Any attempt on the part of the Americans to garrison the interior towns with their troops or any other act which might be construed as a conquest, should meet with resistance.
"After having written these lines, I had another conference with Mr. St. Clair of the Free Press, who sent for me regarding the question of independence. He has had a consultation with the Supreme Judge of this place, and he is of opinion that you should proclaim independence at once, notwithstanding what Admiral Dewey and Consul Williams say against it, and this should be done before General Merritt can arrive. A Government having been thus const.i.tuted in due form, the Americans would have no right to invade the Philippines without committing a violation of international law. They are no longer fighting against the Spaniards against whom they declared war. The advice of Consul Williams to delay this, is a diplomatic play to gain time until the arrival of General Merritt, because he is well aware of the false position said General would find himself in. The key to the situation is now in your hands; do not permit any one to take it away from you. The Americans have done nothing but bombard and destroy the Spanish fleet on the high seas; they have not conquered any land, but in the meantime the control of the Philippines has pa.s.sed by conquest from the hands of the Spaniards and the Americans have no right to enter further. Under certain conditions and guarantees, permit the landing of American troops; but be very careful, they must not be permitted to land until they execute an agreement with the duly const.i.tuted government of the Philippines, respecting all its inst.i.tutions, and they must under no pretext whatever be permitted to garrison any place except the munic.i.p.al limits of Manila, Cebu, and Iloilo, and even therein care should be observed ... You must not permit a single soldier to land without having these guarantees." [107]
When General Anderson, with the first United States troops of occupation, arrived at Manila Bay, Aguinaldo did not call on him, as an "ally" might have been expected to do. Later, however, Admiral Dewey and General Anderson went to see Aguinaldo, but without any of the ceremony of an official military call, the Admiral saying to General Anderson:--
"Do not take your sword or put on your uniform, but just put on your blouse. Do not go with any ceremony." [108]
And they went in that way.
On July 4, 1898, General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo definitely requesting his cooperation in the following words:--
"For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations with you, and to have you and your force cooperate with us in the military operations against the Spanish forces." [109]
On July 5 Aguinaldo replied, thanking General Anderson for the
"amicable sentiments which the natives of these islands inspire in the Great North American nation," [110]
and also for his desire to have friendly relations with the Filipinos and treat them with justice, courtesy and kindness. There is, however, not a word relative to cooperation in his reply, and Anderson apparently never renewed his request for cooperation in military operations.
On July 6 he wrote to Aguinaldo again, saying:--
"I am encouraged by the friendly sentiment expressed by Your Excellency in your welcome letter received on the 5th instant, to endeavour to come to a definite understanding, which I hope will be advantageous to both. Very soon we expect large additional land forces, and it must be apparent to you as a military officer that we will require much more room to camp our soldiers and also store room for our supplies. For this I would like to have Your Excellency"s advice and cooperation, as you are best acquainted with the resources of the country." [111]
To this letter there was no reply. However, in a letter dated July 9, 1898, to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army, General Anderson says of Aguinaldo:--
"When we first landed he seemed very suspicious, and not at all friendly, but I have now come to a better understanding with him and he is much more friendly and seems willing to cooperate. But he has declared himself Dictator and President, and is trying to take Manila without our a.s.sistance. This is not probable, but if he can effect his purpose he will, I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our part to establish a provisional government." [112]
Evidently, however, cooperation, even in the matter of getting necessary transportation, did not materialize, for on July 17 S. R. Jones, Chief Quartermaster, wrote Aguinaldo as follows:--
"We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for transportation, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For all this we are willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We find so far that the native population are not willing to give us this a.s.sistance as promptly as required. But we must have it, and if it becomes necessary we will be compelled to send out parties to seize what we may need. We would regret very much to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our nation has spent millions in money to send forces here to expel the Spaniards and to give good government to the whole people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight.
"General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are here for their good, and that they must supply us with labor and material at the current market prices. We are prepared to purchase five hundred horses at a fair price, but cannot undertake to bargain for horses with each individual owner."
Aguinaldo sent this letter by a staff officer to General Anderson inquiring whether it was sent by authority of the latter, who then indorsed on it in a statement that it was. Nevertheless, Major Jones reported on July 20 that it was impossible to secure transportation except upon Aguinaldo"s order and that the natives had removed their cart wheels and hidden them, from which it is to be inferred that the transportation requested had not been furnished.
Obviously General Anderson was informed that Aguinaldo had given orders against furnishing the transportation desired, for on July 21 he wrote the Adjutant-General of the Army as follows:--
"Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an elaborate system of military government, under his a.s.sumed authority as Dictator, and has prohibited any supplies being given us, except by his order. As Go this last, I have written to him that our requisitions on the country for horses, ox carts, fuel, and bamboo (to make scaling ladders) must be filled, and that he must aid in having them filled."
On July 23 General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo as follows:--
"_General_: When I came here three weeks ago I requested Your Excellency to give what a.s.sistance you could to procure means of transportation for the American Army, as it was to fight the cause of your people. So far we have received no response.
"As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make requisition on you for five hundred horses and fifty oxen and ox carts. If you cannot secure these I will have to pa.s.s you and make requisition directly on the people.
"I beg leave to request an answer at your earliest convenience.
"I remain with great respect, etc." [113]
To this letter, Aguinaldo replied as follows:--
"Replying to your letter of yesterday, I have the honor to manifest to Your Excellency that I am surprised beyond measure at that which you say to me in it, lamenting the non-receipt of any response relative to the a.s.sistance that you have asked of me in the way of horses, carabaos, and carts, because I did reply through the bearer that I was disposed to issue proper orders whenever you advised me of the number of these, giving me notice in advance.
"I have sent orders to the nearest provinces in order that within the shortest time possible horses be brought for sale, but I cannot a.s.sure Your Excellency that we will have the number of 500 that you need, because there are not many horses in this vicinity, owing to deaths from epizootic diseases in January, February, and March last.
"Whenever we have them collected, I shall have the pleasure to advise Your Excellency.
"I have also ordered to be placed at my disposal 50 carts that I shall place at your disposition when you need them, provided you give me previous notice four days in advance." [114]
General Anderson replied:--
"Your favour of the 26th ultimo in relation to requisitions for cattle, horses, etc., is satisfactory I regret that there should have been any misunderstanding about it. The people to whom we applied even for the hiring of carromatas, etc., told our people that they had orders to supply nothing except by your orders. I am pleased to think that this was a misapprehension on their part." [115]
From this series of communications it appears that it took three weeks, and a very direct threat to seize transportation, to bring about Aguinaldo"s promise of a.s.sistance in securing it. What help had he given, meanwhile, in other matters?
On July 14, 1899, General Anderson wrote asking him to a.s.sist American officers in making reconnaissance of the approaches to Manila, and to favor them with his advice. [116]
On July 19, 1899, he again wrote Aguinaldo asking him to allow Major J. F. Bell, [117] who was gathering information for General Merritt, to see maps, and further requesting him to place at Bell"s disposal any available information about the force of the enemy and the topography of the country. [118]
On July 21 he wrote again asking for pa.s.ses for a Lieutenant E. I. Bryan and party, who were making a reconnaissance. [119]
Such records as I have been able to find do not show what response, if any, Aguinaldo made to these several requests, but General Anderson"s original views as to the willingness of the Insurgents to cooperate with him underwent an early change, for on July 18, 1898, in a letter to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army he makes the following statement:--
"The Insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, has declared himself Dictator and self-appointed President. He has declared martial law and promulgated a minute method of rule and administration under it.
"We have observed all official military courtesies, and he and his followers express great admiration and grat.i.tude to the great American republic of the north, yet in many ways they obstruct our purposes and are using every effort to take Manila without us.
"I suspect also that Aguinaldo is secretly negotiating with the Spanish authorities, as his confidential aide is in Manila." [120]
This suspicion was entirely justified, as we shall see later.
On July 24 Aguinaldo wrote a letter to General Anderson in effect warning him not to disembark American troops in places conquered by the Filipinos from the Spaniards without first communicating in writing the places to be occupied and the object of the occupation. [121]
Aguinaldo"s a.s.sumption of civil authority on July 15, 1899, did not pa.s.s unnoticed. On July 21 General Anderson wrote the Adjutant-General of the army concerning it:--
"His a.s.sumption of civil authority I have ignored, and let him know verbally that I could, and would, not recognize it, while I did not recognize him as a military leader. It may seem strange that I have made no formal protest against his proclamation as Dictator, his declaration of martial law, and publication and execution of a despotic form of government. I wrote such a protest, but did not publish it, at Admiral Dewey"s request, and also for fear of wounding the susceptibilities of Major-General Merritt, but I have let it be known in every other way that we do not recognize the Dictatorship. These people only respect force and firmness. I submit, with all deference, that we have heretofore underrated the natives. They are not ignorant, savage tribes, but have a civilization of their own; and although insignificant in appearance, are fierce fighters, and for a tropical people they are industrious. A small detail of natives will do more work in a given time than a regiment of volunteers."
Because he was invited as general rather than as president, Aguinaldo refused to attend a parade and review on the 4th of July. This fact is, in itself, an answer to his claim that the Americans were tacitly recognizing his pretensions.
After referring to this incident, Blount says:--
"On subsequent anniversaries of the day in the Philippines it was deemed wise simply to prohibit the reading of our declaration before gatherings of the Filipino people. It saved discussion." [122]
This statement is incorrect. I myself was present the following year when the declaration was read on the Luneta to a considerable gathering of Filipinos among whom were many school children, and it has often been read since.