COMPARATIVE FORCE.
Tons. No. Guns. Weight Metal. Crews. Loss. Wasp 450 9 250 135 10 Frolic 467 10 274 110 90
Vice-Admiral Jurien de la Graviere comments on this action as follows [Footnote: "Guerres Maritimes," ii, 287 (Septieme edition, Paris, 1881).]:
DIAGRAM [Footnote: It is difficult to reconcile the accounts of the manoeuvres in this action. James says "larboard" where Cooper says "starboard"; one says the Wasp wore, the other says that she could not do so, etc.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: Shows the paths of the Wasp and the Frolic during their battle and the positions of the ships at various times during the battle from 11.32 to 12.15]
"The American fire showed itself to be as accurate as it was rapid. On occasions when the roughness of the sea would seem to render all aim excessively uncertain, the effects of their artillery were not less murderous than under more advantageous conditions. The corvette Wasp fought the brig Frolic in an enormous sea, under very short canvas, and yet, forty minutes after the beginning of the action, when the two vessels came together, the Americans who leaped aboard the brig found on the deck, covered with dead and dying, but one brave man, who had not left the wheel, and three officers, all wounded, who threw down their swords at the feet of the victors." Admiral de la Graviere"s criticisms are especially valuable, because they are those of an expert, who only refers to the war of 1812 in order to apply to the French navy the lessons which it teaches, and who is perfectly unprejudiced. He cares for the lesson taught, not the teacher, and is quite as willing to learn from the defeat of the Chesapeake as from the victories of the Const.i.tution-while most American critics only pay heed to the latter.
The characteristics of the action are the practical equality of the contestants in point of force and the enormous disparity in the damage each suffered; numerically, the Wasp was superior by 5 per cent., and inflicted a ninefold greater loss.
Captain Jones was not destined to bring his prize into port, for a few hours afterward the Poictiers, a British 74, Captain John Poer Beresford, hove in sight. Now appeared the value of the Frolic"s desperate defence; if she could not prevent herself from being captured, she had at least ensured her own recapture, and also the capture of the foe. When the Wasp shook out her sails they were found to be cut into ribbons aloft, and she could not make off with sufficient speed. As the Poictiers pa.s.sed the Frolic, rolling like a log in the water, she threw a shot over her, and soon overtook the Wasp. Both vessels were carried into Bermuda. Captain Whinyates was again put in command of the Frolic. Captain Jones and his men were soon exchanged; 25,000 dollars prize-money was voted them by Congress, and Captain and Lieutenant Biddle were both promoted, the former receiving the captured ship Macedonian. Unluckily the blockade was too close for him to succeed in getting out during the remainder of the war.
On Oct. 8th Commodore Rodgers left Boston on his second cruise, with the President, United States, Congress, and Argus, [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Rodgers. Jan. 1. 1813.] leaving the Hornet in port. Four days out, the United States and Argus separated, while the remaining two frigates continued their cruise together. The Argus, [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Arthur Sinclair, Jan. 4, 1813.] Captain Sinclair, cruised to the eastward, making prizes of 6 valuable merchant-men, and returned to port on January 3d. During the cruise she was chased for three days and three nights (the latter being moonlight) by a British squadron, and was obliged to cut away her boats and anchors and start some of her water. But she saved her guns, and was so cleverly handled that during the chase she actually succeeded in taking and manning a prize, though the enemy got near enough to open fire as the vessels separated. Before relating what befell the United States, we shall bring Commodore Rodgers" cruise to an end.
On Oct. 10th the Commodore chased, but failed to overtake, the British frigate Nymphe, 38, Captain Epworth. On the 18th, off the great Bank of Newfoundland, he captured the Jamaica packet Swallow, homeward bound, with 200,000 dollars in specie aboard. On the 31st, at 9 A. M., lat. 33 N., long. 32 W., his two frigates fell in with the British frigate Galatea, 36, Captain Woodley Losack, convoying two South Sea ships, to windward. The Galatea ran down to reconnoitre, and at 10 A. M., recognizing her foes, hauled up on the starboard tack to escape. The American frigates made all sail in chase, and continued beating to windward, tacking several times, for about three hours. Seeing that she was being overhauled, the Galatea now edged away to get on her best point of sailing; at the same moment one of her convoy, the Argo, bore up to cross the hawse of her foes, but was intercepted by the Congress, who lay to to secure her. Meanwhile the President kept after the Galatea; she set her top-mast, top-gallant mast and lower studding-sails, and when it was dusk had gained greatly upon her. But the night was very dark, the President lost sight of the chase, and, toward midnight, hauled to the wind to rejoin her consort. The two frigates cruised to the east as far as 22 W., and then ran down to 17 N.; but during the month of November they did not see a sail. They had but slightly better luck on their return toward home. Pa.s.sing 120 miles north of Bermuda, and cruising a little while toward the Virginia capes, they reentered Boston on Dec. 31st, having made 9 prizes, most of them of little value.
When four days out, on Oct. 12th, Commodore Decatur had separated from the rest of Rodgers" squadron and cruised east; on the 25th, in lat. 29 N., and long. 29 30" W. while going close-hauled on the port tack, with the wind fresh from the S. S. E., a sail was descried on the weather beam, about 12 miles distant. [Footnote: Official letter of Commodore Decatur, Oct. 30. 1812.] This was the British 38-gun frigate Macedonian, Captain John Surnam Carden. She was not, like the Guerriere, an old ship captured from the French, but newly built of oak and larger than any American 18-pounder frigate; she was reputed (very wrongfully) to be a "crack ship." According to Lieut. David Hope, "the state of discipline on board was excellent; in no British ship was more attention paid to gunnery. Before this cruise, the ship had been engaged almost every day with the enemy; and in time of peace the crew were constantly exercised at the great guns." [Footnote: Marshall"s "Naval Biography," vol. iv, p. 1018.] How they could have practised so much and learned so little is certainly marvellous.
The Macedonian set her foretop-mast and top-gallant studdings sails and bore away in chase, [Footnote: Capt. Carden to Mr. Croker, Oct. 28, 1812.] edging down with the wind a little aft the starboard beam. Her first lieutenant wished to continue on this course and pa.s.s down ahead of the United States, [Footnote: James, vi. 165.] but Capt. Carden"s over-anxiety to keep the weather-gage lost him this opportunity of closing. [Footnote: Sentence of Court-martial held on the San Domingo, 74. at the Bermudas. May 27, 1812.] Accordingly he hauled by the wind and pa.s.sed way to windward of the American. As Commodore Decatur got within range, he eased off and fired a broadside, most of which fell short [Footnote: Marshall, iv, 1080.]; he then kept his luff, and, the next time he fired, his long 24"s told heavily, while he received very little injury himself. [Footnote: Cooper, 11, 178.] The fire from his main-deck (for he did not use his carronades at all for the first half hour) [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Decatur.] was so very rapid that it seemed as if the ship was on fire; his broadsides were delivered with almost twice the rapidity of those of the Englishman. [Footnote: James, vi, 169.] The latter soon found he could not play at long bowls with any chance of success; and, having already erred either from timidity or bad judgment, Captain Carden decided to add rashness to the catalogue of his virtues. Accordingly he bore up, and came down end on toward his adversary, with the wind on his port quarter. The States now (10.15) laid her main-topsail aback and made heavy play with her long guns, and, as her adversary came nearer, with her carronades also.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Shows the paths of the United States and the Macedonian during their battle and the positions of the ships at various times during the battle from 09.45 to 11.15]
The British ship would reply with her starboard guns, hauling up to do so; as she came down, the American would ease off, run a little way and again come to, keeping up a terrific fire. As the Macedonian bore down to close, the chocks of all her forecastle guns (which were mounted on the outside) were cut away [Footnote: Letter of Captain Carden.]; her fire caused some damage to the American"s rigging, but hardly touched her hull, while she herself suffered so heavily both alow and aloft that she gradually dropped to leeward, while the American fore-reached on her. Finding herself ahead and to windward, the States tacked and ranged up under her adversary"s lee, when the latter struck her colors at 11.15, just an hour and a half after the beginning of the action. [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Decatur.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: Captain Stephen Decatur: a charcoal drawing done in 1809 by Charles B.J.F. St.-Memin. (Courtesy Library of Congress)]
The United States had suffered surprisingly little; what damage had been done was aloft. Her mizzen top-gallant mast was cut away, some of the spars were wounded, and the rigging a good deal cut; the hull was only struck two or three times. The ships were never close enough to be within fair range of grape and musketry, [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Decatur.] and the wounds were mostly inflicted by round shot and were thus apt to be fatal. Hence the loss of the Americans amounted to Lieutenant John Messer Funk (5th of the ship) and six seamen killed or mortally wounded, and only five severely and slightly wounded.
The Macedonian, on the other hand, had received over a hundred shot in her hull, several between wind and water; her mizzen-mast had gone by the board; her fore-and maintop-masts had been shot away by the caps, and her main-yard in the slings; almost all her rigging was cut away (only the fore-sail being left); on the engaged side all of her carronades but two, and two of her main-deck guns, were dismounted. Of her crew 43 were killed and mortally wounded, and 61 (including her first and third lieutenants) severely and slightly wounded. [Footnote: Letter of Captain Carden.] Among her crew were eight Americans (as shown by her muster-roll); these asked permission to go below before the battle, but it was refused by Captain Carden, and three were killed during the action. James says that they were allowed to go below, but this is untrue; for if they had, the three would not have been slain. The others testified that they had been forced to fight, and they afterward entered the American service-the only ones of the Macedonian"s crew who did, or who were asked to.
The Macedonian had her full complement of 301 men; the States had, by her muster-roll of October 20th, 428 officers, petty officers, seamen, and boys, and 50 officers and privates of marines, a total of 478 (instead of 509 as Marshall in his "Naval Biography" makes it).
COMPARATIVE FORCE.
Broadside Weight Size. Guns. Metal. Men. Loss.
United States 1576 27 786 478 12 Macedonian 1325 25 547 301 104 Comparative Comparative Loss Force. Inflicted.
States 100 100 Macedonian 66 11 That is, the relative force being about as three is to two, [Footnote: I have considered the United States as mounting her full allowance of 54 guns; but it is possible that she had no more than 49. In Decatur"s letter of challenge of Jan. 17, 1814 (which challenge, by the way, was a most bl.u.s.tering affair, reflecting credit neither on Decatur, nor his opponent, Captain Hope, nor on any one else, excepting Captain Stackpole of H. M. S. Statira), she is said to have had that number; her broadside would then be 15 long 24"s below, 1 long 24, 1 12-pound, and 8 42-pound carronades above. Her real broadside weight of metal would thus be about 680 lbs., and she would be superior to the Macedonian in the proportion of 5 to 4. But it is possible that Decatur had landed some of his guns in 1813, as James a.s.serts; and though I am not at all sure of this, I have thought it best to be on the safe side in describing his force.] the damage done was as nine to one!
Of course, it would have been almost impossible for the Macedonian to conquer with one third less force; but the disparity was by no means sufficient to account for the ninefold greater loss suffered, and the ease and impunity with which the victory was won. The British sailors fought with their accustomed courage, but their gunnery was exceedingly poor; and it must be remembered that though the ship was bravely fought, still the defence was by no means so desperate as that made by the Ess.e.x or even the Chesapeake, as witnessed by their respective losses. The Macedonian, moreover, was surrendered when she had suffered less damage than either the Guerriere or Java. The chief cause of her loss lay in the fact that Captain Carden was a poor commander. The gunnery of the Java, Guerriere, and Macedonian was equally bad; but while Captain Lambert proved himself to be as able as he was gallant, and Captain Dacres did nearly as well, Captain Carden, on the other hand, was first too timid, and then too rash, and showed bad judgment at all times. By continuing his original course he could have closed at once; but he lost his chance by over-anxiety to keep the weather-gage, and was censured by the court-martial accordingly. Then he tried to remedy one error by another, and made a foolishly rash approach. A very able and fair-minded English writer says of this action: "As a display of courage the character of the service was n.o.bly upheld, but we would be deceiving ourselves were we to admit that the comparative expertness of the crews in gunnery was equally satisfactory. Now, taking the difference of effect as given by Captain Carden, we must draw this conclusion-that the comparative loss in killed and wounded (104 to 12), together with the dreadful account he gives of the condition of his own ship, while he admits that the enemy"s vessel was in comparatively good order, must have arisen from inferiority in gunnery as well as in force." [Footnote: Lord Howard Dougla.s.s, "Naval Gunnery." p. 525]
On the other hand, the American crew, even according to James, were as fine a set of men as ever were seen on shipboard. Though not one fourth were British by birth, yet many of them had served on board British ships of war, in some cases voluntarily, but much more often because they were impressed. They had been trained at the guns with the greatest care by Lieutenant Allen. And finally Commodore Decatur handled his ship with absolute faultlessness. To sum up: a brave and skilful crew, ably commanded, was matched against an equally brave but unskilful one, with an incompetent leader; and this accounts for the disparity of loss being so much greater than the disparity in force.
At the outset of this battle the position of the parties was just the reverse of that in the case of the Const.i.tution and Guerriere: the Englishman had the advantage of the wind, but he used it in a very different manner from that in which Captain Hull had done. The latter at once ran down to close, but manoeuvred so cautiously that no damage could be done him till he was within pistol shot. Captain Carden did not try to close till after fatal indecision, and then made the attempt so heedlessly that he was cut to pieces before he got to close quarters. Commodore Decatur, also, manoeuvred more skilfully than Captain Dacres, although the difference was less marked between these two. The combat was a plain cannonade; the States derived no advantage from the superior number of her men, for they were not needed. The marines in particular had nothing whatever to do, while they had been of the greatest service against the Guerriere. The advantage was simply in metal, as 10 is to 7. Lord Howard Dougla.s.s" criticisms on these actions seem to me only applicable in part. He says (p. 524): "The Americans would neither approach nor permit us to join in close battle until they had gained some extraordinary advantage from the superior faculties of their long guns in distant cannonade, and from the intrepid, uncirc.u.mspect, and often very exposed approach of a.s.sailants who had long been accustomed to contemn all manoeuvring. Our vessels were crippled in distant cannonade from encountering rashly the serious disadvantage of making direct attacks; the uncirc.u.mspect gallantry of our commanders led our ships unguardedly into the snares which wary caution had spread."
These criticisms are very just as regards the Macedonian, and I fully agree with them (possibly reserving the right to doubt Captain Carden"s gallantry, though readily admitting his uncirc.u.mspection). But the case of the Guerriere differed widely. There the American ship made the attack, while the British at first avoided close combat; and, so far from trying to cripple her adversary by a distant cannonade, the Const.i.tution hardly fired a dozen times until within pistol shot. This last point is worth mentioning, because in a work on "Heavy Ordnance," by Captain T. F. Simmons, R. A. (London, 1837), it is stated that the Guerriere received her injuries before the closing, mentioning especially the "thirty shot below the water-line"; whereas, by the official accounts of both commanders, the reverse was the case. Captain Hull, in his letter, and Lieutenant Morris, (in his autobiography) say they only fired a few guns before closing; and Captain Dacres, in his letter, and Captain Brenton, in his "History," say that not much injury was received by the Guerriere until about the time the mizzen-mast fell, which was three or four minutes after close action began.
Lieutenant Allen was put aboard the Macedonian as prize-master; he secured the fore- and main-masts and rigged a jury mizzen-mast, converting the vessel into a bark. Commodore Decatur discontinued his cruise to convoy his prize back to America; they reached New London Dec. 4th. Had it not been for the necessity of convoying the Macedonian, the States would have continued her cruise, for the damage she suffered was of the most trifling character.
Captain Garden stated (in Marshall"s "Naval Biography") that the States measured 1,670 tons, was manned by 509 men, suffered so from shot under water that she had to be pumped out every watch, and that two eighteen-pound shot pa.s.sed in a horizontal line through her main-masts; all of which statements were highly creditable to the vividness of his imagination. The States measured but 1,576 tons (and by English measurement very much less), had 478 men aboard, had not been touched by a shot under water-line, and her lower masts were unwounded. James states that most of her crew were British, which a.s.sertion I have already discussed; and that she had but one boy aboard, and that he was seventeen years old,-in which case 29 others, some of whom (as we learn from the "Life of Decatur") were only twelve, must have grown with truly startling rapidity during the hour and a half that the combat lasted.
During the twenty years preceding 1812 there had been almost incessant warfare on the ocean, and although there had been innumerable single conflicts between French and English frigates, there had been but one case in which the French frigate, single-handed, was victorious. This was in the year 1805 when the Milan captured the Cleopatra. According to Troude, the former threw at a broadside 574 pounds (actual), the latter but 334; and the former lost 35 men out of her crew of 350, the latter 58 out of 200. Or, the forces being as 100 to 58, the loss inflicted was as 100 to 60; while the States" force compared to the Macedonian"s being as 100 to 66, the loss she inflicted was as 100 to 11.
British ships, moreover, had often conquered against odds as great; as, for instance, when the Sea Horse captured the great Turkish frigate Badere-Zaffer; when the Astrea captured the French frigate Gloire, which threw at a broadside 286 pounds of shot, while she threw but 174; and when, most glorious of all, Lord Dundonald, in the gallant little Speedy, actually captured the Spanish xebec Gamo of over five times her own force! Similarly, the corvette Comus captured the Danish frigate Fredrickscoarn, the brig Onyx captured the Dutch sloop Manly, the little cutter Thorn captured the French Courier-National, and the Pasly the Spanish Virgin; while there had been many instances of drawn battles between English 12-pound frigates and French or Spanish 18-pounders.
Captain Hull having resigned the command of the Const.i.tution, she was given to Captain Bainbridge, of the Constellation, who was also entrusted with the command of the Ess.e.x and Hornet. The latter ship was in the port of Boston with the Const.i.tution, under the command of Captain Lawrence. The Ess.e.x was in the Delaware, and accordingly orders were sent to Captain Porter to rendezvous at the Island of San Jago; if that failed several other places were appointed, and if, after a certain time, he did not fall in with his commodore he was to act at his own discretion.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Captain William Bainbridge: a portrait by John Wesley Jarvis, circa 1814. (Courtesy U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]
On October 26th the Const.i.tution and Hornet sailed, touched at the different rendezvous, and on December 13th arrived off San Salvador, where Captain Lawrence found the Bonne Citoyenne, 18, Captain Pitt Barnaby Greene. The Bonne Citoyenne was armed with 18 32-pound carronades and 2 long nines, and her crew of 150 men was exactly equal in number to that of the Hornet; the latter"s short weight in metal made her antagonist superior to her in about the same proportion that she herself was subsequently superior to the Penguin, or, in other words, the ships were practically equal. Captain Lawrence now challenged Captain Greene to single fight, giving the usual pledges that the Const.i.tution should not interfere. The challenge was not accepted for a variety of reasons; among others the Bonne Citoyenne was carrying home half a million pounds in specie. [Footnote: Brenton and James both deny that Captain Greene was blockaded by the Hornet, and claim that he feared the Const.i.tution. James says (p. 275) that the occurrence was one which "the characteristic cunning of Americans turned greatly to their advantage"; and adds that Lawrence only sent the challenge because "it could not be accepted," and so he would "suffer no personal risk." He states that the reason it was sent, as well as the reason that it was refused, was because the Const.i.tution was going to remain in the offing and capture the British ship if she proved conqueror. It is somewhat surprising that even James should have had the temerity to advance such arguments. According to his own account (p. 277) the Const.i.tution left for Boston on Jan. 6th, and the Hornet remained blockading the Bonne Citoyenne till the 24th, when the Montagu, 74, arrived. During these eighteen days there could have been no possible chance of the Const.i.tution or any other ship interfering, and it is ridiculous to suppose that any such fear kept Captain Greene from sailing out to attack his foe. No doubt Captain Greene"s course was perfectly justifiable, but it is curious that with all the a.s.sertions made by James as to the cowardice of the Americans, this is the only instance throughout the war in which a ship of either party declined a contest with an antagonist of equal force (the cases of Commodore Rodgers and Sir George Collier being evidently due simply to an overestimate of the opposing ships.)] Leaving the Hornet to blockade her, Commodore Bainbridge ran off to the southward, keeping the land in view.
At 9 A. M., Dec. 29, 1812, while the Const.i.tution was running along the coast of Brazil, about thirty miles offsh.o.r.e in lat.i.tude 13 6" S., and longitude 31 W., two strange sail were made, [Footnote: Official letter of Commodore Bainbridge, Jan. 3, 1813.] insh.o.r.e and to windward. These were H. B. M. frigate Java, Captain Lambert, forty-eight days out of Spithead, England, with the captured ship William in company. Directing the latter to make for San Salvador, the Java bore down in chase of the Const.i.tution. [Footnote: Official letter of Lieutenant Chads, Dec. 31, 1812.] The wind was blowing light from the N.N.E., and there was very little sea on. At 10 the Java made the private signals, English, Spanish, and Portuguese in succession, none being answered; meanwhile the Const.i.tution was standing up toward the Java on the starboard tack; a little after 11 she hoisted her private signal, and then, being satisfied that the strange sail was an enemy, she wore and stood off toward the S.E., to draw her antagonist away from the land, [Footnote: Log of the Const.i.tution.] which was plainly visible. The Java hauled up, and made sail in a parallel course, the Const.i.tution bearing about three points on her lee bow. The Java gained rapidly, being much the swifter.
At 1.30 the Const.i.tution luffed up, shortened her canvas to top-sails, top-gallant sails, jib, and spanker, and ran easily off on the port tack, heading toward the southeast; she carried her commodore"s pendant at the main, national ensigns at the mizzenpeak and main top-gallant mast-head, and a Jack at the fore. The Java also had taken in the main-sail and royals, and came down in a lasking course on her adversary"s weather-quarter, [Footnote: Lieutenant Chads" Address to the Court-martial, April 23, 1813.] hoisting her ensign at the mizzen-peak, a union Jack at the mizzen top-gallant mast-head, and another lashed to the main-rigging. At 2 P. M., the Const.i.tution fired a shot ahead of her, following it quickly by a broadside, [Footnote: Commodore Bainbridge"s letter.] and the two ships began at long bowls, the English firing the lee or starboard battery while the Americans replied with their port guns. The cannonade was very spirited on both sides, the ships suffering about equally. The first broadside of the Java was very destructive, killing and wounding several of the Const.i.tution"s crew. The Java kept edging down, and the action continued, with grape and musketry in addition; the swifter British ship soon forereached and kept away, intending to wear across her slower antagonist"s bow and rake her; but the latter wore in the smoke, and the two combatants ran off to the westward, the Englishman still a-weather and steering freer than the Const.i.tution, which had luffed to close. [Footnote: Log of the Const.i.tution.] The action went on at pistol-shot distance. In a few minutes, however, the Java again forged ahead, out of the weight of her adversary"s fire, and then kept off, as before, to cross her bows; and, as before, the Const.i.tution avoided this by wearing, both ships again coming round with their heads to the east, the American still to leeward. The Java kept the weather-gage tenaciously, forereaching a little, and whenever the __Const.i.tution_ luffed up to close, [Footnote: Log of Const.i.tution.] the former tried to rake her. But her gunnery was now poor, little damage being done by it; most of the loss the Americans suffered was early in the action. By setting her foresail and main-sail the Const.i.tution got up close on the enemy"s lee beam, her fire being very heavy and carrying away the end of the Java"s bowsprit and her jib-boom. [Footnote: Lieutenant Chads" letter.] The Const.i.tution forged ahead and repeated her former manoeuvre, wearing in the smoke. The Java at once hove in stays, but owing to the loss of head-sail fell off very slowly, and the American frigate poured a heavy raking broadside into her stern, at about two cables" length distance. The Java replied with her port guns as she fell off. [Footnote: Lieutenant Chads" letter.] Both vessels then bore up and ran off free, with the wind on the port quarter; the Java being abreast and to windward of her antagonist, both with their heads a little east of south. The ships were less than a cable"s length apart, and the Const.i.tution inflicted great damage while suffering very little herself. The British lost many men by the musketry of the American topmen, and suffered still more from the round and grape, especially on the forecastle, [Footnote: Testimony of Christopher Speedy, in minutes of the Court-martial on board H. M. S. Gladiator, at Portsmouth, April 23, 1813] many marked instances of valor being shown on both sides. The Java"s masts were wounded and her rigging cut to pieces, and Captain Lambert then ordered her to be laid aboard the enemy, who was on her lee beam. The helm was put a-weather, and the Java came down for the Const.i.tution"s main-chains. The boarders and marines gathered in the gangways and on the forecastle, the boatswain having been ordered to cheer them up with his pipe that they might make a clean spring. [Footnote: Testimony of James Humble, in do., do.] The Americans, however, raked the British with terrible effect, cutting off their main top-mast above the cap, and their foremast near the cat harpings. [Footnote: Log of Const.i.tution.] The stump of the Java"s bowsprit got caught in the Const.i.tution"s mizzen-rigging, and before it got clear the British suffered still more.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Const.i.tution vs. Java: a comptemporary American engraving done under the supervision of a witness to the action. (Courtesy Beverley R. Robinson Collection, U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]
Finally the ships separated, the Java"s bowsprit pa.s.sing over the taffrail of the Const.i.tution; the latter at once kept away to avoid being raked. The ships again got nearly abreast, but the Const.i.tution, in her turn, forereached; whereupon Commodore Bainbridge wore, pa.s.sed his antagonist, luffed up under his quarter, raked him with the starboard guns, then wore, and recommenced the action with his port broadside at about 3.10. Again the vessels were abreast, and the action went on as furiously as ever. The wreck of the top hamper on the Java lay over her starboard side, so that every discharge of her guns set her on fire, [Footnote: Lieut. Chads" Address.] and in a few minutes her able and gallant commander was mortally wounded by a ball fired by one of the American main-top-men. [Footnote: Surgeon J. C. Jones" Report.] The command then devolved on the first lieutenant, Chads, himself painfully wounded. The slaughter had been terrible, yet the British fought on with stubborn resolution, cheering l.u.s.tily. But success was now hopeless, for nothing could stand against the cool precision of the Yankee fire. The stump of the Java"s foremast was carried away by a double-headed shot, the mizzen-mast fell, the gaff and spanker boom were shot away, also the main-yard, and finally the ensign was cut down by a shot, and all her guns absolutely silenced; when at 4.05 the Const.i.tution, thinking her adversary had struck, [Footnote: Log of the Const.i.tution (as given in Bainbridge"s letter).] ceased firing, hauled aboard her racks, and pa.s.sed across her adversary"s bows to windward, with her top-sails, jib, and spanker set. A few minutes afterward the Java"s main-mast fell, leaving her a sheer hulk. The Const.i.tution a.s.sumed a weatherly position, and spent an hour in repairing damages and securing her masts; then she wore and stood toward her enemy, whose flag was again flying, but only for bravado, for as soon as the Const.i.tution stood across her forefoot she struck. At 5.25 she was taken possession of by Lieutenant Parker, 1st of the Const.i.tution, in one of the latter"s only two remaining boats.
The American ship had suffered comparatively little. But a few round shot had struck her hull, one of which carried away the wheel; one 18-pounder went through the mizzen-mast; the fore-mast, main-top-mast, and a few other spars were slightly wounded, and the running rigging and shrouds were a good deal cut; but in an hour she was again in good fighting trim. Her loss amounted to 8 seamen and 1 marine killed; the 5th lieutenant, John C. Alwyn, and 2 seamen, mortally, Commodore Bainbridge and 12 seamen, severely, and 7 seamen and 2 marines, slightly wounded; in all 12 killed and mortally wounded, and 22 wounded severely and slightly. [Footnote: Report of Surgeon Amos A. Evans.]
"The Java sustained unequalled injuries beyond the Const.i.tution," says the British account. [Footnote: "Naval Chronicle," xxix. 452.] These have already been given in detail; she was a riddled and entirely dismasted hulk. Her loss (for discussion of which see farther on) was 48 killed (including Captain Henry Lambert, who died soon after the close of the action, and five midshipmen), and 102 wounded, among them Lieutenant Henry Ducie Chads, Lieutenant of Marines David Davies, Commander John Marshall, Lieut. James Saunders, the boatswain. James Humble, master, Batty Robinson, and four midshipmen.
In this action both ships displayed equal gallantry and seamanship. "The Java," says Commodore Bainbridge, "was exceedingly well handled and bravely fought. Poor Captain Lambert was a distinguished and gallant officer, and a most worthy man, whose death I sincerely regret." The manoeuvring on both sides was excellent; Captain Lambert used the advantage which his ship possessed in her superior speed most skilfully, always endeavoring to run across his adversary"s bows and rake him when he had forereached, and it was only owing to the equal skill which his antagonist displayed that he was foiled, the length of the combat being due to the number of evolutions. The great superiority of the Americans was in their gunnery. The fire of the Java was both less rapid and less well directed than that of her antagonist; the difference of force against her was not heavy, being about as ten is to nine, and was by no means enough to account for the almost fivefold greater loss she suffered.
[Ill.u.s.tration: This differs somewhat from the English diagram: the American officers distinctly a.s.sert that the Java kept the weather-gage in every position.]
The foregoing is a diagram of the battle. It differs from both of the official accounts, as these conflict greatly both as to time and as regards some of the evolutions. I generally take the mean in cases of difference; for example, Commodore Bainbridge"s report makes the fight endure but 1 hour and 55 minutes, Lieutenant Chads" 2 hours and 25 minutes: I have made it 2 hours and 10 minutes, etc., etc.
The tonnage and weight of metal of the combatants have already been stated; I will give the complements shortly. The following is the
COMPARATIVE FORCE AND LOSS.
Relative Weight No. Relative Loss Tons. Metal. Men. Loss. Force. Inflicted.
Const.i.tution 1576 654 475 34 100 100 Java 1340 576 426 150 89 23 In hardly another action the war do the accounts of the respective forces differ so widely; the official British letter makes their total of men at the beginning of the action 377, of whom Commodore Bainbridge officially reports that he paroled 378! The British state their loss in killed and mortally wounded at 24; Commodore Bainbridge reports that the dead alone amounted to nearly 60! Usually I have taken each commander"s account of his own force and loss, and I should do so now if it were not that the British accounts differ among themselves, and whenever they relate to the Americans, are flatly contradicted by the affidavits of the latter"s officers. The British first handicap themselves by the statement that the surgeon of the Const.i.tution was an Irishman and lately an a.s.sistant surgeon in the British navy ("Naval Chronicle," xxix, 452); which draws from Surgeon Amos A. Evans a solemn statement in the Boston Gazette that he was born in Maryland and was never in the British navy in his life. Then Surgeon Jones of the Java, in his official report, after giving his own killed and mortally wounded at 24, says that the Americans lost in all about 60, and that 4 of their amputations perished under his own eyes; whereupon Surgeon Evans makes the statement (Niles" Register, vi, p. 35), backed up by affidavits of his brother officers, that in all he had but five amputations, of whom only one died, and that one, a month after Surgeon Jones had left the ship. To meet the a.s.sertions of Lieutenant Chads that he began action with but 377 men, the Const.i.tution"s officers produced the Java"s muster-roll, dated Nov. 17th, or five days after she had sailed, which showed 446 persons, of whom 20 had been put on board a prize. The presence of this large number of supernumeraries on board is explained by the fact that the Java was carrying out Lieutenant-General Hislop, the newly-appointed Governor of Bombay, and his suite, together with part of the crews for the Cornwallis, 74, and gun-sloops Chameleon and Icarus; she also contained stores for those two ships.
Besides conflicting with the American reports, the British statements contradict one another. The official published report gives but two midshipmen as killed; while one of the volumes of the "Naval Chronicle" (vol. xxix, p. 452) contains a letter from one of the Java"s lieutenants, in which he states that there were five. Finally, Commodore Bainbridge found on board the Const.i.tution, after the prisoners had left, a letter from Lieutenant H. D. Cornick, dated Jan. 1, 1813, and addressed to Lieutenant Peter V. Wood, 22d Regiment, foot, in which he states that 65 of their men were killed. James ("Naval Occurrences") gets around this by stating that it was probably a forgery; but, aside from the improbability of Commodore Bainbridge being a forger, this could not be so, for nothing would have been easier than for the British lieutenant to have denied having written it, which he never did. On the other hand, it would be very likely that in the heat of the action, Commodore Bainbridge and the Java"s own officers should overestimate the latter"s loss. [Footnote: For an account of the shameless corruption then existing in the Naval Administration of Great Britain, see Lord Dundonald"s "Autobiography of a seaman." The letters of the commanders were often garbled, as is mentioned by Brenton. Among numerous cases that he gives, may be mentioned the cutting out of the Chevrette, where he distinctly says, "our loss was much greater than was ever acknowledged." (Vol. i, p. 505, edition of 1837.)]
Taking all these facts into consideration, we find 446 men on board the Java by her own muster-list; 378 of these were paroled by Commodore Bainbridge at San Salvador; 24 men were acknowledged by the enemy to be killed or mortally wounded; 20 were absent in a prize, leaving 24 unaccounted for, who were undoubtedly slain.
The British loss was thus 48 men killed and mortally wounded, and 102 wounded severely and slightly. The Java was better handled and more desperately defended than the Macedonian or even the Guerriere. and the odds against her were much smaller; so she caused her opponent greater loss, though her gunnery was no better than theirs.
Lieutenant Parker, prize-master of the Java, removed all the prisoners and baggage to the Const.i.tution, and reported the prize to be in a very disabled state; owing partly to this, but more to the long distance from home and the great danger there was of recapture, Commodore Bainbridge destroyed her on the 31st, and then made sail for San Salvador. "Our gallant enemy," reports Lieutenant Chads, "has treated us most generously"; and Lieutenant-General Hislop presented the Commodore with a very handsome sword as a token of grat.i.tude for the kindness with which he had treated the prisoners.
Partly in consequence of his frigate"s injuries, but especially because of her decayed condition, Commodore Bainbridge sailed from San Salvador on Jan. 6, 1813, reaching Boston Feb. 27th, after his four months" cruise. At San Salvador he left the Hornet still blockading the Bonne Citoyenne.
In order "to see ourselves as others see us," I shall again quote from Admiral Jurien de la Graviere, [Footnote "Guerres Maritimes," ii, 284 (Paris, 1881).] as his opinions are certainly well worthy of attention both as to these first three battles, and as to the lessons they teach. "When the American Congress declared war on England in 1812," he says, "it seemed as if this unequal conflict would crush her navy in the act of being born; instead, it but fertilized the germ. It is only since that epoch that the United States has taken rank among maritime powers. Some combats of frigates, corvettes, and brigs, insignificant without doubt as regards material results, sufficed to break the charm which protected the standard of St. George, and taught Europe what she could have already learned from some of our combats, if the louder noise of our defeats had not drowned the glory, that the only invincibles on the sea are good seamen and good artillerists.
"The English covered the ocean with their cruisers when this unknown navy, composed of six frigates and a few small craft hitherto hardly numbered, dared to establish its cruisers at the mouth of the Channel, in the very centre of the British power. But already the Const.i.tution had captured the Guerriere and Java, the United States had made a prize of the Macedonian, the Wasp of the Frolic, and the Hornet of the Peac.o.c.k. The honor of the new flag was established. England, humiliated, tried to attribute her multiplied reverses to the unusual size of the vessels which Congress had had constructed in 1799, and which did the fighting in 1812. She wished to refuse them the name of frigates, and called them, not without some appearance of reason, disguised line-of-battle ships. Since then all maritime powers have copied these gigantic models, as the result of the war of 1812 obliged England herself to change her naval material; but if they had employed, instead of frigates, cut-down 74"s (vaisseaux rases), it would still be difficult to explain the prodigious success of the Americans. * * *