On September 10 General Garcia reported to Aguinaldo that on the previous night the Americans had attempted to push back his line at San Lazaro, and that morning had concentrated and penetrated the Insurgent territory, making a reconnaissance through the fields about Sampaloc. Aguinaldo put an endors.e.m.e.nt on this communication saying that he had long since ordered that the Insurgent line should not be pa.s.sed. He instructed Garcia to throw troops in front of the Americans at Sampaloc, and order them to leave, and to warn the bolo men. Obviously, little more was needed to provoke an Insurgent attack. [187]
An unsigned draft of an order in Aguinaldo"s handwriting dated Malolos, September 13 (?), 1898, [188] shows how tense was the situation while the question of withdrawal of the Insurgent forces from the city of Manila was under consideration. It contains instructions for General Pio del Pilar, General P. Garcia and General Noriel or Colonel Cailles. Their purpose is hardly open to doubt.
General Pio del Pilar was directed:--
"To have a detachment posted in the interval from the branch of the river of Paco in a northerly direction to the bridge and so on up to the Pasig river in the direction of Pandacan, the river serving as a line until the suburb of Panque is reached which will be under our jurisdiction. Proceed to execute this order on its receipt, posting detachments where they are necessary and trenches will be made without loss of time working day and night. Do not rest for by doing so we may lose the opportunity; beg of the troops to a.s.sist in the formation of intrenchments. Matters have a bad aspect, we especially expect something Wednesday and Thursday, the 15th and 16th of this month. The danger is imminent on the mentioned days, also in the time that follows.
"Keep strict vigilance at all hours. In case you receive orders to leave that place, do not do so on any account without my orders, happen what may....
"Concentrate all your forces in Santa Ana before the day arrives.
"Warn your soldiers against firing at random as the Spaniards did, if possible have them calculate the number of their antagonists and how much ammunition there is in comparison with the number of the attacking force, in fact, there are occasions when each shot fired kills as many as four men.
"I hope you will see to the execution of these instructions and that you will maintain the honour of the Philippines by your courage and in no way permit your rights to be trampled underfoot." [189]
General Garcia was instructed as follows:--
"On Wednesday, the 14th of this month, you will post detachments in the points indicated by lines on the enclosed plan. On receipt of this and as soon as you learn its contents, proceed secretly to determine the most suitable places to post detachments and immediately post our troops and have intrenchments made employing day and night in this work. Beg this of our soldiers." [190]
The instructions to Noriel or Cailles read as follows:--
"At eight o"clock in the morning of Wednesday, the 14th, withdraw your command from the town of Malate as indicated on the enclosed plan, from the bridge in Singalong and in a straight line from there to the branch of the river in Paco will be the line of our jurisdiction even though we may not be of one mind in the matter. On receipt of this proceed to determine the most suitable places to post our troops even if they are not supplied with batteries; on posting the detachments give instructions to have intrenchments made immediately without resting, especially on the days of the 15th and 16th. Since affairs have a serious aspect, do not lose vigilance and be on the alert at all times....
"Concentrate all the forces and have a call to arms in Cavite so that all the troops may be in Pasay on Wednesday night.
"In case the Americans attempt to order you out do not leave your posts, happen what may, but exercise prudence and be prepared leaving them to give the provocation. Answer them that you have no instructions given you with regard to what they ask." [191]
Obviously the maintenance of peace at this time hung by a very slender thread. On September 14 the governor of Cavite telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--
"Most urgent. I desire to know from you the result of the ultimatum. Advise me if we must prepare our troops for action to-morrow. I await a reply." [192]
But war was not to begin at this time. On September 23 Bray wrote to Aguinaldo advising him to maintain a defensive att.i.tude until the result of the negotiations at Paris should become known, giving way to the Americans and not showing his teeth. He could take the offensive later if advisable and should have little difficulty in settling accounts with the American soldiers. [193]
Bray suggested the possibility of an alliance between the American and the Spanish soldiers if a conflict should arise before the departure of the latter. [194]
Meanwhile preparations for the attack progressed. During September, Sandico wrote Aguinaldo suggesting the urgent necessity of reorganizing the "masons" and the Katipunan, [195] and that all be furnished with knives, to be kept hidden so that they might be "ready for any event."
In spite of efforts to keep the Insurgent soldiers in hand, feeling among them ran high, and they wanted to fight. [196] On November 30, 1898, General Mascardo telegraphed from San Fernando to Aguinaldo asking if he might begin firing in order to prevent the American troops from disembarking, and Aguinaldo promptly answered in the affirmative. [197]
On December 5 Malvar telegraphed from Lipa that according to a despatch from Batangas, American divers were working unceasingly and that a subordinate had ordered that they be fired on if they attempted to land. Aguinaldo replied that he did not mind their working at sea, but that they must not be allowed to land under any circ.u.mstances. [198]
On December 6 Sandico telegraphed Aguinaldo as follows:--
"The difficulty of last night at the San Juan picket with the American troops has been adjusted without prejudice. Our preparations ought to continue. Awaiting orders." [199]
San Juan was where the firing commenced on February 4, 1899.
On December 9 Cailles wired Aguinaldo as follows:--
"Report to you that there are 3000 Americans in front of our position at Singalong. I do not know what they wish; if they enter Pineda I open fire." [200]
By this time the Insurgents had made up their minds that the Americans, who had been bearing their insults in silence, were cowards. Aguinaldo"s indors.e.m.e.nt on this telegram reads:--
"Answered: Nevertheless the 3000 American soldiers are few against my Colonel and his 300 soldiers, and I believe you have more than that number. E.A., Dec. 12, 1898." [201]
Relative to the insults which were at this time showered upon Americans, Taylor has made the following statement: [202]--
"Fortune had been good to Aguinaldo and his a.s.sociates in the eight months during which the United States had prevented Spain from relieving her beleaguered garrisons in the Philippines, and she might still be kind. The men about Aguinaldo who had risen farthest and fastest could not endure the thought of having to accept subordinate positions in a government not directed by themselves. The halberdiers at the door of the palace of the president saluted them as the halberdiers at the doorway of his lordship the governor-general in Manila had struck the marble steps with their halberds at the coming of the Spanish generals. They swaggered down the streets of Malolos, clashing their swords behind them, and they knew that if they won, the Philippines would be divided into fiefs which they, as dukes and marquises, would hold in feudal tenure from a Malay potentate. They were confident. They held Luzon. They held the people. They had no intention of returning to office stools or to the life of outlaws and hunted men. The United States force in Manila was small and America was far. It was true that they might have to fight for the prize which they had seized, but the military leaders about Aguinaldo were confident of winning in case they fought. They believed the Americans were afraid of them and would be easily beaten. American soldiers had been seized and had been insulted by the followers of Aguinaldo and no resort had been made to force. The Americans had been ordered to avoid bringing on an engagement and had obeyed. It is also probable that many of the insults to which they had been subjected were not appreciated by them. A tall soldier from western America paid no attention to the insults hurled at him in a language which he did not understand. And yet the small excited Filipinos might retire feeling that the American had tamely submitted to insult worse than a blow."
By the middle of December, Aguinaldo had placed in position in the vicinity of Manila all of the field guns in his possession.
The Treaty of Paris was signed on December 10. It provided for the termination of Spanish sovereignty in the Philippines. This was what the Insurgents had been waiting for, and thereafter things moved rapidly. It is obvious that an attack was definitely planned for at this time, for on December 21, Commandant F. E. Rey telegraphed Aguinaldo that the second chief of the second zone of Manila had directed him to a.s.sist by entering that city as soon as they opened fire against the American troops. [203]
On the following day Cailles reported that he had occupied blockhouse No. 12, which was within the American lines, and added the following significant statement:--
"The order of yesterday was, on hearing the first shots from Santa Ana, for my whole force to hurl themselves on the American line of trenches, and to follow the living to Manila. The dead can lie with the dead. Yesterday we were content waiting for the arming of the San Quintin." [204]
San Quintin"s Day was the anniversary of the Sicilian vespers, the ma.s.sacre of the French in Sicily in 1268. Obviously the Insurgents were planning something similar for Manila.
For some reason the attack was not made as planned, but there was no intention of abandoning it. Within fifteen days of January 1 some 40,000 Filipinos left Manila. Why? On January 7, Aguinaldo wrote to Senor Benito Legarda at Manila, saying:--
"I beg you to leave Manila with your family and come here to Malolos, but not because I wish to frighten you--I merely wish to warn you for your satisfaction, although it is not yet the day or the week." [205]
Many details of the plan of attack have come into our possession. Doctor Manuel Xeres Burgos wrote Aguinaldo during January relative to a plan for an uprising of the prisoners in Bilibid Prison, saying that it should by all means come "before the movement is begun anywhere else," and calling attention to the necessity of stationing men to prevent the American soldiers near by in the Zorilla theatre from coming to the rescue. On the back of this letter there is a sketch plan showing where bolo men were to be stationed, ready to attack these soldiers. [206]
In his message to Congress dated January 1, 1899, Aguinaldo said:--
"I consider arguments unnecessary in support of the proposed amendments, every one knows that our newborn Republic now has to fight for its existence against giants in ambition and in power." [207]
An unsigned letter addressed to Apacible on January 4, 1899, contains the following statement:--
"It appears that conflict with the Americans is imminent and inevitable. Several of their vessels with thousands of soldiers commanded by General Miller were sent to Iloilo on December 20th last to take that port together with the whole of Visayas and Mindanao." [208]
On January 4 the following significant telegram was sent out:--
"Circular Telegram from the Secretary of the Interior to Provincial Presidents, wherever there may be Telegraphic Service, to be communicated to the Local Chiefs of each Town.
"_Malolos_, January 4, 1899, 9.35 A.M.
"To the Provincial President of the Province of Pangasinan:
"Hasten the preparation of all the towns in order to oppose the American invasion. See that all the inhabitants prepare their bolos and daggers; also that in each street and barrio national militia is organized, each six of whom should be commanded by a corporal, each thirteen by a sergeant, each twenty-six by a second lieutenant, each fifty-two by a first lieutenant, and each one hundred and four by a captain, directing that the soldiers of the national militia elect their own officers, informing all that upon our att.i.tude depends our salvation.
_Lingayen_, January 4, 1899."
There is a note thereon which reads:--
"Communicate this to all of the local chiefs, and to the commanding general."