"The words "if practicable" had reference to letters of General Johnston of the 12th and 15th of July, which made it extremely doubtful if he had the power to make the movement, in view of the relative strength and position of Patterson"s forces as compared with his own.
"The plan of campaign reported to have been submitted, but [pg 370] not accepted, and to have led to a decision of the War Department, can not be found among its files, nor any reference to any decision made upon it; and it was not known that the army had advanced beyond the line of Bull Run, the position previously selected by General Lee, and which was supposed to have continued to be the defensive line occupied by the main body of our forces. Inquiry has developed the fact that a message, to be verbally delivered, was sent by Hon. Mr. Chesnut. If the conjectures recited in the report were entertained, they rested on the accomplishment of one great condition, namely, that a junction of the forces of Generals Johnston and Holmes should be made with the army of General Beauregard and should gain a victory. The junction was made, the victory was won; but the consequences that were predicted did not result. The reasons why no such consequences could result are given in the closing pa.s.sages of the reports of both the commanding generals, and the responsibility can not be transferred to the Government at Richmond, which certainly would have united in any feasible plan to accomplish such desirable results.
"If the plan of campaign mentioned in the report had been presented in a written communication, and in sufficient detail to permit proper investigation, it must have been p.r.o.nounced to be impossible at that time, and its proposal could only have been accounted for by the want of information of the forces and positions of the armies in the field. The facts that rendered it impossible are the following:
"1. It was based, as related from memory by Colonel Chesnut, on the supposition of drawing a force of about twenty-five thousand men from the command of General Johnston. The letters of General Johnston show his effective force to have been only eleven thousand, with an enemy thirty thousand strong in his front, ready to take possession of the Valley of Virginia on his withdrawal.
"2. It proposed to continue operations by effecting a junction of a part of the victorious forces with the army of General Garnett in Western Virginia. General Garnett"s forces amounted only to three or four thousand men, then known to be in rapid retreat before vastly superior forces under McClellan, and the news that he was himself killed and his army scattered arrived within forty-eight hours of Colonel Chesnut"s arrival in Richmond.
[pg 371]
"3. The plan was based on the improbable and inadmissible supposition that the enemy was to await everywhere, isolated and motionless, until our forces could effect junctions to attack them in detail.
"4. It could not be expected that any success obtainable on the battle-field would enable our forces to carry the fortifications on the Potomac, garrisoned, and within supporting distance of fresh troops; nor after the actual battle and victory did the generals on the field propose an advance on the capital, nor does it appear that they have since believed themselves in a condition to attempt such a movement.
"It is proper also to observe that there is no communication on file in the War Department, as recited at the close of the report, showing what were the causes which prevented the advance of our forces and prolonged, vigorous pursuit of the enemy to and beyond the Potomac.
(Signed) "Jefferson Davis."
It has not been my purpose to describe the battles of the war. To the reports of the officers serving on the field, in the armies of both Governments, the student of history must turn for knowledge of the details, and it will be the task of the future historian, from comparison of the whole, to deduce the truth.
It is fortunate for the cause of justice that error and misrepresentation have, in their inconsistencies and improbabilities, the elements of self-destruction, while truth is in its nature consistent and therefore self-sustaining. To such general remarks in regard to campaigns, sieges, and battles as may seem to me appropriate to the scope and object of my work, I shall append or insert, from time to time, the evidence of reliable actors in those affairs, as well to elucidate obscurity as to correct error.
From the official reports it appears that the strength of the two armies was: Confederate, 30,167 men of all arms, with 29 guns;180 Federal, 35,732 men,181 with a body of cavalry, of which only one company is reported, and a large artillery force not [pg 372] shown in the tabular statement. Of these troops, some on both sides were not engaged in the battle. This, it is believed, was the case to a much larger extent on our side than on that of the enemy. He selected the point of attack, and could concentrate his troops for that purpose, but we were guarding a line of some seven miles front, and therefore widely dispersed.
For the purpose above stated, extracts are herein inserted from a narrative in the "Operations on the Line of Bull Run in June and July, 1861, including the First Battle of Mana.s.sas." The name of the author, J. A. Early, will, to all who know him, be a sufficient guarantee for the accuracy of the statements, and for the justice of the conclusions announced. To those who do not know him, it may be proper to state that he was educated as a soldier; after leaving the army became a lawyer, but, when his country was involved in war with Mexico, he volunteered and served in a regiment of his native State, Virginia. After that war terminated, he returned to the practice of his profession, which he was actively pursuing when the controversy between the sections caused the call of a convention to decide whether Virginia should secede from the Union. He was sent, by the people of the county in which he resided, to represent them in that convention. There he opposed to the last the adoption of the ordinance for secession; but, when it was decided, against his opinion, to resort to the remedy of withdrawal from the Union, he, true to his allegiance to the State of which he was a citizen, paused not to cavil or protest, but at once stepped forth to defend her against a threatened invasion. The sword that had rusted in peace gleamed brightly in war. He rose to the high grade of lieutenant-general. None have a more stainless record as a soldier, none have shown a higher patriotism or purer fidelity through all the bitter trials to which we have been subjected since open war was ended and nominal peace began.
Extracts from the narrative of General J. A. Early, of events occurring when he was colonel of the Twenty-fourth Regiment of Virginia Infantry and commanding a brigade:
"On June 19, 1861, I arrived at Mana.s.sas Junction and reported to General P. G. T. Beauregard, the Twenty-fourth Virginia [pg 373] Regiment having been previously sent to him, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Hairsten, from Lynchburg, where I had been stationed under the orders of General Robert E. Lee, for the purpose of organizing the Virginia troops which were being mustered into service at that place....
"On the morning of July 18th, my brigade was moved, by order of General Beauregard, to the left of Camp Walker, on the railroad, and remained there some time....
"On falling back, General Ewell, in pursuance of his instructions, had burned the bridges on the railroad over Pope"s Run, from Fairfax Station to Union Mills, and while I was at Camp Walker I saw the smoke ascending from the railroad-bridge over Bull Run, which was burned that morning.
"The burning of this bridge had not been included in the previous instructions to Ewell, and I have always been at a loss to know why it was now fired. That bridge certainly was not necessary to the enemy for crossing Bull Run, either with his troops or wagons, as that stream was easily fordable at numerous places, both above and below. The bridge was, moreover, susceptible of easy defense, as there were deep cuts leading to it on both sides. The only possible purpose to be subserved by the burning of that bridge would have been the prevention for a short time of the running of trains over it by the enemy, in the event of our defeat, or evacuation of Mana.s.sas without a fight. As it was, we were afterward greatly inconvenienced by its destruction." ...
The attack made on the 18th is described as directed against our right center, and as having been met and repulsed in a manner quite creditable to our raw troops, of whom he writes:
"On the 19th they were occupied in the effort to strengthen their position by throwing up the best defenses they could with the implements at hand, which consisted of a very few picks and spades, some rough bowie-knives, and the bayonets of the muskets.... The position was a very weak one, as the banks on the opposite side of Bull Run overlooked and commanded those on the south side, which were but a few feet above the water"s edge, and there was an open field in rear of the strip of woods on our side of the stream, for a considerable distance up and down it, which exposed all of our movements on that side to observation [pg 374] from the opposite one, as the strip of woods afforded but a thin veil which could be seen through....
"About dusk on the 19th, brigade commanders were summoned to a conference at McLean"s house by General Beauregard, and he then informed us of the fact that General Johnston had been ordered, at his instance, from the Valley, and was marching to cooperate with us. He stated that Johnston would march directly across the Blue Ridge toward the enemy"s right flank, and would probably attack on that flank at dawn the next morning. Before he had finished his statement of the plans he proposed pursuing in the event of Johnston"s attack on the enemy"s right flank, a party of hors.e.m.e.n rode up in front of the house, and, dismounting, one of them walked in and reported himself as Brigadier-General T. J. Jackson, who had arrived with the advanced brigade of Johnston"s troops by the way of Mana.s.sas Gap Railroad, and he stated that his brigade was about twenty-five hundred strong. This information took General Beauregard very much by surprise, and, after ascertaining that General Jackson had taken the cars at Piedmont Station, General Beauregard asked him if General Johnston would not march the rest of his command on the direct road, so as to get on the enemy"s right flank. General Jackson replied with some little hesitation, and, as I thought at the time, in rather a stolid manner, that he thought not; that he thought the purpose was to transport the whole force by railroad from Piedmont Station. This was the first time I ever saw General Jackson, and my first impressions of him were not very favorable from the manner in which he gave his information. I subsequently ascertained very well how it was that he seemed to know so little, in the presence of the strangers among whom he found himself, of General Johnston"s intended movements, and I presume nothing but the fact of General Beauregard being his superior in rank, and his being ordered to report to him, could have elicited as much information from him, under the circ.u.mstances, as was obtained. After General Jackson had given the information above stated, and received instructions where to put his brigade, he retired, and General Beauregard proceeded to develop fully his plans for the next day. The information received from General Jackson was wholly unexpected, but General Beauregard said he thought Jackson was not correctly informed, and was mistaken; that he was satisfied General Johnston was marching with the rest of his troops and [pg 375] would attack the enemy"s right flank early next day as he had before stated. Upon this hypothesis, he directed that when General Johnston"s attack began and he had become fully engaged, of which we were to judge from the character of the musketry-fire, we should cross Bull Run from our several positions, and move upon the enemy so as to attack him on his left flank and rear. He said that he had no doubt General Johnston"s attack would be a complete surprise to the enemy; that the latter would not know what to think of it; that when he turned to meet that attack, and soon found himself a.s.sailed on the other side, he would be still more surprised and would not know what to do; that the effect would become a complete rout-a perfect Waterloo; and that, when the enemy took to flight, we would pursue, cross the Potomac, and arouse Maryland....
"During the 20th General Johnston arrived at Mana.s.sas Junction by the railroad, and that day we received the order from him a.s.suming command of the combined armies of General Beauregard and himself.
"Early on the morning of the 21st (Sunday), we heard the enemy"s guns open from the heights north of Bull Run, from which they had opened on the 18th, and I soon received orders for the movement of my brigade....
"Upon arriving there (McLean"s Ford), I found General Jones had returned to the intrenchments with his brigade, and I was informed by him that General Beauregard had directed that I should join him (General Beauregard) with my brigade.... He then asked me if I had received an order from General Beauregard to go to him, and, on my replying in the negative, he informed me that he had such an order for me in a note to him. He sent to one of his staff-officers for the note, and showed it to me. The note was one directing him to fall back behind Bull Run, and was in pencil. At the foot of it were these words: "Send Early to me." This was all the order that I received to move to the left, and it was shown to me a very little after twelve o"clock.... Chisholm, who carried the note to Jones, in which was contained the order I received, pa.s.sed me at McLean"s Ford going on to Jones about, or a little after, eleven o"clock. If I had not received the order until 2 P. M., it would have been impossible for me to get on the field at the time I reached it, about 3.30 P. M. Colonel Chisholm informed me that the order was for all the troops to [pg 376] fall back across Bull Run.... I was met by Colonel John S. Preston, one of the General"s aides, who informed me that General Beauregard had gone where the fighting was ... but that General Johnston was just in front, and his directions were that we should proceed to the left, where there was a heavy fire of musketry.... When we reached General Johnston, he expressed great gratification at our arrival, but it was very perceptible that his antic.i.p.ations were not sanguine. He gave me special instructions as to my movements, directing me to clear our lines completely before going to the front.... In some fields on the left of our line we found Colonel Stuart with a body of cavalry and some pieces of artillery, belonging, as I understood, to a battery commanded by Lieutenant Beckham.... I found Stuart already in position beyond our extreme left, and, as I understood it, supporting and controlling Beckham"s guns, which were firing on the enemy"s extreme right flank, thus rendering very efficient service. I feel well a.s.sured that Stuart had but two companies of cavalry with him, as these were all I saw when he afterward went in pursuit of the enemy. As I approached the left, a young man named Saunders came galloping to me from Stuart with the information that the enemy was about retreating, and a request to hurry on. This was the first word of encouragement we had received since we reached the vicinity of the battle. I told the messenger to inform Stuart that I was then moving as rapidly as my men could move; but he soon returned with another message informing me that the other was a mistake, that the enemy had merely retired behind the ridge in front to form a new flanking column, and cautioning me to be on my guard. This last information proved to be correct. It was the last effort of the enemy to extend his right beyond our left, and was met by the formation of my regiments in his front.... The hill on which the enemy"s troops were was Chinn"s Hill, so often referred to in the accounts of this battle, and the one next year, on the same field.... An officer came to me in a gallop, and entreated me not to fire on the troops in front, and I was so much impressed by his earnest manner and confident tone, that I halted my brigade on the side of the hill, and rode to the top of it, when I discovered, about a hundred and fifty yards to my right, a regiment bearing a flag which was drooping around the staff in such a manner as not to be distinguishable from the Confederate flag of that day. I thought that, [pg 377] if the one that had been in front of me was a Virginia regiment, this must also be a Confederate one; but one or two shots from Beckham"s guns on the left caused the regiment to face about, when its flag unfurled, and I discovered it to be the United States flag. I forthwith ordered my brigade forward, but it did not reach the top of the hill soon enough to do any damage to the retiring regiment, which retreated precipitately down the hill and across the Warrenton Pike. At that time there was very little distinction between the dress of some of the Federal regiments and some of ours. As soon as the misrepresentation in regard to the character of the troops was corrected, my brigade advanced to the top of the hill that had been occupied by the enemy, and we ascertained that his troops had retired precipitately, and a large body of them was discovered in the fields in rear of Dogan"s house, and north of the turnpike. Colonel c.o.c.ke, with one of his regiments, now joined us, and our pieces of artillery were advanced and fired upon the enemy"s columns with considerable effect, causing them to disperse, and we soon discovered that they were in full retreat.... When my column was seen by General Beauregard, he at first thought it was a column of the enemy, having received erroneous information that such a column was on the Mana.s.sas Gap Railroad. The enemy took my troops, as they approached his right, for a large body of our troops from the Valley; and as my men, moving by flank, were stretched out at considerable length, from weariness, they were greatly over-estimated. We scared the enemy worse than we hurt him....
"We saw the evidences of the flight all along our march, and unmistakable indications of the overwhelming character of the enemy"s defeat in abandoned muskets and equipments. It was impossible for me to pursue the enemy farther, as well because I was utterly unacquainted with the crossings of the Run and the woods in front, as because most of the men belonging to my brigade had been marching the greater part of the day and were very much exhausted. But pursuit with infantry would have been unavailing, as the enemy"s troops retreated with such rapidity that they could not have been overtaken by any other than mounted troops. On the next day we found a great many articles that the routed troops had abandoned in their flight, showing that no expense or trouble had been spared by the enemy in equipping his army.... In my movement after the retreat of the enemy commenced, [pg 378] I pa.s.sed the Carter house and beyond our line of battle. The enemy had by this time entirely disappeared, and, having no knowledge of the country whatever, being on the ground for the first time, besides not observing any movement of troops from our line, I halted, with the expectation of receiving further orders. Observing some men near the Carter house, I rode to it, and found some five or six Federal soldiers, who had collected some wounded there of both sides, and among them Colonel Gardner, of the Eighth Georgia Regiment, who was suffering from a very painful wound in the leg, which was fractured just above the ankle.... Just after my return from the house where I saw Colonel Gardner, President Davis, in company with several gentlemen, rode to where my command was, and addressed a few stirring remarks to my regiments, in succession, which received him with great enthusiasm.
"I briefly informed Mr. Davis of the orders I had received, and the movements of my brigade, and asked him what I should do under the circ.u.mstances. He told me that I had better get my men into line, and wait for further orders. I then requested him to inform Generals Johnston and Beauregard of my position, and my desire to receive orders. I also informed him of the condition in which I had found Colonel Gardner, and also of Colonel Jones being in the neighborhood badly wounded, requesting him to have a surgeon sent to their relief, as all of mine were in the rear attending to the wounded of their regiments. While we were talking, we saw a body of troops moving on the opposite side of Bull Run, some distance below us.
"Mr. Davis then left me, going to the house where Colonel Gardner was, and I moved my brigade some half a mile farther, and formed it in line across the peninsula formed by a very considerable bend in Bull Run above the stone bridge. I put out a line of pickets in front, and my brigade bivouacked in this position for the night. By the time all these dispositions were made it was night, and I then rode back with Captain Gardner over the route I had moved on, as I knew no other, in order to find General Johnston or General Beauregard, so that I might receive orders, supposing that there would be a forward movement early in the morning. I first went to the Lewis house, which I found to be a hospital filled with wounded men; but was unable to get any information about either of the generals. I then rode toward Mana.s.sas, and, after going some distance in that direction, I met an [pg 379] officer who inquired for General Johnston, stating that he was on his staff. I informed him that I was looking for General Johnston also, as well as for General Beauregard, and supposed they were at Mana.s.sas; but he said that he was just from Mana.s.sas, and neither of the generals was there.... At about twelve o"clock at night I lay down in the field in rear of my command, on a couple of bundles of wheat in the straw. My men had no rations with them. I had picked up a haversack on the field, which was filled with hard biscuits, and had been dropped by some Yankee in his flight, and out of its contents I made my own supper, distributing the rest among a number of officers who had nothing.
"Very early next morning, I sent Captain Gardner to look out for the generals, and get orders for my command. He went to Mana.s.sas, and found General Beauregard, who sent orders to me to remain where I was until further orders, and to send for the camp-equipage, rations, etc., of my command. A number of the men spread over the country in the vicinity of the battlefield, and picked up a great many knapsacks, India-rubber cloths, blankets, overcoats, etc., as well as a good deal of sugar, coffee, and other provisions that had been abandoned by the enemy....
"After I had received orders showing that there was no purpose to make a forward movement, I rode over a good deal of the field, north of the Warrenton pike, and to some hospitals in the vicinity, in order to see what care was being taken of the wounded. I found a hospital on the Sudley road, back of the field of battle, at which Colonel Jones, of the Fourth Alabama, had been, which was in charge of a surgeon of a Rhode Island regiment, whose name was Harris, I think. I asked him if he had what he wanted for the men under his care, and he told me he would like to have some morphine, of which his supply was short. I directed a young surgeon of our cavalry, who rode up at the time, to furnish the morphine, which he did, from a pair of medical saddle-pockets which he had. Dr. Harris told me that he knew that their troops had had a great deal of coffee and sugar mixed, ready for boiling, of which a good deal had been left at different points near the field, and asked if there would be any objection to his sending out and gathering some of it for the use of the wounded under his charge, as it would be of much service to them. I gave him the permission to get not only that, but anything else that would tend to the comfort of his patients. There [pg 380] did not come within my observation any instance of harsh or unkind treatment of the enemy"s wounded; nor did I see any indication of a spirit to extend such treatment to them. The stories which were afterward told before the Committee on the Conduct of the War (appointed by the Federal Congress), in regard to "rebel atrocities," were very grossly exaggerated, or manufactured from the whole cloth....
"On the night following the battle, when I was looking for Generals Beauregard and Johnston, in riding over and to the rear of the battle-field, I discovered that the greater part of the troops that had been engaged in the battle were in a great state of confusion. I saw companies looking for their regiments, and squads looking for their companies, and they were scattered as far as I went toward Mana.s.sas. It was very apparent that no considerable body of those troops that had been engaged on the left could have been brought into a condition next day for an advance toward Washington....
"The dispute as to who planned the battle, or commanded on the field, General Johnston or General Beauregard, is a most unprofitable one. The battle which General Beauregard planned was never fought, because the enemy did not move as he expected him to move. The battle which was fought was planned by McDowell, at least so far as the ground on which it was fought was concerned. He made a movement on our left which was wholly unexpected and unprovided for, and we were compelled to fight a defensive battle on that flank, by bringing up reenforcements from other points as rapidly as possible. When Generals Johnston and Beauregard arrived on the field where the battle was actually fought, it had been progressing for some time, with the odds greatly against us. What was required then was to rally the troops already engaged, which had been considerably shattered, and hold the position to which they had been compelled to retire until reenforcements could be brought up. According to the statements of both generals, the command of the troops then on the field was given to General Beauregard, and he continued to exercise it until the close, but in subordination, of course, to General Johnston, as commander-in-chief, while the movements of all the reenforcements as they arrived were unquestionably directed by the latter. According to the statement of both, the movement of Elzey"s brigade to the left averted a great danger, and both concur in [pg 381] attributing the turning of the tide of battle to the movement of my brigade against the enemy"s extreme right flank (General Beauregard in a letter on the origin of the battle-flag, and General Johnston in his "Narrative" recently published).
"General Beauregard unquestionably performed the duty a.s.signed him with great ability, and General Johnston gives him full credit therefor. Where, then, is there any room for a controversy in regard to the actual command, and what profit can there be in it?
"General Johnston a.s.sumes the responsibility for the failure to advance on Washington, and why, then, should an effort be made to shift it on any one else? He certainly was commander-in-chief, and had the privilege of advancing if he thought proper. The attempt to show that the failure to advance was due to the want of transportation and rations for the army is idle. If the Bull Run bridge had not been burned on the 18th, our supplies could have been run to Alexandria, if we could have advanced, as easily as to Mana.s.sas, for the enemy had repaired the railroad to Fairfax Station as he moved up, and failed to destroy it when he went back. Moreover, we had abundant transportation at that time for all the purposes of an advance as far as Washington. In my brigade, the two Virginia regiments had about fourteen six-horse wagons each, and that would have furnished enough for the brigade, if the Seventh Louisiana had none. In 1862 we carried into Maryland only enough wagons to convey ammunition, medical supplies, and cooking-utensils, and we started from the battle-field of second Mana.s.sas with no rations on hand, being, before we crossed the Potomac, entirely dependent on the country, which, in July, 1861, was teeming with supplies, but in August and September, 1862, was nearly depleted. The pretense, therefore, that the advance in July, 1861, was prevented by the want of transportation and of supplies is wholly untenable."
I will now make the promised extracts from reminiscences of Colonel (then Captain) Lay, which were sent to a friend, and handed to me for my use. The paper bears date February 13, 1878. After some preliminary matter, and stating that his force consisted of three cavalry companies, the narrative proceeds:
"I was under orders to be in the saddle at 6.30 A. M., July 21, 1861, and to report immediately to General Beauregard at his headquarters. About 7.30 A. M. I accompanied him and General Johnston [pg 382] to a position near to Mitch.e.l.l"s Ford, where for some hours we remained under an active fire of the long-range guns of the enemy upon the opposite hills. When the unexpected flank movement of the enemy was developed, with the generals named, we rode at rapid speed to the left, when General Beauregard immediately rode to the front, General Johnston taking position near and to the left of the Lewis house.... About 3.15 P. M., Captain R. Lindsey Walker, with his battery, took position to the left and in front of the Lewis house and commenced firing. I was near him when the shot from his battery was fired, and watched its effect as it swept through the columns of the enemy, producing perfect confusion and demoralization.... I rode to join my brother, Colonel Lay, whom I saw going toward my command from General Johnston. He reported to me that General Johnston said: "Now is your time; push the pursuit." I started at once on a trot, was pa.s.sing General Johnston, who gave some orders, and I understood him to say, "Salute the President in pa.s.sing." ... I saluted, and pa.s.sed on at a gallop.
"I halted at Bull Run to water my horses-then suffering-and to confer a moment or two with my gallant old commander, General Philip St. George c.o.c.ke.
"I pa.s.sed on, ... when to my astonishment I saw the President near me in the orchard. I immediately rode up to him, and said that he was much farther forward than he should be; that the forces of the enemy were not entirely broken, and very few of our troops in front of the Run, and advised him to retire; that I was then about to charge....
"We made the charge; a small body of the enemy broke before we reached them, and scattered, and the larger body of troops beyond proved to be of our own troops rapidly advancing upon our left.... After parting from the President, I pushed on to Sudley Church, and far beyond. Sent my surgeon, Dr. Randolph Barksdale, to Captains Tillinghast, Ricketts, and other badly wounded United States officers, and was going on until a superior force should stop me, but was recalled by an order and returned over the field to my quarters at Mana.s.sas a little before daylight-I and my little gallant squadron-having been actively in the saddle, I think, more than twenty hours....
(Signed) "John F. Lay,
"Late Colonel of Cavalry, C. S. A.
[pg 383]
"N.B.: It may be well to add that General R. Lindsey Walker (then Captain Walker, of the battery referred to) is now in my office, and confirms my recollection.... J. F. L."
The quartermaster-general of General Beauregard"s command, W. L. Cabell, states in a letter written at Dallas, Texas, on the 16th of August, 1880, in regard to the field transportation of General Beauregard"s forces before the battle of Mana.s.sas, that as nearly as he could remember it was as follows, viz.:
One four-horse wagon to each company.
One for field and staff (regimental).
One for ammunition.
One for hospital purposes.
Two wagons for each battery of artillery.
Twenty-five wagons in a train for depot purposes.
One ambulance for each regiment.
Transportation belonging to General Johnston"s army did not arrive until the day (or probably two days) after the battle.
If General Johnston, as stated, had nine thousand infantry, the field transportation reported above could surely have been distributed so as to supply this additional force, and have rendered, as General Early states, the pretense wholly untenable that the advance in July, 1861, was prevented by want of transportation.
The deep anxiety which had existed, and was justified by the circ.u.mstances, had corresponding gratification among all cla.s.ses and in all sections of our country. On the day after the victory, the Congress, then sitting in Richmond, upon receiving the dispatch of the President from the field of Mana.s.sas, adopted resolutions expressive of their thanks to the most high G.o.d, and inviting the people of the Confederate States to offer up their united thanksgiving and praise for the mighty deliverance. The resolutions also deplored the necessity which had caused the soil of our country to be stained with the blood of its sons, and to their families and friends offered the most cordial sympathy; a.s.suring them that in the hearts of our people would be enshrined "the names of the gallant dead as the champions of free and const.i.tutional liberty."