"It was in the execution of this important duty, which could not have been confided to a fitter man, that the lamented General bravely lost his life."
He was the officer whose devoted gallantry and self-sacrificing generosity were noticed in connection with the fall of Fort Henry.
This severe battle was signalized by so many feats of individual intrepidity that its roll of honor is too long for the limits of these pages.
Though some gave way in confusion, and others failed to respond when called on, the heroism of the rest shed l.u.s.ter on the field, and "the main body of the troops retired in good order." The gallant brigades of Green and c.o.c.kerell covered the rear.
The topographical features of the position at the railroad-bridge across the Big Black were such as, with the artificial strength given to it, made it quite feasible to defend it against a direct approach even of an army as much superior in numbers to that of Pemberton as was that of Grant; but the attack need not be made by a direct approach. The position could be turned by moving either above or below by fords and ferries, and thus advancing upon Vicksburg by other and equally eligible routes. From what has already been quoted, it will be understood that General Pemberton considered the occupation of Vicksburg vitally important in connection with the command of the Mississippi River, and the maintenance of communication with the country beyond it. It was therefore that he had been so reluctant to endanger his connection with that point as his base. Pressed as he was by the enemy, whose object, it had been unmistakably shown, was to get possession of Vicksburg and its defenses, the circ.u.mstances made it imperative that he should abandon a position, the holding of which would not effect his object, and that he should withdraw his forces from the field to unite them with those within the defenses of Vicksburg, and endeavor, as speedily as possible, to reorganize the depressed and discomfited troops.
One of the immediate results of the retreat from Big Black was the necessity of abandoning our defenses on the Yazoo, at Snyder"s Mills; this position and the line of Chickasaw Bayou were no longer tenable.
All stores that could be transported were ordered to be sent into Vicksburg as rapidly as possible, the rest, including heavy guns, to be destroyed. During the night of the 17th nothing of importance occurred. On the morning of the 18th the troops were disposed from right to left on the defenses. On the entire line, one hundred and two pieces of artillery of different caliber, princ.i.p.ally field-guns, were placed in position at such points as were deemed most suitable to the character of the gun. Instructions had been given from Bovina that all the cattle, sheep, and hogs, belonging to private parties, and likely to fall into the hands of the enemy, should be driven within our lines. Grant"s army appeared on the 18th.
The development of the intrenched line from our extreme right was about eight miles, the shortest defensible line of which the topography of the country admitted. It consisted of a system of detached works, redans, lunettes, and redoubts, on the prominent and commanding points, with the usual profile of raised field-works, connected in most cases by rifle pits. To hold the entire line there were about eighteen thousand five hundred infantry, but these could not all be put in the trenches, as it was necessary to keep a reserve always ready to reenforce any point heavily threatened.
The campaign against Vicksburg had commenced as early as November, 1862, and reference has been made to the various attempts to capture the position both before and after General Grant arrived and took command in person. He had now by a circuitous march reached the rear of the city, established a base on the Mississippi River a few miles below, had a fleet of gunboats in the river, and controlled the navigation of the Yazoo up to Haines"s Bluff, and was relieved from all danger in regard to supplying his army. We had lost the opportunity to cut his communications while he was making his long march over the rugged country between Bruinsburg and the vicinity of Vicksburg. Pemberton had by wise prevision endeavored to secure supplies sufficient for the duration of an ordinary siege, and, on the importance which he knew the Administration attached to the holding of Vicksburg, he relied for the cooperation of a relieving army to break any investment which might be made. Disappointed in the hope which I had entertained that the invading army would be unable to draw its supplies from Bruinsburg or Grand Gulf, and be driven back before crossing the Big Black, it now only remained to increase as far as possible the relieving army, and depend upon it to break the investment. The ability of the Federals to send reenforcements was so much greater than ours, that the necessity for prompt action was fully realized; therefore, when General Johnston on May 9th was ordered to proceed to Mississippi, he was directed to take from the Army of Tennessee three thousand good troops, and informed that he would find reenforcements from General Beauregard. On May 12th a dispatch was sent to him at Jackson, stating, "In addition to the five thousand men originally ordered from Charleston [Beauregard], about four thousand more will follow. I fear more can not be spared to you." On May 22d I sent the following dispatch to General Bragg, at Tullahoma, Tennessee:
"The vital issue of holding the Mississippi at Vicksburg is dependent on the success of General Johnston in an attack on the investing force. The intelligence from there is discouraging. Can you aid him?"
To this he replied on the 23d of May, 1863:
"Sent thirty-five hundred with the General, three batteries of artillery and two thousand cavalry since; will dispatch six thousand more immediately."
In my telegram to General Bragg, after stating the necessity, I submitted the whole question to his judgment, having full reliance in the large-hearted and comprehensive view which his self-denying nature would take of the case, and I responded to him:
"Your answer is in the spirit of patriotism heretofore manifested by you. The need is sore, but you must not forget your own necessities."
On the 1st of June General Johnston telegraphed to me that the troops at his disposal available against Grant amounted to twenty-four thousand one hundred, not including Jackson"s cavalry command and a few hundred irregular cavalry. Mr. Seddon, Secretary of War, replied to him stating the force to be thirty-two thousand. In another dispatch, of June 5th, the Secretary says his statement rested on official reports of numbers sent, regrets his inability to promise more, as we had drained our resources even to the danger of several points, and urged speedy action. "With the facilities and resources of the enemy time works against us." Again, on the 16th, Secretary Seddon says:
"If better resources do not offer, you must hazard attack."
On the 18th, while Pemberton was inspecting the intrenchments along which his command had been placed, he received by courier a communication from General Johnston, dated "May 17, 1863, camp between Livingston and Brownsville," in answer to Pemberton"s report of the result of the battles of Baker"s Creek and Big Black, and the consequent evacuation of Snyder"s Mills. General Johnston wrote:
"If Haines"s Bluff is untenable, Vicksburg is of no value and can not be held. If, therefore, you are invested in Vicksburg, you must ultimately surrender. Under such circ.u.mstances, instead of losing both troops and place, we must, if possible, save the troops. If it is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies, and march to the northeast."
Pemberton, in his report, remarks:
"This meant the fall of Port Hudson, the surrender of the Mississippi River, and the severance of the Confederacy."
He recurs to a former correspondence with myself in which he had suggested the possibility of the investment of Vicksburg by land and water, and the necessity for ample supplies to stand a siege, and says his application met my favorable consideration, and that additional ammunition was ordered. Confident in his ability, with the preparations which had been made, to stand a siege, and firmly relying on the desire of the President and of General Johnston to raise it, he "felt that every effort would be made, and believed it would be successful." He, however, summoned a council of war, composed of all his general officers, laid before them General Johnston"s communication, and desired their opinion on "the question of practicability," and on the 18th replied to General Johnston that he had placed his instructions before the general officers of the command, and that "the opinion was unanimously expressed that it was impossible to withdraw the army from this position with such morale and material as to be of further service to the Confederacy." He then announces his decision to hold Vicksburg as long as possible, and expresses the hope that he may be a.s.sisted in keeping this obstruction to the enemy"s free navigation of the Mississippi River.
He closes his letter thus:
"I still conceive it to be the most important point in the Confederacy."
While the council of war was a.s.sembled, the guns of the enemy opened on the works, and the siege proper commenced.
Making meager allowance for a reserve, it required the whole force to be constantly in the trenches, and, when they were all on duty, it did not furnish one man to the yard of the _developed line_. On the 19th two a.s.saults were made at the center and left. Both were repulsed and heavy loss inflicted; our loss was small. At the game time the mortar-fleet of Admiral Porter from the west side of the peninsula kept up a bombardment of the city.
Vicksburg is built upon hills rising successively from the river. The intrenchments were upon ridges beyond the town, only approaching the river on the right and left flanks, so that the fire of Porter"s mortar-fleet was mainly effective upon the private dwellings, and the women, the children, and other noncombatants.
The hills on which the city is built are of a tenacious calcareous clay, and caves were dug in these to shelter the women and children, many of whom resided in them during the entire siege. From these places of refuge, heroically facing the danger of sh.e.l.ls incessantly bursting over the streets, gentlewomen hourly went forth on the mission of humanity to nurse the sick, the wounded, and to soothe the dying of their defenders who were collected in numerous hospitals.
Without departing from the softer character of their s.e.x, it was often remarked that, in the discharge of the pious duties a.s.sumed, they seemed as indifferent to danger as any of the soldiers who lined the trenches.
During the 20th, 21st, and the forenoon of the 22d, a heavy fire of artillery and musketry was kept up by the besiegers, as well as by the mortar- and gun-boats in the river. On the afternoon of the 22d preparation was made for a general a.s.sault. The attacking columns were allowed to approach to within good musket-range, when every available gun was opened with grape and canister, and our infantry, "rising in the trenches, poured into their ranks volley after volley with so deadly an effect that, leaving the ground literally covered in some places with their dead and wounded, they [the enemy]
precipitately retreated." One of our redoubts had been breached by their artillery previous to the a.s.sault, and a lodgment made in the ditch at the foot of the redoubt, on which two colors were planted.
General Stevenson says in his report:
"The work was constructed in such a manner that the ditch was commanded by no part of the line, and the only means by which they could be dislodged was to retake the angle by a desperate charge, and either kill or compel the surrender of the whole party by the use of hand-grenades. A call for volunteers for this purpose was made, and promptly responded to by Lieutenant-Colonel E. W. Pettus, Twentieth Alabama Regiment, and about forty men of Waul"s Texas Legion. A more gallant feat than this charge has not ill.u.s.trated our arms during the war. The preparations were quietly and quickly made, but the enemy seemed at once to divine our intentions, and opened upon the angle a terrible fire of shot, sh.e.l.l, and musketry. Undaunted, this little band, its chivalrous commander at its head, rushed upon the work, and, in less time than it required to describe it, the flags were in our possession. Preparations were then quickly made for the use of hand-grenades, when the enemy in the ditch, being informed of our purpose, immediately surrendered.
"From this time forward, although on several occasions their demonstrations seemed to indicate other intentions, the enemy relinquished all idea of a.s.saulting us, and confined himself to the more cautious policy of a system of gradual approaches and mining."
His force was not less than sixty thousand men. Thus affairs continued until July 1st, when General Pemberton thus describes the causes which made capitulation necessary:
"It must be remembered that, for forty-seven days and nights, those heroic men had been exposed to burning suns, drenching rains, damp fogs, and heavy dews, and that during all this period they never had, by day or by night, the slightest relief. The extent of our works required every available man in the trenches, and even then they were in many places insufficiently manned. It was not in my power to relieve any portion of the line for a single hour. Confined to the narrow limits of trench, with their limbs cramped and swollen, without exercise, constantly exposed to a murderous storm of shot and sh.e.l.l... . Is it strange that the men grew weak and attenuated? ...
They had held the place against an enemy five times their number, admirably clothed and fed, and abundantly supplied with all the appliances of war. Whenever the foe attempted an a.s.sault, they drove him back discomfited, covering the ground with his killed and wounded, and already had they torn from his grasp five stands of colors as trophies of their prowess, none of which were allowed to fall again into his hands."
Under these circ.u.mstances, he says, he became satisfied that the time had arrived when it was necessary either to evacuate the city by cutting his way out or to capitulate. Inquiries were made of the division commanders respecting the ability of the troops to make the marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful sortie and force their way through the enemy; all of whom reported their several commands quite unequal to the performance of such all effort. Therefore, it was resolved to seek terms of capitulation.
These were obtained, and the city was surrendered on July 4th.
The report of General Pemberton contains this statement:
"Knowing the anxious desire of the Government to relieve Vicksburg, I felt a.s.sured that, if within the compa.s.s of its power, the siege would be raised; but, when forty-seven days and nights had pa.s.sed, with the knowledge I then possessed that no adequate relief was to be expected, I felt that I ought not longer to place in jeopardy the brave men whose lives had been intrusted to my care. Hence, after the suggestion of the alternative of cutting my way out, I determined to make terms, not because my men were starved out, not because I could not hold out yet a little longer, but because they were overpowered by numbers, worn down with fatigue, and each day saw our defenses crumbling beneath their feet... . With an unlimited supply of provisions, the garrison could, for the reasons already given, have held out much longer."
At the close of General Pemberton"s report he notices two officers, whose gallant services have been repeatedly mentioned in the foregoing pages, as follows:
"I can not close this report without brief tribute to the memory of two of the best soldiers in the Confederate service. I refer to Major-General John S. Bowen and Brigadier-General Martin E. Green.
Always faithful, zealous, and brave, they fell, as became them, in the discharge of their duty. General Green died upon the lines he had so long and so gallantly defended. General Bowen, having pa.s.sed scathless through the b.l.o.o.d.y scenes of Shiloh, Iuka, Corinth, Grand Gulf, Port Gibson, Baker"s Creek, and Vicksburg, perished by disease after the capitulation."
With an unlimited supply of provisions the garrison could not, for the reasons already given, have held out much longer. Our loss in killed, wounded, and missing, from the landing of the enemy on the east to the capitulation, was 5,632; that of the enemy, according to his own statement, was 8,875. The number of prisoners surrendered, as near as I can tell, did not exceed 28,000.
In addition to the efforts made to relieve Vicksburg by an attack on Grant"s army in the rear, instructions were sent to General Kirby Smith, commanding on the west side of the river, to employ a part of his forces in cooperation with our troops on the east side. From General Richard Taylor"s work, "Destruction and Reconstruction," I learn that--
"the Federal army withdrew from Alexandria [a town on Red River, Louisiana] on the 13th of May, and on the 23d crossed the Mississippi and proceeded to invest Port Hudson... . A communication from General Kirby Smith informed me that Major-General Walker, with a division of infantry and three batteries, four thousand strong, was on the march from Arkansas, and would reach me within the next few days; and I was directed to employ Walker"s force to relieve Vicksburg, now invested by General Grant, who had crossed the Mississippi on the 1st of May."
General Taylor states that his view was that this force might be best employed for the relief of Vicksburg by a movement to raise the siege of Port Hudson, which he regarded as feasible, while a direct movement toward Vicksburg he considered would be unavailing, because the peninsula opposite to that city was partially occupied by the enemy and commanded by the gunboats in the river; he states, however, that he was overruled, and proceeded with Walker"s division to cross the Tensas and attack two Federal camps on the bank of the Mississippi, the one ten and the other fourteen miles above Vicksburg, but that, after driving the troops over the levee, the gunboats in the river protected them from any further a.s.sault. Then, being convinced that nothing useful could be effected in that quarter, he, in conformity with his original idea, ordered General Walker to retire to Alexandria, intending to go thence to the Teche.
He says this order was countermanded and the division kept in the region between the Tensas and the Mississippi until the fall of Vicksburg. Taylor had left Mouton"s and Green"s brigades in the country west of the Teche, and thither he went in person. At Alexandria he found three regiments of Texan mounted men, about six hundred and fifty aggregate, under the command of Colonel (afterward Brigadier-General) Major, and these were ordered to Morgan"s Ferry on the Atchafalaya. Taylor then proceeded to the camps of Mouton and Green, on the lower Teche. After giving instructions preparatory to an attack on a work which the Federals had constructed at Berwick"s Bay, Taylor returned to join Colonel Major"s command on the Atchafalaya, and with it moved down the Fardoche and Grossetete to Fausse Riviere, opposite to Port Hudson. Here the noise of the bombardment then in progress could be distinctly heard, and here he learned that the Federal force left in New Orleans did not exceed one thousand men.
It was now the 10th of June. He was about one hundred miles from the Federal force at Berwick"s Bay. He furnished Colonel Major with guides, informed him that he must be at Berwick"s Bay on the morning of the 23d, as Mouton and Green would attack at dawn on that day.
Taylor then hastened to the camp of Mouton and Green. The country through which Major was to march was in possession of the enemy, therefore secrecy and celerity were alike required for success. The men carried their rations, and the wagons were sent back across the Atchafalaya. In his rapid march. Major captured seventy prisoners and burned two steamers, and the combined movements of Mouton, Green, and Major, all reached their goal at the appointed time, of which General Taylor says: "Although every precaution had been taken to exclude mistakes and insure cooperation, such complete success is not often attained in combined military movement; and I felt that sacrifices were due to fortune."
At Berwick"s Bay the Federals had constructed works to strengthen a position occupied as a depot of supplies. The effective garrison was small, the princ.i.p.al number of those present being sick and convalescents. The works mounted twelve guns, thirty-twos and twenty-fours, and a gunboat was anch.o.r.ed in the bay. Our object was to capture Berwick"s Bay, and thence proceed to the execution of the plan above indicated. For this purpose, having arrived on the Teche, a short distance above Berwick"s Bay, some small boats (skiffs) and a number of sugar-coolers were collected, in which the men were embarked. Major Hunter, of the Texas regiment, and Major Blair, of the Second Louisiana, were placed in command, and detachments were drawn from the forces. They embarked at night, and paddled down the Teche to the Atchafalaya and Grand Lake. They had about twelve miles to go, and were expected to reach the northeast end of the island, a mile from Berwick"s, before daylight, where they were to remain until they heard the guns of our force on the west side of the bay. At dawn on June 23d our guns opened on the gunboat and speedily drove it away. Fire was then directed on the earthworks, and the enemy attempted to reply, when a shout was heard in the rear, and Hunter with his party came rushing on. Resistance ceased at once. The spoils of Berwick"s were of vast importance. Twelve thirty-two- and twenty-four-pounder guns, many small arms and accouterments, great quant.i.ties of quartermaster"s and commissary"s, ordnance, and medical stores, and seventeen hundred prisoners were taken. Then, as promptly as circ.u.mstances would permit, Taylor, with three thousand men of all arms, proceeded, with the guns and munitions he had acquired, to the execution of the object of his campaign--to raise the siege of Port Hudson, by cutting Banks"s communication with New Orleans and making a demonstration which would arouse that city. "Its population of two hundred thousand was bitterly hostile to Federal rule, and the appearance of a Confederate force on the opposite bank of the river would raise such a storm as to bring Banks from Port Hudson, the garrison of which could then unite with General Joseph Johnston in the rear of General Grant."
In the first week in July, twelve guns were placed on the river below Donaldsonville. Fire was opened and one transport destroyed and several turned back. Gunboats attempted to dislodge our batteries, but were driven away by dismounted men, protected by the levee. For three days the river was closed to transports, and mounted scouts were pushed down to a point opposite Kenner, sixteen miles above New Orleans. A few hours more, and there would have been great excitement in the city. But, by the surrender of Port Hudson on July 9th, the enemy were in sufficient force, not only to arrest Taylor"s movements, but to require a withdrawal from the exposed position which this little command had a.s.sumed for the great object of relieving that place, and thus giving of its garrison, perhaps about five thousand men, as a reenforcement to break the investment of Vicksburg.
Port Hudson, which thus capitulated, was situated on a bend of the Mississippi, about twenty-two miles above Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and one hundred and forty-seven above New Orleans. The defenses in front, or on the water-side, consisted of three series of batteries situated on a bluff and extending along the river above the place. Farther up was an impa.s.sable marsh forming a natural defense, and in the rear the works were strong, consisting of several lines of intrenchments and rifle-pits, with heavy trees felled in every direction. General Banks with a large force landed on May 21, 1863, and on the 27th an a.s.sault was made on the works, and repulsed. A bombardment from the river was then kept up for several days, and on June 14th another unsuccessful a.s.sault was made. This was their last a.s.sault, but the enemy, resorting to mines and regular approaches, was slowly progressing with these when the news of the surrender of Vicksburg was received. Major-General Gardner, who was in command, then made a proposal to General Banks to capitulate, which was accepted by the latter, and the position was yielded to him on the next day. The surrender included about six thousand persons all told, fifty-one pieces of artillery, and a quant.i.ty of ordnance stores. Our loss in killed and wounded in the a.s.saults was small compared to that of the enemy, and by the fall of Vicksburg the position of Port Hudson had ceased to have much importance.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Map of Port Hudson]
More than six weeks the garrison, which had resisted a vastly superior force attacking by both land and water, had cheerfully encountered danger and fatigue without a murmur, had borne famine and had repulsed every a.s.sault, and yielded Port Hudson only when the fall of Vicksburg had deprived the position of its importance. A chivalric foe would have recognized the gallantry of the defense in the terms usually given under like circ.u.mstances; such, for instance, as were granted to Major Anderson at Fort Sumter, or, at the least, have paroled the garrison.
I had regarded it of vast importance to hold the two positions of Vicksburg and Port Hudson. Though gunboats had pa.s.sed the batteries of both, they had found it hazardous, and transport-vessels could not prudently risk it. The garrisons of both places had maintained them with extraordinary gallantry, inspired no doubt as well by consciousness of the importance of their posts as by the soldierly character common to Confederate troops. Taylor on the 10th received intelligence of the fall of Port Hudson, and some hours later learned that Vicksburg had surrendered. His batteries and outposts were ordered in to the Lafourche, and Mouton was sent to Berwick"s to cross the stores to the west side of the bay. On the 13th a force of six thousand men followed his retreat down the Lafourche; but Green, with fourteen hundred dismounted men and a battery, attacked the Federals so vigorously as to drive them into Donaldsonville, capturing two hundred prisoners, many small-arms, and two guns.