"In the spring of 1893, just before the opening of the World"s Fair, the general managers of the various roads centering in Chicago, were very apprehensive lest there should be a general strike among all cla.s.ses of railroad employes for an increase of wages. The officers of the organizations appealed to the men not to strike, arguing that it was their patriotic duty to bear with patience their grievances until the fair was over. The result was there was no strike anywhere. The men all worked in harmony throughout the country. Some of the managers promised, by implication at least, that there would be an increase of wages to reward the patriotic action of their men. Instead of doing as they promised, the general managers during this time equipped their organization to protect their mutual interests."
Mr. Debs then read an article from a Chicago paper which told how the general managers had formed an air tight a.s.sociation which would be able to deal with any strikes that might arise in the future, and suggested that the a.s.sociation rather courted than feared trouble with employes of the railroads.
Continuing, Mr. Debs said: "Shortly after the new a.s.sociation had completed its organization it became apparent what course it intended to pursue. About Sept. 1, the Louisville & Nashville road made a sweeping reduction of 10 per cent in the pay of all its employes--the section men getting 67-1/2 cents a day under this reduction. Then in succession followed the East Tennessee, Virginia & Georgia, the Richmond & Danville, the Mobile & Ohio, Nashville & Chattanooga, Big Four, New York & New England, New York, New Haven & Hartford, Wabash, Union Pacific, Northern Pacific, Monon, Great Northern and the Great Western was just on the point of declaring a reduction when the strike was declared. "It was significant that no two roads declared a reduction at the same time, and in most instances the reductions began with the unorganized and poorest paid men in the service. The men viewed these reductions with apprehension and unrest. This was particularly the case after Judge Caldwell had declared upon investigation that the cut on the Union Pacific was unwarrantable. In two cases the reductions annulled and the original pay of the men restored. On the Union Pacific--on the order of Judge Caldwell and on the Great Northern through the efforts of the American Railway Union. In the later case the matter was decided by a board of arbitration, composed of leading capitalists and business men of St. Paul and Minneapolis.
"These conditions confronted the American Railway Union, when its delegates met here in convention. The employes felt that other systems in sound financial conditions had taken advantage of the unfortunate condition of the country to reduce wages. The men had lost confidence in their old unions which had failed utterly to protect them against these reductions and they came in the hope that the American Railway Union would take some steps to resist them and protect its members against the rapacity of the railroad companies. This was the reason they were ripe to take up the cause of the Pullman strikers. They were wrought up to a point where they were willing to jeopardize their positions to protect both themselves and the Pullman employes. The primary purpose was to cut off Pullman"s revenues by cutting off his cars and thereby force him to a settlement."
Mr. Wright: "I understand you to say you advised against the Pullman strike. Why did you do so?"
Mr. Debs: "We had just gone through a strike on the Great Northern and I did not think it advisable to go into another at that time."
Mr. Wright: "What would have been the action of the convention if there had been no strike at Pullman? Did not that strike force the issue?"
Mr. Debs: "There would have been no trouble with the railroads, I think, but for the Pullman strike. That and the depressed condition of the country aggravated the situation so as to bring about a general strike."
Mr. Wright: "Was the general strike precipitated by the Pullman troubles?"
Mr. Debs: "Yes sir, it was."
Mr. Wright: "Was a notice of the action of the convention served on the different companies?"
Mr. Debs: "Not by the convention. That matter was left to the men on the various systems. From the action of the managers toward the American Railway Union generally, the matter of serving a formal notice of our action on them was not looked upon as necessary, as we were very sure it would be ignored."
Mr. Wright: "Was notice served on the Illinois Central and Rock Island roads?"
Mr. Debs: "I think so, but am not sure."
Mr. Worthington: "Did they have notice through the press?"
Mr. Debs: "Yes, sir."
Mr. Wright: "Do you know the date on which the general managers adopted their resolution to resist the strike?"
Mr. Debs: "I think it was June 24, four days after our action. It was currently reported at that time, though I have no written or other evidence of the fact that the general managers resolved among themselves to exterminate the union."
Mr. Wright: "If the American Railway Union had had its own way in regard to its policy would a general strike have been postponed?"
Mr. Debs: "Yes, sir. The conditions were not altogether propitious and we were fully aware of the fact."
Mr. Wright: "What was the number of your membership at that time?"
Mr. Debs: "About 150,000."
Mr. Wright: "Did you consider that strong enough for a general strike?"
Mr. Debs: "Yes, sir. But it was not a question of membership altogether.
There were other reasons." Mr. Debs said there was one other point to which he wished to call the attention of the commission. One great reason the men had in resisting a reduction of wages was the fact that the companies never restored them voluntarily. The tendency had therefore been for the employes to get closer together to resist the combined efforts of the managers. That was the principle, he said, which had inspired the idea of the American Railway Union. Then resuming the history of the strike Mr. Debs said:
"Pursuant to the order of the convention, which was practically the order of 150,000 men composing the American Railway Union, the members refused to handle Pullman cars. It has been claimed that the president of the union was a self appointed leader who had ordered the strike, etc. In this connection I wish to say that while such is not the case, when the report came in I gave it my approval as president. I do not wish to avoid any of the responsibility. If I had had the authority I would have ordered it under the same circ.u.mstances. June 26, the men began to refuse to haul Pullman cars. They had been advised not to handle the cars on any system where they could not get the sanction of a sufficient number of men to make such a refusal effective. The officers of the union opened headquarters at Uhlics Hall and as committees came in from various roads and made their reports they were advised how to act, and above all else to avoid trouble and violence and to maintain order. We advised them of their right to quit in a body and told them their rights ended there, and that the railroad companies had a right to hire new men and their right began there."
Commissioner Kernan: "What steps if any did you take to prevent violence?"
Mr. Debs: "When we saw there was to be trouble we issued an appeal to the men not to commit any acts of violence. Fourteen years of experience taught me that violence was the worst thing that could happen for any strike."
Commissioner Kernan: "How about the telegrams sent by you?"
Mr. Debs: "None of them were inflammatory."
Commissioner Kernan: "How about that "save your money and buy a gun"
telegram?"
Mr. Debs: "I can explain that telegram very easily. Among those who were employed at headquarters to take charge of our correspondence and telegraphing was a young man named Benedict. He had authority to sign my name to telegrams in answer to questions, etc. The telegram was sent to a man whom Mr. Benedict had worked under as a telegraph operator in Montana. The allusion to the gun was a playful expression which they had been accustomed to use in joking each other, and was understood in that way by the man who received the telegram. I have his letter in explanation of the matter which I will be glad to turn over to the commissioners. I never saw many of the telegrams sent out and did not see the one you refer to. The employes, obedient to the order of the convention, began as I have said, to refuse to handle cars. The refusal usually came from the switchmen who refused to make up trains with the Pullman equipment. As they refused they were discharged--when the others would quit.
"July 1st. After five days of strike the general managers were completely defeated and their immediate resources exhausted. Up to that time there had been no signs of violence anywhere. Our men were intact and confident. Then the intervention of the courts was called into play.
"July 2d. I was served with a sweeping injunction restraining me from sending out telegrams or issuing orders having the effect of persuading the men to quit work. This injunction was issued wherever the trouble existed. The result was to reduce our influence to nothing. This was the point from which the strike was conducted by telegrams and otherwise.
Then a special grand jury was called to inquire into my conduct with the result that I was indicted with other officials of the union and warrants issued for our arrest. We were held under a joint bond of $10,000. Then followed an attachment issued for contempt of the injunction of July 2d, and our incarceration in the county jail. As soon as our men found we were under arrest they quit. The U. S. courts ended the strike, not the soldiers." Mr. Debs told of the seizure of his mail and personal effects. He said he merely cited the fact to show to what extent the U. S. authorities were willing to go to defeat the strikers. He also commented on Gen. Miles who was reported to have gone directly to the General Managers headquarters on his arrival with the U.
S. troops. He said Gen. Miles was quoted next day as having said he had broken the back bone of the strike. Mr. Debs thought Gen. Miles had mistaken his mission which was to preserve order and not to help the railroads run their trains. He said:
"I think Gen. Miles was vulgarly out of place, both when he went to the General Managers and when he made the remark credited to him." He said he thought if the General Managers were compelled to bring into court copies of their telegrams sent to the attorney general as the American Railway Union had done he could substantiate the charge that it was the object to annihilate the American Railway Union.
Mr. Worthington: "Did I understand you this morning to charge the General Managers a.s.sociation with the responsibility of the strike?"
Mr. Debs: "Not in that broad and general way. The American Railway Union ordered the strike and is responsible for it, but there were aggravating circ.u.mstances which ought to go in mitigation under any view of the situation. But the att.i.tude taken by the General Managers" a.s.sociation, their expressed determination to crush the American Railway Union, in that respect and in refusing to arbitrate they were responsible. We felt if they could combine we could and each was culpable."
Mr. Worthington: "You believe in enforcing the law, do you not, and in the proper authorities using sufficient force to do it, do you not?"
Mr. Debs: "Most certainly I do."
Mr. Worthington: "You have doubtless given considerable thought to the matter. How do you think strikes can be avoided?"
Mr. Debs: "There are two ways. First. By submitting to reduction in wages and other grievances as the old organizations have done for years.
When the general manager determines to reduce wages he proposes a cut of 20 per cent when he only intends to make a 10 per cent reduction. Then there is a conference when they finally agree on 10 per cent. This avoids strikes but it reduces wages. The second way is a unification of all, or practically all the railroad men of the country in a prudently managed organization. That would prevent strikes on railroads, for even if the railroads could unite to beat such an organization, it would be expensive."
Mr. Worthington: "Do you believe that such an organization would be so strong as to compel the adoption of all reasonable demands?"
Mr. Debs: "We did believe it, or the American Railway Union would never have been organized. We see now that it cannot because all the organized forces of society and of the government are arrayed against it. When a strike inconveniences no one, no one is particularly interested in it and it gradually dwindles down to the little end of nothing. But when a strike does inconvenience the public, as railroad strikes must of necessity do, the organized forces of society and the government, a practically impregnable force, and properly so, is arrayed against it.
Take, for instance, the Ann Arbor strike. It inconvenienced the public and immediately the roads applied to the courts, and Judge Taft issued an injunction against the men. The first of the injunctions that have been so much questioned both by lawyers and laborers."
Mr. Worthington: "Is it justifiable to incommode the public as such strikes do?"
Mr. Debs: "It depends on circ.u.mstances. I believe with Admiral Porter, that a pin is worth fighting for if a principle is involved. To resist degradation is justifiable no matter what the result. If there were no resistance, things would be, if possible, worse than they are and without resistance degradation is inevitable. If the railroads treated their men fairly there would be no labor organizations. Every organization of railroad men is traceable to oppression. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers was born of the tyranny of the Michigan Central road. I have that from the lips of Mr. Robinson, the founder of that organization. The first meetings were held in secret because the men would have been discharged if the management knew they were organizing.
Everywhere organization originated from similar causes. No legislation can reconcile railroad employers and employes while human nature is in it. Confidence has been destroyed. The men have been so treated that they have grown suspicious, and when general managers, who are themselves employes, order a reduction of wages on instructions from those above them, that it is necessary because of hard times or slack business, the men are not at all a.s.sured that such are the reasons. They may accept the reduction, but they are not satisfied. In many instances the general managers obey orders to reduce wages with regret for they are humane men, many of them. Soon after the Great Northern strike, the president of a railroad told me that I now had the opportunity to make myself a most enviable reputation, both among railroad employers and employes by advising the men themselves to propose a reduction of say 10 per cent in their wages during these dull times, thus putting the road under obligation to increase wages when business improved. I said to him, only a few months ago your road was doing a phenomenally heavy business. Did you propose an increase of even 5 per cent in your employes wages because you were making money? Every time a decrease in wages has been prevented or an increase secured, it has been the result of weeks of labor and pleading and the expenditures of thousands of dollars by the men. Every schedule ever adopted is evidence of that.
Now that the strike is practically over the usual persecutions will be indulged in against those who took part in it. Some people are felicitating themselves that the strike has been suppressed, but the safety valve has been screwed down, that"s all. The men are no more satisfied than they were. Some of them will get back their old positions; others will get work on other roads; still others will find work elsewhere, while some will be forced to remain idle for a long time. None of them are satisfied with the conditions and sooner or later strikes will break out again, I fear. You might as well try to stop Niagara with a feather as crush the spirit of organization."
Commissioner Kernan: "If it should be shown that government ownership of railroads resulted in poorer service and more expensive management, do you think it would be a good thing?"
Mr. Debs: "Government ownership of railroads is decidedly better than railroad ownership of government. The time is coming when there must be government ownership of railroads. Strikes cannot be averted otherwise."