Who shall decide? Which is sovereign, Mr. Lincoln and his proclamation or the Const.i.tution? The Const.i.tution says:
"This Const.i.tution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, shall be the supreme law of the land."
Was it thus obeyed by Mr. Lincoln as the supreme law of the land? It was not obeyed, but set aside, subverted, overturned by him. But he said in his oath:
"I do solemnly swear that I will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Const.i.tution of the United States."
Did he do it? Is such treatment of the Const.i.tution the manner to preserve, protect, and defend it? Of what value, then, are paper const.i.tutions and oaths binding officers to their preservation, if there is not intelligence enough in the people to discern the violations, and virtue enough to resist the violators?
Again the report says:
"We understood from him that no terms or proposals of any treaty or agreement looking to an ultimate settlement would be entertained or made by him with the authorities of the Confederate States, because that would be a recognition of their existence as a separate power, which under no circ.u.mstances would be done; and, for a like reason, that no such terms would be entertained by him for the States separately."
Now the Const.i.tution of the United States says, in Article X:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Const.i.tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
Within the purview of this article of the Const.i.tution the States are independent, distinct, and sovereign bodies--that is, in their reserved powers they are as sovereign, separate, and supreme as the Government of the United States in its delegated powers. One of these reserved powers is the right of the people to alter or abolish any form of government, and to inst.i.tute a new one such as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness; that power is neither "delegated to the United States by the Const.i.tution nor prohibited by it to the States." On the contrary, it is guaranteed to the States by the Const.i.tution itself in these words:
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Const.i.tution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
Mark the words, "are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." No one will venture to say that a sovereign State, by the mere act of accession to the Const.i.tution, delegated the power of secession. The a.s.sertion would be of no validity if it were made; for the question is one of fact as to the powers delegated or not delegated to the United States by the Const.i.tution. It is absurd to ask if the power of secession in a State is delegated to the United States by the Const.i.tution, or prohibited by it to the States. No trace of the delegation or prohibition of this power is to be found in the Const.i.tution. It is, therefore, as the Const.i.tution says, "reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
The Convention of the State of New York, which ratified the Const.i.tution of the United States on July 26, 1788, in its resolution of ratification said:
"We do declare and make known ... that the powers of Government may be rea.s.sumed by the people, whensoever it shall become necessary to their happiness; that every power, jurisdiction, and right, which is not by the said Const.i.tution clearly delegated to the Congress of the United States, or to the departments of the Government thereof, remains to the people of the several States, or to their respective State governments, to whom they may have granted the same... .
Under these impressions, and declaring that the rights aforesaid can not be abridged or violated," etc., etc., "we, the said delegates, in the name and in behalf of the people of the State of New York, do, by these presents, a.s.sent to and ratify the said Const.i.tution."
With this and other conditions stated in the resolution of ratification, it was accepted and approved by the other States, and New York became a member of the Union. The resolution of Rhode Island a.s.serts the same reservation in regard to the rea.s.sumption of powers.
It is unnecessary to examine here whether this reserved power exists in the States respectively or in the people; for, when the Confederate States seceded, it was done by the people, acting through, or in conjunction with, the State, and by that power which is expressly reserved to them in the Const.i.tution of the United States. When Mr. Lincoln, therefore, issued his proclamation calling for seventy-five thousand men to subjugate certain "combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings," he not only thereby denied the validity of the Const.i.tution, but sought to resist, by military force, the exercise of a power clearly reserved in the Const.i.tution, and reaffirmed in its tenth amendment, to the States respectively or to the people for their exercise. But, in order to justify his flagrant disregard of the Const.i.tution, he contrived the fiction of "combinations," and upon this basis commenced the b.l.o.o.d.y war of subjugation with all its consequences. Thus, any recognition of the Confederate States, or of either of them, in his negotiations, would have exposed the groundlessness of his fiction. But the Const.i.tution required him to recognize each of them, for they had simply exercised a power which it expressly reserved for their exercise. Thus it is seen who violated the Const.i.tution, and upon whom rests the responsibility of the war.
It has been stated above that the conditions offered to our soldiers whenever they proposed to capitulate, were only those of subjugation.
When General Buckner, on February 16, 1862, asked of General Grant to appoint commissioners to agree upon terms of capitulation, he replied:
"No terms, except unconditional and immediate surrender, can be accepted."
When General Lee asked the same question, on April 9, 1865, General Grant replied:
"The terms upon which peace can be had are well understood. By the South laying down their arms, they will hasten that most desirable event, save thousands of human lives and hundreds of millions of property not yet destroyed."
When General Sherman made an agreement with General Johnston for formal disbandment of the army of the latter, it was at once disapproved by the Government of the United States, and Sherman therefore wrote to Johnston:
"I demand the surrender of your army on the same terms as were given to General Lee at Appomattox, on April 9th, purely and simply."
It remains to be stated that the Government which spurned all these proposals for peace, and gave no terms but unconditional and immediate surrender, was inst.i.tuted and organized for the purposes and objects expressed in the following extract, and for no others:
"We, the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Const.i.tution for the United States of America."
[Footnote 117: General Hampton"s letter to General Sherman, February 27, 1865.]
[Footnote 118: "The Story of the Great March, from the Diary of a Staff Officer." By Brevet Major George Ward Nichols, Aide-de-Camp to General Sherman. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1865, pp. 112, _et seq_.]
CHAPTER LI.
General Sherman leaves Savannah.--His March impeded.--Difficulty In collecting Troops to oppose him.--The Line of the Salkehatchie.-- Route of the Enemy"s Advance.--Evacuation of Columbia.--Its Surrender by the Mayor.--Burning the City.--Sherman responsible.-- Evacuation of Charleston.--The Confederate Forces in North Carolina.--General Johnston"s Estimate.--General Johnston a.s.signed to the Command.--The Enemy"s Advance from Columbia to Fayetteville, North Carolina.--"Foraging Parties."--Sherman"s Threat and Hampton"s Reply.--Description of Federal "Treasure-Seekers" by Sherman"s Aide-de-Camp.--Failure of Johnston"s Projected Attack at Fayetteville.--Affair at Kinston.--Cavalry Exploits.--General Johnston withdraws to Smithfield.--Encounter at Averysboro.-- Battles of Bentonville.--Union of Sherman"s and Schofield"s Forces.--Johnston"s Retreat to Raleigh.
After the evacuation of Savannah by General Hardee, it soon became known that General Sherman was making preparations to march northward through the Carolinas with the supposed purpose of uniting his forces with those of General Grant before Richmond. General Hardee, having left detachments at proper points to defend the approaches to Charleston and Augusta, Georgia, withdrew the rest of his command to the first-named city. General Wheeler"s cavalry held all the roads northward, and, by felling trees and burning bridges, obstructed considerably the enemy"s advance, which in the early part of January was still further impeded by the heavy rains which had swollen the rivers and creeks far beyond their usual width and depth.
The seriously impaired condition of our railroad communications in Georgia and Alabama, the effect of the winter rains on the already poor and ill-constructed country roads, the difficulty in collecting and transporting supplies, to impeded the concentration of our available forces, that Generals Beauregard and Hardee--the former at Columbia, South Carolina, and the latter at Charleston--could only r.e.t.a.r.d, not prevent, the onward march of the enemy. At the outset of his movement the Salkehatchie River presented a very strong line of defense. Its swollen condition at that time, and the wide, deeply inundated swamps on both sides, rendered it almost impossible to force or outflank the position if adequately defended. It might have been better if we had then abandoned the attempt to hold cities of no strategic importance, and concentrated their garrisons at this point, where the chances of successful resistance were greater than at any subsequent period of the campaign. For, even if our expectation had been disappointed, and had the superior numerical force of the enemy compelled us to withdraw from this line, the choice of several good positions was open to us, any one of which, by moving upon converging lines, we could reach sooner than was possible to Sherman, whose pa.s.sage of the river must have been much enc.u.mbered and delayed by his trains. Of these defensive positions, Branchville and Orangeburg may be regarded as eligible: had Sherman headed his columns toward Charleston, our forces would have been in position to attack him in front and on the flank. Had his objective point been Augusta, he would have had our army in his rear; and had, as proved to be the case, Columbia been the place at which he aimed, our army would have been able to reach there sooner than he could.
[Ill.u.s.tration: Lieutenant-General William J. Hardee]
General Sherman left Savannah January 22, 1865, and reached Pocotaligo on the 24th. On February 3d he crossed the Salkehatchie with slight resistance at River"s and Beaufort bridges, and thence pushed forward to the South Carolina Railroad at Midway, Bamberg, and Graham"s. After thoroughly destroying the railroad between these places, which occupied three or four days, he advanced slowly along the line of the railroad, threatening Branchville, the junction of the railroads from Augusta to Columbia and Charleston. For a short time it was doubtful whether he proposed to attack Augusta, Georgia, where it was well known we had our princ.i.p.al powder-mill, many important factories and shops, and large stores of army supplies; but on the 11th it was found that he was moving north to Orangeburg, on the road from Branchville to Columbia, the latter city being the objective point of his march. Early on the morning of the 16th the head of his columns reached the Congaree opposite Columbia. The bridge over that stream had been burned by our retreating troops, but a pontoon bridge, built by the enemy under cover of strong detachments who had crossed higher up at Saluda Factory, enabled the main body to pa.s.s the river and enter the city on the morning of the 17th, the Confederate troops having previously evacuated it. On the same day the Mayor formally surrendered the city to Colonel Stone, commanding a brigade of the Fifteenth Corps, and claimed for its citizens the protection which the laws of civilized war always accord to non-combatants. In infamous disregard not only of the established rules of war, but of the common dictates of humanity, the defenseless city was burned to the ground, after the dwelling-houses had been robbed of everything of value, and their helpless inmates subjected to outrage and insult of a character too base to be described.
Hypocrisy is the tribute which vice pays to virtue; therefore General Sherman has endeavored to escape the reproaches for the burning of Columbia by attributing it to General Hampton"s order to burn the cotton in the city, that it might not fall into the hands of the enemy. General Hampton has proved circ.u.mstantially that General Sherman"s statement is untrue, and, though in any controversy to which General Hampton may be a party, no corroborative evidence is necessary to substantiate his a.s.sertion of a fact coming within his personal observation, hundreds of unimpeachable witnesses have testified that the burning of Columbia was the deliberate act of the Federal soldiery, and that it was certainly permitted, if not ordered, by the commanding General. The following letter of General Hampton will to those who know him be conclusive:
"WILD WOODS, MISSISSIPPI, _April 21, 1866._
"To Hon. REVERDY JOHNSON, _United States Senate._
"SIR: A few days ago I saw in the published proceedings of Congress that a pet.i.tion from Benjamin Kawles, of Columbia, South Carolina, asking for compensation for the destruction of his house by tho Federal army, in February, 1865, had been presented to the Senate, accompanied by a letter from Major-General Sherman. In this letter General Sherman uses the following language: "The citizens of Columbia set fire to thousands of bales of cotton rolled out into the streets, and which were burning before we entered Columbia; I, myself, was in the city as early as nine o"clock, and I saw these fires, and knew that efforts were made to extinguish them, but a high and strong wind prevented. I gave no orders for the burning of your city, but, on the contrary, the conflagration resulted from the great imprudence of cutting the cotton bales, whereby the contents were spread to the wind, so that it became an impossibility to arrest the fire. I saw in your Columbia newspaper the printed order of General Wade Hampton, that on the approach of the Yankee army all the cotton should thus be burned, and, from what I saw myself, I have no hesitation in saying that he was the cause of the destruction of your city."
"This charge, made against me by General Sherman, having been brought before the Senate of the United States, I am naturally most solicitous to vindicate myself before the same tribunal. But my State has no representative in that body. Those who should be her const.i.tutional representatives there are debarred the right of entrance into those halls. There are none who have the right to speak for the South; none to partic.i.p.ate in the legislation which governs her; none to impose the taxes she is called upon to pay, and none to vindicate her sons from misrepresentation, injustice, or slander.
Under these circ.u.mstances, I appeal to you, in the confident hope you will use every effort to see that justice is done in this matter.
"I deny, emphatically, that any cotton was fired in Columbia by my order. I deny that the citizens "set fire to thousands of bales rolled out into the streets." I deny that any cotton was on fire when the Federal troops entered the city. I most respectfully ask of Congress to appoint a committee, charged with the duty of ascertaining and reporting all the facts connected with the destruction of Columbia, and thus fixing upon the proper author of that enormous crime the infamy he richly deserves. I am willing to submit the case to any honest tribunal. Before any such I pledge myself to prove that I gave a positive order, by direction of General Beauregard, that no cotton should be fired; that not one bale was on fire when General Sherman"s troops took possession of the city; that he promised protection to the city, and that, in spite of his solemn promise, he burned the city to the ground, deliberately, systematically, and atrociously. I, therefore, most earnestly request that Congress may take prompt and efficient measures to investigate this matter fully. Not only is this due to themselves and to the reputation of the United States army, but also to justice and to truth. Trusting that you will pardon me for troubling you, I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
"WADE HAMPTON."
Were this the only instance of such barbarity perpetrated by General Sherman"s army, his effort to escape the responsibility might be more successful, because more plausible; but when the eulogists of his exploits note exultingly that "wide-spreading columns of smoke rose wherever the army went," when it is incontrovertibly true that the line of his march could be traced by the burning dwelling-houses and by the wail of women and children pitilessly left to die from starvation and exposure in the depth of winter, his plea of "not guilty" in the case of the city of Columbia can not free him from the reprobation which outraged humanity must attach to an act of cruelty which only finds a parallel in the barbarous excesses of Wallenstein"s army in the Thirty Years" War, and which, even at that period of the world"s civilization, sullied the fame of that otherwise great soldier.
In consequence of General Sherman"s movements, it was considered advisable to evacuate Charleston (February 17th), that General Hardee"s command might become available for service in the field; and thus that n.o.ble city and its fortresses, which the combined military and naval forces of the United States, during an eighteen months"
siege, had failed to reduce, and which will stand for ever as imperishable monuments of the skill and fort.i.tude of their defenders, were, on February 21st, without resistance, occupied by the Federal forces under General Q. A. Gillmore.
Fort Sumter, though it now presented the appearance of a ruin, was really better proof against bombardment than when first subjected to fire. The upper tier of masonry, from severe battering, had fallen on the outer wall, and shot and sh.e.l.l served only to solidify and add harder material to the ma.s.s. Over its rampart the Confederate flag defiantly floated until the city of Charleston was evacuated.
Every effort that our circ.u.mstances permitted was immediately and thenceforward made to collect troops for the defense of North Carolina. General Hood"s army, the troops under command of General D.
H. Hill at Augusta, General Hardee"s force, a few thousand men under General Bragg, and the cavalry commands of Generals Hampton and Wheeler, const.i.tuted our entire available strength to oppose Sherman"s advance. These were collected as rapidly as our broken communications and the difficulty of gathering and transporting supplies would permit.
After the fall of Columbia, General Beauregard, commanding the military department, retreated toward North Carolina. The Army of Tennessee (Hood"s) was moving from the west to make a junction with the troops retiring from South Carolina. The two forces, if united with Hardee"s command, then moving in the same direction, would, it was hoped, be able to make effective resistance to Sherman"s advance.
In any event it was needful that they should be kept in such relation to Lee"s army as to make a junction with it practicable. In this state of affairs I was informed that General Beauregard, after his troops had entered North Carolina, had decided to march to the eastern part of that State. This would leave the road to Charlotte open to Sherman"s pursuing column, which, interposing, would prevent the troops coming from the west from joining Beauregard, enable him to destroy our force in detail by the joint action of his own army and that of Schofield, commanding the district of Wilmington. The anxiety created by this condition of affairs caused me, after full correspondence with General Lee, to suggest to him to give his views to General Beauregard, and I sent to General Beauregard"s headquarters the chief-engineer, General J. F. Gilmer, he being possessed fully of my opinions and wishes. General Beauregard modified his proposed movements so as to keep his forces on the left of the enemy"s line of march until the troops coming from Hood"s army could make a junction. These were the veteran commands of Stevenson, Cheatham, and Stewart. Lieutenant-General S. D. Lee, though he had not entirely recovered from a wound received in the Tennessee campaign, was at Augusta, Georgia, collecting the fragments of Hood"s army to follow the troops previously mentioned. They had not moved together, and the first-named division had reached Beauregard"s army in South Carolina.