On the issue of declaring war, however, public opinion was different. It was President Wilson"s summons to the neutrals to follow him in breaking off diplomatic relations that had given force to the earlier campaign; but on June 5th the American Minister, acting on instructions, presented a Note to the Chinese Government urging that the preservation of national unity was more important than entry into the war, and suggesting the desirability of preserving peace for the present. What had happened in the meantime was that the war issue, which might never have become acute but for President"s Wilson"s action, had been used by the j.a.panese to revive the conflict between North and South, and to instigate the Chinese militarists to unconst.i.tutional action. Sun Yat Sen and most of the Southern politicians were opposed to the declaration of war; Sun"s reasons were made known in an open letter to Mr. Lloyd George on March 7th. They were thoroughly sound.[76] The Cabinet, on May 1st, decided in favour of war, but by the Const.i.tution a declaration of war required the consent of Parliament. The militarists attempted to coerce Parliament, which had a majority against war; but as this proved impossible, they brought military force to bear on the President to compel him to dissolve Parliament unconst.i.tutionally. The bulk of the Members of Parliament retired to the South, where they continued to act as a Parliament and to regard themselves as the sole source of const.i.tutional government. After these various illegalities, the military autocrats were still compelled to deal with one of their number, who, in July, effected a five days" restoration of the Manchu Emperor. The President resigned, and was succeeded by a person more agreeable to the militarists, who have henceforth governed in the North, sometimes without a Parliament, sometimes with a subservient unconst.i.tutional Northern Parliament. Then at last they were free to declare war. It was thus that China entered the war for democracy and against militarism.
Of course China helped little, if at all, towards the winning of the war, but that was not what the Allies expected of her. The objects of the European Allies are disclosed in the French Note quoted above. We wished to confiscate German property in China, to expel Germans living in China, and to prevent, as far as possible, the revival of German trade in China after the war. The confiscation of German property was duly carried out--not only public property, but private property also, so that the Germans in China were suddenly reduced to beggary. Owing to the claims on shipping, the expulsion of the Germans had to wait till after the Armistice. They were sent home through the Tropics in overcrowded ships, sometimes with only 24 hours" notice; no degree of hardship was sufficient to secure exemption. The British authorities insisted on expelling delicate pregnant women, whom they officially knew to be very likely to die on the voyage. All this was done after the Armistice, for the sake of British trade. The kindly Chinese often took upon themselves to hide Germans, in hard cases, from the merciless persecution of the Allies; otherwise, the miseries inflicted would have been much greater.
The confiscation of private property during the war and by the Treaty of Versailles was a new departure, showing that on this point all the belligerents agreed with the Bolsheviks. Dr. Reid places side by side two statements, one by President Wilson when asking Congress to agree to the Declaration of War: "We shall, I feel confident, conduct our operations as belligerents without pa.s.sion, and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the principles of right and fairplay we profess to be fighting for"; the other by Senator Hitchc.o.c.k, when the war was over, after a day spent with President Wilson in learning the case for ratification of the Versailles Treaty: "Through the Treaty, we will yet get very much of importance.... In violation of all international law and treaties we have made disposition of a billion dollars of German-owned properly here. The Treaty validates all that."[77] The European Allies secured very similar advantages from inducing China to enter the war for righteousness.
We have seen what England and France gained by the Chinese declaration of war. What j.a.pan gained was somewhat different.
The Northern military faction, which controlled the Peking Government, was completely dependent upon j.a.pan, and could do nothing to resist j.a.panese aggression. All the other Powers were fully occupied with the war, and had sold China to j.a.pan in return for j.a.panese neutrality--for j.a.pan can hardly be counted as a belligerent after the capture of Tsingtau in November 1914. The Southern Government and all the liberal elements in the North were against the clique which had seized the Central Government. In March 1918, military and naval agreements were concluded between China and j.a.pan, of which the text, never officially published, is given by Millard.[78] By these agreements the j.a.panese were enabled, under pretence of military needs in Manchuria and Mongolia, to send troops into Chinese territory, to acquire control of the Chinese Eastern Railway and consequently of Northern Manchuria, and generally to keep all Northern China at their mercy. In all this, the excuse of operations against the Bolsheviks was very convenient.
After this the j.a.panese went ahead gaily. During the year 1918, they placed loans in China to the extent of Yen 246,000,000,[79] _i.e.,_ about 25,000,000. China was engaged in civil war, and both sides were as willing as the European belligerents to sell freedom for the sake of victory. Unfortunately for j.a.pan, the side on which j.a.pan was fighting in the war proved suddenly victorious, and some portion of the energies of Europe and America became available for holding j.a.pan in check. For various reasons, however, the effect of this did not show itself until after the Treaty of Versailles was concluded. During the peace negotiations, England and France, in virtue of secret agreements, were compelled to support j.a.pan. President Wilson, as usual, sacrificed everything to his League of Nations, which the j.a.panese would not have joined unless they had been allowed to keep Shantung. The chapter on this subject in Mr. Lansing"s account of the negotiations is one of the most interesting in his book.[80] By Article 156 of the Treaty of Versailles, "Germany renounces, in favour of j.a.pan, all her rights, t.i.tle, and privileges" in the province of Shantung.[81] Although President Wilson had consented to this gross violation of justice, America refused to ratify the Treaty, and was therefore free to raise the issue of Shantung at Washington. The Chinese delegates at Versailles resisted the clauses concerning Shantung to the last, and finally, encouraged by a vigorous agitation of Young China,[82] refused to sign the Treaty. They saw no reason why they should be robbed of a province as a reward for having joined the Allies. All the other Allies agreed to a proceeding exactly as iniquitous as it would have been if we had annexed Virginia as a reward to the Americans for having helped us in the war, or France had annexed Kent on a similar pretext.
Meanwhile, Young China had discovered that it could move Chinese public opinion on the anti-j.a.panese cry. The Government in Peking in 1919-20 was in the hands of the pro-j.a.panese An Fu party, but they were forcibly ejected, in the summer of 1920, largely owing to the influence of the Young China agitation on the soldiers stationed in Peking. The An Fu leaders took refuge in the j.a.panese Legation, and since then the Peking Government has ventured to be less subservient to j.a.pan, hoping always for American support. j.a.pan did everything possible to consolidate her position in Shantung, but always with the knowledge that America might re-open the question at any time. As soon as the Washington Conference was announced, j.a.pan began feverishly negotiating with China, with a view to having the question settled before the opening of the Conference. But the Chinese, very wisely, refused the illusory concessions offered by j.a.pan, and insisted on almost unconditional evacuation. At Washington, both parties agreed to the joint mediation of England and America. The pressure of American public opinion caused the American Administration to stand firm on the question of Shantung, and I understand that the British delegation, on the whole, concurred with America. Some concessions were made to j.a.pan, but they will not amount to much if American interest in Shantung lasts for another five years.
On this subject, I shall have more to say when I come to the Washington Conference.
There is a question with which the Washington Conference determined not to concern itself, but which nevertheless is likely to prove of great importance in the Far East--I mean the question of Russia. It was considered good form in diplomatic circles, until the Genoa Conference, to pretend that there is no such country as Russia, but the Bolsheviks, with their usual wickedness, have refused to fall in with this pretence.
Their existence const.i.tutes an embarra.s.sment to America, because in a quarrel with j.a.pan the United States would unavoidably find themselves in unwilling alliance with Russia. The conduct of j.a.pan towards Russia has been quite as bad as that of any other Power. At the time of the Czecho-Slovak revolt, the Allies jointly occupied Vladivostok, but after a time all withdrew except the j.a.panese. All Siberia east of Lake Baikal, including Vladivostok, now forms one State, the Far Eastern Republic, with its capital at Chita. Against this Republic, which is practically though not theoretically Bolshevik, the j.a.panese have launched a whole series of miniature Kolchaks--s.e.m.e.nov, Horvath, Ungern, etc. These have all been defeated, but the j.a.panese remain in military occupation of Vladivostok and a great part of the Maritime Province, though they continually affirm their earnest wish to retire.
In the early days of the Bolshevik regime the Russians lost Northern Manchuria, which is now controlled by j.a.pan. A board consisting partly of Chinese and partly of reactionary Russians forms the directorate of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which runs through Manchuria and connects with the Siberian Railway. There is not through communication by rail between Peking and Europe as in the days before 1914. This is an extreme annoyance to European business men in the Far East, since it means that letters or journeys from Peking to London take five or six weeks instead of a fortnight. They try to persuade themselves that the fault lies with the Bolsheviks, but they are gradually realizing that the real cause is the reactionary control of the Chinese Eastern Railway. Meanwhile, various Americans are interesting themselves in this railway and endeavouring to get it internationalized. Motives similar to those which led to the Vanderlip concession are forcing friendship with Russia upon all Americans who have Siberian interests. If j.a.pan were engaged in a war with America, the Bolsheviks would in all likelihood seize the opportunity to liberate Vladivostok and recover Russia"s former position in Manchuria. Already, according to _The Times_ correspondent in Peking, Outer Mongolia, a country about as large as England, France and Germany combined, has been conquered by Bolshevik armies and propaganda.
The Bolsheviks have, of course, the enthusiastic sympathy of the younger Chinese students. If they can weather their present troubles, they have a good chance of being accepted by all vigorous progressive people in Asia as the liberators of Asia from the tyranny of the Great Powers. As they were not invited to Washington, they are not a party to any of the agreements reached there, and it may turn out that they will upset impartially the ambitions of j.a.pan, Great Britain and America.[83] For America, no less than other Powers, has ambitions, though they are economic rather than territorial. If America is victorious in the Far East, China will be Americanized, and though the sh.e.l.l of political freedom may remain, there will be an economic and cultural bondage beneath it. Russia is not strong enough to dominate in this way, but may become strong enough to secure some real freedom for China. This, however, is as yet no more than a possibility. It is worth remembering, because everybody chooses to forget it, and because, while Russia is treated as a pariah, no settlement of the Far East can be stable. But what part Russia is going to play in the affairs of China it is as yet impossible to say.
FOOTNOTES:
[Footnote 63: On this subject George Gleason, _What Shall I Think of j.a.pan?_ pp. 174-5, says: "This paragraph concerns the iron and steel mills at the city of Hanyang, which, with Wuchang and Hangkow, form the Upper Yangtze commercial centre with a population of 1,500,000 people.
The Hanyeping Company owns a large part of the Tayeh iron mines, eighty miles east of Hangkow, with which there are water and rail connections.
The ore is 67 per cent. iron, fills the whole of a series of hills 500 feet high, and is sufficient to turn out 1,000,000 tons a year for 700 years. [Probably an overstatement.] Coal for the furnaces is obtained from Pinghsiang, 200 miles distant by water, where in 1913 five thousand miners dug 690,000 tons. j.a.panese have estimated that the vein is capable of producing yearly a million tons for at least five centuries....
"Thus did j.a.pan attempt to enter and control a vital spot in the heart of China which for many years Great Britain has regarded as her special trade domain."
Mr. Gleason is an American, not an Englishman. The best account of this matter is given by Mr. Coleman, _The Far East Unveiled_, chaps. x.-xiv.
See below, pp. 232-3.]
[Footnote 64: See letter from Mr. Eugene Chen, _j.a.pan Weekly Chronicle_, October 20, 1921.]
[Footnote 65: The Notes embodying this agreement are quoted in Pooley, _j.a.pan"s Foreign Policies_, Allen & Unwin, 1920, pp. 141-2.]
[Footnote 66: On this subject, Baron Hayashi, now j.a.panese Amba.s.sador to the United Kingdom, said to Mr. Coleman: "When Viscount Kato sent China a Note containing five groups, however, and then sent to England what purported to be a copy of his Note to China, and that copy only contained four of the groups and omitted the fifth altogether, which was directly a breach of the agreement contained in the Anglo-j.a.panese Alliance, he did something which I can no more explain than you can.
Outside of the question of probity involved, his action was unbelievably foolish" (_The Far East Unveiled_, p. 73).]
[Footnote 67: The demands in their original and revised forms, with the negotiations concerning them, are printed in Appendix B of _Democracy and the Eastern Question_, by Thomas F. Millard, Allen & Unwin, 1919.]
[Footnote 68: The texts concerned in the various stages of the Shantung question are printed in S.G. Cheng"s _Modern China_, Appendix ii, iii and ix. For text of Ishii-Lansing Agreement, see Gleason, op. cit. pp.
214-6.]
[Footnote 69: Three books, all by Americans, give the secret and official history of this matter. They are: _An American Diplomat in China_, by Paul S. Reinsch, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922; _Democracy and the Eastern Question_, by Thomas F. Millard, Allen & Unwin, 1919; and _China, Captive or Free?_ by the Rev. Gilbert Reid, A.M., D.D. Director of International Inst.i.tute of China, Allen & Unwin, 1922.]
[Footnote 70: Millard, p. 99.]
[Footnote 71: See Pooley, _j.a.pan"s Foreign Policies_, pp. 23 ff; Coleman, _The Far East Unveiled_, chap, v., and Millard, chap. iii.]
[Footnote 72: Millard, pp. 64-66.]
[Footnote 73: Reid, op. cit. pp. 114-5; Cheng, op. cit., pp. 343-6.]
[Footnote 74: See Appendix III of Cheng"s _Modern China_, which contains this note (p. 346) as well as the other "doc.u.ments relative to the negotiations between j.a.pan and the Allied Powers as to the disposal of the German rights in respect of Shantung Province, and the South Sea Islands north of the Equator."]
[Footnote 75: The story of the steps leading up to China"s declaration of war is admirably told in Reid, op. cit. pp. 88-109.]
[Footnote 76: Port of the letter is quoted by Dr. Reid, p. 108.]
[Footnote 77: Reid, op. cit. p. 161. Chap. vii. of this book, "Commercial Rivalries as affecting China," should be read by anyone who still thinks that the Allies stood for honesty or mercy or anything except money-grubbing.]
[Footnote 78: Appendix C, pp. 421-4.]
[Footnote 79: A list of these loans is given by Hollington K. Tong in an article on "China"s Finances in 1918" in _China in_ 1918, published early in 1919 by the Peking leader, pp. 61-2. The list and some of the comments appear also in Putnam Weale"s _The Truth about China and j.a.pan_.]
[Footnote 80: Mr. Lansing"s book, in so far as it deals with j.a.panese questions, is severely criticized from a j.a.panese point of view in Dr.
Y. Soyeda"s pamphlet "Shantung Question and j.a.panese Case," League of Nations a.s.sociation of j.a.pan, June 1921. I do not think Dr. Soyeda"s arguments are likely to appeal to anyone who is not j.a.panese.]
[Footnote 81: See the clauses concerning Shantung, in full, in Cheng"s _Modern China_, Clarendon Press, pp. 360-1.]
[Footnote 82: This agitation is well described in Mr. M.T.Z. Tyau"s _China Awakened_ (Macmillan, 1922) chap, ix., "The Student Movement."]
[Footnote 83: "Soviet Russia has addressed to the Powers a protest against the discussion at the Washington Conference of the East China Railway, a question exclusively affecting China and Russia, and declares that it reserves for itself full liberty of action in order to compel due deference to the rights of the Russian labouring ma.s.ses and to make demands consistent with those rights" (_Daily Herald_, December 22, 1921). This is the new-style imperialism. It was not the "Russian labouring ma.s.ses," but the Chinese coolies, who built the railway. What Russia contributed was capital, but one is surprised to find the Bolsheviks considering that this confers rights upon themselves as heirs of the capitalists.]
CHAPTER IX
THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE
The Washington Conference, and the simultaneous conference, at Washington, between the Chinese and j.a.panese, have somewhat modified the Far Eastern situation. The general aspects of the new situation will be dealt with in the next chapter; for the present it is the actual decisions arrived at in Washington that concern us, as well as their effect upon the j.a.panese position in Siberia.
In the first place, the Anglo-j.a.panese Alliance has apparently been brought to an end, as a result of the conclusion of the Four Power Pact between America, Great Britain, France and j.a.pan. Within this general alliance of the exploiting Powers, there is a subordinate grouping of America and Great Britain against France and j.a.pan, the former standing for international capitalism, the latter for national capitalism. The situation is not yet plain, because England and America disagree as regards Russia, and because America is not yet prepared to take part in the reconstruction of Europe; but in the Far East, at any rate, we seem to have decided to seek the friendship of America rather than of j.a.pan.
It may perhaps be hoped that this will make our Chinese policy more liberal than it has been. We have announced the restoration of Wei-hai-wei--a piece of generosity which would have been more impressive but for two facts: first, that Wei-hai-wei is completely useless to us, and secondly, that the lease had only two more years to run. By the terms of the lease, in fact, it should have been restored as soon as Russia lost Port Arthur, however many years it still had to run at that date.
One very important result of the Washington Conference is the agreement not to fortify islands in the Pacific, with certain specified exceptions. This agreement, if it is adhered to, will make war between America and j.a.pan very difficult, unless we were allied with America.
Without a naval base somewhere near j.a.pan, America could hardly bring naval force to bear on the j.a.panese Navy. It had been the intention of the Navy Department to fortify Guam with a view to turning it into a first-cla.s.s naval base. The fact that America has been willing to forgo this intention must be taken as evidence of a genuine desire to preserve the peace with j.a.pan.
Various small concessions were made to China. There is to be a revision of the Customs Schedule to bring it to an effective five per cent. The foreign Post Offices are to be abolished, though the j.a.panese have insisted that a certain number of j.a.panese should be employed in the Chinese Post Office. They had the effrontery to pretend that they desired this for the sake of the efficiency of the postal service, though the Chinese post is excellent and the j.a.panese is notoriously one of the worst in the world. The chief use to which the j.a.panese have put their postal service in China has been the importation of morphia, as they have not allowed the Chinese Customs authorities to examine parcels sent through their Post Office. The development of the j.a.panese importation of morphia into China, as well as the growth of the poppy in Manchuria, where they have control, has been a very sinister feature of their penetration of China.[84]
Of course the Open Door, equality of opportunity, the independence and integrity of China, etc. etc., were reaffirmed at Washington; but these are mere empty phrases devoid of meaning.
From the Chinese point of view, the chief achievement at Washington was the Shantung Treaty. Ever since the expulsion by the Germans at the end of 1914, the j.a.panese had held Kiaochow Bay, which includes the port of Tsingtau; they had stationed troops along the whole extent of the Shantung Railway; and by the treaty following the Twenty-one Demands, they had preferential treatment as regards all industrial undertakings in Shantung. The railway belonged to them by right of conquest, and through it they acquired control of the whole province. When an excuse was needed for increasing the garrison, they supplied arms to brigands, and claimed that their intervention was necessary to suppress the resulting disorder. This state of affairs was legalized by the Treaty of Versailles, to which, however, America and China were not parties. The Washington Conference, therefore, supplied an opportunity of raising the question afresh.
At first, however, it seemed as if the j.a.panese would have things all their own way. The Chinese wished to raise the question before the Conference, while the j.a.panese wished to settle it in direct negotiation with China. This point was important, because, ever since the Lansing-Ishii agreement, the j.a.panese have tried to get the Powers to recognize, in practice if not in theory, an informal j.a.panese Protectorate over China, as a first step towards which it was necessary to establish the principle that the j.a.panese should not be interfered with in their diplomatic dealings with China. The Conference agreed to the j.a.panese proposal that the Shantung question should not come before the Conference, but should be dealt with in direct negotiations between the j.a.panese and Chinese. The j.a.panese victory on this point, however, was not complete, because it was arranged that, in the event of a deadlock, Mr. Hughes and Sir Arthur Balfour should mediate. A deadlock, of course, soon occurred, and it then appeared that the British were no longer prepared to back up the j.a.panese whole-heartedly, as in the old days. The American Administration, for the sake of peace, showed some disposition to urge the Chinese to give way. But American opinion was roused on the Shantung question, and it appeared that, unless a solution more or less satisfactory to China was reached, the Senate would probably refuse to ratify the various treaties which embodied the work of the Conference. Therefore, at the last moment, the Americans strongly urged j.a.pan to give way, and we took the same line, though perhaps less strongly. The result was the conclusion of the Shantung Treaty between China and j.a.pan.