During the retreat, supplies were found at Pamphlin"s Depot, Farmville, Danville, Saulsbury, and Charlotte. Major B. P. Noland, chief commissary for Virginia, wrote to General St. John, April 16, 1874. After saying that he had read with care the report of General St. John, and expressing the opinion that it was entirely correct, of which no one in the Confederacy had better opportunities to judge, he writes:
"I think the plan adopted by your predecessor, Colonel Northrop (which was continued by you), for obtaining for the use of the army the products of the country, was as perfect and worked as effectively as any that could have been devised... . I left Richmond at one o"clock of the night Richmond was evacuated, with orders from you to make Lynchburg my headquarters, and be ready to forward supplies from that point to the army. I never heard of any order for the acc.u.mulation of supplies at Amelia Springs."
Lewis E. Harvie, a distinguished citizen of Virginia, and who at the close of the war was President of the Richmond and Danville and Piedmont Railroads, wrote to General St. John on January 1, 1876.
From his letter I make the following extracts, referring to the condition of affairs in 1865. He writes:
"The difficulties of obtaining supplies were very great, particularly when the roads under my charge were cut, and transportation suspended on them, which was the case on one or two occasions for several weeks. Engines and care, and machinery generally, on these roads were insufficient and inadequate from wear and tear to accomplish the amount of transportation required for the Government... . The Richmond and Danville and Piedmont Railroads were kept open, and about that time we added largely to its rolling-stock by procuring engines and cars from the different roads on the route of the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad west. Starvation had stared the Army of Northern Virginia in the face; and the commissary department organized an appeal to the people on the line of the Richmond and Danville Railroad for voluntary contributions of supplies, and a number of gentlemen of influence, character, and position, including the most eminent clergymen of the State, addressed them in several counties, urging them to furnish the supply wanted.
"No one who witnessed can ever forget the results. Contribution was universal, and supplies of food sufficient to meet the wants of the army at the time were at once sent to the depots on the road until they were packed and groaned under their weight; and I affirm that at the time of the evacuation of Richmond, the difficulty of delivering supplies sufficient for the support of the Army of Northern Virginia under General Lee was solved and surmounted, for I know that abundant supplies were in reach of transportation on the Richmond and Danville Railroad, being ma.s.sed in Danville, Charlotte, and at other points; and, from the increased motive power above referred to, they could have been delivered as fast as they were required... . At the time of the evacuation of the city, there were ample supplies in it, as well as on the railroad west of Amelia Court-House, to have been delivered at the latter place for the retreating army, if its numbers had been double what they were. No orders were ever given to any officers or employee of the Richmond and Danville Railroad to transport any supplies to Amelia Court-House for General Lee"s army, nor did I ever bear that any such orders were sent to the commissary department on the occasion of the evacuation of Richmond, until after the surrender of the army."
Mr. Harvie then recites his interview, held on Sat.u.r.day, the day before evacuation, with the Quartermaster-General, the Secretary of War, and myself, from whom he learned that he might go home for a fortnight, there being no expectation that Richmond would be evacuated in the mean time. He adds that the next day he was informed by telegraph of the proposed evacuation, and returned to Richmond, at which place he conferred with myself and the Secretary of War about the route to be taken by the wagon supply-train, and that he had a long conversation with me on the care, during our night-ride to Danville.
In regard to sending supplies to Amelia Court-House, he writes:
"I have never believed that any orders to place supplies of food at Amelia Court-House were received by the commissary department at the time of the evacuation of the city, because from Richmond, or from the upper portions of the railroad, if required, they could at once have been transported without any delay or difficulty. Neither the road nor the telegraph was cut or disturbed until the day after the evacuation of the city."
It may perhaps be thought that the amount of evidence adduced is greater than necessary to disprove the very improbable a.s.sertion that, instead of burden-cars, a pa.s.senger train had been loaded with provisions for Lee"s army at Amelia Court-House, and that these pa.s.senger-cars, without being permitted to unload the freight, had, in reckless disregard of the wants of our worn and hard-pressed defenders, been ordered to proceed immediately to Richmond, thus leaving them to starvation, and the necessity to surrender, in order to enable the executive department to escape; but, as I had no personal knowledge of the matter, it was necessary to quote those whose functions brought them into closer communication with the subject to which the calumny related.
In the night of the 2d, the same on which General Ewell evacuated the defenses of the capital and General Lee withdrew from Petersburg, I left Richmond and reached Danville on the next morning.
Neither the president of the railroad, who was traveling with me, nor I knew that there was anything which required attention at Amelia Court-House or other station on the route. Had General Lee"s letter to me, written on the afternoon of the 2d, been received at Richmond, which I think it was not, the fact that he proposed to march to Amelia Court-House would have been known; but it would have been unjust to the officers of the commissary department to doubt that any requisition made or to be made for supplies had received or would receive the most prompt and efficient attention. If, however, I had known that General Lee wanted supplies placed at Amelia Court-House, I would certainly have inquired as to the time of reaching that station, and have asked to have the train stopped so as to enable me to learn whether the supplies were in depot or not. The unfounded calumny, after perhaps having given it more consideration than it was worth, is now dismissed.
Though the occupation of Danville was not expected to be permanent, immediately after arriving there rooms were obtained, and the different departments resumed their routine labors. Nothing could have exceeded the kindness and hospitality of the patriotic citizens.
They cordially gave as an "Old Virginia welcome," and with one heart contributed in every practicable manner to cheer and aid us in the work in which we were engaged.
The town was surrounded by an intrenchment as faulty in location as construction. I promptly proceeded to correct the one and improve the other, while energetic efforts were being made to collect supplies of various kinds for General Lee"s army.
The design, as previously arranged with General Lee, was that, if he should be compelled to evacuate Petersburg, he would proceed to Danville, make a new defensive line of the Dan and Roanoke Rivers, unite his army with the troops in North Carolina, and make a combined attack upon Sherman; if successful, it was expected that reviving hope would bring reenforcements to the army, and Grant, being then far removed from his base of supplies, and in the midst of a hostile population, it was thought we might return, drive him from the soil of Virginia, and restore to the people a government deriving its authority from their consent. With these hopes and wishes, neither seeking to diminish the magnitude of our disaster nor to excite illusory expectations, I issued, on the 5th, the following proclamation, of which, viewed by the light of subsequent events, it may fairly be said it was over-sanguine:
"The General-in-Chief found it necessary to make such movements of his troops as to uncover the capital. It would be unwise to conceal the moral and material injury to our cause resulting from its occupation by the enemy. It is equally unwise and unworthy of us to allow our energies to falter and our efforts to become relaxed under reverses, however calamitous they may be. For many months the largest and finest army of the Confederacy, under a leader whose presence inspires equal confidence in the troops and the people, has been greatly trammeled by the necessity of keeping constant watch over the approaches to the capital, and has thus been forced to forego more than one opportunity for promising enterprise. It is for us, my countrymen, to show by our bearing under reverses, how wretched has been the self-deception of those who have believed us less able to endure misfortune with fort.i.tude than to encounter danger with courage.
"We have now entered upon a new phase of the struggle. Relieved from the necessity of guarding particular points, our army will be free to move from point to point, to strike the enemy in detail far from his base. Let us but will it, and we are free.
"Animated by that confidence in your spirit and fort.i.tude which never yet failed me, I announce to you, fellow-countrymen, that it is my purpose to maintain your cause with my whole heart and soul; that I will never consent to abandon to the enemy one foot of the soil of any of the States of the Confederacy; that Virginia--n.o.ble State, whose ancient renown has been eclipsed by her still more glorious recent history; whose bosom has been bared to receive the main shock of this war; whose sons and daughters have exhibited heroism so sublime as to render her ill.u.s.trious in all time to come--that Virginia, with the help of the people and by the blessing of Providence, shall be held and defended, and no peace ever be made with the infamous invaders of her territory.
"If, by the stress of numbers, we should be compelled to a temporary withdrawal from her limits or those of any other border State, we will return until the baffled and exhausted enemy shall abandon in despair his endless and impossible task of making slaves of a people resolved to be free.
"Let us, then, not despond, my countrymen, but, relying on G.o.d, meet the foe with fresh defiance and with unconquered and unconquerable hearts.
"JEFFERSON DAVIS."
While thus employed, little if any reliable information in regard to the Army of Northern Virginia was received, until a gallant youth, the son of General Henry A. Wise, came to Danville, and told me that, learning Lee"s army was to be surrendered, he had during the night mounted his fleet horse, and, escaping through and from the enemy"s cavalry, some of whom pursued him, had come quite alone to warn me of the approaching event. Other unofficial information soon followed, and of such circ.u.mstantial character as to prove that Lieutenant Wise"s antic.i.p.ation had been realized.
Our scouts now reported a cavalry force to be moving toward the south around the west side of Danville, and we removed thence to Greensboro, pa.s.sing a railroad-bridge, as was subsequently learned, a very short time before the enemy"s cavalry reached and burned it. I had telegraphed to General Johnston from Danville the report that Lee had surrendered, and, on arriving at Greensboro, conditionally requested him to meet me there, where General Beauregard at the time had his headquarters, my object being to confer with both of them in regard to our present condition and future operations.
[Footnote 123: "Memoirs of Service Afloat," Admiral Semmes, pp.
811-815.]
CHAPTER LIV
Invitation of General Johnston to a Conference.--Its Object.--Its Result.--Provisions on the Line of Retreat.--Notice of President Lincoln"s a.s.sa.s.sination.--Correspondence between Johnston and Sherman.--Terms of the Convention.--Approved by the Confederate Government.--Rejected by the United States Government.-- Instructions to General Johnston.--Disobeyed.--Statements of General Johnston.--His Surrender.--Movements of the President South.--His Plans.--Order of General E. E. Smith to his Soldiers.-- Surrender.--Numbers paroled.--The President overtakes his Family.-- His Capture.--Taken to Hampton Roads, and imprisoned in Fortress Monroe.
The invitation to General Johnston for a conference, noticed in a previous chapter, was as follows:
"GREENSBORO, NORTH CAROLINA, _April 11 1865--12 M._
"General J. E. JOHNSTON, _headquarters, via Raleigh:_
"The Secretary of War did not join me at Danville. Is expected here this afternoon.
"As your situation may render best, I will go to your headquarters immediately after the arrival of the Secretary of War, or you can come here; in the former case our conference must be without the presence of General Beauregard. I have no official report from General Lee. The Secretary of War may be able to add to information heretofore communicated.
"The important question first to be solved is, At what point shall concentration be made, in view of the present position of the two columns of the enemy, and the routes which they may adopt to engage your forces before a proposed junction with General Walker and others. Your more intimate knowledge of the data for the solution of the problem deters me from making a specific suggestion on that point.
"JEFFERSON DAVIS."
In compliance with this request, General J. E. Johnston came up from Raleigh to Greensboro, and with General Beauregard met me and most of my Cabinet at my quarters in a house occupied by Colonel J. Taylor Wood"s family. Though I was fully sensible of the gravity of our position, seriously affected as it was by the evacuation of the capital, the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, and the consequent discouragement which these events would produce, I did not think we should despair. We still had effective armies in the field, and a vast extent of rich and productive territory both east and west of the Mississippi, whose citizens had evinced no disposition to surrender. Ample supplies had been collected in the railroad depots, and much still remained to be placed at our disposal when needed by the army in North Carolina.
The failure of several attempts to open negotiations with the Federal Government, and notably the last by commissioners who met President Lincoln at Hampton Roads, convinced me of the hopelessness under existing circ.u.mstances to obtain better terms than were then offered, i. e., a surrender at discretion. My motive, therefore, in holding an interview with the senior generals of the army in North Carolina was not to learn their opinion as to what might be done by negotiation with the United States Government, but to derive from them information in regard to the army under their command, and what it was feasible and advisable to do as a military problem.
The members of my Cabinet were already advised as to the object of the meeting, and, when the subject was introduced to the generals in that form, General Johnston was very reserved, and seemed far less than sanguine. His first significant expression was that of a desire to open correspondence with General Sherman, to see if he would agree to a suspension of hostilities, the object being to permit the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the existing war. Confident that the United States Government would not accept a proposition for such negotiations, I distinctly expressed My conviction on that point, and presented as an objection to such an effort that, so far as it should excite delusive hopes and expectations, its failure would have a demoralizing effect both on the troops and the people. Neither of them had shown any disposition to surrender, or had any reason to suppose that their Government contemplated abandoning its trust--the maintenance of the Const.i.tution, freedom, and independence of the Confederate States.
From the inception of the war, the people had generally and at all times expressed their determination to accept no terms of peace that did not recognize their independence; and the indignation manifested when it became known that Mr. Lincoln had offered to our commissioners at Hampton Roads a surrender at discretion as the only alternative to a continuance of the war a.s.sured me that no true Confederate was prepared to accept peace on such terms. During the last years of the war the main part of the infantry in the Army of Northern Virginia was composed of men from the farther South. Many of these, before the evacuation of Petersburg and especially about the time of Lee"s surrender, had absented themselves to go homeward, and, it was reported, made avowal of their purpose to continue the struggle. I had reason to believe that the spirit of the army in North Carolina was unbroken, for, though surrounded by circ.u.mstances well calculated to depress and discourage them, I had learned that they earnestly protested to their officers against the surrender which rumor informed them was then in contemplation. If any shall deem it a weak credulity to confide in such reports, something may be allowed to an intense love for the Confederacy to a thorough conviction that its fall would involve ruin, both material and moral, and to a confidence in the righteousness of our cause, which, if equally felt by my compatriots, would make them do and dare to the last extremity.
But if, taking the gloomiest view, the circ.u.mstances were such as to leave no hope of maintaining the independence of the Confederate States--if negotiations for peace must be on the basis of reunion and the acceptance of the war legislation--it seemed to me that certainly better terms for our country could be secured by keeping organized armies in the field than by laying down our arms and trusting to the magnanimity of the victor.
For all these considerations I was not at all hopeful of any success in the attempt to provide for negotiations between the civil authorities of the United States and those of the Confederacy, believing that, even if Sherman should agree to such a proposition, his Government would not ratify it; but, after having distinctly announced my opinion, I yielded to the judgment of my const.i.tutional advisers, of whom only one held my views, and consented to permit General Johnston, as he desired, to hold a conference with General Sherman for the purpose above recited.
Then, turning to what I supposed would soon follow, I invited General Johnston to an expression of his choice of a line of retreat toward the southwest. He declared a preference for a different route from that suggested by me, and, yielding the point, I informed him that I would have depots of supplies for his army placed on the route he had selected. The commissary-general, St. John, executed the order, as shown in his report published in the "Southern Historical Society Papers," vol. viii, pp. 103-107.
Referring to the period which followed the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, General I. M. St. John, Commissary-General Confederate States Army, writes:
"The bureau headquarters were continued in North Carolina until the surrender of that military department. During the interval preparations were made for the westward movement of forces as then contemplated. In these arrangements the local depots were generally found so full and supplied so well in hand, from Charlotte southwest, that the commissary-general was able to report to the Secretary of War that the requisitions for which he was notified to prepare could all be met. The details of this service were executed, and very ably, by Major J. H. Claiborne, then, and until the end, a.s.sistant commissary-general."
Major Claiborne, in his report, writes:
"Being placed under orders as a.s.sistant commissary-general, I forwarded supplies from South Carolina to General J. E. Johnston"s army, and also collected supplies at six or seven named points in that State for the supposed retreat of General Johnston"s army through the State. This duty, with a full determination at the evacuation of this city [Richmond] to follow the fortunes of our cause, gave me opportunity of ascertaining the resources of the country for my department. The great want was that of transportation, and specially was it felt by all collecting commissaries for a few months before the surrender."
It will thus be seen that my expectations, referred to above, caused adequate provision to be made for the retreat of our army, if that result should become necessary by the failure of the attempt to open negotiations for an honorable peace. I had never contemplated a surrender, except upon such terms as a belligerent might claim, as long as we were able to keep the field, and never expected a Confederate army to surrender while it was able either to fight or to retreat. Lee had only surrendered his army when it was impossible for him to do either one or the other, and had proudly rejected Grant"s demand, in the face of overwhelming numbers, until he found himself surrounded and his line of retreat blocked by a force much larger than his own.
After it had been decided that General Johnston should attempt negotiation with General Sherman, he left for his army headquarters; and I, expecting that he would soon take up his line of retreat, which his superiority in cavalry would protect from hara.s.sing pursuit, proceeded with my Cabinet and staff toward Charlotte, North Carolina. While on the way, a dispatch was received from General Johnston announcing that General Sherman had agreed to a conference, and asking that the Secretary of War, General J. C. Breckinridge, should return to cooperate in it. The application was complied with, and the Postmaster-General, John H. Reagan, also went at my request.
He, however, was not admitted to the conference.
We arrived at Charlotte on April 18, 1865, and I there received, at the moment of dismounting, a telegram from General Breckinridge announcing, on information received from General Sherman, that President Lincoln had been a.s.sa.s.sinated. An influential citizen of the town, who had come to welcome me, was standing near me, and, after remarking to him in a low voice that I had received sad intelligence, I handed the telegram to him. Some troopers encamped in the vicinity had collected to see me; they called to the gentleman who had the dispatch in his hand to read it, no doubt supposing it to be army news. He complied with their request, and a few, only taking in the fact, but not appreciating the evil it portended, cheered, as was natural at news of the fall of one they considered their most powerful foe. The man, who invented the story of my having read the dispatch with exultation, had free scope for his imagination, as he was not present, and had no chance to know whereof he bore witness, even if there had been any foundation of truth for his fiction.