On 16th Aug. the First British Expeditionary Force, under General Sir John French, completed its landing at Boulogne, and four days later had arrived and concentrated on the line Avesnes-Le Cateau, on the left or exposed flank of the French Fifth Army under General de Lanzerac. It consisted of 50,000 infantry with its artillery, and five brigades of cavalry--some 70,000 troops altogether, a mere drop in the ocean compared with the millions of men who were marching to battle for the great military powers, but destined to play a part in the forthcoming struggle out of all proportion to its size.
The position at this juncture was, briefly, as follows: the Germans having at length captured the last forts of Liege, with its gallant commander General Leman, were overrunning Belgium. Brussels had just been evacuated (20th Aug.), and the main Belgian army, menaced by greatly superior forces of the enemy, and disappointed in its hope of effective support from the Franco-British troops, was retiring to seek the protection of the forts of Antwerp. Having occupied Brussels on the 20th, the German Higher Command appointed Baron von der Goltz as Governor. A reign of terror in Belgium had already been inaugurated as part of Germany"s deliberate policy of "frightfulness", including the ruthless execution of civilians on unsubstantiated charges of shooting at the invaders.
The French armies, under the supreme command of General Joffre, who, like Lord Kitchener, had been an engineer student when the Franco-Prussian War broke out, and had been Chief of the General Staff since 1911, were now disposed for the double purpose of meeting the threatened German onslaught and preparing the counter-offensive on which French doctrines of strategy had been based. Starting from the Swiss frontier there were nine divisions forming the Alsace force, the main offensive group, consisting of the French First and Second Armies, being extended along the Lorraine frontier, and the Third Army about Verdun. The Fourth Army formed the ma.s.s of manoeuvre held in reserve behind the centre, while the Fifth, whose left wing was now extended by the British Expeditionary Force, faced the Ardennes as far as the Belgian frontier.
Germany was not seriously alarmed by the spectacular advance of the French into their lost provinces. It suited the strategy of her War Staff to keep the French ma.s.s of manoeuvre as far as possible from the point at which it would soon be sorely needed; and their feint attacks in the direction of Longwy, Luneville, and Belfort were designed to strengthen the belief that their real offensive would come in the frontal a.s.sault which the French dispositions had a.s.sumed. Germany, however, had always intended to strike through Belgium when the time came to deliver the knock-out blow to France before Russia had time to mobilize her millions.
The German advance was proceeding according to the plan which had been worked out in detail as far back as 1904 by the soldier-scholar of the Garde-Ulanen, Count von Schlieffen, who died two years before his great scheme was put into execution. Based on the a.s.sumption that Germany and Austria-Hungary would have to fight France, Russia, Great Britain, and Belgium without the aid of Italy, it provided for an immediate attack by the right wing of the German army of such weight and ferocity as to destroy the French left by a single blow, and then roll up the main French armies one after the other. The South and Russian fronts were meantime to be lightly held, everything being staked on the sudden, overwhelming blow in the north through Belgium. One of the bitter controversies in Germany, after the war, raged round the responsibility for the failure of this plan, the execution of which devolved on General von Moltke, nephew of the great strategist of the Franco-Prussian War. The Kaiser believed that the name of Moltke would strike terror into the hearts of Germany"s enemies, but the second Moltke lacked the genius of his predecessor, and the course of events proved that he was not equal to the task of carrying out so prodigious a plan.
It was doubly necessary to strike at once with an immediate maximum of strength now that Britain had already ranged herself alongside the Allies.
This maximum of strength was attained long before France had completed her mobilization, and enabled Germany to launch her unexpected blow with crushing effect. She had reckoned, however, without the stubborn defence of the Belgians in the opening moves of the game, a defence which clogged the wheels of her mighty war machine at the critical moment; and was wholly unprepared for Britain"s great achievement in transporting her "insignificant" but indomitable army, without a hitch, complete in every detail, and establishing it in its place in the line of battle, hundreds of miles from its base, in less than three weeks from the declaration of war.
Clearly there was no time to be lost in solving the military problem on the Western front before the Russians could throw their full weight into the scales.
The secret of Germany"s sudden attempt to overwhelm the Allied left by an outflanking movement was well kept. The position in Belgium was obviously grave; but Joffre still clung to the belief that if the Germans attacked the Allied left in force, they would leave their own position in front of the French Fifth Army so exposed as to give him an opening for a successful counter-stroke with de Lanzerac"s troops in co-operation with the British.
Up to the 22nd General French"s preparations were all in the direction of offensive action on these lines; his two corps had taken up their positions through Binche and Mons and along the ca.n.a.l to Conde.
The German tide which now swept through the plains of Belgium entirely upset the Allied calculations. General French woke on 22nd Aug. to find the troops of the French Fifth Army on his right in unmistakeable retreat. The full force of the German blow, delivered by von Buelow"s Second Army, had been felt by de Lanzerac"s troops on the Sambre at daybreak, and had pressed them back from the river. The British position held by the 1st Corps (1st and 2nd Divisions) under General Sir Douglas Haig, the 2nd Corps (3rd and 5th Divisions) under General Sir H. Smith-Dorrien, and the Cavalry Division under General Allenby, became isolated by the retreat of de Lanzerac--"the most complete example", as Lord French long afterwards described him, "of the Staff College pedant whose "superior education" had given him little idea of how to conduct war". De Lanzerac asked General French if he would attack the flank of the German columns which were pressing him back from the Sambre, but the British Commander, who had received definite instructions from Lord Kitchener that his command was to be an entirely independent one, "and that you will in no case come in any sense under the orders of any Allied general", replied that with his own position so seriously threatened by the retreat of de Lanzerac"s troops such an operation was impracticable, but he agreed to retain his present position for the next twenty-four hours.
The British army fulfilled this pledge, and the barrier thus held and maintained during the subsequent retreat, though shattered in parts, saved the French left from being outflanked by the invading right wing of the Germans under von Kluck. The whole situation became extremely critical on the following day (23rd Aug.). Namur, the forts of which had been regarded as impregnable, fell before the crushing attack of the heavy Austrian howitzers brought up by the advancing Germans; the French thrust into Alsace-Lorraine had just been countered by the German Fifth Army under the Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, which compelled the French to retreat from all but a corner of Alsace; and the main German attack, launched at the other end of the line, forced the French back both from the Sambre and the Meuse. The French Fifth Army, the position of which was considerably weakened by the fall of Namur, was attacked both by von Buelow"s army in front, and by a Saxon army under von Hausen on its right. It was forced back until von Hausen found a gap on its right flank, through which he proceeded to pour his Saxons with the object of rolling up the French Third and Fourth Armies under Ruffey and Langle de Cary. These retreated in turn, to recover alignment with de Lanzerac"s Fifth Army, which had retreated from the British right. The British army was thus left "in the air", outflanked not only on the right, where von Buelow was now advancing on it from Charleroi, but also on the left, where von Kluck"s right wing was sweeping down in full force from the north-west.
The onslaught on the British front began shortly after noon with a bombardment of some 600 guns along the whole line of 25 miles; followed by a great frontal attack in ma.s.s formation. The British troops, all experts at musketry, used their rifles with such deadly effect that the frontal attack crumpled up. The line held; but with the German tide surging round on either flank the position became increasingly critical. Under the threatened turning movement General Smith-Dorrien withdrew from the Mons salient, and before nightfall took up a fresh line some 3 miles south of the ca.n.a.l. The advanced troops of the 1st Corps had not been seriously engaged, and held their ground. It was not until late that night that the desperate situation on his right was fully revealed to General French; and when news also arrived from Joffre that the British army would probably be attacked the next day by at least three German corps and two cavalry divisions, it became clear that a general and immediate retirement was inevitable. What actually happened was that the enemy attacked with no fewer than four corps, and at least two cavalry divisions.
_The Retreat from Mons_
The great retreat began shortly after dawn on the 24th with a feint attack by the 1st Division, under cover of which the 2nd Corps moved back 5 miles, and then stood in turn to protect the retirement of the 1st Corps. Further withdrawals were effected that day by alternate corps, covered by heavy rear-guard actions, until the 1st Corps had reached the line between Maubeuge and Bavai, with the 2nd Corps extending the line from Bavai to Bry. Von Kluck"s army, though kept in check by the retreating troops, followed closely on their heels and round their left flank, their design apparently being to turn the British left and press them back on Maubeuge, the fortress close on their right rear, which, well fortified and provisioned as it was, offered, as General French afterwards pointed out (in _1914_), a terrible temptation to an army seeking shelter against overwhelming odds. Bazaine"s example at Metz in 1870, and a shrewd suspicion that the German move was deliberately planned with that end in view, proved sufficient reasons for avoiding the trap. A further retreat was accordingly ordered to the line Le Cateau-Cambrai, some miles farther back.
Tournai, which was held by a French Territorial brigade, fell that day.
There was nothing apparently to prevent the German host at this juncture from continuing its course to the coast and seizing the Channel ports as far as the Seine. That, doubtless, would have been included in the programme had the Germans antic.i.p.ated a campaign of any considerable duration. The Kaiser, however, had promised his troops that they should be home again "before the leaves fall"; and to bring this about it was necessary to settle with the Allied army once and for all. Where von Moltke failed, according to Ludendorff and other critics after the war, was in not striking farther to the north or north-west, and in not throwing still more weight into the scale from his left wing.
On the 25th the French were still retreating all along the line save at Maubeuge, the garrison of which held out until 7th Sept., and at Longwy, north of Verdun, which fell on 28th Aug. The British army, battle-worn and suffering severely from the heat, but resisting all the German efforts to turn its western flank, marched stubbornly back, gallantly a.s.sisted by Allenby"s cavalry. The French were a day"s march ahead of them when the British reached the Le Cateau position. General French decided, therefore, that, sorely as the troops needed rest, there was nothing for it but to resume the retreat at daybreak, and issued orders to that effect. The hardest fighting on the 25th had fallen to the 1st Corps at Landrecies, where Haig"s weary troops were violently attacked at nightfall, before they could s.n.a.t.c.h any rest, by fresh enemy troops sent forward in pursuit in motors and lorries. The German infantry paid dearly for their temerity in advancing through the narrow streets of the town in close order, two or three British machine-guns mowing them down in hundreds. The attack was a disastrous failure.
The 2nd Corps did not reach Le Cateau until ten or eleven o"clock that night, thoroughly exhausted after a hard day"s fighting and marching.
Smith-Dorrien had lost heavily in the operations, and was so convinced that his troops were unfit to resume the march at daybreak that he elected to stand and abide by the result. The magnificent fight put up by his troops on the following day, a.s.sisted by Allenby and Sordet"s cavalry, and two divisions of French Territorial troops under d"Amade, which had been detailed to guard the British left flank, saved the situation, and averted, in the considered opinion expressed by General French five years later, "a stupendous repet.i.tion of Sedan". The actual result was a total loss of some 14,000 officers and men, about 80 guns, and numbers of machine-guns, as well as quant.i.ties of ammunition and material. According to General French, these losses heavily handicapped the British army in the subsequent stages of the retreat, and were felt throughout the first battle of the Marne and the early operations on the Aisne. In his dispatch of Sept., 1914, the British Commander-in-Chief had written of this battle in eulogistic terms.
It was not till some time later, he explains, that he came to know the full details of the battle and to appreciate it in all its details. For General Smith-Dorrien it is urged that his stand at Le Cateau broke the full force of the German pursuit, and checked its course in time.
On the 27th the shattered 2nd Corps, having broken off the action, continued the retreat with the 1st Corps. On the 28th Gough, with the 3rd Cavalry Brigade at St. Quentin, and Chetwode, with the 5th at Cerizy, turned on the leading German cavalry at both these places and threw them back on their main bodies in confusion. For the first time since the retreat began the worn-out British infantry, having reached the line of the Oise between Noyon and La Fere, were able to rest and sleep in peace.
On the 29th the British troops reached the line Compiegne-Soissons, the Germans on the same day occupying La Fere and Amiens, as well as Rethel and other towns along the French front. Bapaume held out until the rolling-stock had been removed from Amiens, but the flood-tide of invasion now seemed to be carrying everything before it. Uhlans threatened to cut Sir John French"s communications with his base at Boulogne and Dieppe. The base was accordingly transferred to St. Nazaire, at the mouth of the Loire.
Timely help came to the retiring British troops on the 29th by a brilliant counter-stroke near Guise on the part of the French Fifth Army on their right; but neither the British nor the French troops on de Lanzerac"s right were in a position to make a stand in support of that reaction. The Aisne was forced by the invaders on the 28-29th, and Rheims, Chalons, and Laon abandoned to them within the ensuing forty-eight hours. Falling back doggedly from the Aisne and the Oise, the British troops withdrew on 2nd Sept. to Chantilly-Nanteuil, the German advance having been checked on the previous day by the 4th (Guards) Brigade in a stiff rear-guard action at Villers-Cotterets.
The great retreat was coming to an end. Victory and Paris seemed within the enemy"s grasp. He had--as he thought--so shattered the British army that it was now entirely negligible as a fighting force. He was ignorant of the real strength of the force that was gathering on the British left north of Paris--the new French Sixth Army under General Maunoury. It seemed both to von Kluck and the German Higher Command that they had only the shaken French Fifth Army seriously to reckon with on the Allied left, and, as von Kluck was considered more than strong enough for the task, von Moltke took the Garde Reserve Corps and 11th Army Corps from his right wing to East Prussia, where the Russians were now carrying the war well into the Fatherland.
The help rendered by the Russians at this critical phase of the war was invaluable, and played no small part in the approaching struggle on the Marne. In his fears for the safety of Paris, Joffre was naturally anxious to profit by this relief, and discussed with Sir John French the possibility of taking the offensive at the earliest possible moment. There appears to have been some misunderstanding as to Sir John"s plans at this point. The British Commander-in-Chief declares that he had every intention of remaining in the line and filling the gap between the French Fifth and Sixth Armies, but the French Higher Command was apparently under the impression that he was determined not to fight any more until his troops had been given a week to reorganize and refit. Lord Kitchener himself hurried to Paris to clear the matter up, but "full accord", according to President Poincare, long afterwards, "was not re-established without trouble". As soon, however, as the offensive was ordered, continued the same authority, the British Commander-in-Chief gave his a.s.sistance without reserve. "His army fought with magnificent courage, and Great Britain played a brilliant part in the common victory."
In the meantime the retreat continued, the British, on 2nd Sept., reaching the line of the Marne towards Lagny and Meaux, with the French Fifth Army, now under the command of Franchet d"Esperey, on their right, retiring on Chateau-Thierry, and Maunoury"s new Sixth Army, on their left, retiring towards Paris. It was at this point that von Kluck made the fatal mistake of dismissing the British army as practically crushed and out of action.
Diverting the advance of the German First Army, he left Paris on his right in order to deal what he hoped would be a decisive blow at the French Fifth Army south of the Marne. By 5th Sept. the British army had fallen back to the Forest of Crecy to bring it in line with the French Fifth Army.
Not only was the British army at length receiving sorely needed reinforcements, but the French army was every moment increasing in strength and numbers as it fell back on its reserves. Besides the French Sixth Army on the British left, another new French army had sprung into being behind the marshes of St. Gond--the Ninth, under Foch, who filled the gap between Franchet d"Esperey"s Fifth and Langle de Cary"s Fourth Army--behind Vitry.
Eastward the line was continued by the French Third Army, now commanded by Sarrail in place of Ruffey; and Castlenau"s Second Army, now fighting the battle of the Grand Couronne de Nancy which stemmed the German invasion at this point, and prevented the threatened envelopment on the Allies" right, where the Kaiser himself had gone to inspire the troops of Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria.
_First Battles of Marne and Aisne_
Secure on the right, Joffre was at last able to deliver the great counter-stroke on the left which the Germans had invited by their tremendous bid for swift and decisive victory. The retreat came to an end on 5th Sept., when Joffre gave Sir John French his final plans for the coming offensive, and von Kluck, ignorant of the recuperative powers of the British, as well as of the strength of the French Sixth Army on their left, marched across their front in pursuit of d"Esperey"s Fifth. That night the Germans crossed the Marne, and the Grand and Pet.i.t Morin--two streams which branch off roughly parallel to one another south of the Marne--while some of their patrols reached the Seine, there catching a fleeting glimpse of the capital where they confidently hoped the French would soon be brought to terms.
When at last the retreat came to an end, the British army had been reinforced by the 4th Division, which, with the 19th Infantry Brigade--and subsequently the 6th Division--became the Third Army Corps under General Pulteney, who arrived in France to take command of it on 30th Aug.
Deficiencies in armament and material had also been partially made good, but, most important of all, Sir John French bore witness, "the promise of an immediate advance against the enemy had sent a thrill of exultation and enthusiasm throughout the whole force".
The first battle of the Marne had scarcely opened on 6th Sept., 1914, when von Kluck, realizing that Maunoury"s force on his extreme right was becoming dangerous, sent two army corps northwards to deal with it.
Maunoury had already crossed the Marne and fought the first battle of the Ourcq on the 5th. The dispatch of the two German corps to keep him in check made a way now for the British troops, when, according to plan, they turned on the invaders with the object of a.s.sailing their flank with the French Sixth Army on their left; while the French Fifth Army, and the French armies to its right, made a simultaneous frontal attack.
Both Joffre and French were under the impression that the German thrust was still in full career when their counter-stroke was delivered. Already, however, the tide had begun to turn. Von Kluck, realizing too late--what should have been obvious from the first--that his communications were being seriously threatened on the Ourcq, saw that retreat was inevitable unless he could crush the forces gathering so ominously against his right flank.
The opening of the battle of the Marne thus became on von Kluck"s part an effort to overwhelm Maunoury on his right, while he kept the British army and French Fifth Army at bay with strong rear-guards and cavalry. The surprise of the day to the Germans was probably the remarkable part played by the British, who, instead of being practically wiped out, as the enemy fondly believed, attacked with an energy and dash which carried everything before them, and, but for filling their allotted role of maintaining alignment with the French armies on each flank, would doubtless have advanced farther than they did. As it was, the progress made was considerable. The Germans were driven back to the Grand Morin, and the line of that stream made good on the following day.
Meantime the French Fifth Army on their right, materially helped by this success, had also recovered a good deal of ground, while Foch and Langle de Cary, farther east, held their own against the fierce a.s.saults of the German centre. A last desperate effort was being made to hack a way through at this point, and Sarrail, on Langle de Cary"s right, had to give way a little along the Meuse. That day the Germans reached the most southerly point of their advance, at Provins. The deciding phase of the battle, however, was developing with dramatic swiftness on von Kluck"s right wing.
Maunoury was hard pressed by the repeated onslaughts of the enemy, whose heavy reinforcements at this point held the issue in the balance for several days. General Gallieni, the Governor of Paris, hurried up fresh troops to Maunoury in motor-buses and taxis, and the French line held.
The British army helped matters considerably by driving the Germans across the Grand Morin at Coulommiers on the 7th, and on the following day from the Pet.i.t Morin, thus also helping d"Esperey with the French Fifth Army, on its right, to continue his advance farther east as far as Montmirail. On the 9th came the decisive blows which removed all doubts as to the issue of the battle. Von Kluck"s retreat on his left flank exposed the right of von Buelow"s Second Army, which was further jeopardized by a gap which appeared on its left, where it should have linked up with von Hausen"s Third Army.
This double opening gave Foch, facing von Buelow in the marshes of St.
Gond, the opportunity which he sought of smashing the enemy"s centre. He seized it by a series of lightning blows which drove the German centre back on the morning of the 10th in complete disorder, pursued by Foch"s victorious infantry.
[Ill.u.s.tration]
All the reinforcements sent to von Kluck were now of no avail against the French Sixth Army, which had been fighting against odds since 6th Sept., helped not a little by Pulteney"s 3rd Corps on its right flank. Maunoury carried the Ourcq on the 9th, and Pulteney"s corps was able to cross the Marne, after stiff fighting at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, at dawn on the following day, when the German retreat became general. The left of the British 2nd Corps had crossed the Marne at Nanteuil, where the bridges were found unbroken and the enemy gone, on the morning of the 9th, but was ordered not to advance too far north until the 1st and 2nd Corps were firmly established on the northern bank. The 1st crossed later in the day at Charly-sur-Marne and Saulchery, clearing the ground of the enemy and making many captures; but the 3rd Corps had a harder task at La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, and, as already mentioned, was not completely established on the other side until the following morning. The first battle of the Marne ended on the night of the 10th with the enemy in full retreat to the north and north-east and the Allies in hot pursuit. By the 12th he had been driven back from the Seine a distance of 65 miles, and the great German plan of a sudden crushing defeat of the Allies in the West had collapsed like a house of cards.
The hopes thus raised among the Allies of a speedy termination of the war in their favour were, on the other hand, equally illusory. Though the Germans lost heavily in officers and men, as well as in guns and other war material, their retreat was no disorderly flight. Many desperate rear-guard actions were fought all along the line, but the enemy retired steadily to prepared positions on the Aisne, where the eyes of all the commanders were to be opened to the possibilities of trench warfare under modern conditions. It needed many hard lessons before the truth was driven home.
When the first battle of the Aisne opened on 13th Sept., the British army already had its outposts on that river, the main body being in positions somewhat to the south, between Soissons and Bourg. Throwing bridges across during the night, the advance was continued on the opposite bank on the following day, though not without heavy British casualties, amounting to between 1500 and 2000, including 3 commanding officers. The 6th Division arrived from England at this stage, and joined its own 3rd Corps on the left. Further advance was stayed by the strength of the enemy"s entrenched positions, in which he now determined to make his stand. Here he was backed by an overpowering superiority in artillery which, with fierce counter-attacks on the part of his infantry, gallantly repulsed though they were, caused such severe losses that the British Commander-in-Chief was forced to a.s.sume a defensive role, while Maunoury, de Castlenau, and Foch each made stupendous efforts to break the enemy"s line and renew the war of movement and manoeuvre on which their military principles had been based.
All, however, ended in the same dreary deadlock of entrenchments.
Failing to shift the enemy from these impregnable positions, Joffre endeavoured to outflank the German right wing, already threatened by Maunoury"s advance along the Oise. Two new French armies were formed from the reserves to extend the Allied left--the Seventh, entrusted to de Castlenau, whose Second Army was transferred to Dubail, and the Tenth, the command of which was given to Maud"huy. De Castlenau"s Seventh Army, though it failed to turn the enemy"s flank--the movement having been antic.i.p.ated by him--succeeded in extending the pressure of Maunoury"s left, which had swung round by the 20th until it ran north from Compiegne to west of La.s.signy, and in building the first section of Joffre"s great besieging wall which, gradually extending from the Alps to the sea, became the impenetrable barrier between the enemy and his main objectives. The Allies"
line was continued by de Castlenau through Roye to Albert, and thence, by Maud"huy"s Tenth Army, through Arras to Lens.
Von Moltke had now been superseded in the German Higher Command by Falkenhayn, who promptly countered Joffre"s new strategy by similar extensions of the German front, thus beginning the outflanking race destined only to end in stalemate on the coast. While extending their right the Germans made a strenuous effort to regain the initiative by a blow with the army group nominally commanded by the German Crown Prince on Sarrail"s flank on the Meuse. It was a blow aimed at Verdun and the whole of the Allied line, which it hoped to break through at this point and so take in the rear. Verdun, however, had been rendered impenetrable by miles of powerfully protected outer defences, and practically the only success which fell to the Crown Prince on this occasion was the capture of the Camp-des-Romains and St. Mihiel on the Meuse, thus creating the remarkable salient east of Verdun which was destined to remain until the Franco-American force flattened it out in the victorious advance of the Allies four years later. The German Crown Prince fared even worse a week later, when he attacked along the main road through the Argonne towards Verdun, only to be flung back. It was after this double failure that the Germans bombarded Rheims and shattered her n.o.ble cathedral.
The crucial phase of the struggle in the West had shifted towards the coast as the first battle of the Aisne died down on 28th Sept., and the campaigns began in Artois which led in due course to the fierce struggles for the Labyrinth, the Vimy Ridge, Lens, and Loos. The extension of the French left placed the British army in an anomalous position. Even before Joffre had begun to build his barrier in this direction the British Commander-in-Chief had felt strongly that his proper sphere of action was on the Belgian frontier on the left flank of the French armies, for the two-fold purpose of defending the Channel ports and being in position to concert combined action with the British navy. He suggested this move to the north to Joffre on 29th Sept., pointing out its strategical advantages and the possibility of doing so now that the position of his force on the right bank of the Aisne had been thoroughly well entrenched. Joffre agreed in principle to General French"s proposal, but postponed the movement until 3rd Oct.
_Retreat from Antwerp_
By this time the critical situation of the Belgian army at Antwerp had become hopeless, and the danger of a German descent on the Channel ports suddenly became acute. Since their retreat towards Antwerp after their evacuation of Brussels on 20th Aug., the Belgians had kept the Germans at bay by vigorous counter-attacks, and threatened their communications by sundry sorties from the fortress. These sorties and counter-attacks, calling for reinforcements at a time when every soldier was needed on the main fighting fronts, infuriated the Germans and led to the reign of terror which included the deliberate destruction of Louvain and similar outrages at Malines, Termonde, and elsewhere.
Having made his position secure on the Aisne, and brought up his heavy guns, the enemy began his bombardment of the outer forts of Antwerp on 28th Sept. By the 3rd of Oct. the Belgians were endangered not only by the besieging army, but also by the ever-lengthening German line which, having now been extended from La.s.signy to Lille--only 38 miles from the sea--threatened to isolate the Belgian forces from the Franco-British armies. They accordingly decided that plans must be made at once to withdraw from Antwerp in the direction of Ghent, both to protect the coast-line and gain touch with the Allies. The British troops hurriedly sent to reinforce the Belgians--a brigade of Royal Marines and part of the recently formed Naval Division--had no influence on the fate of the fortress, but helped in protecting the flight of the citizens and in the final retreat of the Belgian army. Some 1500 of the Royal Naval Division were forced across the Dutch frontier and interned, and about 800 were made prisoners. The remnants of the British force, and the bulk of the Belgian army, escaped westward, leaving the Germans on 9th Oct. in possession of the deserted city. A little more and the German commander (von Beseler) might have closed the gap beyond the Scheldt through which this retreat had been made. Luckily for the Allies, too, the German Higher Command failed, as Lord French long afterwards expressed it, to gather the richer harvest which had been put within its grasp by the capture of Antwerp. There was then apparently no insuperable obstacle to an immediate German advance on Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, before the Allied troops could arrive from the main theatres to prevent it. "As on the Marne, so at Antwerp, they were not prepared to seize the psychological moment and to play boldly for the great stake".
General French, who had been given no voice in the Antwerp dispositions, was now in the midst of the British move from the Aisne front to the north, where he was to be reinforced by the 7th Infantry and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, which had been landed on the Belgian coast to defend Zeebrugge and Ostend under Rawlinson"s command, and the Indian contingent, which had just arrived at Orleans under Willc.o.c.ks.
_First Battle of Ypres_
The two corps under de Castlenau and de Maud"huy were now under the supreme command of General Foch, who had orders to control all the French armies operating in the northern theatre, and was confident that it was still possible to outflank the Germans and bend them back behind the Scheldt. At the end of a fortnight the British army had been successfully transported to the north from the Aisne--after successfully holding the line of that river for twenty-five days against many desperate efforts of the enemy to break through--and had taken up its position on the left of Maud"huy"s corps, the Allies" line being extended thence into Flanders by the French 8th Corps (under d"Urbal), which had been called up by Joffre to this end, as well as to help the sorely tried Belgians. Meantime the Germans, besides pressing Maud"huy hard in front of Arras, and forcing his Territorials out of Lille, had driven the retreating Belgian army out of Houthulst Forest to the line of the Yser north of Ypres, whence it took refuge behind the Yser and completed the Allied line to the coast. Rawlinson"s 4th Corps, covering the retreat of the Belgian army, had hard fighting most of the way before it succeeded in joining the main British army, the German forces from Antwerp concentrating westwards in ever increasing numbers. By the 15th Capper"s 7th Division was east of Ypres, while Byng"s 3rd Cavalry Division, a day earlier, had connected up with Gough"s 2nd Cavalry Division in front of Kemmel and a.s.sisted in the capture of that position, a gain which proved of the utmost importance in the subsequent struggle for Ypres. Allenby"s Cavalry Corps had greatly distinguished itself during the two previous days, driving the enemy back all the way in a magnificent sweep to the north and north-east.