moving off in the direction of the concealed pirogues, but suddenly turned round as if she durst not venture nearer land. The instant the pirogues found the brigantine was turning back, they rushed forth out of the reeds and pulled away at their utmost speed in pursuit of her. The brigantine pretended to seek her safety in flight, and steered in the direction where our six others lay concealed, the pirogues following with the utmost confidence. When these were near enough, a shot was fired as a signal to the Spanish vessels, upon which they, in their turn, rushed out upon the pirogues and canoes with the utmost velocity, and bored several of them into the ground. Now the other brigantine also came up which had shammed flight, so that many of the canoes were captured, and numbers of the enemy killed and wounded. From this moment the Mexicans never again attempted similar stratagems on the lake, nor durst they venture so close in our neighbourhood with their convoys of provisions.
When the inhabitants of those towns which lay in the lake found that we were daily gaining fresh victories both by land and water, and that our allies of Chalco, Tezcuco, Tlascalla, and other districts, became more and more closely united to us, they began to consider the great losses they continually sustained, and the numbers of prisoners we took. The chiefs of these towns, therefore, held a conference among themselves, which ended in their sending an emba.s.sy to Cortes to sue for peace, and humbly to beg forgiveness for the past; adding, that they had been obliged to obey the commands of Quauhtemoctzin.
Cortes was uncommonly rejoiced to find these people were coming to their senses, and we others belonging to the divisions of Alvarado and Sandoval likewise congratulated ourselves on this circ.u.mstance.
Our general received the amba.s.sadors kindly, and told them their towns had certainly deserved severe punishment, but he would, nevertheless, pardon them. The towns which sued for peace on this occasion were Iztapalapan, Huitzilopuzco, Cojohuacan, Mizquic, and all the other towns lying in that part of the lake which contained sweet water.