In writing of the possibilities of the white race in the equatorial zone it is understood that the problem relates to the lowlands. There are, of course, favoured highlands, such as those of Colombia, where the temperature is at the same time moderate and equable and the climate appears admirably adapted to white men.
A healthy city life in the tropics would be easily attainable in a new country settled wholly by white people and under a medical despotism.
The general, but non-specialist, opinion upon the Isthmus is not as sanguine as that of Colonel Gorgas upon the hygienic future of the white race in the tropics. The general opinion among Americans seems to be that, as far as they are concerned, they would, if engaged in the tropical parts of South or Central America, avail themselves of the improving means of transit to revisit frequently the United States, and would rely upon such vacations in higher lat.i.tudes for the retention of their native vigour.
CHAPTER VI
ON THE SHORTENING OF DISTANCES BY SEA, AND ON THE STEAMSHIPS AVAILABLE FOR Ca.n.a.l TRANSIT
_The Shortening of Distances by Sea._
AS the sole object of a ship ca.n.a.l is to shorten sea distances, the figures given in this section are of primary importance to a proper understanding of the subject. The figures here given are those for steamships following the actual or prospective routes. They are adopted from the figures supplied to the Ca.n.a.l Commission from the United States Hydrographic Bureau and are expressed in nautical miles. It is perhaps not wholly superfluous to warn the reader that the apparent relative distances as shown on charts of the world, especially those on the usual Mercator projection, are very different from the real relative distances. Moreover, it is impossible to see correctly the relative distances between places far apart on a globe, for the foreshortening of the rounded surface produces distortion. By applying a measuring tape to the globe the true relative distances can be readily ascertained. This is a salutary exercise and serves to correct the erroneous notions which tend to fix themselves in the minds of all of us owing to the appearance of the surface of the globe on the plane of the paper or on the plane of vision. Such a measurement of shortest distances would give a very fair notion of the actual reductions due to the Suez and Panama Ca.n.a.ls, but there would still be considerable differences between these figures and the distance calculated from the actual courses pursued by steamships, which in what follows will be referred to simply as "the" distance between ports.
[Ill.u.s.tration: RIO GRANDE, NEAR LA BOCA.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: RIO GRANDE, FROM ANCON HILL.]
The most notable effect of the Panama Ca.n.a.l will be the reduction of distance between the Atlantic and Pacific ports of North America.
Taking New York as our port of reckoning on the Atlantic, the distance thence to Panama and all ports north thereof on the Pacific seaboard of Central and North America will be reduced by 8,415 miles.
The reduction of distance from New York to the Pacific ports of South America, on the other hand, is not constant, but varies from the above maximum of 8,415 miles at Panama to a minimum of about 1,004 miles at Punta Arenas (in the Straits of Magellan). The _average_ shortening on this coast is therefore
8,415 + 1,004 ------------- = 4,709 miles.
2
The actual shortening to Iquique, the nitrate port in Chile, is 5,200 miles. We shall not be far out in saying briefly that the distance between New York and South American Pacific ports will be shortened by an average of 5,000 miles.
The Ca.n.a.l shortens the distance between the Pacific coast of the Americas and the ports of Europe also, though in a lesser degree. Thus, taking Liverpool as our example (and the reductions are much the same for London, Antwerp, or Hamburg), the Ca.n.a.l will shorten the distance to Panama and all ports on the coast to the north by a constant quant.i.ty, viz., 6,046 miles.
The reduction to Pacific ports south of Panama is not a constant but a variable quant.i.ty, ranging from the above maximum of 6,046 miles at Panama itself to zero at a point between Punta Arenas and Coronel (the most southern industrial port of Chile). We may put the average shortening of distance between Liverpool and South American Pacific ports at about 2,600 miles.
Viewing the whole matter from the standpoint of the Pacific ports of the Americas, we see an absolute commercial advantage accruing to them all in the diminished distance to the Atlantic and Gulf ports of North America and to the ports of Europe.
Viewing the matter from the standpoint of the Atlantic and Gulf ports of North America--to fix our ideas we will say from the standpoint of New York--we see the same absolute advantage _plus_ a compet.i.tive advantage, in that the reduction is greater for New York than for Liverpool (_i.e._, Europe).
As the world is at present const.i.tuted, steamers from New York and from Liverpool proceeding to these Pacific ports all pa.s.s Pernambuco, in Brazil, near the easternmost point of South America, not far south of the equator. This port is 4,066 miles from Liverpool and 3,696 miles from New York, so that, by sea, San Francisco is only 370 miles nearer to New York than to Liverpool. But Colon is 4,720 miles from Liverpool and only 1,961 from New York, so that _via_ the Ca.n.a.l all the Pacific ports of the Americas are 2,759 miles nearer to New York than to Liverpool.
Let us next consider the Ca.n.a.l as the starting place for Trans.p.a.cific voyages, the _role_ for which it was originally projected in the sixteenth century. In those days the Isthmus of Suez was firmly held by the hostile Moslem, and even if a ca.n.a.l had then been open there, it would not have been available for the commerce of Christian Europe. Thus the discovery of a strait, or the cutting of a ca.n.a.l, at the Isthmus of Panama would at that time have opened to Europeans a shorter seaway to the Orient. But now that the Suez route has been opened for ships, the _Panama Ca.n.a.l will not bring any port in Australia or the East Indies, nor any ice-free port in Asia or Asiatic Islands, nearer to any European port_. Of all ports on the west, that is to say the Old World or "Oriental" side, of the Pacific, only those of New Zealand and some in Siberia will be brought nearer to Liverpool, and that to an insignificant amount.
[Ill.u.s.tration: LA BOCA, FROM ANCON HILL.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: ANCON CEMETERY.]
Distances are, however, much diminished between New York and both the northern and the southern ports of the Oriental Pacific coasts, as the following table shows:--
New York to-- Reduction.
Yokohama { by Suez 13,564 } 3,729 miles.
{ by Panama 9,835 }
Shanghai { by Suez 12,514 } 1,629 miles.
{ by Panama 10,885 }
Sydney { by Cape of Good Hope 13,658 } 3,806 miles.
{ by Panama (_via_ Tahiti) 9,852 }
Melbourne { by Cape of Good Hope 13,083 } 2,656 miles.
{ by Panama (_via_ Tahiti) 10,427 }
Wellington,{ by Straits of Magellan 11,414 } 2,542 miles.
N.Z. { by Panama (_via_ Tahiti) 8,872 }
Since the Ca.n.a.l does not reduce the distances between these places and Europe (except slightly in the case of Wellington), the compet.i.tive gain of New York is equal in all cases to the absolute gain in distance. The following figures show the distances from New York to Hong Kong and Manila by the Suez and Panama routes:--
New York to-- Reduction.
Hong Kong{ by Suez 11,655 { by Panama 11,744
Manila { by Suez 11,601 } { by Panama, _via_ San Francisco } 16 miles.
{ and Yokohama 11,585 } { by Panama, Honolulu and { Guam 11,729
Ports on the mainland of Asia in these lat.i.tudes are of course nearer to New York by way of Suez.
The opportunities of a port for commerce obviously depend in a great measure upon the centrality of its position with reference to the other ports of the world. Let us see how Liverpool and New York were originally situated in this respect, and how far their situations are altered first by the opening of the Suez route and secondly by that of Panama; remembering also that the changes introduced by the ca.n.a.ls have about the same effect on Antwerp or Hamburg as on Liverpool.
Prior to the opening of the Suez Ca.n.a.l in 1869 the route to Asia and Australia was _via_ the Cape of Good Hope from both Liverpool and New York. This gave Liverpool an advantage of 480 miles for all Asiatic and Australian ports as well as for the East Coast of Africa. For most of South America and all the Pacific coast of the Americas the route was _via_ Pernambuco, and New York had an advantage of 370 miles.
Suez being open but Panama still closed, the route to Asia is _via_ Gibraltar for both Liverpool and New York. New York is distant 3,207 miles and Liverpool 1,283 from that place, so that Liverpool has an advantage of 1,924 miles instead of 480 on the voyage to all Asiatic ports, a compet.i.tive benefit of 1,444 miles resulting from the opening of the Suez Ca.n.a.l.
The voyage to Australia from New York being still made _via_ the Cape of Good Hope, while that from Liverpool is most shortly made by Suez, Liverpool is 1,622 miles nearer by the ca.n.a.l and 480 by the Cape, thus obtaining a benefit of 1,142 miles when the Suez route is taken.
The opening of the Panama route leaves unchanged the relative distances to the Atlantic coast of South America, to Africa, and to Asiatic ports south of Shanghai; but it is New York and not Liverpool which is now the nearer port to Yokohama, Sydney, and Melbourne; and Wellington, New Zealand, formerly nearly equidistant, is placed 2,739 miles nearer to New York than to Liverpool.
With reference to Northern China, however, it is to be noted that, although the Panama route shortens the distance between New York and Shanghai by 1,629 miles, Liverpool will still be the nearer to Shanghai by 295 miles, a.s.suming the New York vessel to call at San Francisco.
[Ill.u.s.tration: COMMISSION"S HOTEL AT ANCON.]
[Ill.u.s.tration: ADMINISTRATION BUILDING, ANCON.]
These facts are ill.u.s.trated by the figures given on the next page.
Nearer to New York than to Liverpool by