THURSDAY, APRIL 10, 1902.
The meeting was resumed. General L. J. Meyer was the first speaker. He said that if anyone intended to continue the struggle he would stand by him, but they should first consider how great the responsibility was that rested on the two Republican Governments. The princ.i.p.al matter that should be taken into consideration was what is to the advantage of the people. Unless a miracle occurred nothing could save the people. He knew what their condition was as regarded food and ammunition. Their cause--whatever might be said--had not improved since June, 1901, but had gone backward. They should not shut their eyes to facts. The rebellion in the Cape Colony was, after all, feeble, and the cause was not progressing there. Would it not be possible to conclude a federal union with the two Colonies? An offensive and defensive treaty? Friendship in trade? If all attempts in these directions came to nothing, could they not be satisfied with an "enc.u.mbered independence"? and if England did not want this, and refused to concede anything, the time would have arrived for the matter to be laid before the people.
Chief Commandant de Wet said he did not wish to boast when he said that the enemy had concentrated their greatest forces against him, and that he had at his disposal the smallest forces; but as far as he was concerned there could be no mention of the surrender of their independence. Their cause had progressed since last June. The places of the burghers whom they lost in the Republics were filled by recruits in the Cape Colony. He had sufficient food, clothes, and ammunition for more than a year. Before he conceded an iota of their independence he would allow himself to be banished for ever.
State Secretary Reitz asked whether they should not discuss some questions first. Should they not, for example: (1) Request an armistice; (2) Try to get into communication with their Deputation; (3) Make proposals in which the following points were raised: (_a_) Customs Convention; (_b_) Postal Union; (_c_) The Franchise; (_d_) Their Foreign Affairs; (_e_) Amnesty for Colonial Burghers; (_f_) Their relation to other Powers; (_g_) The Paramount Power of England, and (4) In order that they did not at once repulse the British by using the word "Independence," would it not be better to use another word instead, for instance, "Self-government"?
General Hertzog said that the Const.i.tution of the Republics did not permit the Governments to meddle with the independence. That was most severely punishable under Roman-Dutch law. The Governments could not part with the independence of the Republics without authority from the people. They should request a conference with Lord Kitchener on the basis of their independence. All they heard was from British sources, and they therefore did not know what the true condition of affairs was. What a.s.surance had they that England was not willing to give them their independence, if she could retain the Cape Colony?
General de la Rey also thought that they should demand their independence. They should concede only what was forced from them.
General Hertzog, seconded by General Olivier, then submitted a draft resolution to the meeting, which was referred to a committee consisting of the two Presidents, the State Secretary, and General Hertzog.
After an adjournment the committee handed in a draft resolution, which was accepted and dispatched to Lord Kitchener.
The resolution read as follows:--
Resolution pa.s.sed at Klerksdorp by the Governments of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State.
"The Governments of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State having met with reference to the transmission to them of the correspondence which pa.s.sed in Europe between the Government of His Majesty the King of England and the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of the Netherlands concerning the desirability of giving the Governments of these Republics an opportunity of communicating with their plenipotentiaries in Europe, who still continue to enjoy the confidence of both the Republics;
"Considering the spirit of reconciliation (_rapprochement_) which is apparent on the part of the Government of His Britannic Majesty, as well as to the desire therein expressed by Lord Lansdowne on behalf of his Government to cause this struggle to come to an end;
"Are of opinion that this is a suitable time to again show their willingness to do all in their power to terminate this war; and
"Consequently resolve to make certain proposals to Lord Kitchener as representing the Government of His Britannic Majesty, which can serve as a basis for further negotiations with the object of establishing the desired peace;
"It is further the view of both these Governments that in order to accelerate the attainment of the desired object, and to prevent misunderstandings as much as possible, His Excellency Lord Kitchener be requested to meet the two Republican Governments personally, at a time and place to be appointed by him, in order to enable them to submit to him direct peace proposals, which they are prepared to make, in order thus by means of direct discussion and conference with him immediately to solve all questions which may arise, and thereby to ensure that this meeting shall bear the desired fruit."
This resolution was forwarded to Lord Kitchener under covering letter signed by the two Presidents.
In the afternoon, after a general discussion, the same Committee was appointed to make a draft of the points which could be conceded to the British.
The meeting adjourned till the following morning.
APRIL 11, 1902.
On meeting again the following morning, the Committee submitted the following doc.u.ment:--
"Proceeding from the basis that they do not recognise the annexation, the two Governments are prepared to conclude peace by conceding the following matters:--
1. The concluding of a perpetual Treaty of friendship and peace, including:--
(_a_) Arrangements relative to a Customs Convention.
(_b_) Post, Telegraph and Railway Union,
(_c_) Fixing of the Franchise.
2. Dismantling of all State Forts.
3. Arbitration in all future differences between the contracting parties, an equal number of arbitrators to be appointed by each party from their subjects, with an umpire to be chosen by both parties.
4. Equal educational rights for both the English and Dutch languages.
5. Mutual amnesty.
Mr. Krogh asked whether the following could not be included in the proposal:--"The conclusion of an offensive and defensive Treaty with England."
President Steyn remarked that if they themselves offered to conclude an offensive and defensive treaty with England, they would thereby alienate all other nations from them. England would use such proposal to kill all the sympathy other nations had for them.
The meeting did not consider it advisable to add anything to the proposal, and accepted it as submitted by the Committee.
Mr. L. J. Jacobsz inquired whether, although it was plain that the Governments were not competent to decide on questions touching the independence of the Republics, they could not raise the point. If England did not accept the proposal of the Republican Governments, and the matter had to be laid before the people, it would be well if those Governments knew what England was prepared to give instead of the independence. The question should be thoroughly taken into serious consideration by their Governments, because, in his opinion, matters had not improved, but become worse since June, 1901.
General Hertzog was of opinion that the Republican outlook had improved during the past year. As proof thereof he pointed to the good spirit that prevailed amongst the burghers. They were determined to persevere. He also pointed to the engagements that had taken place since June, 1901. Then it had also been said that the cause was hopeless, and that no engagement of any importance could still be fought. He also showed that they knew nothing of the real condition of the enemy. The Republics being so shut off made that impossible. They should bear in mind that the enemy also had a hard time of it. England could not continue indefinitely to enlist soldiers and to borrow money. He was not yet prepared to surrender his independence.
Commandant General Botha said that they could not take it amiss in one another if there was no unanimity of views. They had gathered together confidentially, and should treat one another open-heartedly. There was nothing that urged him personally to terminate the struggle. He could flee about as well as anyone else, but when he considered the circ.u.mstances, he was bound to say, "We are becoming weaker." They were being forced out of those parts of the country which were the best for them, and to which they had clung most tenaciously. He wished to prove from facts that they had become weaker. In the Northern and South-eastern parts of the Republic they had 9,570 men a year ago. Now they had there only 5,200 men, a reduction thus of 4,370 men. At their meeting on June 20th last year he had said that they should throw the responsibility of the continuance of the war more upon the people.
They should then have said plainly that only faith and perseverance could save them, and that there was no other means of salvation.
However, the majority of them had taken another view. What he then specially relied upon was the Cape Colony, on the strength of the reports that they received from there. Their reports were to the effect that 2,000 burghers had risen in the Cape Colony. Now, according to the statements of Generals de Wet and de la Rey, there were about 600 of his (General Botha"s) burghers and of the Free State burghers together in the Cape Colony; altogether there were about 2,600 burghers under arms there. There has therefore been no further rising during the past year. He was firmly convinced that they could expect nothing from the rebellion in the Cape Colony. The time for a big rising there was past. It appeared that their men were scattered over that Colony in small groups, and effected nothing. They had to live on those people who were well disposed towards them (the Boers), and the result was that those people were treated very harshly by the enemy, and would be compelled later to a.s.sist the latter to drive those groups of rebels out of the country. Already many Colonists had been hanged. Their cause was often compared to that of the American Colonists, but it was not clear to him how that comparison could be made. The enemy (the British) had about 40,000 men in America, and America had more than one million inhabitants. She also had the support of France, and a means of importing supplies. They (the Boers) had no such means of importing what was necessary, and there was no proper communication with the outside world. The forces of the enemy in the country were much greater than the entire male population of the two Republics. Their population had now been reduced to 15,000 or 16,000 men. Had they grounds for saying that they with 15,000 men could achieve what 50,000 burghers could not do? They were becoming so weak that he was afraid that they would afterwards no longer be considered a party that had to be reckoned with. It was not impossible that they would afterwards be declared rebels, and then a mutual murdering would take place. He did not think that it could be expected of him to co-operate towards that end. They could not speak of "right," because they knew from sad experience that the stronger party did just what it wanted to. Their people were too good to allow matters to proceed so far. Scheepers was already under the sod, and whom must they shoot for him? Not an ordinary soldier, but an officer, for only officers were equal to their burghers. If the enemy continued to capture burghers as they had done during the last year, then they would within a short time become too weak to effect anything. They had indeed during the last year had such successful engagements that they could hardly account for it themselves, but it was also equally true that the best part of their country was being made uninhabitable for their commandos. In the High Veld there was no more food for their people. They could not bring food there either, because if wagons with provisions were sent thither the enemy captured the greater part of them. He had already informed his Government and General de la Rey that he would be obliged to give up certain portions of the country, and they would have to discuss whither the commandos of those parts had to go.
How must this war end? Must they wait until everyone had been captured? or should they, for the sake of their people, adopt another course? His Government, his officers, and he himself, could say: "Let the enemy carry out their proclamations concerning us. We have nothing more to lose. We have fought for nothing else than our country, and wish to have that back or nothing else. Banish us, banish the Government." But then, what about the People? The People could not be banished. Was there now not still a chance to save something for the People? He considered this point worthy of consideration. For their Leaders he thought it would be easier to continue till they died a manly death, or till they were banished to far-off islands, than to submit to the yoke of the enemy; but they had a duty towards the People.
The State Secretary thought it would be best for the People themselves to elect persons to make their views clear to the Government.
At this juncture a telegram was received from Lord Kitchener stating that he was prepared to have a personal interview with the two Republican Governments, and requesting them to come to Pretoria that same evening.
CHAPTER III.
FIRST NEGOTIATIONS AT PRETORIA.
Early the next morning, Sat.u.r.day, April 12th, 1902, the two Republican Governments, travelling in separate trains, arrived at Pretoria, and at nine o"clock a meeting with Lord Kitchener took place in his house.
Lord Kitchener expressed the desire that they should first confer informally, and that the Secretaries should withdraw.
The Secretaries then left the chamber, and therefore the discussion that ensued between Lord Kitchener and the Governments cannot be communicated officially.
However, we publish the following report, embracing what took place at the interview on April 12th, 1902, with Lord Kitchener, and at the interview with Lord Kitchener and Lord Milner on April 14th and following days, which was taken down by the Rev. J. D. Kestell immediately afterwards, as communicated to him by General Hertzog. The report was immediately revised by President Steyn and by the Government Secretary, Mr. W. J. C. Brebner. This report can therefore be considered as secondary evidence of great value.
After a few everyday observations, President Steyn remarked that Lord Kitchener might begin.