Against the backdrop of these unsuccessful attempts to resist an absolutist state, the English achievement seems all the more striking. There was far more solidarity among key social groups in England to protect their rights against the king than there was elsewhere. The English Parliament included representatives of all of the country"s propertied cla.s.ses, from the great n.o.bles down to yeoman farmers. Two groups were of particular importance, the gentry and the Third Estate. The former had not been recruited as a cla.s.s into state service, as in Russia, and the latter were largely unwilling to trade their political rights for t.i.tles and individual privileges, as in France. The French, Spanish, and Russian monarchies succeeded in undermining the cohesion of their various elites by selling access and t.i.tles to individuals within the elite. The Russian mestnichestvo, or table of n.o.ble rankings, served a purpose very similar to that of French and Spanish venal offices in this regard. While English monarchs tried similar stratagems like the sale of offices, Parliament remained a cohesive inst.i.tution for the reasons presented in the previous chapter previous chapter -a common commitment to local government, the Common Law, and religion. -a common commitment to local government, the Common Law, and religion.
But it is not sufficient to explain why the English Parliament was strong enough to force the monarchy into a const.i.tutional settlement. The Hungarian n.o.bility represented in the diet was also very powerful and well organized. Like the English barons at Runnymede, the lesser Hungarian n.o.bility forced their monarch into a const.i.tutional compromise in the thirteenth century, the Golden Bull, and in subsequent years kept the central state on a very short leash.1 After the death of Matyas Hunyadi in 1490, the n.o.ble estate reversed the centralizing reforms that the monarchy had put into place in the previous generation and returned power to themselves. After the death of Matyas Hunyadi in 1490, the n.o.ble estate reversed the centralizing reforms that the monarchy had put into place in the previous generation and returned power to themselves.
But the Hungarian n.o.ble estate did not use their power to strengthen the country as a whole; rather, they sought to lower taxes on themselves and guard their own narrow privileges at the expense of the country"s ability to defend itself. In England, by contrast, the const.i.tutional settlement coming out of the Glorious Revolution of 16881689 vastly strengthened the state, to the point that it became, over the next century, the dominant power in Europe. So if the English Parliament was strong enough to constrain a predatory monarch, we need to ask why that Parliament did not itself evolve into a rent-seeking coalition and turn against itself like the Hungarian Diet.
There are at least two reasons why accountable government in England did not degenerate into rapacious oligarchy. The first has to do with England"s social structure compared to that of Hungary. While the groups represented in the English Parliament were an oligarchy, they sat on top of a society that was much more mobile and open to nonelites than was Hungary"s. In Hungary, the gentry had been absorbed into a narrow aristocracy, whereas in England they represented a large and cohesive social group, more powerful in certain ways than the aristocracy. England, unlike Hungary, had a tradition of gra.s.sroots political partic.i.p.ation in the form of the hundred and county courts and other inst.i.tutions of local governance. English lords were accustomed to sitting in a.s.semblies on equal terms with their va.s.sals and tenants to decide issues of common interest. Hungary, furthermore, had no equivalent of the English yeomanry, relatively prosperous farmers who owned their own land and could partic.i.p.ate in local political life. And cities in Hungary were strictly controlled by the n.o.ble estate and did not generate a rich and powerful bourgeoisie the way that English ones did.
Second, despite English traditions of individual liberty, the centralized English state was both powerful and well regarded through much of the society. It was one of the first states to develop a uniform system of justice, it protected property rights, and it acquired substantial naval capabilities in its struggles with various Continental powers. The English experiment with republican government after the beheading of Charles I in 1649 and the establishment of Cromwell"s Protectorate was not a happy one. The regicide itself seemed, even to the supporters of Parliament, an unjust and illegal act. The English Civil War witnessed the same sort of progressive radicalization experienced later during the French, Bolshevik, and Chinese revolutions. The more extreme anti-Royalist groups like the Levellers and the Diggers seemed to want not just political accountability but also a much broader social revolution, which frightened the property-owning cla.s.ses represented in Parliament. It was thus with a great deal of relief that the monarchy was restored in 1660 with the accession of Charles II.2 After the Restoration, the issues of political accountability reappeared under the Catholic James II, whose machinations again aroused suspicions and opposition from Parliament and ultimately led to the Glorious Revolution. But this time around, no one wanted to dismantle the monarchy or the state; they only wanted a king who would be accountable to them. They got one in William of Orange. After the Restoration, the issues of political accountability reappeared under the Catholic James II, whose machinations again aroused suspicions and opposition from Parliament and ultimately led to the Glorious Revolution. But this time around, no one wanted to dismantle the monarchy or the state; they only wanted a king who would be accountable to them. They got one in William of Orange.
Ideas were again important. By the late seventeenth century, thinkers like Hobbes and Locke had broken free of concepts of a feudal social order based on cla.s.ses and estates, and argued in favor of a social contract between state and citizen. Hobbes argued in Leviathan Leviathan that human beings are fundamentally equal both in their pa.s.sions and in their ability to inflict violence on one another, and that they have rights merely by virtue of the fact that they are human beings. Locke accepted these premises as well and attacked the notion that legitimate rule could arise from anything other than consent of the governed. One could overthrow a king, but only in the name of the principle of consent. Rights, according to these early liberals, were abstract and universal, and could not be legitimately appropriated by powerful individuals. Hungary had succ.u.mbed to the Turks and the Austrians long before ideas like these could spread there. that human beings are fundamentally equal both in their pa.s.sions and in their ability to inflict violence on one another, and that they have rights merely by virtue of the fact that they are human beings. Locke accepted these premises as well and attacked the notion that legitimate rule could arise from anything other than consent of the governed. One could overthrow a king, but only in the name of the principle of consent. Rights, according to these early liberals, were abstract and universal, and could not be legitimately appropriated by powerful individuals. Hungary had succ.u.mbed to the Turks and the Austrians long before ideas like these could spread there.
There is one simple lesson to be drawn from this comparison. Political liberty-that is, the ability of societies to rule themselves-does not depend only on the degree to which a society can mobilize opposition to centralized power and impose const.i.tutional constraints on the state. It must also have a state that is strong enough to act when action is required. Accountability does not run in just one direction, from the state to the society. If the government cannot act cohesively, if there is no broader sense of public purpose, then one will not have laid the basis for true political liberty. In contrast to Hungary after the death of Matyas Hunyadi, the English state after 1689 remained strong and cohesive, with a Parliament willing to tax itself and make sacrifices in the prolonged foreign struggles of the eighteenth century. A political system that is all checks and balances is potentially no more successful than one with no checks, because governments periodically need strong and decisive action. The stability of an accountable political system thus rests on a broad balance of power between the state and its underlying society.
GETTING TO DENMARK.
One of the problems with Whig history is that it makes England"s story paradigmatic for the rise of const.i.tutional democracy as such. There were, however, other paths that states in Europe took to get to the same place where the English ended up. Since we began this long account of political development by raising the question of how Denmark got to be Denmark-a law-abiding, democratic, prosperous, and well-governed polity with some of the world"s lowest levels of political corruption-we need to spend some time explaining this outcome.
In the year 1500, it was not obvious that Denmark (or any other country in Scandinavia) would turn out differently from other late medieval societies in Europe. Some observers have tried to trace Denmark"s present all the way back to the Vikings who originally settled Scandinavia.3 But it is hard to see how this particular group of tribal marauders distinguished themselves fundamentally from the other Germanic barbarians that settled Europe after the end of the Roman Empire, other than the fact that they sailed in longboats rather than rode horses. But it is hard to see how this particular group of tribal marauders distinguished themselves fundamentally from the other Germanic barbarians that settled Europe after the end of the Roman Empire, other than the fact that they sailed in longboats rather than rode horses.
The Danish monarchy, of very ancient lineage, was relatively weak from the thirteenth century, when the king was forced to sign a Great Charter requiring consultation with a n.o.ble parliament and special privileges for the church.4 The Danish economy, as in the rest of Europe, was based on the manor, though Denmark"s location at the entrance to the Baltic and its proximity to the cities of the Hanseatic League made international trade a relatively more important factor in its economic development. The Danish economy, as in the rest of Europe, was based on the manor, though Denmark"s location at the entrance to the Baltic and its proximity to the cities of the Hanseatic League made international trade a relatively more important factor in its economic development.5 After the breakup of the Kalmar Union, which briefly united much of Scandinavia in the mid-fifteenth century, Denmark remained a fairly important multinational power, controlling Norway, Iceland, the German-speaking territories of Schleswig and Holstein, and provinces across the Sound in what is now western Sweden. After the breakup of the Kalmar Union, which briefly united much of Scandinavia in the mid-fifteenth century, Denmark remained a fairly important multinational power, controlling Norway, Iceland, the German-speaking territories of Schleswig and Holstein, and provinces across the Sound in what is now western Sweden.
If there is a single event that sent Denmark and other parts of Scandinavia off on a distinct development path, it was the Protestant Reformation. As in other parts of Europe, Martin Luther"s ideas proved tremendously destabilizing, catalyzing long-standing popular grievances against the Catholic church. In Denmark, a brief civil war led to a victory by the Protestant side and the establishment of a Lutheran Danish national church in 1536.6 This outcome was driven as much by material as by moral factors: the Danish king saw an important opportunity to seize the church"s considerable a.s.sets, which may have amounted to some 30 percent of the land in Denmark. This outcome was driven as much by material as by moral factors: the Danish king saw an important opportunity to seize the church"s considerable a.s.sets, which may have amounted to some 30 percent of the land in Denmark.7 The truly lasting political impact of the Reformation in Denmark came, however, through its encouragement of peasant literacy. The Lutherans believed strongly in the need for ordinary people to have direct access to G.o.d through their ability to read the Bible or, failing that, Luther"s Lesser Catechism. Beginning in the sixteenth century, the Lutheran church began to set up schools in every village in Denmark, where priests taught peasants the basics of reading and writing. The result was that, by the eighteenth century, the peasantry in Denmark (and in other parts of Scandinavia) had emerged as a relatively well-educated and increasingly well-organized social cla.s.s.8 Social mobilization in contemporary societies usually takes place as a result of economic development. This was also the route taken in medieval England, where extension of property rights under the Common Law facilitated the transformation of the top layer of the English peasantry into politically active yeoman farmers. In premodern sixteenth-century Denmark, by contrast, it was religion that drove social mobilization. Literacy allowed peasants not only to improve their economic condition, it also helped them to communicate among themselves and organize as political agents. It is hard to imagine a greater contrast than that between rural Scandinavia and Russia in the early nineteenth century, despite geographical proximity and similarities in climate.
Unlike the English case, representative democracy did not emerge out of the survival of a feudal inst.i.tution (parliament) that was sufficiently well organized to resist the centralizing state. In Denmark, an absolutist state with an increasingly sophisticated bureaucracy had been established in 1660 following defeat in a war with Sweden.9 The Danish Diet was abolished and there was no estate-based political structure to which the monarch had to go to receive permission to raise taxes. The Danish Diet was abolished and there was no estate-based political structure to which the monarch had to go to receive permission to raise taxes.
The critical political revolution came in the period from 1760 to 1792, when an enlightened Danish monarchy progressively abolished a form of serfdom known as the Stavnsbnd, first on the royal domains and then for all landowners, and restricted the right of landlords to impose degrading punishments on peasants like flogging on a wooden horse. 10 10 Peasants were not enfranchised, but they were given the right to own land and freely engage in commerce on an equal basis. Peasants were not enfranchised, but they were given the right to own land and freely engage in commerce on an equal basis.11 The Danish monarch saw peasant freedom as an opportunity to undermine the power of the n.o.ble landowners, who fiercely resisted his reforms. Freeing the peasants would allow him to conscript them directly into the national army. Ideas were important as well: Adam Smith"s Wealth of Nations Wealth of Nations had been published in 1776, arguing that landowning farmers would ultimately be far more productive than unfree serfs. But equally important was the fact that the peasantry itself was increasingly educated, mobilized, and ready to take up the opportunities of economic freedom by moving into higher value-added activities like food processing. had been published in 1776, arguing that landowning farmers would ultimately be far more productive than unfree serfs. But equally important was the fact that the peasantry itself was increasingly educated, mobilized, and ready to take up the opportunities of economic freedom by moving into higher value-added activities like food processing.
The second major event making possible modern Danish democracy was externally driven. Denmark remained a middle-range, multinational European power at the end of the eighteenth century. It lost Norway in 1814 as a consequence of the Napoleonic Wars. The spread of the ideas of the French Revolution in the early decades of the nineteenth century had complex political consequences, since they stimulated both cla.s.s-based demands for political partic.i.p.ation on the part of the bourgeoisie and peasantry, as well as demands for national recognition on the part of Denmark"s sizable German-speaking minority.
The Prussians solved the problem by taking the predominantly German-speaking duchies of Schleswig and Holstein away from the Danes in 1864 in a short but decisive war. Overnight, Denmark became a small, h.o.m.ogeneous, largely Danish-speaking country and realized that it would have to live within the confines of a much smaller state.
This, then, forms the context for the story of the emergence of democracy in the late nineteenth century and social democracy in the early twentieth. A farmer-based political movement inspired by the priest and educator N.F.S. Grundtvig took shape at first in the guise of a religious revival movement that broke away from the official Lutheran church and established schools throughout the country.12 After a const.i.tutional monarchy took power in 1848, the farmers" movement and the national liberals representing the bourgeoisie began pushing for direct political partic.i.p.ation, which led to the granting of voting rights the following year. The emergence of the Danish welfare state in the twentieth century is beyond the scope of this volume. But when it finally arrived, it was based not solely on an emerging working cla.s.s but also on the farmer cla.s.s, whose mobilization was facilitated at key junctures not by economic growth but by religion. After a const.i.tutional monarchy took power in 1848, the farmers" movement and the national liberals representing the bourgeoisie began pushing for direct political partic.i.p.ation, which led to the granting of voting rights the following year. The emergence of the Danish welfare state in the twentieth century is beyond the scope of this volume. But when it finally arrived, it was based not solely on an emerging working cla.s.s but also on the farmer cla.s.s, whose mobilization was facilitated at key junctures not by economic growth but by religion.
The development of democracy and a modern market-based economy was far less conflictual and violent in Denmark than it was in England, not to mention France, Spain, and Germany. To get to modern Denmark, the Danes did indeed fight a number of wars with neighbors including Sweden and Prussia, and there were violent civil conflicts in the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. But there was no prolonged civil war, no enclosure movement, no absolutist tyranny, no grinding poverty brought on by early industrialization, and a far weaker legacy of cla.s.s conflict. Ideas were critical to the Danish story, not just in terms of Lutheran and Grundtvigian ideology but also in the way that Enlightenment views about rights and const.i.tutionalism were accepted by a series of Danish monarchs in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
The story of the rise of Danish democracy is full of historical accidents and contingent circ.u.mstances that cannot be duplicated elsewhere. The Danes took a much different route to get to modern liberal democracy than the English, but in the end they arrived at a very similar place. Both countries developed a strong state, rule of law, and accountable government. It would appear, then, that there are a number of different routes for "getting to Denmark."
PART FIVE.
Toward a Theory of Political Development
29.
POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL DECAY.
The biological foundations of politics; mechanisms by which political order evolves; what politics is and how it differs from economics; a definition of inst.i.tutions; sources of political decay; the state, rule of law, accountability, and how they are related; how the conditions for political development have changed over time
This book provides an account of political development from prehuman times up to the eve of the French and American revolutions, the moment when fully modern politics emerged. From that point on, a number of polities appeared that encompa.s.sed all three important categories of political inst.i.tutions: the state, rule of law, and accountable government.
Some readers may conclude that my account of political development is historically determinist. That is, by describing the complex and contextspecific origins of inst.i.tutions, I am arguing that comparable inst.i.tutions can emerge in the present only only under similar conditions, and that countries are locked into a single path of development by their unique historical pasts. under similar conditions, and that countries are locked into a single path of development by their unique historical pasts.
This is definitely not the case. Inst.i.tutions that confer advantages to their societies are routinely copied and improved by others; there are both learning and inst.i.tutional convergence across societies over time. Moreover, the historical story in this volume ends just on the eve of the Industrial Revolution, which changed enormously the conditions under which political development occurred. Both of these points will be elaborated in the concluding chapter concluding chapter. The second volume of this series will then describe and a.n.a.lyze how political development has taken place in the post-Malthusian world.
Given the enormous conservatism of human societies with regard to inst.i.tutions, societies do not get to sweep the decks clear in every generation. New inst.i.tutions are more typically layered on top of existing ones, which survive for extraordinarily long periods of time. Segmentary lineages, for example, are one of the most ancient forms of social organization and yet they continue to exist in many parts of the modern world. It is impossible to understand the possibilities for change in the present without appreciating this legacy, and the way that it often limits choices available to political actors in the present.
Moreover, understanding the complex historical circ.u.mstances under which inst.i.tutions were originally created can help us see why their transfer and imitation are difficult even under modern circ.u.mstances. Oftentimes a political inst.i.tution comes into being as a result of nonpolitical reasons (an economist would say these factors are exogenous exogenous to the political system). We have already seen several examples of this. Private property, to take one case, emerged not only for economic reasons but also because lineages needed a place to bury their ancestors and appease the souls of the dead. Similarly, the sanct.i.ty of the rule of law was historically dependent on the religious origins of law. The state itself came into being in China and Europe as the result of the desperate incentives created by unremitting warfare, something that the contemporary international system seeks to suppress. Trying to re-create these inst.i.tutions without the help of these exogenous factors is therefore often an uphill struggle. to the political system). We have already seen several examples of this. Private property, to take one case, emerged not only for economic reasons but also because lineages needed a place to bury their ancestors and appease the souls of the dead. Similarly, the sanct.i.ty of the rule of law was historically dependent on the religious origins of law. The state itself came into being in China and Europe as the result of the desperate incentives created by unremitting warfare, something that the contemporary international system seeks to suppress. Trying to re-create these inst.i.tutions without the help of these exogenous factors is therefore often an uphill struggle.
I will summarize some of the themes that have run through the historical account of inst.i.tutional development given in this book and try to distill from them the outlines of a theory of political development and political decay. This may not amount to a genuine predictive theory, since outcomes are the result of so many interlocking factors. There is, moreover, the turtle problem: the turtle one chooses as an explanatory factor is always resting on another turtle farther down. One of the reasons I began this volume with an account of the state of nature and human biology is that it is an obvious starting point, a Grund-Schildkrote (base turtle) on which subsequent turtles can be placed.
THE BIOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF POLITICS.
Human beings are not completely free to socially construct their own behavior. They have a shared biological nature. That nature is remarkably uniform throughout the world, given the fact that most contemporary humans outside of Africa descended from a single relatively small group of individuals some fifty thousand years ago. This shared nature does not determine political behavior, but it both frames and limits the nature of inst.i.tutions that are possible. It also means that human politics is subject to certain recurring patterns of behavior across time and across cultures. This shared nature can be described in the following propositions.
Human beings never existed in a presocial state. The idea that human beings at one time existed as isolated individuals, who interacted either through anarchic violence (Hobbes) or in pacific ignorance of one another (Rousseau), is not correct. Human beings as well as their primate ancestors always lived in kin-based social groups of varying sizes. Indeed, they lived in these social units for a sufficiently long period of time that the cognitive and emotional faculties needed to promote social cooperation evolved and became hardwired in their genetic endowments. This means that a rational-choice model of collective action, in which individuals calculate that they will be better off by cooperating with one another, vastly understates the degree of social cooperation that exists in human societies and misunderstands the motives that underlie it. The idea that human beings at one time existed as isolated individuals, who interacted either through anarchic violence (Hobbes) or in pacific ignorance of one another (Rousseau), is not correct. Human beings as well as their primate ancestors always lived in kin-based social groups of varying sizes. Indeed, they lived in these social units for a sufficiently long period of time that the cognitive and emotional faculties needed to promote social cooperation evolved and became hardwired in their genetic endowments. This means that a rational-choice model of collective action, in which individuals calculate that they will be better off by cooperating with one another, vastly understates the degree of social cooperation that exists in human societies and misunderstands the motives that underlie it.1 Natural human sociability is built around two principles, kin selection and reciprocal altruism. The principle of kin selection or inclusive fitness states that human beings will act altruistically toward genetic relatives (or individuals believed to be genetic relatives) in rough proportion to their shared genes. The principle of reciprocal altruism says that human beings will tend to develop relationships of mutual benefit or mutual harm as they interact with other individuals over time. Reciprocal altruism, unlike kin selection, does not depend on genetic relatedness; it does, however, depend on repeated, direct The principle of kin selection or inclusive fitness states that human beings will act altruistically toward genetic relatives (or individuals believed to be genetic relatives) in rough proportion to their shared genes. The principle of reciprocal altruism says that human beings will tend to develop relationships of mutual benefit or mutual harm as they interact with other individuals over time. Reciprocal altruism, unlike kin selection, does not depend on genetic relatedness; it does, however, depend on repeated, direct personal personal interaction and the trust relationships generated out of such interactions. These forms of social cooperation are the default ways human beings interact in the absence of incentives to adhere to other, more impersonal inst.i.tutions. When impersonal inst.i.tutions decay, these are the forms of cooperation that always reemerge because they are natural to human beings. What I have labeled patrimonialism is political recruitment based on either of these two principles. Thus, when bureaucratic offices were filled with the kinsmen of rulers at the end of the Han Dynasty in China, when the Janissaries wanted their sons to enter the corps, or when offices were sold as heritable property in ancien regime France, a natural patrimonial principle was simply rea.s.serting itself. interaction and the trust relationships generated out of such interactions. These forms of social cooperation are the default ways human beings interact in the absence of incentives to adhere to other, more impersonal inst.i.tutions. When impersonal inst.i.tutions decay, these are the forms of cooperation that always reemerge because they are natural to human beings. What I have labeled patrimonialism is political recruitment based on either of these two principles. Thus, when bureaucratic offices were filled with the kinsmen of rulers at the end of the Han Dynasty in China, when the Janissaries wanted their sons to enter the corps, or when offices were sold as heritable property in ancien regime France, a natural patrimonial principle was simply rea.s.serting itself.
Human beings have an innate propensity for creating and following norms or rules. Since inst.i.tutions are essentially rules that limit individual freedom of choice, one can equivalently say that human beings have a natural inclination to create inst.i.tutions. Rules can be rationally derived by individuals calculating how to maximize their own self-interest, which requires that they enter into social contracts with other individuals. Human beings are born with a suite of cognitive faculties that allow them to solve prisoner"s-dilemma-type problems of social cooperation. They can remember past behavior as a guide to future cooperation; they pa.s.s on information about trustworthiness through gossip and other forms of information sharing; they have acute perceptual faculties for detecting lies and untrustworthy behavior through vocal and visual cues; and they have common modes for sharing information through language and nonverbal forms of communication. The ability to make and obey rules is an economizing behavior in the sense that it greatly reduces the transaction costs of social interaction and permits efficient collective action. Since inst.i.tutions are essentially rules that limit individual freedom of choice, one can equivalently say that human beings have a natural inclination to create inst.i.tutions. Rules can be rationally derived by individuals calculating how to maximize their own self-interest, which requires that they enter into social contracts with other individuals. Human beings are born with a suite of cognitive faculties that allow them to solve prisoner"s-dilemma-type problems of social cooperation. They can remember past behavior as a guide to future cooperation; they pa.s.s on information about trustworthiness through gossip and other forms of information sharing; they have acute perceptual faculties for detecting lies and untrustworthy behavior through vocal and visual cues; and they have common modes for sharing information through language and nonverbal forms of communication. The ability to make and obey rules is an economizing behavior in the sense that it greatly reduces the transaction costs of social interaction and permits efficient collective action.
The human instinct to follow rules is often based in the emotions rather than in reason, however. Emotions like guilt, shame, pride, anger, embarra.s.sment, and admiration are not learned behaviors in the Lockean sense of being somehow acquired after birth through interaction with the empirical world outside the individual. Rather, they come naturally to small children, who then organize their behavior around genetically grounded yet culturally transmitted rules. Our capacity for rule making and following is thus very much like our capacity for language: while the content of the rules is conventional and varies from society to society, the "deep structure" of the rules and the ability to acquire them are natural.
This propensity of human beings to endow rules with intrinsic value helps to explain the enormous conservatism of societies. Rules may evolve as useful adaptations to a particular set of environmental conditions, but societies cling to them long after those conditions have changed and the rules have become irrelevant or even dysfunctional. The Mamluks refused to adopt firearms long after their usefulness had been demonstrated by the Europeans, because of their emotional investment in a certain form of cavalry warfare. This led directly to their defeat by the Ottomans, who were far more willing to adapt. There is thus a general principle of the conservation of inst.i.tutions across different human societies.
Human beings have a natural propensity for violence. From the first moment of their existence, human beings have perpetrated acts of violence against other human beings, as did their primate ancestors. From the first moment of their existence, human beings have perpetrated acts of violence against other human beings, as did their primate ancestors. Pace Pace Rousseau, the propensity for violence is not a learned behavior that arose only at a certain point in human history. At the same time, social inst.i.tutions have always existed to control and channel violence. Indeed, one of the most important functions of political inst.i.tutions is precisely to control and aggregate the level at which violence appears. Rousseau, the propensity for violence is not a learned behavior that arose only at a certain point in human history. At the same time, social inst.i.tutions have always existed to control and channel violence. Indeed, one of the most important functions of political inst.i.tutions is precisely to control and aggregate the level at which violence appears.
Human beings by nature desire not just material resources but also recognition . Recognition is the acknowledgment of another human being"s dignity or worth, or what is otherwise understood to be status. Struggles for recognition or status often have a very different character from struggles over resources, since status is relative rather than absolute, or what the economist Robert Frank calls a "positional good." . Recognition is the acknowledgment of another human being"s dignity or worth, or what is otherwise understood to be status. Struggles for recognition or status often have a very different character from struggles over resources, since status is relative rather than absolute, or what the economist Robert Frank calls a "positional good."2 In other words, one can have high status only if everyone else has lower status. Unlike cooperative games, or the gains from free trade, which are positive sum and allow both players to win, struggles over relative status are zero sum in which a gain for one player is necessarily a loss for another. In other words, one can have high status only if everyone else has lower status. Unlike cooperative games, or the gains from free trade, which are positive sum and allow both players to win, struggles over relative status are zero sum in which a gain for one player is necessarily a loss for another.
A great deal of human politics revolves around struggles for recognition. This was true not just of would-be Chinese dynasts seeking the Mandate of Heaven but also of humble peasant rebels seeking justice under banners like the Yellow or Red Turbans, or the French Bonnets Rouges. Arab tribes were able to settle their differences and conquer much of North Africa and the Middle East because they sought recognition for their religion, Islam, much as European warriors conquered the New World under the banner of Christianity. In more recent times, the rise of modern democracy is incomprehensible apart from the demand for equal recognition that lies at its core. In England, there was a progressive shift in the nature of demands for recognition, from the rights of the tribe or village, to the rights of Englishmen, to Locke"s rights of man.
It is important to resist the temptation to reduce human motivation to an economic desire for resources. Violence in human history has often been perpetrated by people seeking not material wealth but recognition. Conflicts are carried on long beyond the point when they make economic sense. Recognition is sometimes related to material wealth, but at other times it comes at the expense of material wealth, and it is an unhelpful oversimplification to regard it as just another type of "utility."
IDEAS AS CAUSE.
It is impossible to develop any meaningful theory of political development without treating ideas as fundamental causes of why societies differ and follow distinct development paths. In social science terms, they are independent variables, or in turtle terminology, they are turtles far down the stack that do not necessarily stand on the backs of turtles related to the economy or physical environment.
People in all human societies create mental models of reality. These mental models attribute causality to various factors-oftentimes invisible ones-and their function is to make the world more legible, predictable, and easy to manipulate. In earlier societies, these invisible forces were spirits, demons, G.o.ds, or Nature; today, they are abstractions like gravity, radiation, economic self-interest, social cla.s.ses, and the like. All religious beliefs const.i.tute a mental model of reality, in which observable events are attributed to or caused by non- or dimly observable forces. Since at least the time of David Hume, we have understood that it is not possible to verify causality through empirical data alone. With the rise of modern natural science, however, we have moved toward theories of causation that can at least be falsified, through either controlled experiments or statistical a.n.a.lysis. With better ways of testing causal theories, human beings can more effectively manipulate their environment, using fertilizer and irrigation, for example, rather than the blood of sacrificial victims to increase crop yields. But every known human society has generated some type of causal model of reality, suggesting that this is a natural rather than an acquired faculty.
Shared mental models-most particularly those that take the form of religion-are critical in facilitating large-scale collective action. Collective action based merely on rational self-interest is wholly inadequate in explaining the degree of social cooperation and altruism that actually exists in the world.3 Religious belief helps to motivate people to do things they would not do if they were interested only in resources or material well-being, as we saw in the case of the rise of Islam in seventh-century Arabia. The sharing of belief and culture improves cooperation by providing common goals and facilitating the cooperative solution of shared problems. Religious belief helps to motivate people to do things they would not do if they were interested only in resources or material well-being, as we saw in the case of the rise of Islam in seventh-century Arabia. The sharing of belief and culture improves cooperation by providing common goals and facilitating the cooperative solution of shared problems.4 Many people, observing religious conflict in the contemporary world, have become hostile to religion as such and regard it as a source of violence and intolerance.5 In a world of overlapping and plural religious environments, this can clearly be the case. But they fail to put religion in its broader historical context, where it was a critical factor in permitting broad social cooperation that transcended kin and friends as a source of social relationships. Moreover, secular ideologies like Marxism-Leninism or nationalism that have displaced religious beliefs in many contemporary societies can be and have been no less destructive due to the pa.s.sionate beliefs that they engender. In a world of overlapping and plural religious environments, this can clearly be the case. But they fail to put religion in its broader historical context, where it was a critical factor in permitting broad social cooperation that transcended kin and friends as a source of social relationships. Moreover, secular ideologies like Marxism-Leninism or nationalism that have displaced religious beliefs in many contemporary societies can be and have been no less destructive due to the pa.s.sionate beliefs that they engender.
Mental models and rules are intimately intertwined, since the models often suggest clear rules for societies to follow. Religions are more than theories; they are prescriptive moral codes that seek to enforce rules on their followers. They, like the rules they enjoin, are invested with considerable emotional meaning and therefore are believed for intrinsic reasons and not simply because they are accurate or useful. While religious beliefs cannot be verified, they are also difficult to falsify. All of this reinforces the fundamental conservatism of human societies, because mental models of reality once adopted are hard to change in the light of new evidence that they are not working.
The universality of some form of religious belief among virtually all known human societies suggests that it is somehow rooted in human nature. Like language and rule following, the content of religious belief is conventional and varies from society to society, but the faculty for creating religious doctrines is innate.6 Nothing of what I say here about the political impact of religion rests, however, on whether or not there is a "religion gene." Even if it were a learned behavior, it would still have a large effect on political behavior. Nothing of what I say here about the political impact of religion rests, however, on whether or not there is a "religion gene." Even if it were a learned behavior, it would still have a large effect on political behavior.
Thinkers like Karl Marx and emile Durkheim, seeing the utilitarian role that religious beliefs play in binding communities together (whether the community as a whole, or a particular social cla.s.s), believed that religion was therefore somehow deliberately created for that purpose. As we have seen, religious views evolve along with political and economic orders, moving from shamanism and magic to ancestor worship to polyand monotheistic religions with highly developed doctrines.7 Religious beliefs must obviously be related in some manner to the material conditions of existence of the groups that maintain them. Suicide cults or sects forbidding reproduction among their members like the Shakers tend not to survive for very long. It is therefore very tempting to see religion as somehow the product of those material conditions and wholly explicable in terms of them. Religious beliefs must obviously be related in some manner to the material conditions of existence of the groups that maintain them. Suicide cults or sects forbidding reproduction among their members like the Shakers tend not to survive for very long. It is therefore very tempting to see religion as somehow the product of those material conditions and wholly explicable in terms of them.
This would, however, be an enormous mistake. Religion can never be explained simply by reference to prior material conditions. We saw this most clearly with regard to the contrast between China and India. Up until the end of the first millennium B.C., both societies were similar in terms of social structure based on agnatic lineages and the kinds of political forms thereby produced. But thereafter Indian society took a sharp detour that could be explained only by the rise of Brahmanic religion. The specific metaphysical propositions that underlie that religion are highly complex and sophisticated, and it is a fool"s errand to try to relate them in any detail to the specific economic and environmental conditions existing in northern India at that particular time.
I have traced many other instances where religious ideas played an independent role in shaping political outcomes. The Catholic church played a major role, for example, in the shaping of two major European inst.i.tutions. It was critical in undermining the structure of property rights of kin groups among the barbarian Germanic tribes that took over the Roman Empire from the sixth century on, which in turn was crucial in weakening tribalism per se. Europe therefore made an exit out of kinship-based social organization through social rather than political means, in sharp contrast to China, India, and the Middle East. Then, in the eleventh century, the Catholic church declared its independence from secular authority, organizing itself as a modern hierarchy, and then promulgating a transnational European rule of law. While comparable independent religious inst.i.tutions existed in India, the Middle East, and the Byzantine Empire, none succeeded to the extent of the Western church in inst.i.tutionalizing an independent legal order. Without the invest.i.ture conflict and its consequences, the rule of law would never have become so deeply rooted in the West.
In none of these cases do religious values simply trump material interests. The Catholic church, just like the Brahmin cla.s.s in India or the cla.s.s of ulama in Muslim societies, const.i.tuted a social group with its own material interests. The changes in inheritance laws mandated by Gregory I appear to have been undertaken not for doctrinal but for self-interested reasons, as a means of diverting land away from their kin group owners toward the church itself. Nonetheless, the church was not simply another political actor like the warlords dominating Europe at the time. It could not readily convert its resources into military power, nor could it engage in predation without the help of secular authorities. On the other hand, it had a legitimacy that it could confer on the secular political actors, which they could not achieve on their own. Economists sometimes speak of political actors "investing" in legitimacy, as if legitimacy were a simple factor of production like land or machines.8 But legitimacy has to be understood in its own terms, that is, in terms of the ideas people hold about G.o.d, justice, man, society, wealth, virtue, and the like. But legitimacy has to be understood in its own terms, that is, in terms of the ideas people hold about G.o.d, justice, man, society, wealth, virtue, and the like.
One of the most important changes in values and ideology that define the modern world-the idea of the equality of recognition-appeared just at the end of the period covered in this volume. The idea of human equality has deep roots; writers from Hegel to Tocqueville to Nietzsche have traced modern ideas of equality to the biblical idea of man made in the image of G.o.d. The expansion of the charmed circle of human beings accorded equal dignity was very slow, however, and only after the seventeenth century came eventually to include the lower social cla.s.ses, women, racial, religious, and ethnic minorities, and the like.
The pa.s.sage from band- and tribal-level societies to state-level ones represented, in some sense, a huge setback for human freedom. States were wealthier and more powerful than their kin-based predecessors, but that wealth and power led to a huge amount of stratification that left some masters and many others slaves. Hegel would say that the recognition offered a ruler in such an unequal society was defective and ultimately unsatisfying even to the rulers, because it was offered by people who themselves lacked dignity. The rise of modern democracy gives all people the opportunity of ruling themselves, on the basis of the mutual recognition of the dignity and rights of their fellow humans. It thus seeks to restore, in the context of large and complex societies, something of what was lost in the original transition to the state.
The story of the emergence of accountable government cannot be told without reference to the spread of these ideas. We saw in the case of the English Parliament how its solidarity depended critically on a belief in the rights of Englishmen, and how the Glorious Revolution was shaped by a broader Lockean concept of universal natural rights. These were the ideas that would go on to animate the American Revolution. If the historical reasons I present for the rise of accountability seem at times rooted in the material interests of the actors in these struggles, they must in turn be seen against the backdrop of ideas that defined who the actors were and what their scope for collective action was.
THE GENERAL MECHANISM OF POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT.
Political systems evolve in a manner roughly comparable to biological evolution. Darwin"s theory of evolution is based on two very simple principles, variation and selection. Variation among organisms occurs due to random genetic combinations; those variants that are better adapted to their specific environments have greater reproductive success and therefore propagate themselves at the expense of those less well adapted.
In a very long historical perspective, political development has followed the same general pattern: the forms of political organization employed by different groups of human beings have varied, and those forms that were more successful-meaning those that could generate greater military and economic power-displaced those that were less successful. At this high level of abstraction, it is hard to see how political development could have proceeded in any other way. What is more important, however, is to understand the ways political evolution differs from its biological counterpart, of which there are at least three.
First, in political evolution, the units of selection are rules and their embodiments as inst.i.tutions, rather than genes as in biological evolution. Although human biology facilitates the formulation and following of rules, it does not determine their content, and that content can vary enormously. Rules are the basis for inst.i.tutions that confer advantages on those societies employing them and are selected through the interaction of human agents over less advantageous ones.
Second, in human societies, variation among inst.i.tutions can be planned and deliberate, as opposed to random. Hayek argues strongly against the idea that human societies self-consciously design inst.i.tutions, something he traces to the hubris of post-Cartesian rationalism.9 He argues that most information in societies is local in nature and therefore cannot be comprehended by centralized human agents. He argues that most information in societies is local in nature and therefore cannot be comprehended by centralized human agents.10 The weakness of Hayek"s argument is that human beings successfully design inst.i.tutions all the time, at all levels of society. He does not like top-down, centralized social engineering on the part of states, but he is willing to accept bottom-up, decentralized inst.i.tutional innovation that is no less subject to human design. While large-scale design may work less frequently than smaller-scale projects, it still does periodically work. Human beings can rarely plan for unintended consequences and missing information, but the fact that they can plan means that the variance in inst.i.tutional forms they create is more likely to produce adaptive solutions than simple randomness. Hayek is correct, however, that inst.i.tutional evolution is not dependent on the ability of human beings to design successful inst.i.tutions; random variation and the principle of selection by themselves can produce an adaptive evolutionary outcome. The weakness of Hayek"s argument is that human beings successfully design inst.i.tutions all the time, at all levels of society. He does not like top-down, centralized social engineering on the part of states, but he is willing to accept bottom-up, decentralized inst.i.tutional innovation that is no less subject to human design. While large-scale design may work less frequently than smaller-scale projects, it still does periodically work. Human beings can rarely plan for unintended consequences and missing information, but the fact that they can plan means that the variance in inst.i.tutional forms they create is more likely to produce adaptive solutions than simple randomness. Hayek is correct, however, that inst.i.tutional evolution is not dependent on the ability of human beings to design successful inst.i.tutions; random variation and the principle of selection by themselves can produce an adaptive evolutionary outcome.11 The third way political development differs from biological evolution is that the selected characteristics-inst.i.tutions in one case, genes in the other-are transmitted culturally rather than genetically. This represents both an advantage and a disadvantage with respect to the adaptability of the system. Cultural traits, whether norms, customs, laws, beliefs, or values, can at least in theory be altered on the fly within the s.p.a.ce of a single generation, as in the spread of Islam in the seventh century, or literacy among the Danish peasantry in the sixteenth. On the other hand, human beings tend to invest inst.i.tutions and the mental models they arise from with intrinsic value, which leads to the conservation of inst.i.tutions over time. A biological organism, by contrast, doesn"t worship or reify its own genes; if they do not permit the creature to survive and reproduce, the principle of selection ruthlessly eliminates them. Inst.i.tutional evolution can therefore be both faster and slower than biological evolution.
In contrast to biological evolution, inst.i.tutions can spread through imitation. Some societies with weaker inst.i.tutions are either conquered or eliminated by stronger ones, but in other cases they can adopt the inst.i.tutions of their compet.i.tors in a process known as "defensive modernization."12 During j.a.pan"s Tokugawa shogunate from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, the feudal lords who ran the country knew about the existence of firearms from their early contacts with the Portuguese and other travelers. They engaged in what amounted to a long-term arms control arrangement, however, by which they agreed not to introduce firearms among themselves because they did not want to give up their traditional form of sword- and archery-based warfare. But when Commodore Matthew Perry showed up with his "black ships" in Tokyo Bay in 1853, the ruling elite realized that they would have to end this comfortable arrangement and acquire the same types of military technology possessed by the Americans if they were not to end up a Western colony like China. After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, j.a.pan introduced not just firearms but also a new form of government, a centralized bureaucracy, a new educational system, and a host of other inst.i.tutions borrowed from Europe and the United States. During j.a.pan"s Tokugawa shogunate from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century, the feudal lords who ran the country knew about the existence of firearms from their early contacts with the Portuguese and other travelers. They engaged in what amounted to a long-term arms control arrangement, however, by which they agreed not to introduce firearms among themselves because they did not want to give up their traditional form of sword- and archery-based warfare. But when Commodore Matthew Perry showed up with his "black ships" in Tokyo Bay in 1853, the ruling elite realized that they would have to end this comfortable arrangement and acquire the same types of military technology possessed by the Americans if they were not to end up a Western colony like China. After the Meiji Restoration in 1868, j.a.pan introduced not just firearms but also a new form of government, a centralized bureaucracy, a new educational system, and a host of other inst.i.tutions borrowed from Europe and the United States.
Biological evolution is both specific and general. Specific evolution occurs as species adapt to very particular environments and differentiate, as in the case of Darwin"s famous finches. But general evolution also occurs as certain successful categories of organisms proliferate across local environments. There were thus large general transitions from single-celled to multicellular organisms, from as.e.xual to s.e.xual reproduction, from dinosaurs to mammals and the like. So, too, in political development. As behaviorally modern humans left Africa some fifty thousand years ago and spread over the world, they adapted to the different local environments they encountered and developed different languages, cultures, and inst.i.tutions. At the same time, certain societies. .h.i.t upon forms of social organization that provided large advantages, and thus there were also general transitions from band- to tribal- to state-level societies. Among state-level societies, those that could organize themselves more effectively defeated or absorbed less effective ones and thus proliferated their own form of social organization. Hence there was both differentiation and convergence among political inst.i.tutions.
Compet.i.tion is critical to the process of political development, just as it is in biological evolution. If compet.i.tion did not exist, there would be no selection pressure on inst.i.tutions, and therefore no incentives for inst.i.tutional innovation, borrowing, or reform. One of the most important compet.i.tive pressures leading to inst.i.tutional innovation has been violence and war. The transition from band- to tribal-level societies was made possible by greater economic productivity, but it was directly motivated by the superior ability of tribal societies to mobilize manpower. In chapter 5 5 I discussed various theories of pristine state formation, including economic self-interest, irrigation, population density, physical geography, religious authority, and violence. Although all these factors play a role, the difficult transition from a free tribal society to a despotic state-level society seems far more plausibly motivated by the need for physical selfpreservation than by economic interest alone. And when we looked at the historical record of state formation in China, India, the Middle East, and Europe, violence once again played a central role in incentivizing not just state formation but also the creation of the specific inst.i.tutions we a.s.sociate with modern states. For reasons detailed below, certain kinds of cooperative problems cannot be solved except through resort to violence. I discussed various theories of pristine state formation, including economic self-interest, irrigation, population density, physical geography, religious authority, and violence. Although all these factors play a role, the difficult transition from a free tribal society to a despotic state-level society seems far more plausibly motivated by the need for physical selfpreservation than by economic interest alone. And when we looked at the historical record of state formation in China, India, the Middle East, and Europe, violence once again played a central role in incentivizing not just state formation but also the creation of the specific inst.i.tutions we a.s.sociate with modern states. For reasons detailed below, certain kinds of cooperative problems cannot be solved except through resort to violence.
SPANDRELS EVERYWHERE.
In a 1979 article, the biologists Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin used the a.n.a.logy of the spandrel to explain the unpredictable way that biological innovation works.13 A spandrel is a curved architectural area formed by the intersection of arches holding up a dome. The spandrel was not deliberately designed by the architect but was an accidental by-product of other components that were deliberately put into place. Nonetheless, spandrels came to be decorated and took on their own character and meaning as time went on. Gould and Lewontin argued that many biological features of organisms evolve for one reason, but then prove to have adaptive benefits for completely different reasons at a later point in time. A spandrel is a curved architectural area formed by the intersection of arches holding up a dome. The spandrel was not deliberately designed by the architect but was an accidental by-product of other components that were deliberately put into place. Nonetheless, spandrels came to be decorated and took on their own character and meaning as time went on. Gould and Lewontin argued that many biological features of organisms evolve for one reason, but then prove to have adaptive benefits for completely different reasons at a later point in time.
We have seen many equivalents of spandrels in political evolution. The idea of the corporation-a permanently lived inst.i.tution with an ident.i.ty separate from the individuals who made it up-arose initially as a religious organization and not for commercial purposes.14 The Catholic church upheld the right of women to inherit property not because it wanted female empowerment-something quite anachronistic in the seventh century-but because it had its eye on valuable real estate held by powerful clans and saw this as a way of getting it away from them. It is doubtful that any church leaders at the time could foresee the impact this would have on kin relationships as a whole. And finally, the whole idea of governments being limited by independent judiciaries was not present in the minds of those engaged in the invest.i.ture conflict, which was a moral and political struggle over the independence of the Catholic church. And yet, in the West, the independence won by a religious organization evolved over time into the independence of the judicial branch. The religious grounding of law was replaced by secular sources, and yet the structure of law remained as it was. Thus the rule of law itself was a kind of spandrel. The Catholic church upheld the right of women to inherit property not because it wanted female empowerment-something quite anachronistic in the seventh century-but because it had its eye on valuable real estate held by powerful clans and saw this as a way of getting it away from them. It is doubtful that any church leaders at the time could foresee the impact this would have on kin relationships as a whole. And finally, the whole idea of governments being limited by independent judiciaries was not present in the minds of those engaged in the invest.i.ture conflict, which was a moral and political struggle over the independence of the Catholic church. And yet, in the West, the independence won by a religious organization evolved over time into the independence of the judicial branch. The religious grounding of law was replaced by secular sources, and yet the structure of law remained as it was. Thus the rule of law itself was a kind of spandrel.
The actual historical roots of different inst.i.tutions often seem to be the products of a long concatenation of historical accidents that one could never have predicted in advance. This might seem discouraging insofar as no contemporary society could ever be expected to pa.s.s through exactly the same sequence of events to arrive at a similar inst.i.tution. But this ignores the role of spandrels in political development. The particular historical source of an inst.i.tution matters less than the inst.i.tution"s functionality. Once discovered, it can be imitated and used by other societies in completely unantic.i.p.ated ways.
INSt.i.tUTIONS.
In this book, I have been using Samuel Huntington"s definition of inst.i.tutions as "stable, valued, recurring patterns of behavior."15 And with regard to the inst.i.tution called the state, I have been using not only Max Weber"s definition of the state (an organization deploying a legitimate monopoly of violence over a defined territory) but also his criteria for a modern state (states should be subject to a rational division of labor, based on technical specialization and expertise, and impersonal both with regard to recruitment and their authority over citizens). Impersonal modern states are difficult inst.i.tutions to both establish and maintain, since patrimonialism-recruitment based on kinship or personal reciprocity-is the natural form of social relationship to which human beings will revert in the absence of other norms and incentives. And with regard to the inst.i.tution called the state, I have been using not only Max Weber"s definition of the state (an organization deploying a legitimate monopoly of violence over a defined territory) but also his cr