On July 29th, while the Junon, 38, Captain Sanders, and Martin, 18, Captain Senhouse, were in Delaware Bay, the latter grounded on the outside of Crow"s Shoal; the frigate anch.o.r.ed within supporting distance, and while in this position the two ships were attacked by the American flotilla in those waters, consisting of eight gun-boats, carrying each 25 men and one long 32, and two heavier block-sloops, [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Angus, July 30, 1813.] commanded by Lieutenant Samuel Angus. The flotilla kept at such a distance that an hour"s cannonading did no damage whatever to anybody; and during that time gun-boat No. 121, Sailing-master Shead, drifted a mile and a half away from her consorts. Seeing this the British made a dash at her, in 7 boats, containing 140 men, led by Lieutenant Philip Westphal. Mr. Shead anch.o.r.ed and made an obstinate defence, but at the first discharge the gun"s pintle gave way, and the next time it was fired the gun-carriage was almost torn to pieces. He kept up a spirited fire of small arms, in reply to the boat-carronades and musketry of the a.s.sailants; but the latter advanced steadily and carried the gun-boat by boarding, 7 of her people being wounded, while 7 of the British were killed and 13 wounded. [Footnote: Letter of Mr. Shead. Aug. 5, 1813.] The defence of No. 121 was very creditable, but otherwise the honor of the day was certainly with the British; whether because the gun-boats were themselves so worthless or because they were not handled boldly enough, they did no damage, even to the grounded sloop, that would seem to have been at their mercy. [Footnote: The explanation possibly lies in the fact that the gun-boats had worthless powder. In the Naval Archives there is a letter from Mr. Angus ("Masters" Commandant Letters," 1813, No. 3: see also No. 91), in which he says that the frigate"s shot pa.s.sed over them, while theirs could not even reach the sloop. He also encloses a copy of a paper, signed by the other gun-boat officers, which runs: "We, the officers of the vessels comprising the Delaware flotilla, protest against the powder as being unfit for service."]
On June 18th the American brig-sloop Argus, commanded by Lieutenant William Henry Allen, late first of the United States, sailed from New York for France, with Mr. Crawford, minister for that country, aboard, and reached L"Orient on July 11th, having made one prize on the way. On July 14th she again sailed, and cruised in the chops of the Channel, capturing and burning ship after ship, and creating the greatest consternation among the London merchants; she then cruised along Cornwall and got into St. George"s Channel, where the work of destruction went on. The labor was very severe and hara.s.sing, the men being able to get very little rest. [Footnote: Court of Inquiry into loss of Argus, 1815.] On the night of August 13th, a brig laden with wine from Oporto was captured and burnt, and unluckily many of the crew succeeded in getting at some of the cargo. At 5 A.M. on the 14th a large brig-of-war was discovered standing down under a cloud of canvas. [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Watson, March 2, 1815.] This was the British brig-sloop Pelican, Captain John Fordyce Maples, which, from information received at Cork three days previous, had been cruising especially after the Argus, and had at last found her; St. David"s Head bore east five leagues (lat. 52 15" N. and 5 50" W.)
The small, fine-lined American cruiser, with her lofty masts and long spars, could easily have escaped from her heavier antagonist: but Captain Allen had no such intention, and, finding he could not get the weather-gage, he shortened sail and ran easily along on the starboard tack, while the Pelican came down on him with the wind (which was from the south) nearly aft. At 6 A.M. the Argus wore and fired her port guns within grape distance, the Pelican responding with her starboard battery, and the action began with great spirit on both sides. [Footnote: Letter of Captain Maples to Admiral Thornborough, Aug. 14, 1813.] At 6.04 a round shot carried off Captain Allen"s leg, inflicting a mortal wound, but he stayed on deck till he fainted from loss of blood. Soon the British fire carried away the main-braces, main-spring-stay, gaff, and try-sail mast of the Argus; the first lieutenant, Mr. Watson, was wounded in the head by a grape-shot and carried below; the second lieutenant, Mr. U. H. Allen (no relation of the captain), continued to fight the ship with great skill. The Pelican"s fire continued very heavy, the Argus losing her spritsail-yard and most of the standing rigging on the port side of the foremast. At 6.14 Captain Maples bore up to pa.s.s astern of his antagonist, but Lieutenant Allen luffed into the wind and threw the main-top-sail aback, getting into a beautiful raking position [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Watson.]; had the men at the guns done their duty as well as those on the quarter-deck did theirs, the issue of the fight would have been very different; but, as it was, in spite of her favorable position, the raking broadside of the Argus did little damage. Two or three minutes afterward the Argus lost the use of her after-sails through having her preventer-main-braces and top-sail tie shot away, and fell off before the wind, when the Pelican at 6.18 pa.s.sed her stern, raking her heavily, and then ranged up on her starboard quarter. In a few minutes the wheel-ropes and running-rigging of every description were shot away, and the Argus became utterly unmanageable. The Pelican continued raking her with perfect impunity, and at 6.35 pa.s.sed her broadside and took a position on her starboard bow, when at 6.45 the brigs fell together, and the British "were in the act of boarding when the Argus struck her colors," [Footnote: Letter of Captain Maples.] at 6.45 A.M. The Pelican carried, besides her regular armament, two long 6"s as stern-chasers, and her broadside weight of metal was thus: [Footnote: James, vi, 320.]
1 X 6 1 X 6 1 X 12 8 X 32
or 280 lbs. against the Argus":
1 X 12 9 X 24
or, subtracting as usual 7 per cent. for light weight of metal, 210 lbs. The Pelican"s crew consisted of but 116 men, according to the British account, though the American reports make it much larger. The Argus had started from New York with 137 men, but having manned and sent in several prizes, her crew amounted, as near as can be ascertained, to 104. Mr. Low in his "Naval History," published just after the event, makes it but 99. James makes it 121; as he placed the crew of the Enterprise at 125, when it was really 102; that of the Hornet at 162, instead of 135; of the Peac.o.c.k at 185, instead of 166; of the Nautilus at 106 instead of 95, etc., etc., it is safe to presume that he has overestimated it by at least 20, which brings the number pretty near to the American accounts. The Pelican lost but two men killed and five wounded. Captain Maples had a narrow escape, a spent grape-shot striking him in the chest with some force, and then falling on the deck. One shot had pa.s.sed through the boatswain"s and one through the carpenter"s cabin; her sides were filled with grape-shot, and her rigging and sails much injured; her foremast, main-top-mast, and royal masts were slightly wounded, and two of her carronades dismounted.
The injuries of the Argus have already been detailed; her hull and lower masts were also tolerably well cut up. Of her crew, Captain Allen, two midshipmen, the carpenter, and six seamen were killed or mortally wounded; her first lieutenant and 13 seamen severely and slightly wounded: total, 10 killed and 14 wounded.
In reckoning the comparative force, I include the Englishman"s six-pound stern-chaser, which could not be fired in broadside with the rest of the guns, because I include the Argus" 12-pound bow-chaser, which also could not be fired in broadside, as it was crowded into the bridle-port. James, of course, carefully includes the latter, though leaving out the former.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Argus vs. Pelican: an engraving published in London in 1817. (Courtesy Beverley R. Robinson Collection, U.S.
Naval Academy Museum)]
COMPARISON.
Comparative No. Weight Comparative Loss Tons. Guns. Metal. Men. Loss. Force. Inflicted.
Argus 298 10 210 104 24 .82 .29 Pelican 467 11 280 116 7 1.00 1.00 [Ill.u.s.tration of ARGUS and PELICAN action from 6.00 A.M. to 6.45]
Of all the single-ship actions fought in the war this is the least creditable to the Americans. The odds in force, it is true, were against the Argus, about in the proportion of 10 to 8, but this is neither enough to account for the loss inflicted being as 10 to 3, nor for her surrendering when she had been so little ill used. It was not even as if her antagonist had been an unusually fine vessel of her cla.s.s. The Pelican did not do as well as either the Frolic previously, or the Reindeer afterward, though perhaps rather better than the Avon, Penguin, or Peac.o.c.k. With a comparatively unmanageable antagonist, in smooth water, she ought to have sunk her in three quarters of an hour. But the Pelican"s not having done particularly well merely makes the conduct of the Americans look worse; it is just the reverse of the Chesapeake"s case, where, paying the highest credit to the British, we still thought the fight no discredit to us. Here we can indulge no such reflection. The officers did well, but the crew did not. Cooper says: "The enemy was so much heavier that it may be doubted whether the Argus would have captured her antagonist under any ordinary circ.u.mstances." This I doubt; such a crew as the Wasp"s or Hornet"s probably would have been successful. The trouble with the guns of the Argus was not so much that they were too small, as that they did not hit; and this seems all the more incomprehensible when it is remembered that Captain Allen is the very man to whom Commodore Decatur, in his official letter, attributed the skilful gun-practice of the crew of the frigate United States. Cooper says that the powder was bad; and it has also been said that the men of the Argus were over-fatigued and were drunk, in which case they ought not to have been brought into action. Besides unskilfulness, there is another very serious count against the crew. Had the Pelican been some distance from the Argus, and in a position where she could pour in her fire with perfect impunity to herself, when the surrender took place, it would have been more justifiable. But, on the contrary, the vessels were touching, and the British boarded just as the colors were hauled down; it was certainly very disgraceful that the Americans did not rally to repel them, for they had still four fifths of their number absolutely untouched. They certainly ought to have succeeded, for boarding is a difficult and dangerous experiment; and if they had repulsed their antagonists they might in turn have carried the Pelican. So that, in summing up the merits of this action, it is fair to say that both sides showed skilful seamanship and unskilful gunnery; that the British fought bravely and that the Americans did not.
It is somewhat interesting to compare this fight, where a weaker American sloop was taken by a stronger British one, with two or three others, where both the comparative force and the result were reversed. Comparing it, therefore, with the actions between the Hornet and Peac.o.c.k (British), the Wasp and Avon, and the Peac.o.c.k (American) and Epervier, we get four actions, in one of which, the first-named, the British were victorious, and in the other three the Americans.
Comparative Comparative Loss Per cent.
Force. Inflicted. Loss.
Pelican (British) 1.00 1.00 .06 Argus (American) .82 .29 .23
Hornet (American) 1.00 1.00 .02 Peac.o.c.k (British) .83 .07 .31
Wasp (American) 1.00 1.00 .02 Avon (British) .80 .07 .33
Peac.o.c.k (American) 1.00 1.00 .01 Epervier (British) .81 .08 .20
It is thus seen that in these sloop actions the superiority of force on the side of the victor was each time about the same. The Argus made a much more effectual resistance than did either the Peac.o.c.k, Avon, or Epervier, while the Pelican did her work in poorer form than either of the victorious American sloops; and, on the other hand, the resistance of the Argus did not by any means show as much bravery as was shown in the defence of the Peac.o.c.k or Avon, although rather more than in the case of the Epervier.
This is the only action of the war where it is almost impossible to find out the cause of the inferiority of the beaten crew. In almost all other cases we find that one crew had been carefully drilled, and so proved superior to a less-trained antagonist; but it is incredible that the man, to whose exertions when first lieutenant of the States Commodore Decatur ascribes the skilfulness of that ship"s men, should have neglected to train his own crew; and this had the reputation of being composed of a fine set of men. Bad powder would not account for the surrender of the Argus when so little damaged. It really seems as if the men must have been drunk or over-fatigued, as has been so often a.s.serted. Of course drunkenness would account for the defeat, although not in the least altering its humiliating character.
"Et tu quoque" is not much of an argument; still it may be as well to call to mind here two engagements in which British sloops suffered much more discreditable defeats than the Argus did. The figures are taken from James; as given by the French historians they make even a worse showing for the British.
A short time before our war the British brig Carnation, 18, had been captured, by boarding, by the French brig Palinure, 16, and the British brig Alacrity, 18, had been captured, also by boarding, by the corvette Abeille, 20.
The following was the comparative force, etc., of the combatants:
Weight Metal. No. Crew. Loss. Carnation 262 117 40 Palmure 174 100 20
Alacrity 262 100 18 Abeille 260 130 19
In spite of the pride the British take in their hand-to-hand prowess both of these ships were captured by boarding. The Carnation was captured by a much smaller force, instead of by a much larger one, as in the case of the Argus; and if the Argus gave up before she had suffered greatly, the Alacrity surrendered when she had suffered still less. French historians a.s.serted that the capture of the two brigs proved that "French valor could conquer British courage"; and a similar opinion was very complacently expressed by British historians after the defeat of the Argus. All that the three combats really "proved" was, that in eight encounters between British and American sloops the Americans were defeated once, and in a far greater number of encounters between French and British sloops the British were defeated twice. No one pretends that either navy was invincible; the question is, which side averaged best?
At the opening of the war we possessed several small brigs; these had originally been fast, handy little schooners, each armed with 12 long sixes, and with a crew of 60 men. As such they were effective enough; but when afterward changed into brigs, each armed with a couple of extra guns, and given 40 additional men, they became too slow to run, without becoming strong enough to fight. They carried far too many guns and men for their size, and not enough to give them a chance with any respectable opponent; and they were almost all ignominiously captured. The single exception was the brig Enterprise. She managed to escape capture, owing chiefly to good luck, and once fought a victorious engagement, thanks to the fact that the British possessed a cla.s.s of vessels even worse than our own. She was kept near the land and finally took up her station off the eastern coast, where she did good service in chasing away or capturing the various Nova Scotian or New Brunswick privateers, which were smaller and less formidable vessels than the privateers of the United States, and not calculated for fighting.
By crowding guns into her bridle-ports, and over-manning herself, the Enterprise, now under the command of Lieutenant William Burrows, mounted 14 eighteen-pound carronades and 2 long 9"s, with 102 men. On September 5th, while standing along sh.o.r.e near Penguin Point, a few miles to the eastward of Portland, Me., she discovered, at anchor inside, a man-of-war brig [Footnote: Letter from Lieutenant Edward R. McCall to Commodore Hull, September 5, 1813.] which proved to be H.M.S. Boxer, Captain Samuel Blyth, of 12 carronades, eighteen-pounders and two long sixes, with but 66 men aboard, 12 of her crew being absent.[Footnote: James, "Naval Occurrences," 264. The American accounts give the Boxer 104 men, on very insufficient grounds. Similarly, James gives the Enterprise 123 men. Each side will be considered authority for its own force and loss.] The Boxer at once hoisted three British ensigns and bore up for the Enterprise, then standing in on the starboard tack; but when the two brigs were still 4 miles apart it fell calm. At midday a breeze sprang up from the southwest, giving the American the weather-gage, but the latter manoeuvred for some time to windward to try the comparative rates of sailing of the vessels. At 3 P.M. Lieutenant Burrows hoisted three ensigns, shortened sail, and edged away toward the enemy, who came gallantly on. Captain Blyth had nailed his colors to the mast, telling his men they should never be struck while he had life in his body. [Footnote: "Naval Chronicle," vol. x.x.xii, p. 462.] Both crews cheered loudly as they neared each other, and at 3.15, the two brigs being on the starboard tack not a half pistol-shot apart, they opened fire, the American using the port, and the English the starboard, battery. Both broadsides were very destructive, each of the commanders falling at the very beginning of the action. Captain Blyth was struck by an eighteen-pound shot while he was standing on the quarter-deck; it pa.s.sed completely through his body, shattering his left arm and killing him on the spot. The command, thereupon, devolved on Lieutenant David McCreery. At almost the same time his equally gallant antagonist fell. Lieutenant Burrows, while encouraging his men, laid hold of a gun-tackle fall to help the crew of a carronade run out the gun; in doing so he raised one leg against the bulwark, when a canister shot struck his thigh, glancing into his body and inflicting a fearful wound. [Footnote: Cooper, "Naval History," vol. ii, p. 259.] In spite of the pain he refused to be carried below, and lay on the deck, crying out that the colors must never be struck. Lieutenant Edward McCall now took command. At 3.30 the Enterprise ranged ahead, rounded to on the starboard tack, and raked the Boxer with the starboard guns. At 3.35 the Boxer lost her main-top-mast and top-sail yard, but her crew still kept up the fight bravely, with the exception of four men who deserted their quarters and were afterward court-martialed for cowardice. [Footnote: Minutes of court-martial held aboard H.M.S. Surprise, January 8, 1814.] The Enterprise now set her fore-sail and took position on the enemy"s starboard bow, delivering raking fires; and at 3.45 the latter surrendered, when entirely unmanageable and defenceless. Lieutenant Burrows would not go below until he had received the sword of his adversary, when he exclaimed, "I am satisfied, I die contented."
[Ill.u.s.tration of action between ENTERPRISE and BOXER from 3.15 to 3.45]
Both brigs had suffered severely, especially the Boxer, which had been hulled repeatedly, had three eighteen-pound shot through her foremast, her top-gallant forecastle almost cut away, and several of her guns dismounted. Three men were killed and seventeen wounded, four mortally. The Enterprise had been hulled by one round and many grape; one 18-pound ball had gone through her foremast, and another through her main-mast, and she was much cut up aloft. Two of her men were killed and ten wounded, two of them (her commander and Midshipman Kervin Waters) mortally. The British court-martial attributed the defeat of the Boxer "to a superiority in the enemy"s force, princ.i.p.ally in the number of men, as well as to a greater degree of skill in the direction of her fire, and to the destructive effects of the first broadside." But the main element was the superiority in force, the difference in loss being very nearly proportional to it; both sides fought with equal bravery and equal skill. This fact was appreciated by the victors, for at a naval dinner given in New York shortly afterward, one of the toasts offered was: "The crew of the Boxer; enemies by law, but by gallantry brothers." The two commanders were both buried at Portland, with all the honors of war. The conduct of Lieutenant Burrows needs no comment. He was an officer greatly beloved and respected in the service. Captain Blyth, on the other side, had not only shown himself on many occasions to be a man of distinguished personal courage, but was equally noted for his gentleness and humanity. He had been one of Captain Lawrence"s pall-bearers, and but a month previous to his death had received a public note of thanks from an American colonel, for an act of great kindness and courtesy. [Footnote: "Naval Chronicle," x.x.xii, 466.]
The Enterprise, under Lieut.-Com. Renshaw, now cruised off the southern coast, where she made several captures. One of them was a heavy British privateer, the Mars, of 14 long nines and 75 men, which struck after receiving a broadside that killed and wounded 4 of her crew. The Enterprise was chased by frigates on several occasions; being once forced to throw overboard all her guns but two, and escaping only by a shift in the wind. Afterward, as she was unfit to cruise, she was made a guard-ship at Charlestown; for the same reason the Boxer was not purchased into the service.
On October 4th some volunteers from the Newport flotilla captured, by boarding, the British privateer Dart, [Footnote: Letter of Mr. Joseph Nicholson, Oct. 5, 1813.] after a short struggle in which two of the a.s.sailants were wounded and several of the privateersmen, including the first officer, were killed.
On December 4th, Commodore Rodgers, still in command of the President, sailed again from Providence, Rhode Island. On the 25th, in lat. 19 N. and long. 35 W., the President, during the night, fell in with two frigates, and came so close that the head-most fired at her, when she made off. These were thought to be British, but were in reality the two French 40-gun frigates Nymphe and Meduse, one month out of Brest. After this little encounter Rodgers headed toward the Barbadoes, and cruised to windward of them.
On the whole the ocean warfare of 1813 was decidedly in favor of the British, except during the first few months. The Hornet"s fight with the Peac.o.c.k was an action similar to those that took place in 1812, and the cruise of Porter was unique in our annals, both for the audacity with which it was planned, and the success with which it was executed. Even later in the year the Argus and the President made bold cruises in sight of the British coasts, the former working great havoc among the merchant-men. But by that time the tide had turned strongly in favor of our enemies. From the beginning of summer the blockade was kept up so strictly that it was with difficulty any of our vessels broke through it; they were either chased back or captured. In the three actions that occurred, the British showed themselves markedly superior in two, and in the third the combatants fought equally well, the result being fairly decided by the fuller crew and slightly heavier metal of the Enterprise. The gun-boats, to which many had looked for harbor defence, proved nearly useless, and were beaten off with ease whenever they made an attack.
The lessons taught by all this were the usual ones. Lawrence"s victory in the Hornet showed the superiority of a properly trained crew to one that had not been properly trained; and his defeat in the Chesapeake pointed exactly the same way, demonstrating in addition the folly of taking a raw levy out of port, and, before they have had the slightest chance of getting seasoned, pitting them against skilled veterans. The victory of the Enterprise showed the wisdom of having the odds in men and metal in our favor, when our antagonist was otherwise our equal; it proved, what hardly needed proving, that, whenever possible, a ship should be so constructed as to be superior in force to the foes it would be likely to meet. As far as the capture of the Argus showed any thing, it was the advantage of heavy metal and the absolute need that a crew should fight with pluck. The failure of the gun-boats ought to have taught the lesson (though it did not) that too great economy in providing the means of defence may prove very expensive in the end, and that good officers and men are powerless when embarked in worthless vessels. A similar point was emphasized by the strictness of the blockade, and the great inconvenience it caused; namely, that we ought to have had ships powerful enough to break it.
We had certainly lost ground during this year; fortunately we regained it during the next two.
BRITISH VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEN.
Name. Guns. Tonnage.
Peac.o.c.k 20 477 Boxer 14 181 Highflyer 6 96 ___ ____ 40 754 AMERICAN VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEN.
Name. Guns. Tonnage.
Chesapeake 50 1,265 Argus 20 298 Viper 10 148 ___ _____ 80 1,711 VESSELS BUILT OR PURCHASED.
Name. Rig. Guns. Tonnage. Where Built. Cost. Rattlesnake Brig 14 278 Medford, Pa. $18,000 Alligator Schooner 4 80 Asp Sloop 3 56 2,600
PRIZES MADE.
Name of Ship. No. of Prizes. President 13 Congress 4 Chesapeake 6 Ess.e.x 14 Hornet 3 Argus 21 Small craft 18 ___ 79
Chapter VI
1813
ON THE LAKES
ONTARIO-Comparison of the rival squadrons--Chauncy takes York and Fort George-Yeo is repulsed at Sackett"s Harbor, but keeps command of the lake-Chauncy sails-Yeo"s partial victory off Niagara--Indecisive action off the Genesee-Chauncy"s partial victory off Burlington, which gives him the command of the lake-ERIE-Perry"s success in creating a fleet-His victory-CHAMPLAIN-Loss of the Growler and Eagle-Summary.
ONTARIO.
Winter had almost completely stopped preparations on the American side. Bad weather put an end to all communication with Albany or New York, and so prevented the transit of stores, implements, etc. It was worse still with the men, for the cold and exposure so thinned them out that the new arrivals could at first barely keep the ranks filled. It was, moreover, exceedingly difficult to get seamen to come from the coast to serve on the lakes, where work was hard, sickness prevailed, and there was no chance of prize-money. The British government had the great advantage of being able to move its sailors where it pleased, while in the American service, at that period, the men enlisted for particular ships, and the only way to get them for the lakes at all was by inducing portions of crews to volunteer to follow their officers thither. [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 357. One of James" most comical misstatements is that on the lakes the American sailors were all "picked men." On p. 367, for example, in speaking of the battle of Lake Erie he says: "Commodore Perry had picked crews to all his vessels." As a matter of fact Perry had once sent in his resignation solely on account of the very poor quality of his crews, and had with difficulty been induced to withdraw it. Perry"s crews were of hardly average excellence, but then the average American sailor was a very good specimen.] However, the work went on in spite of interruptions. Fresh gangs of shipwrights arrived, and, largely owing to the energy and capacity of the head builder, Mr. Henry Eckford (who did as much as any naval officer in giving us an effective force on Ontario), the Madison was equipped, a small despatch sloop, The Lady of the Lake prepared, and a large new ship, the General Pike, 28, begun, to mount 13 guns in each broadside and 2 on pivots.