Part II of the Report contains the scheme which Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford propose for the solution of the problem which they had set themselves to solve in Part I. In giving their reasons for a new policy they observe:
"_No further development (on old lines) is possible unless we are going to give the people of India some responsibility for their own government._ But no one can imagine that no further development is necessary. _It is evident that the present machinery of government no longer meets the needs of the time; it works slowly and it produces irritation_; there is a widespread demand on the part of educated Indian opinion for its alteration; and the need for advance is recognised by official opinion also."
[Italics are ours.]
The new policy sketched by them is, in their judgment, "the logical outcome of the past. Indians must be enabled, in so far as they attain responsibility, to determine for themselves what they want done
"... such limitations on powers as we are now proposing are due only to the obvious fact that time is necessary in order to train both representatives and electorates for the work which we desire them to undertake; and that we offer Indians opportunities at short intervals to prove the progress they are making and to make good their claim, not by the method of agitation but by positive demonstration, to the further stages in self-government which we have just indicated."
That is the only basis on which they maintain they can hope to see in India "the growth of a conscious feeling of organic unity with the Empire as a whole." With these and a few more prefatory remarks about the educational problem and the att.i.tude of the ryot and the enunciation of the general principles on which their proposals are based they proceed to formulate their scheme, starting first with the provinces.
I
The proposals relating to Provincial Government may be noticed under the following heads:
(_a_) _Financial devolution_: It is proposed that henceforth there should be a complete separation of the provincial finances from those of the Government of India; that, reserving certain sources of revenue for the Government of India, all others should be made over to the Provincial Governments with the proviso that the first charge on all Provincial revenues will be a contribution towards the maintenance of the Government of India, considered necessary and demanded by the latter. A certain amount of power to impose fresh taxes and to raise loans is also conceded to the provincial Governments subject to the veto of the Government of India.
(_b_) _Legislative devolution_: "It is our intention," say the authors of the report, "to reserve to the Government of India a general overriding power of legislation for the discharge of all functions which it will have to perform. It should be enabled under this power to intervene in any province for the protection and enforcement of the interests for which it is responsible; to legislate on any provincial matter in respect of which uniformity of legislation is desirable, either for the whole of India or for any two or more provinces; and to pa.s.s legislation which may be adopted either _simpliciter_ or with modifications by any province which may wish to make use of it. We think that the Government of India must be the sole judge of the propriety of any legislation which it may undertake under any one of these categories, and that its competence so to legislate should not be open to challenge in the courts. Subject to these reservations we intend that within the field which may be marked off for provincial legislative control the sole legislative power shall rest with the provincial legislatures." It is not proposed to put a statutory limitation on the power of the Government of India to legislate for the provinces, but it is hoped that "const.i.tutional practice" will prevent the central Government interfering in provincial matters unless the interests for which the latter is responsible are directly affected.
(_c_) _Provincial Executive_: Article 220 gives the Governor the power to appoint "one or two additional members of his Government as members without portfolio for purposes of consultation and advice."
These, in substance, are the proposals of the Secretary of State and the Government of India for the future government of the provinces into which India is divided. Some of these latter and some other tracts are expressly excluded from the operation of these recommendations. It will be at once observed that this is neither autonomy nor home rule. It is a kind of hybrid system with final powers of veto and control vested in the Government of India. The provision as to Provincial Legislatures make it still more complicated.
"Let us now explain how we contemplate in future that the executive Governments of the provinces shall be const.i.tuted. As we have seen, three provinces are now governed by a Governor and an Executive Council of three members, of whom one is in practice an Indian and two are usually appointed from the Indian Civil Service, although the law says only that they must be qualified by twelve years" service under the Crown in India. One province, Bihar and Orissa, is administered by a Lieutenant-Governor with a council of three const.i.tuted in the same way. The remaining five provinces, that is to say, the three Lieutenant-Governorships of the United Provinces, the Punjab and Burma and the Chief Commissionerships of the Central Provinces and a.s.sam are under the administration of a single official Head. We find throughout India a very general desire for the extension of Council government....
Our first proposition, therefore, is that in all these provinces singleheaded administration must cease and be replaced by collective administration.
"In determining the structure of the Executive we have to bear in mind the duties with which it will be charged. We start with the two postulates; the complete responsibility for the government cannot be given immediately without inviting a breakdown, and that some responsibility must be given at once if our scheme is to have any value. We have defined responsibility as consisting primarily in amenability to const.i.tuents, and in the second place in amenability to an a.s.sembly. We do not believe that there is any way of satisfying these governing conditions other than by making a division of the functions of the Government, between those which may be made over to popular control and those which for the present must remain in official hands.... We may call these the "reserved" and "transferred" subjects respectively. It then follows that for the management of these two categories there must be some form of executive body, with a legislative organ in harmony with it....
"We propose therefore that in each province the executive Government should consist of two parts. One part would comprise the head of the province and an executive council of two members.
In all provinces the head of the Government would be known as Governor.... One of the two Executive Councillors would in practice be a European qualified by long official experience, and the other would be an Indian. It has been urged that the latter should be an elected member of the provincial legislative council.
It is unreasonable that choice should be so limited. It should be open to the Governor to recommend whom he wishes.... The Governor in council would have charge of the reserved subjects. The other part of the government would consist of one member or more than one member, according to the number and importance of the transferred subjects, chosen by the Governor from the elected members of the Legislative council. They would be known as ministers. They would be members of the executive Government but not members of the Executive Council; they would be appointed for the life-time of the legislative council, and if reelected to that body would be re-eligible for appointment as members of the Executive. As we have said, they would not hold office at the will of the legislature but at that of their const.i.tuents.
"The portfolios dealing with the transferred subjects would be committed to the ministers, and on these subjects the ministers together with the Governor would form the administration. On such subjects their decision would be final, subject only to the Governor"s advice and control. We do not contemplate that from the outset the Governor should occupy the position of a purely const.i.tutional Governor who is bound to accept the decisions of his ministers."
(_d_) _Provincial Legislatures_: "We propose there shall be in each province an enlarged legislative council, differing in size and composition from province to province, with a substantial elected majority, elected by direct election on a broad franchise, with such communal and special representation as may be necessary."
The questions of franchise and special and communal representation have been entrusted to a special committee the report of which is shortly expected. The same committee will also decide how many official members there will be on each Legislative Council. It is provided that the Governor shall be the President of the Council and will have the power to nominate a Vice-president from the official members. As to the effect of resolutions it is said that "we do not propose that resolutions, whether on reserved or transferred subjects should be binding."
The cla.s.sification of the reserved and transferred subjects was also left to a special committee which has since concluded its labours and whose report is awaited with interest.
_Legislation on reserved subjects_:
"For the purpose of enabling the provincial Government to get through its legislation on reserved subjects, we propose that the head of the Government should have power to certify that a Bill dealing with a reserved subject is a measure "essential to the discharge of his responsibility for the peace or tranquillity of the province or of any part thereof, or for the discharge of his responsibility for the reserved subjects."... The Bill will be read and its general principles discussed in the full legislative council. It will at this stage be open to the council by a majority vote to request the Governor to refer to the Government of India, whose decision on the point shall be final, on the question whether the certified Bill deals with a reserved subject.
If no such reference is made, or if the Government of India decide that the certificate has been properly given, the Bill will then be automatically referred to a Grand Committee of the council. Its composition should reproduce as nearly as possible the proportion of the various elements in the larger body ... the grand committee in every council should be const.i.tuted so as to comprise from 40 to 50 per cent. of its strength. It should be chosen for each Bill, partly by election by ballot, and partly by nomination. The Governor should have power to nominate a bare majority exclusive of himself. Of the members so nominated not more than two-thirds should be officials, and the elected element should be elected _ad hoc_ by the elected members of the council on the system of the transferable vote."
"On reference to the grand committee, the Bill will be debated by that body in the ordinary course, if necessary referred to a select committee, to which body we think that the grand committee should have power to appoint any member of the legislative council whether a member of the grand committee or not. The select committee will, as at present, have power to take evidence. Then, after being debated in the grand committee and modified as may be determined, the Bill will be reported to the whole council. The council will have the right to discuss the Bill again generally, but will not be able to reject it, or to amend it except on the motion of a member of the executive council. The Governor will then appoint a time limit within which the Bill may be debated in the council, and on its expiry it will pa.s.s automatically. But during such discussion the council will have the right to pa.s.s a resolution recording any objection which refers to the principle or details of the measure (but not, of course, to the certificate of its character), and any such resolution will accompany the Act when, after being signed by the Governor, it is submitted to the Governor General and the Secretary of State."
_Provincial Budget_: "... the provincial budget should be framed by the executive Government as a whole. The first charge on provincial revenues will be the contribution to the Government of India; and after that the supply for the reserved subjects will have priority. The allocation of supply for the transferred subjects will be decided by the ministers. If the revenue is insufficient for their needs, the question of new taxation will be decided by the Governor and the ministers. We are bound to recognise that in time new taxation will be necessary, for no conceivable economies can finance the new developments which are to be antic.i.p.ated. The budget will then be laid before the council which will discuss it and vote by resolution upon the allotments.
If the legislative council rejects or modifies the proposed allotment for reserved subjects, the Governor should have power to insist on the whole or any part of the allotment originally provided, if for reasons to be stated he certifies its necessity in the terms which we have already suggested. We are emphatically of opinion that the Governor in Council must be empowered to obtain the supply which he declares to be necessary for the discharge of his responsibilities. Except in so far as the Governor exercises this power the budget would be altered in accordance with the resolutions carried in council."
_Modification of the Scheme by the Government of India._ "After five years" time from the first meeting of the reformed councils we suggest that the Government of India should hear applications from either the provincial Government or the provincial council for the modification of the reserved and transferred lists of the province; and that, after considering the evidence laid before them, they should recommend for the approval of the Secretary of State the transfer of such further subjects to the transferred list as they think desirable. On the other hand, if it should be made plain to them that certain functions have been seriously maladministered, it will be open to them, with the sanction of the Secretary of State, to retransfer subjects from the transferred to the reserved list, or to place restrictions for the future on the minister"s powers in respect of certain transferred subjects....
But it is also desirable to complete the responsibility of the ministers for the transferred subjects. This should come in one of two ways, either at the initiative of the council if it desires and is prepared to exercise greater control over the ministers, or at the discretion of the Government of India, which may wish to make this change as a condition of the grant of new, or of the maintainance of existing, powers. We propose, therefore, that the Government of India may, when hearing such applications, direct that the ministers" salaries, instead of any longer being treated as a reserved subject, and, therefore, protected in the last resort by the Governor"s order from interference should be specifically voted each year by the legislative council; or, failing such direction by the Government of India, it should be open to the councils at that time or subsequently to demand by resolution that such ministers" salaries should be so voted, and the Government of India should thereupon give effect to such request."
_Periodic commissions_: ... Ten years after the first meeting of the new councils established under the Statute a commission should be appointed to review the position. Criticism has been expressed in the past of the composition of Royal Commissions, and it is our intention that the commission which we suggest should be regarded as authoritative and should derive its authority from Parliament itself. The names of the commissioners, therefore, should be submitted by the Secretary of State to both Houses of Parliament for approval by resolution. The commissioners" mandate should be to consider whether by the end of the term of the legislature then in existence it would be possible to establish complete responsible government in any province or provinces, or how far it would be possible to approximate it in others; to advise on the continued reservation of any departments for the transfer of which to popular control it has been proved to their satisfaction that the time had not yet come; to recommend the retransfer of other matters to the control of the Governor in Council if serious maladministration were established; and to make any recommendations for the working of responsible government or the improvement of the const.i.tutional machinery which experience of the systems in operation may show to be desirable....
"There are several other important matters, germane in greater or less degree to our main purpose, which the commission should review. They should investigate the progress made in admitting Indians into the higher ranks of the public service. They should examine the apportionment of the financial burden of India with a view to adjusting it more fairly between the provinces. The commission should also examine the development of education among the people and the progress and working of local self-governing bodies. Lastly the commission should consider the working of the franchise and the const.i.tution of electorates, including the important matter of the retention of communal representation.
Indeed, we regard the development of a broad franchise as the arch on which the edifice of self-government must be raised; for we have no intention that our reforms should result merely in the transfer of powers from a bureaucracy to an oligarchy...."
"In proposing the appointment of a commission ten years after the new Act takes effect we wish to guard against possible misunderstanding. We would not be taken as implying that there can be established by that time complete responsible government in the provinces. In many of the provinces no such consummation can follow in the time named. The pace will be everywhere unequal, though progress in one province will always stimulate progress elsewhere; but undue expectations might be aroused, if we indicated any opinion as to the degree of approximation to complete self-government that might be reached even in one or two of the most advanced provinces. The reasons that make complete responsibility at present impossible are likely to continue operative in some degree even after a decade."
II
The proposals regarding the Government of India called the Central Government may be thus summed up:
(_a_) _General_: "We have already made our opinion clear that pending the development of responsible government in the provinces the Government of India must remain responsible only to Parliament. In other words, in all matters which it judges to be essential to the discharge of its responsibilities for peace, order, and good government it must, saving only for its accountability to Parliament, retain indisputable power."
(_b_) _The Governor General"s Executive Council_: "We would therefore abolish such statutory restrictions as now exist in respect of the appointment of Members of the Governor General"s Council, so as to give greater elasticity both in respect to the size of the Government and the distribution of work."
At present there is one Indian member in the Viceroy"s Executive Council consisting of six ordinary members and one extraordinary besides the Viceroy. This scheme recommends the appointment of another Indian.
(_c_) _The Indian Legislative Council_.
I. Legislative a.s.sembly: "We recommend therefore that the strength of the legislative council, to be known in future as the Legislative a.s.sembly of India, should be raised to a total strength of about 100 members, so as to be far more truly representative of British India. We propose that two-thirds of this total should be returned by election; and that one-third should be nominated by the Governor General, of which third not less than a third again should be non-officials selected with the object of representing minority or special interests.... Some special representation, we think, there must be, as for European and Indian commerce, and also for the large landlords. There should be also communal representation for Muhammadans in most provinces and also for Sikhs in the Punjab."
II. The Council of State: "We do not propose to inst.i.tute a complete bi-cameral system, but to create a second chamber, known as the Council of State, which shall take its part in ordinary legislative business and shall be the final legislative authority in matters which the government regards as essential. The Council of State will be composed of 50 members, exclusive of the Governor General, who would be President, with power to appoint a Vice-President who would normally take his place: not more than 25 will be officials, including the members of the executive council, and 4 would be non-officials nominated by the Governor General.
Official members would be eligible for nomination to both the Legislative a.s.sembly and the Council of State. There would be 21 elected members of whom 15 will be returned by the non-official members of the provincial legislative councils, each council returning two members, other than those of Burma, the Central Provinces and a.s.sam which will return one member each....
"Inasmuch as the Council of State will be the supreme legislative authority for India on all crucial questions and also the revising authority upon all Indian legislation, we desire to attract to it the services of the best men available in the country. We desire that the Council of State should develop something of the experience and dignity of a body of Elder Statesmen; and we suggest therefore that the Governor General in Council should make regulations as to the qualification of candidates for election to that body which will ensure that their status and position and record of services will give to the Council a senatorial character, and the qualities usually regarded as appropriate to a revising chamber."
III. Legislative procedure: "Let us now explain how this legislative machinery will work. It will make for clearness to deal separately with Government Bills and Bills introduced by non-official members. A Government Bill will ordinarily be introduced and carried through all the usual stages in the Legislative a.s.sembly. It will then go in the ordinary course to the Council of State, and if there amended in any way which the a.s.sembly is not willing to accept, it will be submitted to a joint session of both Houses, by whose decision its ultimate fate will be decided. This will be the ordinary course of legislation. But it might well happen that amendments made by the Council of State were such as to be essential in the view of the Government if the purpose with which the Bill was originally introduced was to be achieved, and in this case the Governor General in Council would certify that the amendments were essential to the interests of peace, order, or good government. The a.s.sembly would then not have power to reject or modify these amendments, nor would they be open to revision in a joint session.
"We have to provide for two other possibilities. Cases may occur in which the Legislative a.s.sembly refuses leave to the introduction of a Bill or throws out a Bill which the Government regarded as necessary. For such a contingency we would provide that if leave to introduce a Government Bill is refused, or if the Bill is thrown out at any stage, the Government should have the power, on the certificate of the Governor General in Council that the Bill is essential to the interests of peace, order, or good government, to refer it _de novo_ to the Council of State; and if the Bill, after being taken in all its stages through the Council of State, was pa.s.sed by that body, it would become law without further reference to the a.s.sembly. Further, there may be cases when the consideration of a measure by both chambers would take too long if the emergency which called for the measure is to be met. Such a contingency should rarely arise; but we advise that in cases of emergency, so certified by the Governor General in Council, it should be open to the Government to introduce a Bill in the Council of State, and upon its being pa.s.sed there merely to report it to the a.s.sembly."
IV. Powers of dissolution, etc.: "The Governor General should in our opinion have power at any time to dissolve either the Legislative a.s.sembly or the Council of State or both these bodies.
It is perhaps unnecessary to add that the Governor General and the Secretary of State should retain their existing powers of a.s.sent, reservation, and disallowance to all Acts of the Indian legislature. The present powers of the Governor General in Council under section 71 of the Government of India Act. 1915, to make regulations proposed by local Governments for the peace and good government of backward tracts of territory should also be preserved; with the modification that it will in future rest with the Head of the province concerned to propose such regulations to the Government of India."
V. Fiscal legislation: "Fiscal legislation will, of course, be subject to the procedure which we have recommended in respect of Government Bills. The budget will be introduced in the Legislative a.s.sembly but the a.s.sembly will not vote it. Resolutions upon budget matters and upon all other questions, whether moved in the a.s.sembly or in the Council of State, will continue to be advisory in character."
(d) Privy Council: "We have a further recommendation to make. We would ask that His Majesty may be graciously pleased to approve the inst.i.tution of a Privy Council for India.... The Privy Council"s office would be to advise the Governor General when he saw fit to consult it on questions of policy and administration."
(e) Periodic commissions: "At the end of the last chapter we recommended that ten years after the inst.i.tution of our reforms, and again at intervals of twelve years thereafter, a commission approved by Parliament should investigate the working of the changes introduced into the provinces, and recommend as to their further progress. It should be equally the duty of the commission to examine and report upon the new const.i.tution of the Government of India, with particular reference to the working of the machinery for representation, the procedure by certificate, and the results of joint sessions."