(_f_) That, considering the economic conditions of India, the higher servants of the Government are paid on a scale unparalleled in the history of public administration in the world.
(_g_) That the interests of the services often supersede those of the country and the Government.
(_h_) And last, but not least, that by the gathering of all powers of initiative and execution in their hands they have emasculated India.
As regards (_a_) we have already quoted the opinion of the eminent authors of the report. The principle laid down in the announcement of August 20, and the scheme proposed are supposed to do away with the element of irresponsibility. It is obvious that with the introduction of the principle of popular control into the Government, the power of individual servants of the executive will not remain what it is now, or has been in the past. Much that is vested in and done by the service will be transferred to public bodies elected by popular vote. This will naturally affect (_b_) and (_c_) also. We will here stop to quote again from the Report:
"In the forefront of the announcement of August 20 the policy of the increasing a.s.sociation of Indians in every branch of the administration was definitely placed. It has not been necessary for us, nor indeed would it have been possible, to go into this large question in detail in the time available for our inquiry. We have already seen that Lord Hardinge"s Government was anxious to increase the number of Indians in the public services, and that a Royal Commission was appointed in 1912 to examine and report on the existing limitations in the employment of Indians.... The report was signed only a few months after the outbreak of war, and its publication was deferred in the hope that the war would not be prolonged. When written, it might have satisfied moderate Indian opinion, but when published two years later it was criticised as wholly disappointing. Our inquiry has since given us ample opportunity of judging the importance which Indian opinion attaches to this question. While we take account of this att.i.tude, a factor which carries more weight with us is that since the report was signed an entirely new policy toward Indian government has been adopted, which must be very largely dependent for success on the extent to which it is found possible to introduce Indians into every branch of the administration."
The authors of the Report then proceed to state the limitations of the process, subject to the general remark that at the present moment there are few Indians (we do not admit this) trained in public life, who can replace the Europeans, and thus to alter the personnel of a service must be a long and steady process. They admit that:
"If responsible government is to be established in India there will be a far greater need than is even dreamt of at present for persons to take part in public affairs in the legislative a.s.semblies and elsewhere; and for this reason the more Indians we can employ in the public services the better. Moreover, it would lessen the burden of Imperial responsibilities if a body of capable Indian administrators could be produced. We regard it as necessary, therefore, that recruitment of a largely increased proportion of Indians should be begun at once."
In the next paragraph they state why, in their judgment, it is necessary that a substantial portion of the services must continue to be European.
Their reasons may be gathered from the following:
"The characteristics which we have learned to a.s.sociate with the Indian public services must as far as possible be maintained and the leaven of officers possessed of them should be strong enough to a.s.sure and develop them in the service as a whole. The qualities of courage, leadership, decision, fixity of purpose, detached judgment and integrity in her public servants will be as necessary as ever to India. There must be no such sudden swamping of any service with any new element that its whole character suffers a rapid alteration."
On these grounds they make the following recommendations:
"I. That all distinctions based on race be removed, and that appointments to all branches of the public service be made without racial discrimination" (Paragraph 315).
"II. That for all the public services, for which there is recruitment in England open to Europeans and Indians alike, there must be a system of appointment in India, ... and we propose to supplement it by fixing a definite percentage of recruitment to be made in India."
"III. We have not been able to examine the question of the percentage of recruitment to be made in India for any service other than the Indian Civil Service. The Commission recommended that 25 per cent. of the superior posts of that service should be recruited for in India. We consider that changed conditions warrant some increase in that proportion, and we suggest that 33 per cent. of the superior posts should be recruited for in India, and that this percentage should be increased by 1-1/2 per cent.
annually until the periodic commission is appointed which will re-examine the whole subject.... We have dealt only with the Indian Civil Service, but our intention is that there should be in all other services now recruited from England a fixed percentage of recruitment in India, increasing annually."
Now we must admit that this is certainly a distinct and marked advance on the existing situation. The Indian Const.i.tutional party, however, wants to have the percentage of recruitment in India fixed at 50 per cent., retaining at the same time the annual increase suggested. In our opinion, this difference is not material, provided the number of posts to which the rule of percentage is to be applied is substantially reduced. We may state our position briefly.
We are of the opinion that the system of administration in India is much more costly than it should be, considering the sources and the amounts of Indian revenues. Unless the industries of the country are developed we can see no new sources of increased taxation. Consequently, to us, it seems essential that some economy should be effected in the various departments of the administration. The only way to effect that economy is to substantially reduce the number of posts on which it is considered necessary to retain a certain percentage of Europeans. In speaking of the machinery of the Government of India, the authors of the Report say:
"_We think we have reason for saying that in some respects the machinery is no longer equal to the needs of the time._ The normal work of the departments is heavy. The collective responsibility of the Government is weighty, especially in time of war. There is little time or energy left for those activities of a political nature which the new situation in the country demands. A legislative session of the Government of India imposes a serious strain upon the departments, and especially on the members in charge of them. But apart from the inevitable complexities of the moment, the growing burden of business, which results from the changing political conditions of the country, is leading to an acc.u.mulation of questions which cannot be disposed of as quickly as they present themselves. We find the necessity for reforms admitted, principles agreed upon, and decisions taken, and then long delays in giving effect to them. Difficulties are realized, enquiries are started, commissions report, and then there is a pause. There is a belief abroad that a.s.surances given in public p.r.o.nouncement of policy are sometimes not fulfilled. On this occasion, therefore, we have taken steps to guard against such imputations, and to provide means for ensuring the ordered development of our plans."
PRESENT CAUSES OF DELAY
"267. The main fault for the clogging of the machine does not, we think, lie altogether with its highly trained engineers. What is chiefly wanted is some change of system in the directions of simplicity and speed. _How does it happen that announcements are made that arouse expectations only to defeat them?_ We know that it is not from any intention of deluding the public. We suggest that it is because the wheels move too slowly for the times; the need for change is realized, but because an examination of details would take too long, promises are made in general terms, which on examination it becomes necessary so to qualify with reservations as to disappoint antic.i.p.ations, and even to lead to charges of breach of faith. We suspect that a root-cause of some political discontent lies in such delays. Now, so far as the provinces are concerned, we believe that our proposals _for freeing them to a great extent from the control of the Government of India and the Secretary of State will improve matters. But the Government of India are in the worst case_." [The italics are ours.]
These observations raise an apprehension in our mind that it is proposed to add to the strength of the services under the Government of India.
We, for ourselves, do not see how it can be otherwise. With the steady admission of the popular element into the Government of India the activities of the latter are likely to increase rather than diminish; the secretarial work of the different departments will expand rather than contract. The question of questions is how to meet the increased cost.
The remedy is the same as was suggested many years ago by Sir William Hunter, the official historian of India. He said:
"If we are to give a really efficient administration to India, many services must be paid for at lower rates even at present. For those rates are regulated in the higher branches of the administration by the cost of officers brought from England. You cannot work with imported labor as cheaply as you can with native labor, and I regard the more extended employment of the natives, not only as an act of justice, but as a financial necessity. If we are to govern the Indian people efficiently and cheaply, we must govern them by means of themselves, and pay for the administration at the market rates for native labor."
Now, whatever may be said about the necessity of maintaining a strong European element in the departments which require initiative, courage, resourcefulness and all the other qualities of "leadership" they are certainly not a _sine qua non_ for efficiency in secretarial work. We can see no reason why, then, the different secretariats of the Government of India cannot be manned mainly, if not exclusively, by Indians. Their salaries need not be the same as those now paid to the Europeans engaged in these departments. May we ask if there is any country on earth where such high salaries are paid to the secretarial heads of departments as in India? Secretaries to the Government of India in the Army and Public works and Legislative departments receive 42,000 Rs. each ($14,000, or 2800 a year); Secretaries to the Government of India in the Finance, Foreign, Home, Revenue, Agriculture, Commerce and Industry and Education departments get Rs. 48,000 a year each ($16,000 or 3,200); Educational Commissioners from 30 to 36,000 Rs. ($10,000 to $12,000).
These secretarial officers are not of Cabinet rank. Besides their salaries they get various allowances, and the purchasing value of the rupee in India is much higher than that of 33 cents in the United States or of 16d. in the United Kingdom, the exchange equivalents of an Indian rupee. The same remarks may be made about Provincial Secretariats. We do not ignore the fact that a European who cuts himself away from his country and people for the best part of his life cannot be expected to give his time, energy and talents for the compensation he might accept in his own country, nor that, if the best kind of European talent is desired for India, the compensation must be sufficiently attractive to tempt competent men to accept it. In Paragraphs 318 to 322, both inclusive, the Secretary of India and the Viceroy have put forward a forceful plea for improvement in the conditions of the European Services by (_a_) increment in their salaries, (_b_) expediting promotions, and (_c_) grant of additional allowances, and also by bettering the prospects of pensions and leave. We are afraid the only way to obtain the concurrence of Indian public opinion in this matter, if at all, is by restricting the number of posts which _must_ be held by Europeans.
The _cadre_ of services to which the rule of percentage is to apply must be reduced in strength, and if Europeans are required for posts outside these they should be employed for short periods and from an open market.
For example, it seems inconceivable to us why professional men like doctors, engineers and professors should be recruited for permanent service. Nor is there any reason why the recruitment should be confined to persons of British domicile. The Government of India must be run on business principles. With the exception, perhaps, of the higher posts in the I. C. S. and in the Army, all other offices should be filled by taking the supply on the best available terms for short periods and from open market. By reducing the number of higher posts to which the rule of percentage should apply, the Government would be reducing the number of Indian officers who could claim the same salary as is given to their European colleagues. In our humble opinion, the latter claim is purely sentimental, and the best interests of the country require that the administration should be as economical as is compatible with efficiency.
The strength of the different permanent services should be reduced as much as possible and the deficiency made up by the appointment of the best persons available at the price which the administration may be willing to pay, whether such persons be European, Indian or American.
Take the Indian Educational Service, for example. The members start with a salary of 6000 Rs. a year ($2000 or 400) and rise to about 24,000 Rs.
a year ($8000 or 1600). In the United States, to the best of our knowledge, few professors, if any, get a salary higher than $7000 or 21,000 Rs. a year. High-cla.s.s graduates of Harvard, Yale and Columbia start their tutorial careers at $2000 to $3000 a year, many at $1500 a year. These men would refuse to go to India on a similar salary. On the other hand, if a salary of $4000 to $10,000 were offered to a select few, the services of _the men at the top_ might be had for a short period. Surely, in the best interests of education, it is much better to get first-cla.s.s men on high salaries for short periods than permanently to have third-cla.s.s men beginning with smaller salaries and eventually rising to high salaries and ensuring to themselves life long pensions.
What is true of the Educational Service is similarly, if not equally, true of the Medical, the Engineering and other scientific services. At the present time we have men in these technical services who received their education about twenty or twenty-five years ago and whose knowledge of their respective sciences is antiquated and rusty.
Apothecaries, absolutely innocent of any knowledge of modern surgery, are often appointed to the post of Civil Surgeons. No sensible Indian desires that the present inc.u.mbents should be interfered with, except where it is possible to retire them under the terms of their service.
All engagements should be met honorably. What is needed is that in future there should be a radical departure in the practice of appointing non-Indians to responsible posts in India. We do not want to deprive ourselves of the privilege of being guided in our work by European talent, nor should we grudge them adequate compensation for their services. What we object to is (1) racial discrimination; (2) excessive power being vested in individual officers; (3) the employment of more than a necessary number of persons of alien origin; (4) the crippling of the country"s resources by burdening its finances with unnecessary pensions and leave allowances; (5) the continuance of men on service lists long after their usefulness has disappeared; (6) the filling of appointments by jobbery, as is now done in the so-called non-regulation provinces. We, in the Punjab, have been "blessed" by the rule of several generations of Smiths, Harrys and Jones. Those who failed to pa.s.s the I.
C. S. joined the _cadre_ by the back door and received the same emoluments as those who entered it by compet.i.tion. It is they who block the avenues of promotions and not the sons of the soil.
COST OF ADMINISTRATION
On the subject of the cost of administration it will be instructive to compare the annual salaries allowed to the highest public servants in India, the United States and j.a.pan.
The President of the United States, who ranks with the great royalties of the world in position, gets a salary of $75,000, without any other allowance. The Prime Minister of j.a.pan gets 12,000 yen, or $6000. The Viceroy and the Governor General of India gets 250,000 rupees, or $83,000, besides a very large amount in the shape of various allowances.
The Cabinet Ministers of the United States get a salary of $12,000 each, the j.a.panese 8000 yen or $4000, and the Members of the Viceroy"s Council, $26,700 each.
In the whole Federal Government of the United States there are only three offices which carry a salary of more than $8000. They are:
The President of the General Navy Board $13,500 Solicitor General $10,000 a.s.sistant Solicitor General $9,000
All the other salaries range from $2100 to $8000. In the State Department all offices, including those of the secretaries, carry salaries of from $2100 to $5000. In the Treasury Department the Treasurer gets $8000, three other officers having $6000 each. All the remaining officials get from $2500 to $5000. In the War Department there are only two offices which have a salary of $8000 attached: that of Chief of Staff and that of Quartermaster General. The rest get from $2000 to $6000. In the Navy Department, besides the President of the General Board mentioned above, the President of the Naval Examination Board gets $8000 and so does the Commandant of the Marine Corps. All the rest get from $6000 downwards. In the Department of Agriculture there is only one office carrying a salary of $6000. All the rest get from $5000 downwards. The Chief of the Weather Bureau, an expert, gets $6000. In the Commerce Department four experts get $6000 each, the rest from $5000 downwards.
In j.a.pan the officials of the Imperial Household have salaries ranging from $2750 to $4000. Officials of the Higher Civil Service get from $1850 to $2100 a year; the Vice-Minister of State, $2500; Chief of the Legislative Bureau, $2500; the Chief Secretary of the Cabinet, $2500; and the Inspector General of the Metropolitan Police, $2500; President of the Administrative Litigation Court, $3000; President of the Railway Board, $3750; President of the Privy Council, $3000; Vice-President of the Privy Council, $2750, and so on.
When we come to India we find that the President of the Railway Board gets from $20,000 to $24,000 and that two other members of the Railway Board get $16,000. Secretaries in the Army, Public Works, and Legislative Departments get $14,000. Secretaries in Finance, Foreign, Home, Revenue, Agriculture, Commerce and Industry Departments get $16,000. The Secretary in the Education Department gets $12,000; Joint Secretary, $10,000; Controller and Auditor-General, $14,000; Accountant-General, from $9,000 to $11,000; Commissioner of Salt Revenue, $10,000; Director of Post and Telegraph, from $12,000 to $14,000.
Among the officers directly under the Government of India there are only a few who get salaries below $7000. Most of the others get from that sum up to $12,000.
The United States includes forty-eight States and territories. Some of them are as large in area, if not even larger, than the several provinces of India. The Governors of these States are paid from $2500 to $12,000 a year. Illinois is the only State paying $12,000; five States, including New York and California, pay $10,000; two, Ma.s.sachusetts and Indiana, pay $8000; one pays $7000, and three pay $6000. All the rest pay $5000 or less. There is only one territory, the Philippines, which pays a salary of $20,000 to its Governor-General.
In India the Governors of Madras, Bombay and Bengal each receive $40,000, besides a large amount for allowances. The Lieutenant-Governors of the Punjab, the United Provinces, Bihar and Burma get $33,000 each, besides allowances. The Chief Commissioners receive $11,000 in Bihar, $18,700 in a.s.sam, $20,700 in the Central Provinces, and $12,000 in Delhi. The Political Residents in the native States receive from $11,000 to $16,000, besides allowances.
In j.a.pan the governors of provinces are paid from $1850 to $2250 per year, besides allowances varying from $200 to $300.
The Provincial services in India are paid on a more lavish scale than anywhere else in the world. In Bengal the salaries range from $1600 for a.s.sistant Magistrate and Collector to $21,333 to Members of the Council, and this same extravagance is also true of the other provinces.
Coming to the Judiciary, we find that Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States get a salary of $14,500 each, the Chief Justice getting $15,000; the Circuit Judges get a salary of $7000 each; the District Judges, $6000. In the State of New York the Judges of the Supreme Court, belonging to the General Sessions, get from $17,500 and those of the Special Sessions from $9000 to $10,000 each. City Magistrates get from $7000 to $8000. In India the Chief Justice of Bengal gets $24,000; the Chief Justices of Bombay, Madras and the United Provinces, $20,000 each. The Chief Judges of the Chief Court of the Punjab and Burma get $16,000 each and the Puisine Judges of the High Courts the same amounts.
The Puisine Judges of the Chief Courts receive $14,000. In the Province of Bengal the salaries of the District and Session Judges range from $8,000 to $12,000. District Judges of the other provinces get from about $7000 to $12,000. The Deputy Commissioners in India get a salary in the different provinces ranging from $6000 to $9000 a year. The Commissioners get from $10,000 to $12,000.
In j.a.pan the Appeal Court Judges and Procurators get from $900 to $2500 a year. Only one officer, the President of the Court of Causation, gets as much as $3000. The District Court Judges and Procurators are paid at the rate of from $375 to $1850. It is needless to compare the salaries of minor officials in the three countries. Since the Indian taxpayer has to pay so heavily for the European services engaged in the work of administration, it is necessary that even Indian officers should be paid on a comparatively high scale, thus raising the cost of administration hugely and affecting most injuriously the condition of the men in the lower grades of the government service. The difference between the salaries of the officers and the men forming the rank and file of the government in the three countries shows clearly how the lowest ranks in India suffer from the fact that the highest governmental officials are paid at such high rates.
In New York City the Chief Inspector gets $3500 a year; Captains, $2750; Lieutenants, $2250; Surgeons, $1,750; and Patrolmen, $1,400 each. In j.a.pan the Inspector General of the Metropolitan Police gets $2500. The figures of the lower officials are not available. But the minimum salary of a Constable is $6.50 a month, besides which he gets his equipment, uniform and boots free. In India the Inspectors General get from $8000 to $12,000, the Deputy Inspectors General from $6000 to $7200, District Superintendents of Police from $2666 to $4800, a.s.sistants from $1200 to $2000, Inspectors from $600 to $1000, Sub-inspectors from $200 to $400, Head Constables from $60 to $80, Constables from $40 to $48.
We have taken these figures from the _Indian Year Book_, published by the _Times of India_, Bombay. We know as a fact that the Police-Constables in the Punjab are paid from $2.67 to $3.33 per month--that is, from $32 to $40 per year. The reader should mark the difference between the grades of salaries from the highest to the lowest in India as compared with the United States and j.a.pan. While in India the lowest officials are frightfully underpaid, the highest grades are paid on a lavish scale. In the other countries of the world this is not the case.
EDUCATIONAL DEPARTMENT