On June 14th orders were sent to General Bragg, from Richmond, to proceed to Jackson, Mississippi, and temporarily to a.s.sume command of the department then under command of General Lovell. The order concluded as follows:
"After General Magruder joins, your further services there may be dispensed with. The necessity is urgent and absolute.
"J. DAVIS."
On application to General Beauregard for the necessary order, he replied:
"You can not possibly go. My health does not permit me to remain in charge alone here. This evening my two physicians were insisting that I should go away for one or two weeks, furnishing me with another certificate for that purpose, and I had concluded to go--intending to see you to-morrow on the subject, and leave you in command."
The certificate of the physicians was as follows:
"HEADQUARTERS, WESTERN DEPARTMENT,
"TUPELO, _June 14, 1862._
"We certify that, after attendance on General Beauregard for the past four months, and treatment of his case, in our professional opinion he is incapacitated physically for the arduous duties of his present command, and we urgently recommend rest and recreation.
"R. L. Brodie, Surgeon, P. A. C. S.
"Sam Choppin, Surgeon, P. A. C. S."
These facts were telegraphed to me at once by General Bragg. Soon after, I sent a second dispatch to him, renewing the order, and expressing my surprise that he should have hesitated to obey, when the original order stated "the necessity is urgent and absolute."
Before this second dispatch was received by General Bragg, General Beauregard had transferred the command to him, and had departed for Bladen Springs. General Bragg thus describes the subsequent proceedings:
"Prepared to move, I telegraphed back to the President that the altered conditions induced me to await his further orders. In reply to this, I was immediately notified by telegraph of my a.s.signment to the "permanent command of the army," and was directed to send General Van Dorn to execute my first instructions."
From this statement it appears--1. That General Beauregard was not, as has been alleged, harshly deprived of his command, but that he voluntarily surrendered it, after being furnished with medical certificates of his physical incapacity for its arduous duties. 2.
That he did not even notify his Government, still less ask permission to retire. 3. That the order, a.s.signing another to the command he had abandoned, could not be sent through him, when he had departed and gone to a place where there was no telegraph, and rarely a mail. 4.
That it is neither customary nor proper to send orders to the commander of an army through a general on sick-leave; and in this case it would have been very objectionable, as a similar order had just been sent and disobeyed.
Meanwhile some other events had occurred in the Western Department which should be mentioned. The movement of the forces of the enemy up the Tennessee River, as has been stated, thus flanking some of our positions on the Mississippi River, was followed by his fitting out a naval fleet to move down that river. This fleet, consisting of seven ironclads and one gun-boat, ten mortar-boats, each carrying a thirteen-inch mortar, a coal-barge, two ordnance-steamers, and two transports with troops, left Cairo on March 14th, and arrived at Hickman that evening. A small force of our cavalry left upon its approach. Columbus, as has been stated, had previously been evacuated by our forces and occupied by the enemy. In the morning the fleet continued down toward Island No. 10. This island is situated in that bend of the river which touches the border of Tennessee, a few miles further up the river than New Madrid, although nearly southeast of that point.
In the latter part of February a large force of the enemy under Major-General Pope left Commerce, Missouri, and moved south about fifty miles to New Madrid, with the object of capturing that place.
Aided by the gunboats of Commander Hollins, our small force repulsed the a.s.saults of the enemy three times, but such was the disparity of numbers that it soon became manifest that our forces could not successfully hold the position, and it was evacuated on the night of March 13th. Its defenses consisted of two earthworks, in which about twenty guns were mounted. These were spiked and rendered unfit for use.
The bombardment of Island No. 10, above described, commenced on March 15th, and was continued night and day. Up to April 1st the enemy fired several thousand thirteen-inch and rifle sh.e.l.ls. On March 17th a general attack with five gunboats and four mortar-boats was made, and continued nine hours, without any serious result. Finally, the forces of the enemy were greatly increased, and began to occupy both banks of the river, and also the river above and below the island, when a portion of our force retired, and about April 7th the remainder surrendered.
The fleet, on April 12th, proceeded next to Fort Pillow, about a hundred and eighty miles below Island No. 10, and a bombardment was commenced on the next day. This was continued without effect until the night of June 4th, when both Forts Pillow and Randolph, the latter some twelve miles below the former, were evacuated--these positions having become untenable in consequence of the withdrawal of our forces from Corinth and the adjacent portion of Tennessee.
Nothing now remained to oppose the enemy"s fleet but our gunboats at Memphis, which were, say, seventy miles farther down the river. The gallantry and efficiency displayed by our improvised river navy at New Madrid and Island No. 10 gave rise to hopes scarcely justified by the number of our vessels or their armament. Our boats had fewer guns than those of the enemy, and they were less substantially constructed, but their officers and crews took counsel of their country"s need rather than of their own strength. They manfully engaged the enemy, and disabled one of his rams, but after an hour"s conflict were compelled to retire.
The possession of Memphis being no longer disputed, its occupation by the enemy promptly followed.
At an early period of the war the Government of the United States organized some naval and military expeditions, with a view to capture our harbors, to occupy an extensive tract of country in their vicinity, and especially to obtain possession of a portion of our cotton-crop. The first movement of this kind was by a fleet of naval vessels and transports which appeared off Hatteras Inlet on August 27, 1861. This inlet is a gap in the sandy barrier that lines the coast of North Carolina about eighteen miles southwest of Cape Hatteras. It was the princ.i.p.al entrance to Pamlico Sound, a large body of water lying between the sandy beach and the mainland. The channel of the entrance had about seven feet of water, and was protected by two small forts constructed on the sand. Our forces were under the command of Captain Samuel Barron, an officer of distinction, formerly in the United States Navy. After a short bombardment, which developed the strength of the enemy and his own comparative weakness, he capitulated.
A much larger fleet of naval vessels and transports, carrying fifteen thousand men, appeared off the harbor of Port Royal, South Carolina, on November 4, 1861. This harbor is situated midway between the cities of Charleston and Savannah. It is a broad estuary, into which flow some two or three streams, the interlacing of which with creeks forms a group of numerous islands. The parish, of which these are the greater part, const.i.tuted the richest agricultural district in the State; its staples being sea-island cotton and rice. The princ.i.p.al defenses were Fort Walker, a strong earthwork on Hilton Head, and Fort Beauregard on Philip"s Island. The attack was made by the enemy on the 7th, by a fleet consisting of eight steamers and a sloop-of-war in tow. Some of the steamers were of the first cla.s.s, as the Wabash and the Susquehanna. The conflict continued for four hours, when the forts, because untenable, were abandoned.
In the early part of 1862 several reconnaissances were sent out from Port Royal, and subsequently an expedition visited Darien and Brunswick in Georgia, and Fernandina, Jacksonville, and St. Augustine in Florida. Its design was to take and keep under control this line of seacoast, especially in Georgia. Some small steamers and other vessels were captured, and some ports were occupied.
The system of coast defenses which was adopted and the preparations which had been at that time made by the Government to resist these aggressions of the enemy should be stated. By reference to the topography of our coast, it will be seen that, in the State of North Carolina, are Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds, penetrating far into the interior; then the Cape Fear River, connecting with the ocean by two channels, the southwest channel being defended by a small inclosed fort and a water-battery. On the coast of South Carolina are Georgetown and Charleston Harbors. A succession of islands extends along the coast of South Carolina and Georgia, separated from the mainland by a channel which is navigable for vessels of moderate draft from Charleston to Fernandina, Florida. There are fewer a.s.sailable points on the Gulf than on the Atlantic. Pensacola, Mobile, and the mouth of the Mississippi were defended by works that had hitherto been regarded as sufficiently strong to repulse any naval attack that might be made upon them. Immediately after the bombardment of Fort Sumter, the work of improving the seacoast defense was begun and carried forward as rapidly as the limited means of the Government would permit.
The work that was now done has been so summarily and satisfactorily described by General A. L. Long, chief of artillery, in a paper contributed to the Southern Historical Society, that I avail myself of a few extracts:[18]
"Roanoke Island and other points on Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds were fortified. Batteries were established on the southeast entrance of Cape Fear River, and the works on the southwest entrance strengthened. Defenses were constructed at Georgetown, and at all a.s.sailable points on the northeast coast of South Carolina. The works of Charleston Harbor were greatly strengthened by earthworks and floating batteries. The defenses from Charleston down the coast of South Carolina and Georgia were confined chiefly to the islands and salient points bearing upon the channels leading inland. Defensive works were erected at all important points along the coast. Many of the defenses, being injudiciously located and hastily erected, offered but little resistance to the enemy when attacked. These defeats were not surprising, when we take into consideration the inexperience of the engineers, and the long line of seacoast to be defended. As soon as a sufficient naval force had been collected, an expedition under the command of General E. F. Butler was sent to the coast of North Carolina, and captured several important points. A second expedition, under Admiral Dupont and General Thomas W.
Sherman, was sent to make a descent on the coast of South Carolina.
On the 7th of November Dupont attacked the batteries that were designed to defend Port Royal harbor, as stated above, and almost without resistance carried them and gained possession of Port Royal.
This is the best harbor in South Carolina, and is the strategic key to all the South Atlantic coast. Later, Burnside captured Roanoke Island, and established himself in eastern North Carolina without resistance. The rapid fall of Roanoke Island and Port Royal Harbor struck consternation into the hearts of the inhabitants along the entire coast. The capture of Port Royal gave to the Federals the entire possession of Beaufort Island, which afforded a secure place of rest for the army, while the harbor gave a safe anchorage for the fleet. Beaufort Island almost fills a deep indenture in the main sh.o.r.e, being separated the greater part of its extent by a narrow channel, which is navigable its entire circuit. Its northern extremity extends to within a few miles of the Charleston and Savannah Railroad. The main road from Port Royal to Pocotaligo crosses the channel at this point. The evacuation of Hilton Head, on the southwestern extremity of Beaufort Island, followed the capture of Port Royal. This exposed Savannah, only about twenty-five miles distant, to an attack from that direction. At the same time, the Federals having command of Helena Bay, Charleston was liable to be a.s.sailed from North Edisto or Stono Inlet, and the railroad could have been reached without opposition by the route from Port Royal to Pocotaligo.
"Such was the state of affairs when General Lee reached Charleston, about December 1, 1861, to a.s.sume the command of the Department of North Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. His vigorous mind at once comprehended the situation, and, with his accustomed energy, he met the difficulties that presented themselves. Directing fortifications to be constructed on the Stono and the Edisto and the Combahee, he fixed his headquarters at Coosawhatchee, the point most threatened, and directed defenses to be erected opposite Hilton Head, and on the Broad and Salkehatchie, to cover Savannah. These were the points requiring immediate attention. He superintended in person the works overlooking the approach to the railroad from Port Royal, and soon infused into his troops a part of his own energy. The works he had planned rose with magical rapidity. A few days after his arrival at Coosawhatchee, Dupont and Sherman sent their first reconnaissance in that direction, which was met and repulsed by shots from the newly erected batteries; and now, whether the Federals advanced toward the railroad or turned in the direction of Charleston or Savannah, they were arrested by our batteries. The people, seeing the Federals repulsed at every point, regained their confidence, and with it their energy.
"The most important points being now secured against immediate attack, the General proceeded to organize a system of seacoast defense different from that which had been previously adopted. He withdrew the troops and material from those works which had been established on the islands and salient points which he could not defend to a strong interior line, where the effect of the Federal naval force would be neutralized. After a careful reconnaissance of the coast, he designated such points as he considered it necessary to fortify. The most important positions on this extensive line were Georgetown, Charleston, Pocotaligo, Coosawhatchee, and Savannah.
Coosawhatchee, being central, could communicate with either Charleston or Savannah in two or three hours by railroad, and in case of an attack they could support each other. The positions between Coosawhatchee and Savannah, and those between the former and Charleston, could be reenforced from the positions contiguous to them; there was thus a defensive relation throughout the entire line, extending from Winyaw Bay to the mouth of St. Mary"s River, in Georgia, a distance of about two hundred miles. These detached and supporting works covered a most important agricultural country, and sufficed to defend it from the smaller expeditions made against that region.
"About March 1st the gunboats of the enemy entered the Savannah River by way of the channel leading from Hilton Head. Our naval force was too weak to dispute the possession with them, and they thus cut off the communication of Fort Pulaski with the city. Soon after, the enemy landed a force, under General Gillmore, on the opposite side of the fort. By April 1st they had powerful batteries in position, and on that day opened fire on the fort. Having no hope of succor, Fort Pulaski, after striking a blow for honor, surrendered with about five hundred men." [19]
[Footnote 18: "Seacoast Defenses of the Carolinas and Georgia."]
[Footnote 19: General A. L. Long, in Historical Society Papers.]
CHAPTER XX.
Advance of General McClellan toward Centreville; his Report.--Our Forces ordered to the Peninsula.--Situation at Yorktown.--Siege by General McCellan.--General Johnston a.s.signed to Command; his Recommendation.--Attack on General Magruder at Yorktown.--Movements of McClellan.--The Virginia.--General Johnston retires.--Delay at Norfolk.--Before Williamsburg.--Remark of Hanc.o.c.k.--Retreat up the Peninsula.--Sub-terra Sh.e.l.ls used.-Evacuation of Norfolk.--Its Occupation by the Enemy.
In a previous chapter the retreat of our army from Centreville has been described, and reference has been made to the antic.i.p.ation of the commanding general, J. E. Johnston, that the enemy would soon advance to attack that position. Since the close of the war we have gained information not at that time to us attainable, which shows that, as early as the 31st of January, 1862, the commanding General of the enemy"s forces presented to his President an argument against that line of operations, setting forth the advantages of a movement by water-transports down the Chesapeake into the Rappahannock; and that in the following February, by the direction of President Lincoln, General McClellan held a council with twelve of the generals of that army, who decided in favor of the movement by way of Annapolis, and thence to the Rappahannock, to which their President gave his a.s.sent. When General McClellan, then in the city of Washington, heard that our army had retired, he ordered a general movement of his troops toward the position we had lately occupied. A detachment was sent to make reconnaissance as far as the line of the Rappahannock, by which it was ascertained that our troops had pa.s.sed beyond that river. His account of this movement was given in the following report:
"FAIRFAX COURT-HOUSE, _March 11, 1862,_ 8.30 P.M.
"I have just returned from a ride of more than forty miles. Have examined Centreville, Union Mills, Blackburn"s Ford, etc. The rebels have left all their positions, and, from the information obtained during our ride to-day, I am satisfied that they have fallen behind the Rapidan, holding Fredericksburg and Gordonsville. Their movement from here was very sudden. They left many wagons, some caissons, clothing, ammunition, personal baggage, etc. Their winter-quarters were admirably constructed, many not yet quite finished. The works at Centreville are formidable; more so than at Mana.s.sas. Except the turnpike, the roads are horrible. The country entirely stripped of forage and provisions. Having fully consulted with General McDowell, I propose occupying Mana.s.sas with a portion of Banks"s command, and then at once throwing all forces I can concentrate upon the line agreed upon last week. The Monitor justifies this course. I telegraphed this morning to have the transports brought to Washington, to start from there. I presume you will approve this course. Circ.u.mstances may keep me out here some little time longer.[20]
"G. B. MCCLELLAN, _Major-General_.
"Hon. E. M. STANTON, _Secretary of War_."
The reference to the Monitor is to be explained by the condition previously made in connection with the proposition of going to Fortress Monroe, that the Merrimac, our Virginia, should first be neutralized. The order to bring the "transports" to Washington was due to the fact that they had not dared to run by our batteries on the Potomac, and intended to avoid them by going to Annapolis for embarkation. The withdrawal of our batteries from the banks of the Potomac had removed the objection to going down that river, and the withdrawal of our forces across the Rappahannock was fatal to the programme of landing on that river, and marching to Richmond before our forces could be in position to resist an attack on the capital.
Notwithstanding the a.s.surance given that the destruction of railroads and bridges proved that our army could not intend to advance, apprehension was still entertained of an attack upon Washington.
As soon as we ascertained that the enemy was concentrating his forces at Fortress Monroe, to advance upon our capital by that line of approach, all our disposable force was ordered to the Peninsula, between the James and York Rivers, to the support of General John B.
Magruder, who, with a force of seven to eight thousand men, had, by availing himself of the Warwick River, a small stream which runs through a low, marshy country, from near Yorktown to the James River, constructed an intrenched line across the Peninsula, and with equal skill and intrepidity had thus far successfully checked every attempt to break it, though the enemy was vastly superior in numbers to the troops under General Magruder"s command. Having a force entirely inadequate to occupy and defend the whole line, over thirteen miles long, he built dams in the Warwick River, so as to form pools, across which the enemy, without bridges, could not pa.s.s, and posted detachments at each dam to prevent the use of them by attacking columns of the enemy. To defend the left of his line, where the stream became too small to present a serious obstacle to the pa.s.sage of troops, redoubts were constructed, with curtains connecting them.
Between Yorktown and Gloucester Point, on the opposite sh.o.r.e, the York River is contracted to less than a mile in width, and General Magruder had constructed batteries at both places, which, by their cross fire, presented a formidable obstacle to the accent of ordinary vessels. The fortifications at Norfolk and the navy-yard, together with batteries at Sewell"s Point and Craney Island, in conjunction with the navy, offered means of defense against any attempt to land troops on the south side of James River. After the first trial of strength with our Virginia, there had been an evident disinclination on the part of the enemy"s vessels to encounter her, so that, as long as she floated, the deep water of the roads and mouth of James River.
was not likely to be invaded by ships of war.
As a second line of defense, a system of detached works had been constructed by General Magruder near to Williamsburg, where the width of the Peninsula, available for the pa.s.sage of troops, was only three or four miles. The advantage thus secured to his forces, if they should be compelled to retreat, will be readily appreciated. I am not aware that torpedoes had been placed in York River to prevent the entrance of the enemy"s vessels; indeed, at that time, but little progress had been made in the development of that means of harbor and river defense. General Rains, as will be seen hereafter, had matured his invention of sensitive fuse-primers for sub-terra sh.e.l.ls, and proposed their use for floating torpedoes. Subsequently he did much to advance knowledge in regard to making torpedoes efficient against the enemy"s vessels.