It will be noted that the Tagalog provinces had eighteen out of a total of forty-two elected delegates. The Visayans, by far the most numerous people in the islands, did not have one. The non-Christian provinces had a very disproportionately large total of delegates, of whom four are put down as elected, but on examination we find that one of these is from Lepanto, the capital of which was an Ilocano town; one is from Nueva Vizcaya, where there is a considerable Cagayan-Ilocano population; one is from Benguet, the capital of which was an Ilocano town, and one from Tiagan, which was an Iloeano settlement. These delegates should therefore really be credited to the Ilocanos.
If the individual relationships of the several members are considered, the result is even more striking. Of the thirty-eight delegates a.s.signed to the non-Christian provinces, one only, good old Lino Abaya of Tiagan, was a non-Christian. Many of the non-Christian _comandancias_ were given a number of delegates wholly disproportionate to their population, and in this way the congress was stuffed full of Tagalogs.
Think of Filipe Buencamino, of Aguinaldo"s cabinet, representing the Moros of Zamboanga; of the mild, scholarly botanist Leon Guerrero representing the Moros, Bagobos, Mandayas and Man.o.bos of Davao; of Jose M. Lerma, the unscrupulous politician of the province of Bataan, just across the bay from Manila, representing the wild Moros of Cotabato; of Juan Tuason, a timid Chinese _mestizo_ Manila business man, representing the Yacan and Samal Moros of Basilan; of my good friend Benito Legarda, since a member of the Philippine Commission, and a resident delegate from the Philippines to the congress of the United States, representing the b.l.o.o.d.y Moros of Jolo! Yet they appear as representatives of these several regions.
Few, indeed, of the delegates from non-Christian territory had ever set foot in the provinces or _comandancias_ from which they were appointed, or would have been able to so much as name the wild tribe or tribes inhabiting them.
I have been furnished a list, made up with all possible care by competent persons, from which it appears that there were eighty-five delegates actually present at the opening of congress, of whom fifty-nine were Tagalogs, five Bicols, three Pampangans, two Visayans, and one a Zambalan. For the others there are no data available. Yet it has been claimed that this was a representative body! It was a Tagalog body, without enough representatives of any other one of the numerous Philippine peoples to be worth mentioning.
With a congress thus organized, Aguinaldo should have had no difficulty in obtaining any legislation he desired.
The committee of congress appointed to draw up a const.i.tution set to work promptly, and by October 16,1898, had proceeded so far with their work that Buencamino was able to write to Aguinaldo that while he had been of the opinion that it would have been best for him to continue as a dictator aided by a committee of able men, yet it would now be a blow to the prestige of congress to suspend its sessions. Aguinaldo noted upon this letter the fact that he did not approve of a const.i.tution. [383]
Apparently early in December the committee submitted their project. In presenting it to congress they said [384] that--
"The work whose results the commission has the honour to present for the consideration of congress has been largely a matter of selection; in executing it not only has the French const.i.tution been used, but also those of Belgium, Mexico, Brazil, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Guatemala, as we have considered those nations as most resembling the Filipino people."
The most important difference between this project and the actual const.i.tution adopted was that, although the project provided that the Dominican, Recollect, Franciscan and Augustinian friars should be expelled from the country and that their estates should become the property of the state, yet it recognized the Catholic religion as that of the state and forbade state contribution to the support of any other, although it permitted the practice in private of any religion not opposed to morality, which did not threaten the safety of the country. The government was authorized to negotiate a concordat with the Pope for the regulation of the relations between church and state. A strong party was in favour of this recognition, but it finally failed of adoption, and the const.i.tution as promulgated provided for the freedom and equality of religion and for free and compulsory education which had not been provided for in the original project. The const.i.tution as approved forbade the granting of t.i.tles of n.o.bility, decorations or honorary t.i.tles by the state to any Filipino. This paragraph did not exist in the original project, which merely forbade any Filipino to accept them without the consent of the government.
Mabini, the ablest of all Aguinaldo"s advisers, did not approve of the const.i.tution. He himself had drawn up a project for a const.i.tution during June, 1898, but it was not accepted by the committee, the greater part of whom were Catholics and for that reason opposed to Mabini, who was a bitter antagonist of that church. And yet when separation of church and state was finally provided for it did not please Mabini, who, although he was opposed to church control, wrote to Aguinaldo [385] that the const.i.tution as pa.s.sed by congress was not acceptable and should not be promulgated because the const.i.tutional guarantees of individual liberty could not be maintained, as the army had to be in control for the time being, and furthermore it was not expedient to separate church and state, as this separation would alienate many of their adherents. Indeed, there was not much in the const.i.tution which he thought ought to take immediate effect, [386]
and he wrote that congress was ill-disposed toward him because he had refused to agree to its promulgation. Existing conditions were such that he believed that all powers should be vested in one person. He warned Aguinaldo that if the const.i.tution were put in force, he would be at the mercy of his secretaries. On January 1, 1899, Aguinaldo, probably at the suggestion of Mabini, proposed certain changes in it. [387]
Evidently the provisions of the const.i.tution did not worry Aguinaldo much, as is shown by his reply to the request by some of his officers for information as to what reward those who were first in the attack on Manila should receive. He promised them such t.i.tles as marquis, duke, etc. [388]
On January 2, 1899, Aguinaldo announced the formation of a new cabinet made up as follows: Apolinario Mabini president and secretary of foreign affairs; Teodoro Sandico, secretary of the interior; Mariano Trias, secretary of the treasury; Baldomero Aguinaldo, secretary of war and navy, and Gracio Gonzaga, secretary of _fomento_. [389]
On January 4 Mabini took the oath of office as the president of the council of government. This body met twice a week at Malolos on set days, and at the close of its deliberations forwarded to Aguinaldo a statement of the subjects discussed and the conclusions reached for his decision. The president of the republic did not preside at, or take part in, its deliberations.
On January 4, 1899, General Otis issued a proclamation in which he announced that the United States had obtained possession of the Philippines and that its government would be extended over the islands of the archipelago. Aguinaldo replied next day with one which, if not intended to be a declaration of war, was at least a warning that hostilities were imminent. This proclamation was carried into Manila by his emissaries and posted up over the one issued by the American commander. It was a challenge to a trial of strength, and Aguinaldo and his advisers hastened their preparations for the coming combat.
The secretary of the interior on the same day sent an order to the heads of all provinces directing the organization of territorial militia to resist the American invasion, and ordering the heads of the towns to hold meetings of the people to protest against the aggression of the United States. They were held in accordance with these orders, and records of the proceedings were sent to Malolos and published in the official organ of the government as evidence of the feeling of the people. It was, however, not considered necessary in publishing them to mention the fact that they had been held in compliance with orders.
On January 14, 1899, Mabini wrote to Aguinaldo [390] recommending changes in the proposed const.i.tution, which he still liked as little as ever. He was afraid that Negros and Panay would refuse to accept the form of government it prescribed. The worst thing about it was that the Americans would be less disposed to recognize Aguinaldo"s government; for when they saw the const.i.tution they would know, as it made no mention of them, that the Filipinos wanted independence. Mabini thought that it was possible that the wording of the const.i.tution might have been deliberately planned by members of the congress in favour of annexation to the United States, so that that country would be warned, would become more mistrustful, and would refuse to recognize Aguinaldo"s government. Whatever the president of the council may have thought about the theoretical advisability of a congress to represent the people, he found one much in the way when he had obtained it.
Buencamino advised that the const.i.tution should be approved and promulgated; one argument was that the congress had been consulted in the matter of a national loan, and if it was dissolved, there could be no loan. This was apparently the only matter upon which it had been consulted. [391]
The const.i.tution of the Philippine Republic was ratified at a session of the congress on January 20, 1899.
On January 21, 1899, Aguinaldo sanctioned it and ordered that it should be "kept, complied with and executed in all its parts because it is the sovereign will of the Philippine people." [392] The const.i.tution provided for a government of three coordinate powers, executive, legislative and judicial. Whether it provided for a form of government which would have succeeded in the Philippines was not determined by actual experience. It was never really put in force for war with the United States began in two weeks and the const.i.tution must stand as the expression of the ideas of a certain group of educated natives rather than as the working formula for the actual conduct of the political life of a nation. One proof of this is the fact that not until June 8, 1899, were Aguinaldo"s decrees upon the registration of marriages and upon civil marriage, dated June 20,1898, revoked, and the provisions of the const.i.tution concerning marriage put in effect. [393]
Aguinaldo had approved the const.i.tution; he had informed the foreign consuls and General Otis that it had been promulgated and become the law of the land. It was not promulgated. It had not become the law of the land. It served one important purpose. It pa.s.sed into the hands of the Americans and showed them the ability and the aspirations of certain individuals of the archipelago, but Mabini and his followers did not believe in its form or in its provisions, and Mabini at least was emphatic in his declarations that the time had not yet come for it to be put into effect. On January 24, 1899, he wrote to Aguinaldo that if it should be promulgated it would be absolutely necessary to give the president the veto power, and replace the elected representatives by others appointed by the government. If this were not done the president would be at the mercy of congress, and the people, seeing that disagreement between the executive government and the congress was the cause of its misfortunes, would start another revolutionary movement to destroy both of them. [394]
As long as Mabini remained in power the const.i.tution was mere paper. Its adoption was not indicative of the capacity of the people to maintain self-government. It expressed only the academic aspirations of the men who drafted it. There is not the slightest evidence from any previous or subsequent experience of the people that it would have worked in practice. It was enacted for the misleading of Americans rather than for the benefit of the Filipinos.
While the government of Aguinaldo was called a republic, it was in fact a Tagalog military oligarchy in which the great ma.s.s of the people had no share. Their duty was only to give soldiers for the army and labourers for the fields, and to obey without question the orders they received from the military heads of their provinces.
There is no cause for vain regrets. We did not destroy a republic in the Philippines. There never was anything there to destroy which even remotely resembled a republic.
CHAPTER IX
The Conduct of the War
It is not my intention to attempt to write a history of the war which began on February 4, 1899, nor to discuss any one of its several campaigns. I propose to limit myself to a statement of the conditions under which it was conducted, and a description of the two periods into which it may be divided.
From the outset the Insurgent soldiers were treated with marked severity by their leaders. On June 17, 1898, Aguinaldo issued an order to the military chiefs of certain towns in Cavite providing that a soldier wasting ammunition should be punished with twelve lashes for a first offence, twenty-four for a second, and court-martialled and "severely punished" for a third. [395]
On November 16, 1900, General Lacuna ordered that any officer allowing his soldiers to load their rifles when not before the enemy should be liable to capital punishment, [396] which in practice was frequently inflicted on soldiers for very minor offences.
Men of means were drafted into the ranks and then excused from service on the payment of cash.
The soldiery, quartered on the towns, committed endless abuses. Conditions were bad enough before the outbreak of hostilities, as I have shown in the chapters dealing with Insurgent rule. They grew rapidly worse thereafter, and human life became cheap indeed.
"The doc.u.ments of this period show that the insurgent troops driven from the front of Manila fell upon the people of the neighbouring towns and burnt, robbed, and murdered. Either their officers lost all control over them, or else they directed these outrages. It was not for some days that control was regained." [397]
Endless orders were issued by Aguinaldo and other high Insurgent officers, prohibiting rape, brigandage and robbery, and there was grave need of them. Unfortunately they could not be enforced. Indeed it was often impossible to distinguish between Insurgent soldiers, who removed their uniforms or had none, and brigands pure and simple. [398]
Many men were soldiers at one time and brigands at another. Unquestionably soldiers and brigands sometimes cooperated. Garrisons were withdrawn from towns which did not promptly and fully comply with the demands of Insurgent commanders, [399]
and armed bandits appeared and plundered them.
There were some Insurgent leaders, like Cailles, who suppressed brigandage with a heavy hand, [400] but many of them were indifferent, even if not in alliance with the evil doers.
The Visayas
Feeling between Tagalog soldiers and Visayan people grew constantly more bitter, and before many months had pa.s.sed they fell to killing each other. The highest officers of the "Regional Revolutionary Government of the Visayas" protested vigorously to Aguinaldo, [401]
but without result. The situation was entirely beyond his control.
On April 20, 1899, General Delgado issued an order which tells a significant story of conditions, and of his own weakness in dealing with them. [402]
In Luzon General Trias of Cavite accused the soldiers and citizens of his province of committing "robberies, a.s.saults, kidnappings and crimes which are committed only by barbarous and savage tribes." [403]
That very serious conditions promptly became general is conclusively shown by the record of Aguinaldo"s government for February 24, 1899, when it decided--
"that the president of the council shall study such measures as will put an end to the continual discord and friction between the civil and military authorities of every province, in order that fatal consequences may be avoided."
With such conditions prevailing among the Filipinos themselves, it was to be expected that the laws of civilized warfare would be violated and that American soldiers taken prisoners would sometimes be treated with barbarity. Flags of truce were deliberately violated. [404] American soldiers were trapped, poisoned [405] and murdered in other ways. [406]
It was promptly charged in the United States that American soldiers were committing barbarities, and Blount has revived these old tales.
I know personally that during the early days of the war Insurgent prisoners and wounded were treated with the greatest humanity and kindness.
A part of the Insurgent plan of campaign was the circulation of the most shocking statements concerning the abuses committed by American soldiers. I have elsewhere described [407] the fate that overtook Colonel Arguelles, in part because he told the truth as to the humane treatment by the Americans of prisoners and wounded.