The Naval War of 1812

Chapter 11

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Meanwhile Yeo had been nearly as active at Kingston, laying down two frigates and a huge line-of-battle ship, but his shipwrights did not succeed in getting the latter ready much before navigation closed. The Prince Regent, 58, and Princess Charlotte, 42, were launched on April 15th. I shall antic.i.p.ate somewhat by giving tabular lists of the comparative forces, after the two British frigates, the two American frigates, and the two American brigs had all been equipped and manned. Commodore Yeo"s original six cruisers had been all renamed, some of them re-armed, and both the schooners changed into brigs. The Wolfe, Royal George, Melville, Moira, Beresford, and Sydney Smith, were now named respectively Montreal, Niagara, Star, Charwell, Netly, and Magnet. On the American side there had been but slight changes, beyond the alteration of the Sylph into a brig armed like the Oneida. Of the Superior"s 62 guns, 4 were very shortly sent on sh.o.r.e again.

CHAUNCY"S SQUADRON.

Broadside Name. Rig. Tonnage. Crew. Metal. Armament.

Superior, ship, 1,580 500 1,050lbs. +- 30 long 32"s | 2 " 24"s - 26 short 42"s Mohawk, " 1,350 350 554 lbs. -+- 26 long 24"s | 2 " 18"s "- 14 short 32"s Pike, " 875 300 360 " -+- 26 long 24"s "- 2 " 24"s Madison, " 593 200 364 " -+- 2 long 12"s "- 22 short 32"s Jones, brig, 500 160 332 " -+- 2 long 12"s "- 20 short 32"s Jefferson, " 500 160 332 " -+- 2 long 12"s "- 20 short 32"s Sylph, " 300 100 180 " -+- 2 long 12"s "- 14 short 24"s Oneida, " 243 100 180 " -+- 2 long 12"s "- 14 short 24"s __________ _____ _____ __________ ________ 8 vessels, 5,941 1,870 3,352 lbs. 228 guns.

This is considerably less than James makes it, as he includes all the schooners, which were abandoned as cruisers, and only used as transports or gun-boats. Similarly Sir James had a large number of gun-boats, which are not included in his cruising force. James thus makes Chauncy"s force 2,321 men, and a broadside of 4,188 lbs.

YEO"S SQUADRON

Broadside Name. Rig. Tonnage. Crew. Metal. Armament.

Prince ship, 1,450 485 872 lbs. -+- 32 long 24"s Regent, | 4 short 68"s "- 22 " 32"s Princess " 1,215 315 604 " -+- 26 long 24"s Charlotte, | 2 short 68"s "- 14 " 32"s Montreal, " 637 220 258 " -+- 7 long 24"s "- 18 " 18"s Niagara, " 510 200 332 " -+- 2 long 12"s "- 20 short 32"s Charwell, brig, 279 110 236 " -+- 2 long 12"s "-14 short 32"s Star, " 262 110 236 " -+- 2 long 12"s "-14 short 32"s Netly, " 216 100 180 " -+- 2 long 12"s "-14 short 24"s Magnet, " 187 80 156 " -+- 2 long 12"s "-12 short 24"s __________ _____ _____ _________ ________ 8 vessels, 4,756 1,620 2,874 lbs. 209 guns.

This tallies pretty well with James" statement, which (on p. 488) is 1,517 men, and a broadside of 2,752 lbs. But there are very probably errors as regards the armaments of the small brigs, which were continually changed. At any rate the American fleet was certainly the stronger, about in the proportion of six to five. The disproportion was enough to justify Sir James in his determination not to hazard a battle, although the odds were certainly not such as British commanders had been previously accustomed to pay much regard to. Chauncy would have acted exactly as his opponent did, had he been similarly placed. The odds against the British commodore were too great to be overcome, where the combatants were otherwise on a par, although the refusal to do battle against them would certainly preclude Yeo from advancing any claims to superiority in skill or courage. The Princess Charlotte and Niagara were just about equal to the Mohawk and Madison, and so were the Charwell and Netly to the Oneida and Sylph; but both the Star and Magnet together could hardly have matched either the Jones or the Jefferson, while the main-deck 32"s of the Superior gave her a great advantage over the Prince Regent"s 24"s, where the crews were so equal; and the Pike was certainly too heavy for the Montreal. A decided superiority in the effectiveness of both crews and captains could alone have warranted Sir James Lucas Yeo in engaging, and this superiority he certainly did not possess.

This year the British architects outstripped ours in the race for supremacy, and Commodore Yeo put out of port with his eight vessels long before the Americans were ready. His first attempt was a successful attack on Oswego. This town is situated some 60 miles distant from Sackett"s Harbor, and is the first port on the lake which the stores, sent from the seaboard to Chauncy, reached. Accordingly it was a place of some little importance, but was very much neglected by the American authorities. It was insufficiently garrisoned, and was defended only by an entirely ruined fort of 6 guns, two of them dismounted. Commodore Yeo sailed from Kingston to attack it on the 3d of May, having on board his ships a detachment of 1,080 troops. Oswego was garrisoned by less than 300 men, [Footnote: General order of Gen. Jacob Brown, by R. Jones, a.s.s. Adj.-General, May 12, 1814.] chiefly belonging to a light artillery regiment, with a score or two of militia; they were under the command of Colonel Mitch.e.l.l. The recaptured schooner Growler was in port, with 7 guns destined for the Harbor; she was sunk by her commander, but afterward raised and carried off by the foe.

On the 5th Yeo appeared off Oswego and sent in Captain Collier and 13 gun-boats to draw the fort"s fire; after some firing between them and the four guns mounted in the fort (two long 24"s, one long 12, and one long 6), the gun-boats retired. The next day the attack was seriously made. The Princess Charlotte, Montreal, and Niagara engaged the batteries, while the Charwell and Star scoured the woods with grape to clear them of the militia. [Footnote: Letter of General Gordon Drummond, May 7, 1814.] The debarkation of the troops was superintended by Captain O"Connor, and until it was accomplished the Montreal sustained almost the whole fire of the fort, being set on fire three times, and much cut up in hull, masts, and rigging. [Footnote: Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo, May 17, 1814.] Under this fire 800 British troops were landed, under Lieutenant-Colonel Fischer, a.s.sisted by 200 seamen, armed with long pikes, under Captain Mulcaster. They moved gallantly up the hill, under a heavy fire, and carried the fort by a.s.sault; Mitch.e.l.l then fell back unmolested to the Falls, about 12 miles above the town, where there was a large quant.i.ty of stores. But he was not again attacked. The Americans lost 6 men killed, including Lieutenant Blaeny, 38 wounded, and 25 missing, both of these last falling into the enemy"s hands. The British lost 22 soldiers, marines, and seamen (including Captain Hollaway) killed, and 73 (including the gallant Captain Mulcaster dangerously, and Captain Popham slightly) wounded, [Footnote: Letter of Lieut.-Col. V. Fischer, May 17, 1814. James says "18 killed and 64 wounded," why I do not know; the official report of Col. Fischer, as quoted, says: "Of the army, 19 killed and 62 wounded; of the navy, 3 killed and 11 wounded."] the total loss being 95-nearly a third of the American force engaged. General Drummond, in his official letter, reports that "the fort being everywhere almost open, the whole of the garrison * * * effected their escape, except about 60 men, half of them wounded." No doubt the fort"s being "everywhere almost open" afforded excellent opportunities for retreat; but it was not much of a recommendation of it as a structure intended for defence.

The British destroyed the four guns in the battery, and raised the Growler and carried her off, with her valuable cargo of seven long guns. They also carried off a small quant.i.ty of ordnance stores and some flour, and burned the barracks; otherwise but little damage was done, and the Americans reoccupied the place at once. It certainly showed great lack of energy on Commodore Yeo"s part that he did not strike a really important blow by sending an expedition up to destroy the quant.i.ty of stores and ordnance collected at the Falls. But the attack itself was admirably managed. The ships were well placed, and kept up so heavy a fire on the fort as to effectually cover the debarkation of the troops, which was very cleverly accomplished; and the soldiers and seamen behaved with great gallantry and steadiness, their officers leading them, sword in hand, up a long, steep hill, under a destructive fire. It was similar to Chauncy"s attacks on York and Fort George, except that in this case the a.s.sailants suffered a much severer loss compared to that inflicted on the a.s.sailed. Colonel Mitch.e.l.l managed the defence with skill, doing all he could with his insufficient materials.

After returning to Kingston, Yeo sailed with his squadron for Sackett"s Harbor, where he appeared on May 19th and began a strict blockade. This was especially troublesome because most of the guns and cables for the two frigates had not yet arrived, and though the lighter pieces and stores could be carried over land, the heavier ones could only go by water, which route was now made dangerous by the presence of the blockading squadron. The very important duty of convoying these great guns was entrusted to Captain Woolsey, an officer of tried merit. He decided to take them by water to Stony Creek, whence they might be carried by land to the Harbor, which was but three miles distant; and on the success of his enterprise depended Chauncy"s chances of regaining command of the lake. On the 28th of May, at sunset, Woolsey left Oswego with 19 boats, carrying 21 long 32"s, 10 long 24"s, three 42-pound carronades, and 10 cables-one of the latter, for the Superior, being a huge rope 22 inches in circ.u.mference and weighing 9,600 pounds. The boats rowed all through the night, and at sunrise on the 29th 18 of them found themselves off the Big Salmon River, and, as it was unsafe to travel by daylight, Woolsey ran up into Big Sandy Creek, 8 miles from the Harbor. The other boat, containing two long 24"s and a cable, got out of line, ran into the British squadron, and was captured. The news she brought induced Sir James Yeo at once to send out an expedition to capture the others. He accordingly despatched Captains Popham and Spilsbury in two gun-boats, one armed with one 68-pound and one 24-pound carronade, and the other with a long 32, accompanied by three cutters and a gig, mounting between them two long 12"s and two bra.s.s 6"s, with a total of 180 men. [Footnote: James, vi. 487; while Cooper says 186, James says the British loss was 18 killed and 50 wounded; Major Appling says "14 were killed, 28 wounded, and 27 marines and 106 sailors captured."] They rowed up to Sandy Creek and lay off its mouth all the night, and began ascending it shortly after daylight on the 30th. Their force, however, was absurdly inadequate for the accomplishment of their object. Captain Woolsey had been reinforced by some Oneida Indians, a company of light artillery, and some militia, so that his only care was, not to repulse, but to capture the British party entire, and even this did not need any exertion. He accordingly despatched Major Appling down the river with 120 riflemen [Footnote: Letter from Major D. Appling, May 30, 1814.] and some Indians to lie in ambush. [Footnote: Letter of Capt. M. T. Woolsey, June 1, 1814. There were about 60 Indians: In all, the American force amounted to 180 men. James adds 30 riflemen, 140 Indians, and "a large body of militia and cavalry,"-none of whom were present.] When going up the creek the British marines, under Lieutenant c.o.x, were landed on the left bank, and the small-arm men, under Lieutenant Brown, on the right bank; while the two captains rowed up the stream between them, throwing grape into the bushes to disperse the Indians. Major Appling waited until the British were close up, when his riflemen opened with so destructive a volley as to completely demoralize and "stampede" them, and their whole force was captured with hardly any resistance, the American having only one man slightly wounded. The British loss was severe,-18 killed and 50 dangerously wounded, according to Captain Popham"s report, as quoted by James; or "14 killed and 28 wounded," according to Major Appling"s letter. It was a very clever and successful ambush.

On June 6th Yeo raised the blockade of the Harbor, but Chauncy"s squadron was not in condition to put out till six weeks later, during which time nothing was done by either fleet, except that two very gallant cutting-out expeditions were successfully attempted by Lieutenant Francis H. Gregory, U.S.N. On June 16th he left the Harbor, accompanied by Sailing-masters Vaughan and Dixon and 22 seamen, in three gigs, to intercept some of the enemy"s provision schooners; on the 19th he was discovered by the British gun-boat Black Snake, of one 18-pound carronade and 18 men, commanded by Captain H. Landon. Lieutenant Gregory dashed at the gun-boat and carried it without the loss of a man; he was afterward obliged to burn it, but he brought the prisoners, chiefly royal marines, safely into port. On the 1st of July he again started out, with Messrs. Vaughan and Dixon, and two gigs. The plucky little party suffered greatly from hunger, but on the 5th he made a sudden descent on Presque Isle, and burned a 14-gun schooner just ready for launching; he was off before the foe could a.s.semble, and reached the Harbor in safety next day.

On July 31st Commodore Chauncy sailed with his fleet; some days previously the larger British vessels had retired to Kingston, where a 100-gun two-decker was building. Chauncy sailed up to the head of the lake, where he intercepted the small brig Magnet. The Sylph was sent in to destroy her, but her crew ran her ash.o.r.e and burned her. The Jefferson, Sylph, and Oneida were left to watch some other small craft in the Niagara; the Jones was kept cruising between the Harbor and Oswego, and with the four larger vessels Chauncy blockaded Yeo"s four large vessels lying in Kingston. The four American vessels were in the aggregate of 4,398 tons, manned by rather more than 1,350 men, and presenting in broadside 77 guns, throwing 2,328 lbs. of shot. The four British vessels measured in all about 3,812 tons, manned by 1,220 men, and presenting in broadside 74 guns, throwing 2,066 lbs. of shot. The former were thus superior by about 15 per cent., and Sir James Yeo very properly declined to fight with the odds against him-although it was a nicer calculation than British commanders had been accustomed to enter into.

Major-General Brown had written to Commodore Chauncy on July 13th: "I do not doubt my ability to meet the enemy in the field and to march in any direction over his country, your fleet carrying for me the necessary supplies. We can threaten Forts George and Niagara, and carry Burlington Heights and York, and proceed direct to Kingston and carry that place. For G.o.d"s sake let me see you: Sir James will not fight." To which Chauncy replied: "I shall afford every a.s.sistance in my power to cooperate with the army whenever it can be done without losing sight of the great object for the attainment of which this fleet has been created,-the capture or destruction of the enemy"s fleet. But that I consider the primary object. * * * We are intended to seek and fight the enemy"s fleet, and I shall not be diverted from my efforts to effectuate it by any sinister attempt to render us subordinate to, or an appendage of, the army." That is, by any "sinister attempt" to make him cooperate intelligently in a really well-concerted scheme of invasion. In further support of these n.o.ble and independent sentiments, he writes to the Secretary of the Navy on August 10th [Footnote: See Niles, vii, 12, and other places (under "Chauncy" in index).], "I told (General Brown) that I should not visit the head of the lake unless the enemy"s fleet did so. * * * To deprive the enemy of an apology for not meeting me, I have sent ash.o.r.e four guns from the Superior to reduce her armament in number to an equality with the Prince Regent"s, yielding the advantage of their 68-pounders. The Mohawk mounts two guns less than the Princess Charlotte, and the Montreal and Niagara are equal to the Pike and Madison." He here justifies his refusal to co-operate with General Brown by saying that he was of only equal force with Sir James, and that he has deprived the latter of "an apology" for not meeting him. This last was not at all true. The Mohawk and Madison were just about equal to the Princess Charlotte and Niagara: but the Pike was half as strong again as the Montreal; and Chauncy could very well afford to "yield the advantage of their 68-pounders," when in return Sir James had to yield the advantage of Chauncy"s long 32"s and 42-pound carronades. The Superior was a 32-pounder frigate, and, even without her four extra guns, was about a fourth heavier than the Prince Regent with her 24-pounders. Sir James was not acting more warily than Chauncy had acted during June and July, 1813. Then he had a fleet which tonned 1,701, was manned by 680 men, and threw at a broadside 1,099 lbs. of shot; and he declined to go out of port or in any way try to check the operation of Yeo"s fleet which tonned 2,091, was manned by 770 men, and threw at a broadside 1,374 lbs. of shot. Chauncy then acted perfectly proper, no doubt, but he could not afford to sneer at Yeo for behaving in the same way. Whatever either commander might write, in reality he well knew that his officers and crews were, man for man, just about on a par with those of his antagonists, and so, after the first brush or two, he was exceedingly careful to see that the odds were not against him. Chauncy, in his petulant answers to Brown"s letter, ignored the fact that his superiority of force would prevent his opponent from giving battle, and would, therefore, prevent any thing more important than a blockade occurring.

His ideas of the purpose for which his command had been created were erroneous and very hurtful to the American cause. That purpose was not, except incidentally, "the destruction of the enemy"s fleet"; and, if it was, he entirely failed to accomplish it. The real purpose was to enable Canada to be successfully invaded, or to a.s.sist in repelling an invasion of the United States. These services could only be efficiently performed by acting in union with the land-forces, for his independent action could evidently have little effect. The only important services he had performed had been in attacking Forts George and York, where he had been rendered "subordinate to, and an appendage of, the army." His only chance of accomplishing any thing lay in similar acts of cooperation, and he refused to do these. Had he acted as he ought to have done, and a.s.sisted Brown to the utmost, he would certainly have accomplished much more than he did, and might have enabled Brown to a.s.sault Kingston, when Yeo"s fleet would of course have been captured. The insubordination, petty stickling for his own dignity, and lack of appreciation of the necessity of acting in concert that he showed, were the very faults which proved most fatal to the success of our various land commanders in the early part of the war. Even had Chauncy"s a.s.sistance availed nothing, he could not have accomplished less than he did. He remained off Kingston blockading Yeo, being once or twice blown off by gales. He sent Lieutenant Gregory, accompanied by Midshipman Hart and six men, in to reconnoitre on August 25th; the lieutenant ran across two barges containing 30 men, and was captured after the midshipman had been killed and the lieutenant and four men wounded. On September 21st he transported General Izard and 3,000 men from Sackett"s Harbor to the Genesee; and then again blockaded Kingston until the two-decker was nearly completed, when he promptly retired to the Harbor.

The equally cautious Yeo did not come out on the lake till Oct. 15th; he did not indulge in the empty and useless formality of blockading his antagonist, but a.s.sisted the British army on the Niagara frontier till navigation closed, about Nov. 21st. A couple of days before, Midshipman McGowan headed an expedition to blow up the two-decker (named the St. Lawrence) with a torpedo, but was discovered by two of the enemy"s boats, which he captured and brought in; the attempt was abandoned, because the St. Lawrence was found not to be lying in Kingston.

For this year the material loss again fell heaviest on the British, amounting to one 14-gun brig burned by her crew, one 10-gun schooner burned on the stocks, three gun-boats, three cutters, and one gig captured; while in return the Americans lost one schooner loaded with seven guns, one boat loaded with two, and a gig captured and four guns destroyed at Oswego. In men the British loss was heavier still relatively to that of the Americans, being in killed, wounded, and prisoners about 300 to 80. But in spite of this loss and damage, which was too trivial to be of any account to either side, the success of the season was with the British, inasmuch as they held command over the lake for more than four months, during which time they could cooperate with their army; while the Americans held it for barely two months and a half. In fact the conduct of the two fleets on Lake Ontario during the latter part of the war was almost farcical. As soon as one, by building, acquired the superiority, the foe at once retired to port, where he waited until he had built another vessel or two, when he came out, and the other went into port in turn. Under such circ.u.mstances it was hopeless ever to finish the contest by a stand-up sea-fight, each commander calculating the chances with mathematical exactness. The only hope of destroying the enemy"s fleet was by cooperating with the land-forces in a successful attack on his main post, when he would be forced to be either destroyed or to fight-and this cooperation Chauncy refused to give. He seems to have been an excellent organizer, but he did not use (certainly not in the summer of 1813) his materials by any means to the best advantage. He was hardly equal to his opponent, and the latter seems to have been little more than an average officer. Yeo blundered several times, as in the attack on Sackett"s Harbor, in not following up his advantage at Oswego, in showing so little resource in the action off the Genesee, etc., and he was not troubled by any excess of daring; but during the period when he was actually cruising against Chauncy on the lake he certainly showed to better advantage than the American did. With an inferior force he won a partial victory over his opponent off Niagara, and then kept him in check for six weeks; while Chauncy, with his superior force, was not only partially defeated once, but, when he did gain a partial victory, failed to take advantage of it.

In commenting upon the timid and dilatory tactics of the two commanders on Ontario, however, it must be remembered that the indecisive nature of the results attained had been often paralleled by the numerous similar encounters that took place on the ocean during the wars of the preceding century. In the War of the American Revolution, the English fought some 19 fleet actions with the French, Dutch, and Spaniards; one victory was gained over the French, and one over the Spaniards, while the 17 others were all indecisive, both sides claiming the victory, and neither winning it. Of course, some of them, though indecisive as regards loss and damage, were strategetical victories: thus, Admiral Arbuthnot beat back Admiral Barras off the Chesapeake, in March of 1781; and near the same place in September of the same year the French had their revenge in the victory (one at least in its results) of the Comte de Gra.s.se over Sir Thomas Graves. In the five desperate and b.l.o.o.d.y combats which De Suffrein waged with Sir Edward Hughes in the East Indies, the laurels were very evenly divided. These five conflicts were not rendered indecisive by any overwariness in manoeuvring, for De Suffrein"s attacks were carried out with as much boldness as skill, and his stubborn antagonist was never inclined to baulk him of a fair battle; but the two hardy fighters were so evenly matched that they would pound one another till each was helpless to inflict injury. Very different were the three consecutive battles that took place in the same waters, on the 25th of April, 1758, the 3d of August, 1758, and on the 10th of September, 1759, between Poc.o.c.k and d"Ache [Footnote: "La Marine Francaise sous le Regne de Louis XV," par Henri Riviere, Lieutenant de Vaisseau, Chevalier de la Legion d" Honneur. (Paris et Toulon, 1859), pp. 385 and 439.], where, by skilful manoeuvring, the French admiral saved his somewhat inferior force from capture, and the English admiral gained indecisive victories. M. Riviere, after giving a most just and impartial account of the battles, sums up with the following excellent criticism. [Footnote: Ibid., p. 425. I pay more attention to the sense than to the letter in my translation.]

"It is this battle, won by Hawke, the 20th of November, 1757, and the combats of Poc.o.c.k and d"Ache, from which date two distinct schools in the naval affairs of the 18th century: one of these was all for promptness and audacity, which were regarded as the indispensable conditions for victory; the other, on the contrary, praised skilful delays and able evolutions, and created success by science united to prudence. * * * But these two schools were true only according to circ.u.mstances, not absolutely. When two fleets of equal worth are facing one another, as in the War of the American Revolution, then tactics should come into play, and audacity would often be mere foolhardiness. If it happens, on the other hand, as in the Republic, or during the last years of Louis XV, that an irresolute fleet, without organization, has to contend with a fleet prepared in every way, then, on the part of this last, audacity is wisdom and prudence would be cowardice, for it would give an enemy who distrusts himself time to become more hardy. The only school always true is that one which, freed from all routine, produces men whose genius will unite in one, in knowing how to apply them appropriately, the audacity which will carry off victory, and the prudence which knows how to obtain it in preparing for it."

These generalizations are drawn from the results of mighty battles, but they apply just as well to the campaigns carried on on a small scale, or even to single-ship actions. Chauncy, as already said, does not deserve the praise which most American historians, and especially Cooper, have lavished on him as well as on all our other officers of that period. Such indiscriminate eulogy entirely detracts from the worth of a writer"s favorable criticisms. Our average commander was, I firmly believe, at that time superior to the average commander of any other nation; but to get at this average we must include Chauncy, Rodgers, and Angus, as well as Hull, Macdonough, Perry, Porter, Bainbridge, Biddle, Lawrence, and Warrington.

Sir James Yeo did to the full as well as his opponent, and like him was a good organizer; but he did little enough. His campaigns must be considered as being conducted well or ill according as he is believed to have commanded better men than his opponent, or not. If, as many British writers contend, his crews were an overmatch for the Americans, man for man, even to a slight degree, then Yeo"s conduct was very cowardly; if, on the contrary, the officers and men of the two fleets were on a par, then he acted properly and outgeneralled his opponent. It is to be regretted that most of the histories written on the subject, on either side of the Atlantic, should be of the "hurrah" order of literature, with no attempt whatever to get at the truth, but merely to explain away the defeats or immensely exaggerate the victories suffered or gained by their own side.

Erie and the Upper Lakes.

Hitherto the vessels on these lakes (as well as on Ontario) had been under the command of Commodore Chauncy; but they were now formed into a separate department, under Captain Arthur Sinclair. The Americans had, of course, complete supremacy, and no attempt was seriously made to contest it with them; but they received a couple of stinging, if not very important, defeats. It is rather singular that here the British, who began with a large force, while there was none whatever to oppose it, should have had it by degrees completely annihilated; and should have then, and not till then, when apparently rendered harmless, have turned round and partially revenged themselves by two cutting-out expeditions which were as boldly executed as they were skilfully planned.

Captain Sinclair sailed into Lake Huron with the Niagara, Caledonia, Ariel, Scorpion, and Tigress, and on July 20th burnt the fort and barracks of St. Joseph, which were abandoned by their garrison. On Aug. 4th he arrived off the fort of Machilimacinac (Mackinaw), which was situated on such an eminence that the guns of the vessels could not reach it. Accordingly, the troops under Col. Croghan were landed, covered by the fire of the schooners, very successfully; but when they tried to carry the fort they were driven back with the loss of 70 men. Thence Sinclair sailed to the Nattagawa.s.sa Creek, attacked and destroyed a block-house three miles up it, which mounted three light guns, and also a schooner called the Nancy; but the commander of the schooner, Lieutenant Worsely, with his crew, escaped up the river. Captain Sinclair then departed for Lake Erie, leaving the Scorpion, Lieutenant Turner, and Tigress, Sailing-master Champlin, to blockade the Nattagawa.s.sa. News was received by the British from a party of Indians that the two American vessels were five leagues apart, and it was at once resolved to attempt their capture. On the first of September, in the evening, four boats started out, one manned by 20 seamen, under Lieutenant Worsely, the three others by 72 soldiers under Lieutenants Bulger, Armstrong, and Raderhurst of the army-in all 92 men and two guns, a 6- and a 3-pounder. A number of Indians accompanied the expedition but took no part in the fighting. At sunset on the 2d the boats arrived at St. Mary"s Strait, and spent 24 hours in finding out where the American schooners were. At 6 P.M. on the 3d, the nearest vessel, the Tigress, was made out, six miles off, and they pulled for her. It was very dark, and they were not discovered till they had come within fifty yards, when Champlin at once fired his long 24 at them; before it could be reloaded the four boats had dashed up, those of Lieutenants Worsely and Armstrong placing themselves on the starboard, and those of Lieutenants Bulger and Raderhurst on the port side. There was a short, sharp struggle, and the schooner was carried. Of her crew of 28 men, 3 were killed and five, including Mr. Champlin, dangerously wounded. The a.s.sailants lost three seamen killed, Lieutenant Bulger, seven soldiers and several seamen wounded. [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant A. H. Bulger, Sept. 7, 1814. James says only 3 killed and 8 wounded; but Lieutenant Bulger distinctly says in addition, "and several seamen wounded."] "The defence of this vessel," writes Lieut. Bulger, "did credit to her officers, who were all severely wounded." Next day the prisoners were sent on sh.o.r.e; and on the 5th the Scorpion was discovered working up to join her consort, entirely ignorant of what had happened. She anch.o.r.ed about 2 miles from the Tigress; and next morning at 6 o"clock the latter slipped her cable and ran down under the jib and fore-sail, the American ensign and pendant still flying. When within 10 yards of the Scorpion, the concealed soldiers jumped up, poured a volley into her which killed 2 and wounded 2 men, and the next moment carried her, her surprised crew of 30 men making no resistance. The whole affair reflected great credit on the enterprise and pluck of the British without being discreditable to the Americans. It was like Lieut. Elliot"s capture of the Detroit and Caledonia.

Meanwhile a still more daring cutting-out expedition had taken place at the foot of Lake Erie. The three American schooners, Ohio, Somers, and Porcupine, each with 30 men, under Lieut. Conkling, were anch.o.r.ed just at the outlet of the lake, to cover the flank of the works at Fort Erie. On the night of August 12th, Capt. Dobbs, of the Charwell, and Lieut. Radcliffe, of the Netly, with 75 seamen and marines from their two vessels, which were lying off Fort Erie, resolved to attempt the capture of the schooners. The seamen carried the captain"s gig upon their shoulders from Queenstown to Frenchman"s Creek, a distance of 20 miles; thence, by the aid of some militia, 5 batteaux as well as the gig were carried 8 miles across the woods to Lake Erie, and the party (whether with or without the militia I do not know) embarked in them. Between 11 and 12 the boats were discovered a short distance ahead of the Somers and hailed. They answered "provision boats," which deceived the officer on deck, as such boats had been in the habit of pa.s.sing and repa.s.sing continually during the night. Before he discovered his mistake the boats drifted across his hawse, cut his cables, and ran him aboard with a volley of musketry, which wounded two of his men, and before the others could get on deck the schooner was captured. In another moment the British boats were alongside the Ohio, Lieut. Conkling"s vessel. Here the people had hurried on deck, and there was a moment"s sharp struggle, in which the a.s.sailants lost Lieut. Radcliffe and one seaman killed and six seamen and marines wounded; but on board the Ohio Lieut. Conkling and Sailing-master M. Cally were shot down, one seaman killed, and four wounded, and Captain Dobbs carried her, sword in hand. The Porcupine was not molested, and made no effort to interfere with the British in their retreat; so they drifted down the rapids with their two prizes and secured them below. The boldness of this enterprise will be appreciated when it is remembered that but 75 British seamen (unless there were some militia along), with no artillery, attacked and captured two out of three fine schooners, armed each with a long 32 or 24, and an aggregate of 90 men; and that this had been done in waters where the gig and five batteaux of the victors were the only British vessels afloat.

CHAMPLAIN.

This lake, which had hitherto played but an inconspicuous part, was now to become the scene of the greatest naval battle of the war. A British army of 11,000 men under Sir George Prevost undertook the invasion of New York by advancing up the western bank of Lake Champlain. This advance was impracticable unless there was a sufficiently strong British naval force to drive back the American squadron at the same time. Accordingly, the British began to construct a frigate, the Confiance, to be added to their already existing force, which consisted of a brig, two sloops, and 12 or 14 gun-boats. The Americans already possessed a heavy corvette, a schooner, a small sloop, and 10 gun-boats or row-galleys; they now began to build a large brig, the Eagle, which was launched about the 16th of August. Nine days later, on the 25th, the Confiance was launched. The two squadrons were equally deficient in stores, etc.; the Confiance having locks to her guns, some of which could not be used, while the American schooner Ticonderoga had to fire her guns by means of pistols flashed at the touchholes (like Barclay on Lake Erie). Macdonough and Downie were hurried into action before they had time to prepare themselves thoroughly; but it was a disadvantage common to both, and arose from the nature of the case, which called for immediate action. The British army advanced slowly toward Plattsburg, which was held by General Macomb with less than 2,000 effective American troops. Captain Thomas Macdonough, the American commodore, took the lake a day or two before his antagonist, and came to anchor in Plattsburg harbor. The British fleet, under Captain George Downie, moved from Isle-aux-Noix on Sept. 8th, and on the morning of the 11th sailed into Plattsburg harbor.

The American force consisted of the ship Saratoga, Captain T. Macdonough, of about 734 tons, [Footnote: In the Naval Archives ("Masters"-Commandant Letters," 1814, 1, No. 134) is a letter from Macdonough in which he states that the Saratoga is intermediate in size between the Pike, of 875, and the Madison, of 593 tons; this would make her 734. The Eagle was very nearly the size of the Lawrence or Niagara, on Lake Erie. The Ticonderoga was originally a small steamer, but Commodore Macdonough had her schooner-rigged, because he found that her machinery got out of order on almost every trip that she took. Her tonnage is only approximately known, but she was of the same size as the Linnet.] carrying eight long 24-pounders, six 42-pound and twelve 32-pound carronades; the brig Eagle, Captain Robert Henly, of about 500 tons, carrying eight long 18"s and twelve 32-pound carronades; schooner Ticonderoga, Lieut.-Com. Stephen Ca.s.sin, of about 350 tons carrying eight long 12-pounders, four long 18-pounders, and five 32-pound carronades; sloop Preble, Lieutenant Charles Budd, of about 80 tons, mounting seven long 9"s; the row-galleys Boxer, Centipede, Nettle, Allen, Viper, and Burrows, each of about 70 tons, and mounting one long 24- and one short 18-pounder; and the row-galleys Wilmer, Ludlow, Aylwin, and Ballard, each of about 40 tons, and mounting one long 12. James puts down the number of men on board the squadron as 950,-merely a guess, as he gives no authority. Cooper says "about 850 men, including officers, and a small detachment of soldiers to act as marines." Lossing (p. 866, note 1) says 882 in all. Vol. xiv of the "American State Papers" contains on p. 572 the prize-money list presented by the purser, George Beale, Jr. This numbers the men (the dead being represented by their heirs or executors) up to 915, including soldiers and seamen, but many of the numbers are omitted, probably owing to the fact that their owners, though belonging on board; happened to be absent on sh.o.r.e, or in the hospital; so that the actual number of names tallies very closely with that given by Lossing; and accordingly I shall take that. [Footnote: In the Naval Archives are numerous letters from Macdonough, in which he states continually that, as fast as they arrive, he subst.i.tutes sailors for the soldiers with which the vessels were originally manned. Men were continually being sent ash.o.r.e on account of sickness. In the Bureau of Navigation is the log-book of "sloop-of-war Surprise, Captain Robert Henly" (Surprise was the name the Eagle originally went by). It mentions from time to time that men were buried and sent ash.o.r.e to the hospital (five being sent ash.o.r.e on September 2d); and finally mentions that the places of the absent were partially filled by a draft of 21 soldiers, to act as marines. The notes on the day of battle are very brief.] The total number of men in the galleys (including a number of soldiers, as there were not enough sailors) was 350. The exact proportions in which this force was distributed among the gunboats can not be told, but it may be roughly said to be 41 in each large galley and 26 in each small one. The complement of the Saratoga was 210, of the Eagle, 130, of the Ticonderoga, 100, and of the Preble, 30; but the first three had also a few soldiers distributed between them. The following list is probably pretty accurate as to the aggregate; but there may have been a score or two fewer men on the gun-boats, or more on the larger vessels.

MACDONOUGH"S FORCE.

Metal, from long Name. Tons. Crew. Broadside. or short guns.

Saratoga, 734 240 414 lbs. -+- long, 96 "- short, 318 Eagle, 500 150 264 " -+- long, 72 "- short, 192 Ticonderoga, 350 112 180 " -+- long, 84 "- short, 96 Preble, 80 30 36 " long, 36

Six gun-boats, 420 246 252 " -+- long, 144 "- short, 108 Four gun-boats, 160 104 48 " long, 48

In all, 14 vessels of 2,244 tons and 882 men, with 86 guns throwing at a broadside 1,194 lbs. of shot, 480 from long, and 714 from short guns.

[Ill.u.s.tration: Commodore Thomas Macdonough: a contemporary portrait by Gilbert Stuart. (Courtesy National Gallery of Art, Mellon Collection)]

The force of the British squadron in guns and ships is known accurately, as most of it was captured. The Confiance rated for years in our lists as a frigate of the cla.s.s of the Constellation, Congress, and Macedonian; she was thus of over 1,200 tons. (Cooper says more, "nearly double the tonnage of the Saratoga.") She carried on her main-deck thirty long 24"s, fifteen in each broadside. She did not have a complete spar-deck; on her p.o.o.p, which came forward to the mizzen-mast, were two 32-pound (or possibly 42-pound) carronades and on her s.p.a.cious top-gallant forecastle were four 32-(or 42-) pound carronades, and a long 24 on a pivot. [Footnote: This is her armament as given by Cooper, on the authority of Lieutenant E. A. F. Lavallette. who was in charge of her for three months, and went aboard her ten minutes after the Linnet struck.] She had aboard her a furnace for heating shot; eight or ten of which heated shot were found with the furnace. [Footnote: James stigmatizes the statement of Commodore Macdonough about the furnace as "as gross a falsehood as ever was uttered"; but he gives no authority for the denial, and it appears to have been merely an ebullition of spleen on his part. Every American officer who went aboard the Confiance saw the furnace and the hot shot.] This was, of course, a perfectly legitimate advantage. The Linnet, Captain Daniel Pring, was a brig of the same size as the Ticonderoga, mounting 16 long 12"s. The Chubb and Finch, Lieutenants James McGhie and William Hicks, were formerly the American sloops Growler and Eagle, of 112 and 110 tons respectively. The former mounted ten 18-pound carronades and one long 6; the latter, six 18-pound carronades, four long 6"s, and one short 18. There were twelve gun-boats. [Footnote: Letter of General George Prevost, Sept. 11, 1814. All the American accounts say 13; the British official account had best be taken. James says only ten, but gives no authority; he appears to have been entirely ignorant of all things connected with this action.] Five of these were large, of about 70 tons each; three mounted a long 24 and a 32-pound carronade each; one mounted a long 18 and a 32-pound carronade; one a long 18 and a short 18. Seven were smaller, of about 40 tons each; three of these carried each a long 18, and four carried each a 32-pound carronade. There is greater difficulty in finding out the number of men in the British fleet. American historians are unanimous in stating it at from 1,000 to 1,100; British historians never do any thing but copy James blindly. Midshipman Lea of the Confiance, in a letter (already quoted) published in the "London Naval Chronicle," vol. x.x.xii, p. 292, gives her crew as 300; but more than this amount of dead and prisoners were taken out of her. The number given her by Commander Ward in his "Naval Tactics," is probably nearest right-325. [Footnote: James gives her but 270 men,-without stating his authority.] The Linnet had about 125 men, and the Chubb and Finch about 50 men each. According to Admiral Paulding (given by Lossing, in his "Field Book of the War of 1812," p. 868) their gun-boats averaged 50 men each. This is probably true, as they were manned largely by soldiers, any number of whom could be spared from Sir George Prevost"s great army; but it may be best to consider the large ones as having 41, and the small 26 men, which were the complements of the American gun-boats of the same sizes. The following, then, is the force of

DOWNIE"S SQUADRON.

From what guns, Name. Tonnage. Crew. Broadside. long or short.

Confiance, 1200 325 480 lbs. -+- long, 384 "- short, 96 Linnet, 350 125 96 " long, 96

Chubb, 112 50 96 " -+- long, 6 "- short, 90 Finch, 110 50 84 " -+- long, 12 "- short, 72 Five gun-boats, 350 205 254 " -+- long, 12 "- short, 72 Seven gun-boats, 280 182 182 " -+- long, 54 "- short, 128 In all, 16 vessels, of about 2,402 tons, with 937 men, [Footnote: About; there were probably more rather than less.] and a total of 92 guns, throwing at a broadside 1,192 lbs., 660 from long and 532 from short pieces.

These are widely different from the figures that appear in the pages of most British historians, from Sir Archibald Alison down and up. Thus, in the "History of the British Navy," by C. D. Yonge (already quoted), it is said that on Lake Champlain "our (the British) force was manifestly and vastly inferior, * * * their (the American) broadside outweighing ours in more than the proportion of three to two, while the difference in their tonnage and in the number of their crews was still more in their favor." None of these historians, or quasi-historians, have made the faintest effort to find out the facts for themselves, following James" figures with blind reliance, and accordingly it is only necessary to discuss the latter. This reputable gentleman ends his account ("Naval Occurrences," p. 424) by remarking that Macdonough wrote as he did because "he knew that nothing would stamp a falsehood with currency equal to a pious expression, * * * his falsehoods equalling in number the lines of his letter." These remarks are interesting as showing the unbia.s.sed and truthful character of the author, rather than for any particular weight they will have in influencing any one"s judgment on Commodore Macdonough. James gives the engaged force of the British as "8 vessels, of 1,426 tons, with 537 men, and throwing 765 lbs. of shot." To reduce the force down to this, he first excludes the Finch, because she "grounded opposite an American battery before the engagement commenced," which reads especially well in connection with Capt. Pring"s official letter: "Lieut. Hicks, of the Finch, had the mortification to strike on a reef of rocks to the eastward of Crab Island about the middle of the engagement." [Footnote: The italics are mine. The letter is given in full in the "Naval Chronicle."] What James means cannot be imagined; no stretch of language will convert "about the middle of" into "before." The Finch struck on the reef in consequence of having been disabled and rendered helpless by the fire from the Ticonderoga. Adding her force to James" statement (counting her crew only as he gives it), we get 9 vessels, 1,536 tons, 577 men, 849 lbs. of shot. James also excludes five gun-boats, because they ran away almost as soon as the action commenced (vol. vi, p. 501). This a.s.sertion is by no means equivalent to the statement in Captain Pring"s letter "that the flotilla of gun-boats had abandoned the object a.s.signed to them," and, if it was, it would not warrant his excluding the five gun-boats. Their flight may have been disgraceful, but they formed part of the attacking force nevertheless; almost any general could say that he had won against superior numbers if he refused to count in any of his own men whom he suspected of behaving badly. James gives his 10 gun-boats 294 men and 13 guns (two long 24"s, five long 18"s, six 32-pound carronades), and makes them average 45 tons; adding on the five he leaves out, we get 14 vessels, of 1,761 tons, with 714 men, throwing at a broadside 1,025 lbs. of shot (591 from long guns, 434 from carronades). But Sir George Prevost, in the letter already quoted, says there were 12 gun-boats, and the American accounts say more. Supposing the two gun-boats James did not include at all to be equal respectively to one of the largest and one of the smallest of the gun-boats as he gives them ("Naval Occurrences," p. 417); that is, one to have had 35 men, a long 24, and a 32-pound carronade, the other, 25 men and a 32-pound carronade, we get for Downie"s force 16 vessels, of 1,851 tons, with 774 men, throwing at a broadside 1,113 lbs. of shot (615 from long guns, 498 from carronades). It must be remembered that so far I have merely corrected James by means of the authorities from which he draws his account-the official letters of the British commanders. I have not brought up a single American authority against him, but have only made such alterations as a writer could with nothing whatever but the accounts of Sir George Prevost and Captain Pring before him to compare with James. Thus it is seen that according to James himself Downie really had 774 men to Macdonough"s 882, and threw at a broadside 1,113 lbs. of shot to Macdonough"s 1,194 lbs. James says ("Naval Occurrences," pp. 410, 413): "Let it be recollected, no musketry was employed on either side," and "The marines were of no use, as the action was fought out of the range of musketry"; the 106 additional men on the part of the Americans were thus not of much consequence, the action being fought at anchor, and there being men enough to manage the guns and perform every other duty. So we need only attend to the broadside force. Here, then, Downie could present at a broadside 615 lbs. of shot from long guns to Macdonough"s 480, and 498 lbs. from carronades to Macdonough"s 714; or, he threw 135 lbs. of shot more from his long guns, and 216 less from his carronades. This is equivalent to Downie"s having seven long 18"s and one long 9, and Macdonough"s having one 24-pound and six 32-pound carronades. A 32-pound carronade is not equal to a long 18; so that even by James" own showing Downie"s force was slightly the superior.

Thus far, I may repeat, I have corrected James solely by the evidence of his own side; now I shall bring in some American authorities. These do not contradict the British official letters, for they virtually agree with them; but they do go against James" unsupported a.s.sertions, and, being made by naval officers of irreproachable reputation, will certainly outweigh them. In the first place, James a.s.serts that on the main-deck of the Confiance but 13 guns were presented in broadside, two 32-pound carronades being thrust through the bridle- and two others through the stern-ports; so he excludes two of her guns from the broadside. Such guns would have been of great use to her at certain stages of the combat, and ought to be included in the force. But besides this the American officers positively say that she had a broadside of 15 guns. Adding these two guns, and making a trifling change in the arrangement of the guns in the row-galleys, we get a broadside of 1,192 lbs., exactly as I have given it above. There is no difficulty in accounting for the difference of tonnage as given by James and by the Americans, for we have considered the same subject in reference to the battle of Lake Erie. James calculates the American tonnage as if for sea-vessels of deep holds, while, as regards the British vessels, he allows for the shallow holds that all the lake craft had; that is, he gives in one the nominal, in the other the real, tonnage. This fully accounts for the discrepancy. It only remains to account for the difference in the number of men. From James we can get 772. In the first place, we can reason by a.n.a.logy. I have already shown that, as regards the battle of Lake Erie, he is convicted (by English, not by American, evidence) of having underestimated Barclay"s force by about 25 per cent. If he did the same thing here, the British force was over 1,000 strong, and I have no doubt that it was. But we have other proofs. On p. 417 of the "Naval Occurrences" he says the complement of the four captured British vessels amounted to 420 men, of whom 54 were killed in action, leaving 366 prisoners, including the wounded. But the report of prisoners, as given by the American authorities, gives 369 officers and seamen unhurt or but slightly wounded, 57 wounded men paroled, and other wounded whose number was unspecified. Supposing this number to have been 82, and adding 54 dead, we would get in all 550 men for the four ships, the number I have adopted in my list. This would make the British wounded 129 instead of 116, as James says: but neither the Americans nor the British seem to have enumerated all their wounded in this fight. Taking into account all these considerations, it will be seen that the figures I have given are probably approximately correct, and, at any rate, indicate pretty closely the relative strength of the two squadrons. The slight differences in tonnage and crews (158 tons and 55 men, in favor of the British) are so trivial that they need not be taken into account, and we will merely consider the broadside force. In absolute weight of metal the two combatants were evenly matched-almost exactly;-but whereas from Downie"s broadside of 1,192 lbs. 660 were from long and 532 from short guns, of Macdonough"s broadside of 1,194 lbs., but 480 were from long and 714 from short pieces. The forces were thus equal, except that Downie opposed 180 lbs. from long guns to 182 from carronades; as if 10 long 18"s were opposed to ten 18-pound carronades. This would make the odds on their face about 10 to 9 against the Americans; in reality they were greater, for the possession of the Confiance was a very great advantage. The action is, as regards metal, the exact reverse of those between Chauncy and Yeo. Take, for example, the fight off Burlington on Sept. 28, 1813. Yeo"s broadside was 1,374 lbs. to Chauncy"s 1,288; but whereas only 180 of Yeo"s was from long guns, of Chauncy"s but 536 was from carronades. Chauncy"s fleet was thus much the superior. At least we must say this: if Macdonough beat merely an equal force, then Yeo made a most disgraceful and cowardly flight before an inferior foe; but if we contend that Macdonough"s force was inferior to that of his antagonist, then we must admit that Yeo"s was in like manner inferior to Chauncy"s. These rules work both ways. The Confiance was a heavier vessel than the Pike, presenting in broadside one long 24- and three 32-pound carronades more than the latter. James (vol. vi, p. 355) says: "The Pike alone was nearly a match for Sir James Yeo"s squadron," and Brenton says (vol. ii, 503): "The General Pike was more than a match for the whole British squadron." Neither of these writers means quite as much as he says, for the logical result would be that the Confiance alone was a match for all of Macdonough"s force. Still it is safe to say that the Pike gave Chauncy a great advantage, and that the Confiance made Downie"s fleet much superior to Macdonough"s.

Macdonough saw that the British would be forced to make the attack in order to get the control of the waters. On this long, narrow lake the winds usually blow pretty nearly north or south, and the set of the current is of course northward; all the vessels, being flat and shallow, could not beat to windward well, so there was little chance of the British making the attack when there was a southerly wind blowing. So late in the season there was danger of sudden and furious gales, which would make it risky for Downie to wait outside the bay till the wind suited him; and inside the bay the wind was pretty sure to be light and baffling. Young Macdonough (then but 28 years of age) calculated all these chances very coolly and decided to await the attack at anchor in Plattsburg Bay, with the head of his line so far to the north that it could hardly be turned; and then proceeded to make all the other preparations with the same foresight. Not only were his vessels provided with springs, but also with anchors to be used astern in any emergency. The _Saratoga _was further prepared for a change of wind, or for the necessity of winding ship, by having a kedge planted broad off on each of her bows, with a hawser and preventer hawser (hanging in bights under water) leading from each quarter to the kedge on that side. There had not been time to train the men thoroughly at the guns; and to make these produce their full effect the constant supervision of the officers had to be exerted. The British were laboring under this same disadvantage, but neither side felt the want very much, as the smooth water, stationary position of the ships, and fair range, made the fire of both sides very destructive.

Plattsburg Bay is deep and opens to the southward; so that a wind which would enable the British to sail up the lake would force them to beat when entering the bay. The east side of the mouth of the bay is formed by c.u.mberland Head; the entrance is about a mile and a half across, and the other boundary, southwest from the Head, is an extensive shoal, and a small, low island. This is called Crab Island, and on it was a hospital and one six-pounder gun, which was to be manned in case of necessity by the strongest patients. Macdonough had anch.o.r.ed in a north-and-south line a little to the south of the outlet of the Saranac, and out of range of the sh.o.r.e batteries, being two miles from the western sh.o.r.e. The head of his line was so near c.u.mberland Head that an attempt to turn it would place the opponent under a very heavy fire, while to the south the shoal prevented a flank attack. The Eagle lay to the north, flanked on each side by a couple of gun-boats; then came the Saratoga, with three gun-boats between her and the Ticonderoga, the next in line; then came three gun-boats and the Preble. The four large vessels were at anchor; the galleys being under their sweeps and forming a second line about 40 yards back, some of them keeping their places and some not doing so. By this arrangement his line could not be doubled upon, there was not room to anchor on his broadside out of reach of his carronades, and the enemy was forced to attack him by standing in bows on.

The morning of September 11th opened with a light breeze from the northeast. Downie"s fleet weighed anchor at daylight, and came down the lake with the wind nearly aft, the booms of the two sloops swinging out to starboard. At half-past seven, [Footnote: The letters of the two commanders conflict a little as to time, both absolutely and relatively. Pring says the action lasted two hours and three quarters, the American accounts, two hours and twenty minutes. Pring says it began at 8.00; Macdonough says a few minutes before nine, etc. I take the mean time.] the people in the ships could see their adversaries" upper sails across the narrow strip of land ending in c.u.mberland Head, before the British doubled the latter. Captain Downie hove to with his four large vessels when he had fairly opened the Bay, and waited for his galleys to overtake him. Then his four vessels filled on the starboard tack and headed for the American line, going abreast, the Chubb to the north, heading well to windward of the Eagle, for whose bows the Linnet was headed, while the Confiance was to be laid athwart the hawse of the Saratoga; the Finch was to leeward with the twelve gun-boats, and was to engage the rear of the American line.

As the English squadron stood bravely in, young Macdonough, who feared his foes not at all, but his G.o.d a great deal, knelt for a moment, with his officers, on the quarter-deck; and then ensued a few minutes of perfect quiet, the men waiting with grim expectancy for the opening of the fight. The Eagle spoke first with her long 18"s, but to no effect, for the shot fell short. Then, as the Linnet pa.s.sed the Saratoga, she fired her broadside of long 12"s, but her shot also fell short, except one that struck a hen-coop which happened to be aboard the Saratoga. There was a game c.o.c.k inside, and, instead of being frightened at his sudden release, he jumped up on a gun-slide, clapped his wings, and crowed l.u.s.tily. The men laughed and cheered; and immediately afterward Macdonough himself fired the first shot from one of the long guns. The 24-pound ball struck the Confiance near the hawse-hole and ranged the length of her deck, killing and wounding several men. All the American long guns now opened and were replied to by the British galleys.

The Confiance stood steadily on without replying. But she was baffled by shifting winds, and was soon so cut up, having both her port bow-anchors shot away, and suffering much loss, that she was obliged to port her helm and come to while still nearly a quarter of a mile distant from the Saratoga. Captain Downie came to anchor in grand style,-securing every thing carefully before he fired a gun, and then opening with a terribly destructive broadside. The Chubb and Linnet stood farther in, and anch.o.r.ed forward the Eagle"s beam. Meanwhile the Finch got abreast of the Ticonderoga, under her sweeps, supported by the gun-boats. The main fighting was thus to take place between the vans, where the Eagle, Saratoga, and six or seven gun-boats were engaged with the Chubb, Linnet, Confiance, and two or three gun-boats; while in the rear, the Ticonderoga, the Preble, and the other American galleys engaged the Finch and the remaining nine or ten English galleys. The battle at the foot of the line was fought on the part of the Americans to prevent their flank being turned, and on the part of the British to effect that object. At first, the fighting was at long range, but gradually the British galleys closed up, firing very well. The American galleys at this end of the line were chiefly the small ones, armed with one 12-pounder apiece, and they by degrees drew back before the heavy fire of their opponents. About an hour after the discharge of the first gun had been fired the Finch closed up toward the Ticonderoga, and was completely crippled by a couple of broadsides from the latter. She drifted helplessly down the line and grounded near Crab Island; some of the convalescent patients manned the six-pounder and fired a shot or two at her, when she struck, nearly half of her crew being killed or wounded. About the same time the British gun-boats forced the Preble out of line, whereupon she cut her cable and drifted insh.o.r.e out of the fight. Two or three of the British gun-boats had already been sufficiently damaged by some of the shot from the Ticonderoga"s long guns to make them wary; and the contest at this part of the line narrowed down to one between the American schooner and the remaining British gun-boats, who combined to make a most determined attack upon her. So hastily had the squadron been fitted out that many of the matches for her guns were at the last moment found to be defective. The captain of one of the divisions was a midshipman, but sixteen years old, Hiram Paulding. When he found the matches to be bad he fired the guns of his section by having pistols flashed at them, and continued this through the whole fight. The Ticonderoga"s commander, Lieut. Ca.s.sin, fought his schooner most n.o.bly. He kept walking the taffrail amidst showers of musketry and grape, coolly watching the movements of the galleys and directing the guns to be loaded with canister and bags of bullets, when the enemy tried to board. The British galleys were handled with determined gallantry, under the command of Lieutenant Bell. Had they driven off the Ticonderoga they would have won the day for their side, and they pushed up till they were not a boat-hook"s length distant, to try to carry her by boarding; but every attempt was repulsed and they were forced to draw off, some of them so crippled by the slaughter they had suffered that they could hardly man the oars.

Meanwhile the fighting at the head of the line had been even fiercer. The first broadside of the Confiance, fired from 16 long 24"s, double shotted, coolly sighted, in smooth water, at point-blank range, produced the most terrible effect on the Saratoga. Her hull shivered all over with the shock, and when the crash subsided nearly half of her people were seen stretched on deck, for many had been knocked down who were not seriously hurt. Among the slain was her first lieutenant, Peter Gamble; he was kneeling down to sight the bow-gun, when a shot entered the port, split the quoin, and drove a portion of it against his side, killing him without breaking the skin. The survivors carried on the fight with undiminished energy. Macdonough himself worked like a common sailor, in pointing and handling a favorite gun. While bending over to sight it a round shot cut in two the spanker boom, which fell on his head and struck him senseless for two or three minutes; he then leaped to his feet and continued as before, when a shot took off the head of the captain of the gun and drove it in his face with such a force as to knock him to the other side of the deck. But after the first broadside not so much injury was done; the guns of the Confiance had been levelled to point-blank range, and as the quoins were loosened by the successive discharges they were not properly replaced, so that her broadsides kept going higher and higher and doing less and less damage. Very shortly after the beginning of the action her gallant captain was slain. He was standing behind one of the long guns when a shot from

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