[79] See p. 74.
[80] "Both Spanish fleets had been destroyed and Spain had but one left to protect her own coast cities. The death knell of her once proud colonial empire had sounded. Decrepit as she was, she could not possibly have sent any reinforcements to the Philippines. Besides, the Filipinos would have "eaten them up.""--Blount, p. 127.
[81] P.I.R., 471.4.
[82] _Ibid_., 471.4.
[83] _Ibid_., 450. 2.
[84] P.I.R., 471.4.
[85] "You should not forget what I have stated at the beginning of this letter; because I am of the opinion that those questions should be well considered by all of you. If our people desire independence under the American protectorate, it is necessary that our representatives to the United States be given instructions as to the conditions which we should grant to the United States. The peace negotiations are in full blast, and it is probable that we will be rather late in sending our representatives. Therefore, if you agree to independence under a protectorate, you should recommend it at once. I leave it, however, to your care, as you are better qualified than myself concerning the conditions of our country."--P.I.R., 471.4.
[86] "My Dear Friend: ... The last telegrams from Europe which Felipe will send you by this mail are alarming for our future. The preliminaries of peace are announced. The demand of America is, annexation of Porto Rico and the Ladrone Islands, independence of Cuba under an American protectorate and an American coaling station in the Philippines. That is, they will again deliver us into the hands of Spain. On the other hand, all the powers will unite to prevent the annexation of the Philippines, according to the telegrams of Regidor; the American cabinet hesitates about including us in the negotiations for peace from fear of a conflict with us and the Filipinos in Europe advise us to send a message to America giving our unconditional adhesion. If events will be what these telegrams indicate, we have a dark and b.l.o.o.d.y future before us. To be again in the hands of Spain will mean a long and b.l.o.o.d.y war, and it is doubtful whether the end will be favourable to us. The treaty of peace sanctioned by the other powers will a.s.sure the dominion of Spain. Spain free from Cuba and her other colonies will employ all her energy to crush us and will send here the 150,000 men she has in Cuba. I do not think that the Filipinos will again submit to their tyrants and there will be a long and b.l.o.o.d.y war. And on account of the treaty the other powers will aid Spain to completely dominate us and place all possible obstacles in our way to prevent shipment of arms and all kinds of revolutionary labours. In view of all this and bearing in mind the present urgency of the matter, it is necessary for that government to establish and publish its policy. We believe that the best for us and the only feasible one, if we want to establish negotiations with America, is independence under an American protectorate."--P.I.R., 453.3.
[87] "The policy which you will pursue in the United States is the following one:--
"Make them understand that whatever may be their intention towards us, it is not possible for them to overrule the sentiments of the people represented by the government, and they must first recognize it if we are to come to an agreement. Still do not accept any contracts or give any promises respecting protection or annexation, because we will see first if we can obtain independence. This is what we shall endeavour to secure; meanwhile, if it should be possible to do so, still give them to understand in a way that you are unable to bind yourself but that once we are independent, we will be able to make arrangements with them."--P.I.R., Books C-1.
[88] P.I.R., 5. 7.
[89] In a letter written on that date to Agoncillo he says:--
"Notwithstanding, I enclose you the credentials as requested; thereby you will see that in addition to your representing us at Washington, you may a.s.sist the commission they have formed for the purpose of determining the future condition of the Philippines.
"But you must act in such manner that they may not be able to say that we have accepted the said commission, because it is my wish to protect [protest? D. C. W.] at all times against their being charged with determining our destiny. You must bear in mind that the policy of the government is to obtain absolute independence, and if perchance we should know by the course of events that such cannot be the case, we will then think of protection or annexation."--P.I.R., Books C-1.
[90] On August 30, 1898, Aguinaldo wrote Agoncillo:--
"It is said that General Merritt is going away to take part in the work of the Commission. On this account it is important that you proceed as quickly as possible to America, in order to know what takes place. If perchance we should go back to Spanish control, ask them to help us as the French helped them during their own revolution and ask also the terms."--P.I.R., Books C--1.
[91] Taylor, 18 AJ.
[92] See p. 61.
[93] _Ibid_.
[94] Some time during August, 1898, Sandico wrote a letter to Aguinaldo of which the postscript reads as follows:--
"P.S.--If you think of appointing me as Delegate to Manila, please send me my credentials. There are also annexationists here [_i.e._, in Manila.--D. C. W.]."--P.I.R., 416. 3.
[95] Now Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. He is a man of excellent character, high attainments and great ability. He held important legal positions under the Spanish government. In October, 1898, he was appointed Secretary of Foreign Relations of the "Philippine Republic," but never served as such officer. He was given the degree of Doctor of Law by Yale University in 1904.
[96] Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera, one of the most brilliant living Filipinos. He had spent many years in Paris, was a talented physician, and under American rule served for more than seven years as a member of the Philippine Commission.
[97] Taylor, 55 AJ.
[98] Taylor, 26 AJ.
[99] Senate Doc.u.ments, Vol. 25, Fifty-seventh Congress, First Session, p. 2969.
[100] Senate Doc.u.ments, Vol. 25, pp. 2931-2932.
[101] Senate Doc.u.ments, Vol. 25, p. 2956.
[102] _Ibid_., p. 2966.
[103] _Ibid_., p. 2966.
[104] Senate Doc.u.ments, Vol. 25, p. 2955.
[105] _Ibid._, p. 2952.
[106] The following pa.s.sage is an extract from an unsigned order dated July 22, 1898:--
"For the preservation of peace and good order in the community and to put an end to the acts of those who within and without the city of Manila and in the neighboring provinces not under the control of the Spanish Government, are evading the orders issued by these Headquarters, and in view of the large number of those who are storing and monopolizing food and other most necessary articles, under the pretence of desiring to sell them to the Americans, but whose real intention is to ship them secretly to Manila where they receive higher prices for their merchandise, without regard for the injury they are doing the cause of our independence, I have seen fit to decree the following: ... " P.I.R., 45.5 and 125. 3.
Relative to this matter, Taylor says:--
"The defection of Buencamino and Pilar had opened the road to Aguinaldo, but at first the blockade was not effective. There were too many natives there with friends and relations in Aguinaldo"s camp to make him desire to subject the city to the hardships of an effective siege. And, furthermore, he did not have the force, nor did his men have the necessary discipline, to prevent the ingress of supplies. It was not until the first part of July that the price of provisions increased. It was at no time found necessary by the authorities to take over all the stores of provisions in the city. Indeed, there seems to have been a fairly steady traffic in supplies between Manila and the country to the north. It was a traffic in which it has been charged that certain Spanish officers of rank made large sums. Aguinaldo permitted it, and on July 26, 1898, signed an order directing that food should be sent into Manila from the north to prevent starvation in the city, and ordered the heads of the towns in the vicinity not to interfere with this traffic (P.I.R., 1087-4). The entrance of food supplies was confined to the northern line, for then it would not be known to the Americans who, after July 30, occupied the entrenchments in front of San Antonio Abad. It was not expedient for them to see too much of Aguinaldo"s methods."--Taylor, 14 AJ.
[107] P.I.R., 398. 2.
[108] Senate Doc.u.ment 331, p. 2976, 1902.
[109] P.I.R., 102-10.
[110] P.I.R., Books C-1.
[111] P.I.R., 102-10.
[112] _Ibid._
[113] P.I.R., 102. 10.
[114] _Ibid_., Books C-1.
[115] _Ibid_., 102-10.
[116] P.I.R., 102-10.
[117] Now a major-general.
[118] P.I.R., 102-10.
[119] _Ibid._
[120] _Ibid._