Our force there consisted of the divisions of Major-Generals D. H.
Hill, Huger, and Longstreet, the latter in chief command. In his report, first published in the "Southern Historical Society Papers,"
vol. iii, pp. 277, 278, he writes:
"Agreeably to verbal instructions from the commanding General, the division of Major-General D. H. Hill was, on the morning of the 31st ultimo, formed at an early hour on the Williamsburg road, as the column of attack upon the enemy"s front on that road... . The division of Major-General Huger was intended to make a strong flank movement around the left of the enemy"s position, and attack him in rear of that flank... . After waiting some six hours for these troops to get into position, I determined to move forward without regard to them, and gave orders to that effect to Major-General D. H.
Hill. The forward movement began about two o"clock, and our skirmishers soon became engaged with those of the enemy. The entire division of General Hill became engaged about three o"clock, and drove the enemy steadily back, gaining possession of his abatis and part of his intrenched camp, General Rodes, by a movement to the right, driving in the enemy"s left. The only reenforcements on the field in hand were my own brigades, of which Anderson"s, Wilc.o.x"s, and Kemper"s were put in by the front on the Williamsburg road, and Colston"s and Pryor"s by my right flank. At the same time the decided and gallant attack made by the other brigades gained entire possession of the enemy"s position, with his artillery, camp-equipage, etc. Anderson"s brigade, under Colonel Jenkins, pressing forward rapidly, continued to drive the enemy till nightfall... . The conduct of the attack was left entirely to Major-General Hill. The entire success of the affair is sufficient evidence of his ability, courage, and skill."
This tribute to General Hill was no more than has been accorded to him by others who knew of his services on that day, and was in keeping with the determined courage, vigilance, and daring exhibited by him on other fields.
The reference, made, without qualification, in General Longstreet"s report, to the failure of General Huger to make the attack expected of him, and the freedom with which others have criticised him, renders it proper that some explanation should be given of an apparent dilatoriness on the part of that veteran soldier, who, after long and faithful service, now fills an honored grave.
It will be remembered that General Huger was to move by the Charles City road, so as to turn the left of the enemy and attack him in flank. The extraordinary rain of the previous night had swollen every rivulet to the dimensions of a stream, and the route prescribed to General Huger was one especially affected by that heavy rain, as it led to the head of the White-Oak Swamp. The bridge over the stream flowing into that swamp had been carried away, and the alternatives presented to him was to rebuild the bridge or leave his artillery. He chose the former, which involved the delay that has subjected him to criticism. If any should think an excuse necessary to justify this decision, they are remanded to the accepted military maxim, that the march must never be so hurried as to arrive unfit for service; and, also, they may be reminded that Huger"s specialty was artillery, he being the officer who commanded the siege-guns with which General Scott marched from Vera Cruz to the city of Mexico. To show that the obstacles encountered were not of such slight character as energy would readily overcome, I refer to the report of an officer commanding a brigade on that occasion, Brigadier-General R. E. Rodes, whose great merit and dashing gallantry caused him to be admired throughout the army of the Confederacy. He said:
"On the morning of the 31st the brigade was stationed on the Charles City road, three and a half miles from the point on the Williamsburg road from which it had been determined to start the columns of attack... . I received a verbal order from General Hill to conduct my command at once to the point at which the attack was to be made.
... The progress of the brigade was considerably delayed by the washing away of a bridge near the head of White-Oak Swamp, by reason of which the men had to wade in water waist-deep, and a large number were entirely submerged. At this point the character of the crossing was such that it was absolutely necessary to proceed with great caution to prevent the loss of both ammunition and life. In consequence of this delay, and notwithstanding that the men were carried at double-quick time over very heavy ground for a considerable distance to make up for it, when the signal for attack was given, only my line of skirmishers, the Sixth Alabama and the Twelfth Mississippi Regiments, was in position... . The ground over which we were to move being covered with thick undergrowth, and the soil being marshy--so marshy that it was with great difficulty that either horses or men could get over it--and being guided only by the fire in front, I emerged from the woods from the Williamsburg road under a heavy fire of both artillery and musketry, with only five companies of the Fifth Alabama."
General Huger"s line of march was farther to the right, therefore nearer to White-Oak Swamp, and the impediments consequently greater than where General Rodes found the route so difficult as to be dangerous even to infantry.
On the next day, the 1st of June, General Longstreet states that a serious attack was made on our position, and that it was repulsed.
This refers to the works which Hill"s division had captured the day before, and which the enemy endeavored to retake.
From the final report of General Longstreet, already cited, it appears that he was ordered to attack on the morning of the 31st, and he explains why it was postponed for six hours; then he states that it was commenced by the division of General D. H. Hill, which drove the enemy steadily back, pressing forward until nightfall. The movement of Rodes"s brigade on the right flank is credited with having contributed much to the dislodgment of the enemy from their abatis and first intrenchments. As just stated. General Longstreet reports a delay of some six hours in making this attack, because he was waiting for General Huger, and then made it successfully with Hill"s division and some brigades from his own. These questions must naturally arise in the mind of the reader: Why did not our troops on the left, during this long delay, as well as during the period occupied by Hill"s a.s.sault, cooperate in the attack? and Why, the battle having been preconceived, were they so far removed as not to hear the first guns? The officers of the Federal army, when called before a committee appointed by their Congress to inquiry into the conduct of the war, have by their testimony made it quite plain that the divided condition of their troops and the length of time required for their concentration after the battle commenced, rendered it practicable for our forces, if united--as, taking the initiative, they well might have been--to have crushed or put to flight first Keyes"s and then Heintzelman"s corps before Sumner crossed the Chickahominy, between five and six o"clock in the evening.
By the official reports our aggregate loss was, "killed, wounded, and missing," 6,084, of which 4,851 were in Longstreet"s command on the right, and 1,233 in Smith"s command on the left.
The enemy reported his aggregate loss at 5,739. It may have been less than ours, for we stormed his successive defenses.
Our success upon the right was proved by our possession of the enemy"s works, as well as by the capture of ten pieces of artillery, four flags, a large amount of camp-equipage, and more than one thousand prisoners.
Our aggregate of both wings was about 40,500. The force of the enemy confronting us may be approximated by taking his returns for the 20th of June and adding thereto his casualties on the 31st of May and 1st of June, because between the last-named date and the 20th of June no action had occurred to create any material change in the number present. From these data, viz., the strength of Heintzelman"s corps, 18,810, and of Keyes"s corps, 14,610, on June 20th, by adding their casualties of the 31st of May and 1st of June--4,516--we deduce the strength of these two corps on the 31st of May to have been 37,936 as the aggregate present for duty.
It thus appears that, at the commencement of the action on the 31st of May, we had a numerical superiority of about 2,500. Adopting the same method to calculate the strength of Sumner"s corps, we find it to have been 18,724, which would give the enemy in round numbers a force of 16,000 in excess of ours after General Sumner crossed the Chickahominy.
Both combatants claimed the victory. I have presented the evidence in support of our claim. The withdrawal of the Confederate forces on the day after the battle from the ground on which it was fought certainly gives color to the claim of the enemy, though that was really the result of a policy much broader than the occupation of the field of Seven Pines.
On the morning of June 1st I rode out toward the position where General Smith had been left on the previous night, and where I learned from General Lee that he would remain. After turning into the Nine-mile road, and before reaching that position, I was hailed by General Whiting, who saw me at a distance, and ran toward the road to stop me. He told me I was riding into the position of the enemy, who had advanced on the withdrawal of our troops, and there, pointing, he said, "is a battery which I am surprised has not fired on yon." I asked where our troops were. He said his was the advance, and the others behind him. He also told me that General Smith was at the house which had been his (Whiting"s) headquarters, and I rode there to see him. To relieve both him and General Lee from any embarra.s.sment, I preferred to make the announcement of General Lee"s a.s.signment to command previous to his arrival.
After General Lee arrived, I took leave, and, being subsequently joined by him, we rode together to the Williamsburg road, where we found General Longstreet, his command being in front, and then engaged with the enemy on the field of the previous day"s combat. The operations of that day were neither extensive nor important, save in the collection of the arms acquired in the previous day"s battle.
General R. E. Lee was now in immediate command, and thenceforward directed the movements of the army in front of Richmond. Laborious and exact in details, as he was vigilant and comprehensive in grand strategy, a power, with which the public had not credited him, soon became manifest in all that makes an army a rapid, accurate, compact machine, with responsive motion in all its parts. I extract the following sentence from a letter from the late Colonel R. H. Chilton, adjutant and inspector-general of the army of the Confederacy, because of his special knowledge of the subject:
"I consider General Lee"s exhibition of grand administrative talents and indomitable energy, in bringing up that army in so short a time to that state of discipline which maintained aggregation through those terrible seven days" fights around Richmond, as probably his grandest achievement."
[Footnote 41: For recital and correspondence of 1874, see "Advance and Retreat," by J. B. Hood, Lieutenant-General in the Confederate Army, pp. 153-156.]
CHAPTER XXIII.
The Enemy"s Position.--His Intention.--The Plan of Operations.-- Movements of General Jackson.--Daring and Fort.i.tude of Lee.-- Offensive-Defensive Policy.--General Stuart"s Movement.--Order of Attack.--Critical Position of McClellan.--Order of Mr. Lincoln creating the Army of Virginia.--Arrival of Jackson.--Position of the Enemy.--Diversion of General Longstreet.--The Enemy forced back south of the Chickahominy.--Abandonment of the Railroad.
When riding from the field of battle with General Robert E. Lee on the previous day, I informed him that he would be a.s.signed to the command of the army, _vice_ General Johnston, wounded, and that he could make his preparations as soon as he reached his quarters, as I should send the order to him as soon as arrived at mine. On the next morning, as above stated, he proceeded to the field and took command of the troops. During the night our forces on the left had fallen back from their position at the close of the previous day"s battle, but those on the right remained in the one they had gained, and some combats occurred there between the opposing forces. The enemy proceeded further to fortify his position on the Chickahominy, covering his communication with his base of supplies on York River.
His left was on the south side of the Chickahominy, between White-Oak Swamp and New Bridge, and was covered by a strong intrenchment, with heavy guns, and with abatis in front. His right wing was north of the Chickahominy, extending to Mechanicsville, and the approaches defended by strong works.
Our army was in line in front of Richmond, but without intrenchments.
General Lee immediately commenced the construction of an earthwork for a battery on our left flank, and a line of intrenchment to the right, necessarily feeble because of our deficiency in tools. It seemed to be the intention of the enemy to a.s.sail Richmond by regular approaches, which our numerical inferiority and want of engineer troops, as well as the deficiency of proper utensils, made it improbable that we should be able to resist. The day after General Lee a.s.sumed command, I was riding out to the army, when I saw at a house on my left a number of horses, and among them one I recognized as belonging to him. I dismounted and entered the house, where I found him in consultation with a number of his general officers. The tone of the conversation was quite despondent, and one, especially, pointed out the inevitable consequence of the enemy"s advance by throwing out _boyaux_ and constructing successive parallels. I expressed, in marked terms, my disappointment at hearing such views, and General Lee remarked that he had, before I came in, said very much the same thing. I then withdrew and rode to the front, where, after a short time, General Lee joined me, and entered into conversation as to what, under the circ.u.mstances, I thought it most advisable to do. I then said to him, substantially, that I knew of nothing better than the plan he had previously explained to me, which was to have been executed by General Johnston, but which was not carried out; that the change of circ.u.mstances would make one modification necessary--that, instead, as then proposed, of bringing General A. P. Hill, with his division, on the rear flank of the enemy, it would, because of the preparation for defense made in the mean time, now be necessary to bring the stronger force of General T.
J. Jackson from the Valley of the Shenandoah. So far as we were then informed, General Jackson was hotly engaged with a force superior to his own, and, before he could be withdrawn, it was necessary that the enemy should be driven out of the Valley. For this purpose, as well as to mask the design of bringing Jackson"s forces to make a junction with those of Lee, a strong division under General Whiting was detached to go by rail to the Valley to join General Jackson, and, by a vigorous a.s.sault, to drive the enemy across the Potomac. As soon as he commenced a retreat which unmistakably showed that his flight would not stop within the limits of Virginia, General Jackson was instructed, with his whole force, to move rapidly on the right flank of the enemy north of the Chickahominy. The manner in which the division was detached to reenforce General Jackson was so open that it was not doubted General McClellan would soon be apprised of it, and would probably attribute it to any other than the real motive, and would confirm him in his exaggerated estimate of our strength.
By the rapidity of movement and skill with which General Jackson handled his troops, he, after several severe engagements, finally routed the enemy before the reenforcement of Whiting arrived; and he then, on the 17th of June, proceeded, with that celerity which gave to his infantry its wonderful fame and efficiency, to execute the orders which General Lee had sent to him.
As evidence of the daring and unfaltering fort.i.tude of General Lee, I will here recite an impressive conversation which occurred between us in regard to this movement. His plan was to throw forward his left across the Meadow Bridge, drive back the enemy"s right flank, and then, crossing by the Mechanicsville Bridge with another column, to attack in front, hoping by his combined forces to be victorious on the north side of the Chickahominy; while the small force on the intrenched line south of the Chickahominy should hold the left of the enemy in check. I pointed out to him that our force and intrenched line between that left flank and Richmond was too weak for a protracted resistance, and, if McClellan was the man I took him for when I nominated him for promotion in a new regiment of cavalry, and subsequently selected him for one of the military commission sent to Europe during the War of the Crimea, as soon as he found that the bulk of our army was on the north side of the Chickahominy, he would not stop to try conclusions with it there, but would immediately move upon his objective point, the city of Richmond. If, on the other hand, he should behave like an engineer officer, and deem it his first duty to protect his line of communication, I thought the plan proposed was not only the best, but would be a success. Something of his old _esprit de corps_ manifested itself in General Lee"s first response, that he did not know engineer officers were more likely than others to make such mistakes, but, immediately pa.s.sing to the main subject, he added, "If you will hold him as long as you can at the intrenchment, and then fall back on the detached works around the city, I will be upon the enemy"s heels before he gets there."
Thus was inaugurated the offensive-defensive campaign which resulted so gloriously to our arms, and turned from the capital of the Confederacy a danger so momentous that, looking at it retrospectively, it is not seen how a policy less daring or less firmly pursued could have saved the capital from capture.
To resume the connected thread of our narrative. Preparatory to this campaign, a light intrenchment for infantry cover, with some works for field-guns, was constructed on the south side of the Chickahominy, and General Whiting, with two brigades, as before stated, was sent to reenforce General Jackson in the Valley, so as to hasten the expulsion of the enemy, after which Jackson was to move rapidly from the Valley so as to arrive in the vicinity of Ashland by the 24th of June, and, by striking the enemy on his right flank, to aid in the proposed attack.
The better to insure the success of this movement, General Lawton, who was coming with a brigade from Georgia to join General Lee, was directed to change his line of march and unite with General Jackson in the Valley.
As General Whiting went by railroad, it was expected that the enemy would be cognizant of the fact, but not, probably, a.s.sign to it the real motive; and that such was the case is shown by an unsuccessful attack of the 26th, made on the Williamsburg road, with the apparent intention of advancing by that route to Richmond.
To observe the enemy, as well as to prevent him from learning of the approach of General Jackson, General J. E. B. Stuart was sent with a cavalry force on June 8th to cover the route by which the former was to march, and to ascertain whether the enemy had any defensive works or troops in position to interfere with the advance of those forces.
He reported favorably on both these points, as well as to the natural features of the country. On the 26th of June General Stuart received confidential instructions from General Lee, the execution of which is so interwoven with the seven days" battles as to be more appropriately noticed in connection with them, of which it is proposed now to give a brief account.
Our order of battle directed General Jackson to march from Ashland on the 25th toward Slash Church, encamping for the night west of the Central Railroad; to advance at 3 A.M. on the 26th, and to turn Beaver-Dam Creek. General A. P. Hill was to cross the Chickahominy at Meadow Bridge when Jackson advanced beyond that point, and to move directly upon Mechanicsville. As soon as the bridge there should be uncovered, Longstreet and D. H. Hill were to cross, the former to proceed to the support of A. P. Hill and the latter to that of Jackson.
The four commands were directed to sweep down the north side of the Chickahominy toward the York River Railroad--Jackson on the left and in advance; Longstreet nearest the river and in the rear. Huger, McLaws, and Magruder, remaining on the south side of the Chickahominy, were ordered to hold their positions as long as possible against any a.s.sault of the enemy; to observe his movements, and to follow him closely if he should retreat. General Stuart, with the cavalry, was thrown out on Jackson"s left to guard his flank and give notice of the enemy"s movements. Brigadier-General Pendleton was directed to employ the reserve artillery so as to resist any advance toward Richmond, to superintend that portion of it posted to aid in the operations on the north bank, and hold the remainder for use where needed. The whole of Jackson"s command did not arrive in time to reach the point designated on the 25th. He had, therefore, more distance to move on the 26th, and he was r.e.t.a.r.ded by the enemy.
Not until 3 P.M. did A. P. Hill begin to move. Then he crossed the river and advanced upon Mechanicsville. After a sharp conflict he drove the enemy from his intrenchments, and forced him to take refuge in his works, on the left bank of Beaver Dam, about a mile distant.
This position was naturally strong, the banks of the creek in front being high and almost perpendicular, and the approach to it was over open fields commanded by the fire of artillery and infantry under cover on the opposite side. The difficulty of crossing the stream had been increased by felling the fringe of woods on its banks and destroying the bridges. Jackson was expected to pa.s.s Beaver Dam above, and turn the enemy"s right, so General Hill made no direct attack. Longstreet and D. H. Hill crossed the Mechanicsville Bridge as soon as it was uncovered and could be repaired, but it was late before they reached the north bank of the Chickahominy. An effort was made by two brigades, one of A. P. Hill and the other Ripley"s of D.
H. Hill, to turn the enemy"s left, but the troops were unable in the growing darkness to overcome the obstructions, and were withdrawn.
The engagement ceased about 9 P.M. Our troops retained the ground from which the foe had been driven.
According to the published reports, General McClellan"s position was regarded at this time as extremely critical. If he concentrated on the left bank of the Chickahominy, he abandoned the attempt to capture Richmond, and risked a retreat upon the White House and Yorktown, where he had no reserves, or reason to expect further support. If he moved to the right bank of the river, he risked the loss of his communications with the White House, whence his supplies were drawn by railroad. He would then have to attempt the capture of Richmond by a.s.sault, or be forced to open new communications by the James River, and move at once in that direction. There he would receive the support of the enemy"s navy. This latter movement had, it appears, been thought of previously, and transports had been sent to the James River. During the night, after the close of the contest last mentioned, the whole of Porter"s baggage was sent over to the right bank of the river, and united with the train that set out on the evening of the 27th for the James River.
It would almost seem as if the Government of the United States antic.i.p.ated, at this period, the failure of McClellan"s expedition.
On June 27th President Lincoln issued an order creating the "Army of Virginia," to consist of the forces of Fremont, in their Mountain Department; of Banks, in their Shenandoah Department; and of McDowell, at Fredericksburg. The command of this army was a.s.signed to Major-General John Pope. This cut off all reenforcements from McDowell to McClellan.
In expectation of Jackson"s arrival on the enemy"s right, the battle was renewed at dawn, and continued with animation about two hours, during which the pa.s.sage of the creek was attempted, and our troops forced their way to its banks, where their progress was arrested by the nature of the stream and the resistance encountered. They maintained their position while preparations were being made to cross at another point nearer the Chickahominy. Before these were completed, Jackson crossed Beaver Dam above, and the enemy abandoned his intrenchments, and retired rapidly down the river, destroying a great deal of property, but leaving much in his deserted camps.
After repairing the bridges over Beaver Dam, the several columns resumed their advance, as nearly as possible, as prescribed in the order. Jackson, with whom D. H. Hill had united, bore to the left, in order to cut off reenforcements to the enemy or intercept his retreat in that direction. Longstreet and A. P. Hill moved nearer the Chickahominy. Many prisoners were taken in their progress; and the conflagration of wagons and stores marked the course of the retreating army. Longstreet and Hill reached the vicinity of New Bridge about noon. It was ascertained that the enemy had taken a position behind Powhite Creek, prepared to dispute our progress. He occupied a range of hills, with his right resting in the vicinity of McGhee"s house, and his left near that of Dr. Gaines, on a wooded bluff, which rose abruptly from a deep ravine. The ravine was filled with sharpshooters, to whom its banks gave protection. A second line of infantry was stationed on the side of the hill, overlooking the first, and protected by a breastwork of logs. A third occupied the crest, strengthened with rifle-trenches, and crowned with artillery.
The approach to this position was over an open plain, about a quarter of a mile wide, commanded by a triple line of fire, and swept by the heavy batteries south of the Chickahominy. In front of his center and right the ground was generally open, bounded on the side of our approach by a wood, with dense and tangled undergrowth, and traversed by a sluggish stream, which converted the soil into a deep mora.s.s.
The woods on the further side of the swamp were occupied by sharpshooters, and trees had been felled to increase the difficulty of its pa.s.sage, and detain our advancing columns under the fire of infantry ma.s.sed on the slopes of the opposite hills, and of the batteries on their crests.
Pressing on toward the York River Railroad, A. P. Hill, who was in advance, reached the vicinity of New Cold Harbor about 2 P.M., where he encountered the foe. He immediately formed his line nearly parallel to the road leading from that place toward McGhee"s house, and soon became hotly engaged. The arrival of Jackson on our left was momentarily expected, and it was supposed that his approach would cause the extension of the opposing line in that direction. Under this impression, Longstreet was held back until this movement should commence. The princ.i.p.al part of the enemy"s army was now on the north side of the Chickahominy. Hill"s single division met this large force with the impetuous courage for which that officer and his troops were distinguished. They drove it back, and a.s.sailed it in its strong position on the ridge. The battle raged fiercely, and with varying fortune, more than two hours. Three regiments pierced the enemy"s line, and forced their way to the crest of the hill on his left, but were compelled to fall back before overwhelming numbers. This superior force, a.s.sisted by the fire of the batteries south of the Chickahominy, which played incessantly on our columns as they pressed through the difficulties that obstructed their way, caused them to recoil. Though most of the men had never been under fire until the day before, they were rallied, and in turn repelled the advance of our a.s.sailant Some brigades were broken, others stubbornly maintained their positions, but it became apparent that the enemy was gradually gaining ground. The attack on our left being delayed by the length of Jackson"s march and the obstacles he encountered, Longstreet was ordered to make a diversion in Hill"s favor by a feint on the enemy"s left. In making this demonstration, the great strength of the position already described was discovered, and General Longstreet perceived that, to render the diversion effectual, the feint must be converted into an attack. He resolved, with his characteristic determination, to carry the heights by a.s.sault. His column was quickly formed near the open ground, and, as his preparations were completed, Jackson arrived, and his right division--that of Whiting--took position on the left of Longstreet. At the same time, D. H. Hill formed on our extreme left, and, after a short but b.l.o.o.d.y conflict, forced his way through the mora.s.s and obstructions, and drove the foe from the woods on the opposite side. Ewell advanced on Hill"s right, and became hotly engaged. The first and fourth brigades of Jackson"s own division filled the interval between Ewell and A. P.
Hill. The second and third were sent to the right. The arrival of these fresh troops enabled A. P. Hill to withdraw some of his brigades, wearied and reduced by their long and arduous conflict. The lines being now complete, a general advance from right to left was ordered. On the right, the troops moved forward with steadiness, unchecked by the terrible fire from the triple lines of infantry on the hill, and the cannon on both sides of the river, which burst upon them as they emerged upon the plain. The dead and wounded marked the line of their intrepid advance, the brave Texans leading, closely followed by their no less daring comrades. The enemy were driven from the ravine to the first line of breastworks, over which our impetuous column dashed up to the intrenchments on the crest. These were quickly stormed, fourteen pieces of artillery captured, and the foe driven into the field beyond. Fresh troops came to his support, and he endeavored repeatedly to rally, but in vain. He was forced back with great slaughter until he reached the woods on the banks of the Chickahominy, and night put an end to the pursuit. Long lines of dead and wounded marked each stand made by the enemy in his stubborn resistance, and the field over which he retreated was strewed with the slain. On the left, the attack was no less vigorous and successful. D. H. Hill charged across the open ground in front, one of his regiments having first bravely carried a battery whose fire enfiladed his advance. Gallantly supported by the troops on his right, who pressed forward with unfaltering resolution, he reached the crest of the ridge, and, after a sanguinary struggle, broke the enemy"s line, captured several of his batteries, and drove him in confusion toward the Chickahominy, until darkness rendered further pursuit impossible. Our troops remained in undisturbed possession of the field, covered with the dead and wounded of our opponent; and his broken forces fled to the river or wandered through the woods. Owing to the nature of the country, the cavalry was unable to partic.i.p.ate in the general engagement. It, however, rendered valuable service in guarding Jackson"s flank, and took a large number of prisoners.
On the morning of the 28th it was ascertained that none of the enemy remained in our front north of the Chickahominy. As he might yet intend to give battle to preserve his communications, the Ninth Cavalry, supported by Ewell"s division, was ordered to seize the York River Railroad, and General Stuart with his main body to cooperate.