32.Sacks, "Paradox of Taxation," p. 33.
33.Ibid., pp. 3435.
34.Dougla.s.s North and Barry Weingast have argued that the Glorious Revolution solved the problem of governments credibly committing to secure property rights by setting up an inst.i.tutional system from which none of the parties could profitably defect. Dougla.s.s C. North and Barry R. Weingast, "Const.i.tutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Inst.i.tutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," Journal of Economic History Journal of Economic History 49, no. 4 (1989): 80332. Most of the statistics North and Weingast cite to bolster their case that the Glorious Revolution had a positive effect on growth are actually about growth of public borrowing; their empirical evidence for positive increases in economic growth rates traceable to the const.i.tutional settlement is much sketchier. 49, no. 4 (1989): 80332. Most of the statistics North and Weingast cite to bolster their case that the Glorious Revolution had a positive effect on growth are actually about growth of public borrowing; their empirical evidence for positive increases in economic growth rates traceable to the const.i.tutional settlement is much sketchier.
35.I have already noted Mancur Olson"s theory of "stationary bandits" in traditional societies who seek to extract as much as they can in tax revenues, up to a point where further taxes become self-defeating. Olson went on to argue that after the Glorious Revolution and the advent of democracy, tax rates should have fallen, since rulers who were held accountable to the population as a whole would be prevented from extracting such high levels of taxes. Olson, "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development."
36.Figures taken from Ertman, Birth of the Leviathan Birth of the Leviathan, p. 220. See also John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 16881783 The Sinews of Power: War, Money, and the English State, 16881783 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
37.North and Weingast argue that the const.i.tutional settlement of 16881689 locked in secure property rights because it created an equilibrium from which neither of the parties-king or Parliament-could deviate without seriously harming their own interests. It is not the form of the settlement so much as the relative power and coherence of the contracting parties that underpinned its durability. Any number of countries have adopted English-style const.i.tutions that vest tax and legislative authority in a parliament that shares power with an executive, yet this has not prevented ambitious rulers from subsequently violating the agreement and violating citizens" property rights. What made the English settlement durable was solidarity of the Commons and the fact that it was balanced by a strong state. That solidarity was due, as argued earlier in the chapter, on much earlier precedents like local government, social structure, and law.
38.Alexandre Kojeve, Introduction to the Reading of Hegel Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, trans. James H. Nichols Jr. (New York: Basic Books, 1969).
39.See Walter Russell Mead, G.o.d and Gold: Britain, America, and the Making of the Modern World G.o.d and Gold: Britain, America, and the Making of the Modern World (New York: Knopf, 2007); and Michael Mandelbaum, (New York: Knopf, 2007); and Michael Mandelbaum, The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century The Ideas That Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free Markets in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Public Affairs, 2002). (New York: Public Affairs, 2002).
28: WHY ACCOUNTABILITY? WHY ABSOLUTISM?.
1.The greater sense of national community fostered by broad-ranging political partic.i.p.ation is reflected in the contrast between the Magna Carta and the Golden Bull. The Golden Bull was driven not by barons but by the cla.s.s of royal soldiers and castle guardians who wanted protection from the barons. The English barons claimed to speak on behalf of the whole national community, including the church and ordinary Englishmen, and demanded const.i.tutional protections for their rights. The Hungarian gentry promoting the Golden Bull, by contrast, were primarily interested in protecting their own sectional interests. They, like the French and Russian aristocracy, understood liberty to be a privilege rather than a general condition of citizenship, and when they took care of themselves, they had little interest in defending the rights of anyone else. Sacks, "Paradox of Taxation," p. 15.
2.For an account of this period, see Ronald Hutton, The Restoration: A Political and Religious History of England and Wales, 16581667 The Restoration: A Political and Religious History of England and Wales, 16581667 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985). (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985).
3.See Gert and Gunnar Svendsen, "Social Capital and the Welfare State," in Michael Boss, ed., The Nation-State in Transformation The Nation-State in Transformation (Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 2010). (Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus University Press, 2010).
4.Kenneth E. Miller, Government and Politics in Denmark Government and Politics in Denmark (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968), p. 23. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1968), p. 23.
5.For a description of the medieval peasant economy in neighboring Sweden, see Eli F. Heckscher, An Economic History of Sweden An Economic History of Sweden (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 2529. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 2529.
6.Thomas K. Derry, A History of Scandinavia: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland A History of Scandinavia: Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), pp. 9091. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1979), pp. 9091.
7.See Bonney, "Revenues," p. 452.
8.Ove Korsgaard, The Struggle for the People: Five Hundred Years of Danish History in Short The Struggle for the People: Five Hundred Years of Danish History in Short (Copenhagen: Danish School of Education Press, 2008), pp. 2126. (Copenhagen: Danish School of Education Press, 2008), pp. 2126.
9.Miller, Government and Politics in Denmark Government and Politics in Denmark, p. 26; Nils Andren, Government and Politics in the Nordic Countries Government and Politics in the Nordic Countries (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1964), p. 29. (Stockholm: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1964), p. 29.
10.Uffe stergrd, "Denmark: A Big Small State: The Peasant Roots of Danish Modernity," in John Campbell, John A. Hall, and Ove K. Pedersen, eds., National Ident.i.ty and the Varieties of Capitalism: The Danish Experience National Ident.i.ty and the Varieties of Capitalism: The Danish Experience (Kingston, Ontario: McGillQueen"s University Press, 2006). (Kingston, Ontario: McGillQueen"s University Press, 2006).
11.Harald Westergaard, Economic Development in Denmark: Before and During the World War Economic Development in Denmark: Before and During the World War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922), pp. 56. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922), pp. 56.
12.stergrd, "Denmark," pp. 7681; Korsgaard, The Struggle for the People The Struggle for the People, pp. 6165.
29: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND POLITICAL DECAY.
1.On this point, see the critique of rational choice in John J. DiIulio, Jr., "Principled Agents: The Cultural Bases of Behavior in a Federal Government Bureaucracy," Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 4, no. 3 (1994): 277320. 4, no. 3 (1994): 277320.
2.Frank, Choosing the Right Pond Choosing the Right Pond; and Luxury Fever Luxury Fever (New York: Free Press, 1999). (New York: Free Press, 1999).
3.North, Structure and Change in Economic History Structure and Change in Economic History, pp. 4558; see also North and Arthur Denzau, "Shared Mental Models: Ideologies and Inst.i.tutions," Kyklos Kyklos 47, no. 1 (1994): 331. 47, no. 1 (1994): 331.
4.Friedrich Hayek understood perhaps better than any other social scientist that it was complexity that distinguished the natural from the social sciences and made it impossible to achieve a positive social science that could approach physics or chemistry in predictive ability. See Bruce Caldwell, Hayek"s Challenge: An Intellectual Biography of F. A. Hayek Hayek"s Challenge: An Intellectual Biography of F. A. Hayek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004). (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004).
5.For example, Dawkins, The G.o.d Delusion The G.o.d Delusion, and Hitchens, G.o.d Is Not Great G.o.d Is Not Great.
6.Wade, The Faith Instinct The Faith Instinct, pp. 4345.
7.The cla.s.sic a.n.a.lysis of the development of religion in social anthropology is James G. Frazer, The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion The Golden Bough: A Study in Magic and Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998). (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
8.See, for example, North, Structure and Change Structure and Change, p. 44.
9.Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty Law, Legislation and Liberty, 1:911.
10.Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society."
11.This point is also made in Armen A. Alchian, "Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory," Journal of Political Economy Journal of Political Economy 58 (1950): 21121. 58 (1950): 21121.
12.Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 123.
13.Stephen Jay Gould and R. C. Lewontin, "The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Program: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme," Proceedings of the Royal Society of London Proceedings of the Royal Society of London 205 (1979): 58198. 205 (1979): 58198.
14.Oscar Handlin and Mary Handlin, "Origins of the American Business Corporation," Journal of Economic History Journal of Economic History 5, no. 1 (1945): 123. 5, no. 1 (1945): 123.
15.Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies Political Order in Changing Societies, p. 12. Dougla.s.s North, founder of the New Inst.i.tutional Economics, defines an inst.i.tution as "humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction," meaning that it includes both formal and informal rules. He distinguishes an inst.i.tution from an organization, which is the embodiment of rules among a specific group of people. The problem with North"s definition of an inst.i.tution is that it is too broad, encompa.s.sing everything from the U.S. Const.i.tution to my habits in selecting ripe oranges. Most important, it elides a critical distinction traditionally made between formal inst.i.tutions like const.i.tutions and legal systems, and informal norms that fall into the realm of culture. Many critical controversies have arisen in social theory as to the relative importance of formal versus informal inst.i.tutions, but for North and his followers, they are all simply "inst.i.tutions." Moreover, he does not provide criteria like complexity, adaptability, autonomy, and coherence to measure the degree of inst.i.tutionalization. Dougla.s.s C. North, Inst.i.tutions, Inst.i.tutional Change, and Economic Performance Inst.i.tutions, Inst.i.tutional Change, and Economic Performance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 3. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 3.
16.Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies Political Order in Changing Societies, pp. 1224.
17.Among modern organizations, the j.a.panese Ministry of Finance is an elite body that recruits cla.s.ses of new bureaucrats from j.a.pan"s most prestigious universities. The ministry has its own vision of how to manage the j.a.panese economy and at times has manipulated its political bosses rather than being subordinated by them. It is therefore often seen as a paradigmatic case of an autonomous inst.i.tution. See Peter B. Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995). (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
18.Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962). See also Carol Tavris, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962). See also Carol Tavris, Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me): Why We Justify Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions, and Hurtful Acts Mistakes Were Made (But Not by Me): Why We Justify Foolish Beliefs, Bad Decisions, and Hurtful Acts (New York: Mariner Books, 2008). (New York: Mariner Books, 2008).
19.This is the argument made about twentieth-century Britain in Mancur Olson, The Rise and Decline of Nations The Rise and Decline of Nations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). This book is based on the more general theory of collective action he outlined in (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). This book is based on the more general theory of collective action he outlined in The Logic of Collective Action The Logic of Collective Action.
20.Steven LeBlanc, private conversation.
21.See, for example, Bates, Prosperity and Violence Prosperity and Violence; Bates, Greif, and Singh, "Organizing Violence"; North, Weingast, and Wallis, Violence and Social Orders Violence and Social Orders.
30: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT, THEN AND NOW.
1.For background, see Nils Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), chap. 1. See also Vernon Ruttan, "What Happened to Political Development?" (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003), chap. 1. See also Vernon Ruttan, "What Happened to Political Development?" Economic Development and Cultural Change Economic Development and Cultural Change 39, no. 2 (1991): 26592. 39, no. 2 (1991): 26592.
2.See, for example, David C. McClelland, The Achieving Society The Achieving Society (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961); Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961); Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds., Toward a General Theory of Action Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951). (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1951).
3.A more up-to-date version of this argument was made by Huntington"s student Fareed Zakaria, who emphasized rule of law in addition to state building as a component of political order. See The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad (New York: Norton, 2003). (New York: Norton, 2003).
4.See Maddison, Growth and Interaction in the World Economy, Growth and Interaction in the World Economy, pp. 1230. The a.s.sertion of Gregory Clark that there were no increases in productivity from hunter-gatherer times to 1800 is highly implausible. Clark, pp. 1230. The a.s.sertion of Gregory Clark that there were no increases in productivity from hunter-gatherer times to 1800 is highly implausible. Clark, A Farewell to Alms A Farewell to Alms.
5.Livi-Bacci, A Concise History of World Population A Concise History of World Population.
6.Maddison, Growth and Interaction in the World Economy Growth and Interaction in the World Economy, p. 9.
7.See, for example, David S. Landes, The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development The Unbound Prometheus: Technological Change and Industrial Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969); and Landes, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1969); and Landes, The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor The Wealth and Poverty of Nations: Why Some Are So Rich and Some So Poor (New York: Norton, 1998); Nathan Rosenberg and L. E. Birdzell, (New York: Norton, 1998); Nathan Rosenberg and L. E. Birdzell, How the West Grew Rich How the West Grew Rich (New York: Basic Books, 1986); North and Thomas, (New York: Basic Books, 1986); North and Thomas, The Growth of the Western World The Growth of the Western World; Philippe Aghion and Steven N. Durlauf, eds., Handbook of Economic Growth Handbook of Economic Growth, Vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Elsevier/North Holland, 2005), particularly the chapter by Oded Galor, "From Stagnation to Growth: Unified Growth Theory"; Oded Galor and David N. Weil, "Population, Technology, and Growth: From Malthusian Stagnation to the Demographic Transition and Beyond," American Economic Review American Economic Review 90 (2000): 80628. 90 (2000): 80628.
8.Ma.s.simo Livi-Bacci, Population and Nutrition: An Essay on European Demographic History Population and Nutrition: An Essay on European Demographic History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 12. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 12.
9.Livi-Bacci, Concise History of World Population Concise History of World Population, p. 28.
10.See Alan Macfarlane, "The Malthusian Trap," in William A. Darrity Jr., ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 2d ed. (New York: Macmillan, 2007).
11.Boserup, Population and Technological Change Population and Technological Change, pp. 6365. See also Boserup, Economic and Demographic Relationships in Development Economic and Demographic Relationships in Development (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990). (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990).
12.Livi-Bacci, Population and Nutrition Population and Nutrition, p. 119.
13.Livi-Bacci, Concise History of World Population Concise History of World Population, p. 36.
14.See Marcus Noland and Stephan Haggard, Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform Famine in North Korea: Markets, Aid, and Reform (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007). (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007).
15.This is the subject of Jared Diamond, Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed (New York: Viking, 2005). (New York: Viking, 2005).
16.Livi-Bacci, Concise History of World Population Concise History of World Population, p. 31; Maddison, Growth and Interaction in the World Economy Growth and Interaction in the World Economy, p. 7.
17.Livi-Bacci, Concise History of World Population Concise History of World Population, p. 31.
18.Livi-Bacci, Population and Nutrition Population and Nutrition, p. 20; Diamond, Guns, Germs, and Steel Guns, Germs, and Steel; Boserup, Population and Technological Change Population and Technological Change, pp. 3536.
19.LeBlanc and Register, Constant Battles Constant Battles, pp. 6871.
20.See Paul Collier, The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007).
21.Knack and Keefer, "Inst.i.tutions and Economic Performance"; Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian, "The Primacy of Inst.i.tutions (and what this does and does not mean)," Finance and Development Finance and Development 40, no. 2 (2003): 3134; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 40, no. 2 (2003): 3134; Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, Governance Matters IV Governance Matters IV.
22.Jeffrey Sachs, The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time (New York: Penguin, 2005). (New York: Penguin, 2005).
23.See Melissa Thomas, "Great Expectations: Rich Donors and Poor Country Governments," Social Science Research Network working paper, January 27, 2009.
24.Stephen Haber, Noel Maurer, and Armando Razo, The Politics of Property Rights The Politics of Property Rights (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo Kwame Sundaram, eds., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003); and Mushtaq H. Khan and Jomo Kwame Sundaram, eds., Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia Rents, Rent-Seeking and Economic Development: Theory and Evidence in Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000). (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
25.Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review American Political Science Review 53 (1959): 69105; for a review of the literature, see Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," 53 (1959): 69105; for a review of the literature, see Larry Diamond, "Economic Development and Democracy Reconsidered," American Behavioral Scientist American Behavioral Scientist 15, nos. 45 (1992): 45099. 15, nos. 45 (1992): 45099.
26.Robert J. Barro, Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Survey Determinants of Economic Growth: A Cross-Country Survey (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997). (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).
27.Adam Przeworski et al., Democracy and Development: Political Inst.i.tutions and Material Well-Being in the World, 19501990 Democracy and Development: Political Inst.i.tutions and Material Well-Being in the World, 19501990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
28.Ernest Gellner, Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals (New York: Penguin, 1994). (New York: Penguin, 1994).
29.Ibid.
30.For an example, see Sheri Berman, "Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic," World Politics World Politics 49, no. 3 (1997): 40129. 49, no. 3 (1997): 40129.
31.George Gray Molina, "The Offspring of 1952: Poverty, Exclusion and the Promise of Popular Partic.i.p.ation," and H. Klein, "Social Change in Bolivia since 1952," in Merilee S. Grindle, ed., Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective Proclaiming Revolution: Bolivia in Comparative Perspective (London: Inst.i.tute of Latin American Studies, 2003). (London: Inst.i.tute of Latin American Studies, 2003).
32.This point is made by Thomas Carothers, "The "Sequencing" Fallacy," Journal of Democracy Journal of Democracy 18, no. 1 (2007): 1227; and Marc F. Plattner, "Liberalism and Democracy," 18, no. 1 (2007): 1227; and Marc F. Plattner, "Liberalism and Democracy," Foreign Affairs Foreign Affairs 77, no. 2 (1998): 17180. 77, no. 2 (1998): 17180.
33.Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, eds., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978). (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978).
34.On the general problem of inequality in Latin America and its relationship to democratic stability, see f.u.kuyama, Falling Behind Falling Behind.
35.See Jung-En Woo, Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization Race to the Swift: State and Finance in Korean Industrialization (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991).
36.See Alexander Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962). (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962).
37.Wriston, The Twilight of Sovereignty The Twilight of Sovereignty.
38.See Moses Naim, Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy Illicit: How Smugglers, Traffickers, and Copycats Are Hijacking the Global Economy (New York: Doubleday, 2005). (New York: Doubleday, 2005).BIBLIOGRAPHY.
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